In my sketch here I am imagining that we (Kant and us) would not be able to assess the effectiveness of the physics on the basis that we have no frame of reference for it. This is just one of those preposterous hypotheticals which is of limited application. — Tom Storm

Interesting. What do you have in mind - evolution or deliberate transformation? — Tom Storm

it seems to me that the idea of a same world for everyone is precisely the sort of thinking that the above philosophical perspectives put into question as relying on the assumption of a private sense. — Joshs

According to Apel, in light of these innovative traditions, the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant must be fundamentally reconceived. In particular, the conditions for intersubjectively valid knowledge cannot be explicated in terms of the structure of consciousness or the cognitive capacities of the individual knowing subject but only through a systematic investigation of language as the medium of symbolically mediated knowledge. The pragmatic turn, initiated by Peirce and Charles W. Morris (1901–1979) and continued in the early twenty-first century in speech act theory, further implies that an adequate explanation of how meaningful communication is possible cannot be achieved by a semantic theory alone. Rather, it must be supplemented by a pragmatic study of the relation between linguistic signs and the conditions of their use by speakers. Apel's strong thesis is that his transcendental semiotics yields a set of normative conditions and validity claims presupposed in any critical discussion or rational argumentation. Central among these is the presupposition that a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification (1980).

Quite a few folk say that. What is it you are agreeing with? — Banno

Validated construing is neither a matter of forcing events into pre-determined cognitive slots, nor a matter of shaping our models of the world in conformity with the presumed independent facts of that world via the method of falsification. Rather, it is a matter of making and remaking a world; building, inhabiting, and being changed by our interactive relations with our constructed environment. — Joshs

does this not suggest that the laws of physics are a reflection of how we process reality, not reality as it is in itself (the ineffable noumena). And does it follow from this that hypothetical sophisticated aliens who do not utilize human cognition might have developed an entirely different and efficacious alternative to our physics? — Tom Storm

This is captured nicely in Kant's idea of the synthetic a priori; it is synthetic in that it is synthesized from experience and yet is transcendentally prior in that, once synthesized, it needs no longer to be checked against the world. — Janus

We don't actually experience a world; it is a synthetic inference from the impressions, sounds, feels and images that we experience. — Janus

It might be objected that the most primordial thing for the individual is being somato-sensorially affected, but prior to developing the sense of self that co-arises with the sense of the other and of world, there really is no individuality. — Janus

think animals also synthesize their Umwelts in the same kind of way, and in that sense, they have their own circumscribed worlds, so I don't see it as being wholly dependent on language, except in the reflexive phase. Without that ability to synthesize an Umwelt, language would not be possible in the first [place. — Janus

I don't see how to make this right. Things are generally not dependent on one's nervous system for their existence. — Banno

Going back to enthalpy, why create more work for people because you have happy moments? That is the biggest con of an argument. We have the power to not throw people into the enthalpic process. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps it's even more perverse than that. Having just enough happy experiences makes it seem justifiable to do for another. Happy workers, happily working, in their happy projects. — schopenhauer1

It doesn't have to be human. — Sumyung Gui

I would say that procreation can certainly have value, just as life-extension and exploring the esoteric aspects of life do. — Existential Hope

wouldn't say it is a hypothetical construction; it is rather a logical entailment; — Janus

A neat summation of a basic flaw that is rampant hereabouts. Do you see it in Joshs story? — Banno

What is it about this "nod" to being that people seem to be programmed for? — schopenhauer1

Well, that at least might be a different approach. How would it work? — Banno

Yes, I think I see this and agree. As I said earlier, most of us probably recognize we are tied to a world of ideas and platforms built by our ancestors. But we take this as a given and move on. We don't have the disposition for exploration, nor the foundational knowledge to be of any use in unpicking those ideas and imagining alternatives. Except perhaps is a strictly transactional way through incremental improvements in politics and how we conduct our businesses. Or something like that. — Tom Storm

Are the two vases the same, or different? What's "the" vase? — Banno

Parents missionize de facto. — schopenhauer1

Rather, cultural beliefs calibrate the individual to the "hive mind" so-to-say, that speaking against the core beliefs creates anger and anxiety, so we stick within its bounds. It's group-think. You can't complain too much in society, or you will be hated and spit upon. You are worse than a criminal because you reject all of it, and not just this part or that part of it. — schopenhauer1

Sartre was against bad faith thinking, the idea that we are destined to play a role. — schopenhauer1

As far as human-survival, we develop strong cultural beliefs that are enculturated, but surely that can be de-programmed by other ideas. The individual does have some agency. We are working against common tropes, but these tropes are simply learned and not intractable. — schopenhauer1

. In other words, his idea of an Eternal Return is used to say that we are doomed to simply always exist, so attempts at something like not bringing people into existence would be futile because of the eternally repeating nature of the system, or something of this nature. — schopenhauer1

But we are primates who can deliberate, so are we really the same in that respect to other primates? Are we not more like Zapffe's mechanisms of ignoring, anchoring, denying, etc or Sartre's idea of bad faith? In other words, are we not also an existential animal? — schopenhauer1

I heard about the Musk thing. Really weird anti-democratic stance. — schopenhauer1

Also, on point 1 there, others will argue that creating people that can experience happiness/good things is somehow "moral" despite creating the suffering/negatives/burdens/enthalpy-fighting-entropy that goes with it. — schopenhauer1

Hey plaque you're back! Good to see you. — schopenhauer1

Yes, that is it basically. — schopenhauer1

I suspect these rarified debates about the nature of reality and how language functions are primarily for the benefit of the cognoscenti, a bit like Star Trek lore or stamp collecting. — Tom Storm

supposedly the differences between the drawings show that there never was only one vase, but instead a multitude of vase-phenomena. — Banno

Derrida is saying, at a minimum, that"tone, language, posture, gesture," are philosophically important -- else he wouldn't have written what he wrote, since Heidegger already wrote it. — Moliere

In this sense, even if nothing is hidden, not everyone may be able to see or understand what is in plain sight due to their inability to adopt the correct perspective or framework for understanding. — GPT4

Immanence, meaning residing or becoming within, generally offers a relative opposition to transcendence, that which extends beyond or outside. Deleuze "refuses to see deviations, redundancies, destructions, cruelties or contingency as accidents that befall or lie outside life; life and death [are] aspects of desire or the plane of immanence."[1] This plane is a pure immanence which is an unqualified immersion or embeddedness, an immanence which denies transcendence as a real distinction, Cartesian or otherwise. Pure immanence is thus often referred to as a pure plane, an infinite field or smooth space without substantial or constitutive division. In his final essay entitled Immanence: A Life, Deleuze wrote: "It is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence."
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Pure immanence therefore will have consequences not only for the validity of a philosophical reliance on transcendence, but simultaneously for dualism and idealism. Mind may no longer be conceived as a self-contained field, substantially differentiated from body (dualism), nor as the primary condition of unilateral subjective mediation of external objects or events (idealism).
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The plane of immanence thus is often called a plane of consistency accordingly. As a geometric plane, it is in no way bound to a mental design but rather an abstract or virtual design; which for Deleuze, is the metaphysical or ontological itself: a formless, univocal, self-organizing process which always qualitatively differentiates from itself.

"Where are hallucinations?" is a wrong question. One might want to say that they originate in the brain, but they are not experienced in the brain but in the world. Yet they are not in the world either, they are nowhere - they are hallucinations. — unenlightened

But, except for the bit about scientism, couldn’t this describe any philosopher who wants to overturn the thought of their predecessors? — Jamal