• plaque flag
    2.7k

    I'll try for you and anyone else to find other words.

    They key thing is that we are reasonable-inferential-discursive beings in a world together, the world. We give and ask for reasons, both for what we claim and what we do.

    I'm putting that at the very center of reality, as the assumption which cannot be denied without performative contradiction. A discursive self cannot make sense apart from a world and a language shared with others.

    Being-with-others-in-a-world-in-language is a single phenomenon. Language cannot be peeled off of some independent Real.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    when intelligence and mindedness are at issue, what leads us to be puzzled by the phenomena is our tendency to subsume them under theoretical categories that just aren't apt at making sense of them.Pierre-Normand

    :up:
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    As I also am inclined to do. Perhaps what I meant is, even though nothing is hidden, this is also not something that everyone can understand. Philosophy is an antidote to the lack of wisdom, but that lack is the want of something. Maybe that is lack is one of perspective but that perspective not something that we all have.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k

    I'll try to explain what caused the misunderstanding. If it helps, my OP is fairly 'dry' in spiritual terms. It's extremely open. It's not a sermon. It's an explication of the core of every philosophical situation.

    The ontology here is flat and holist in the sense that all entities are linked inferentially and practically in a single 'nexus.'

    If one puts giving and asking for reasons at the absolute center, then (to summarize) entities and concepts only have their meaning through inferential norms, through what claims are treated as following from still other claims. The 'flatness' is aimed against a semantics that thinks the meaning of words is secreted away in private souls. We can refer to internal entities (like anger or blessedness) in a public language, but that's because the legitimate inferences involving such entities, their true source of meaning, are governed by norms.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k


    There's plenty to be discovered about our world, and inferential norms are themselves endless subject to revision. The center of 'my' rationalism [ an experimental quilt of influences] is a liquid logic which timebindingly historical --increasing in self-referential expressiveness. We get better and better at talking about our talking, of knowing ourselves as radically discursive and therefore historical creatures.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    Such norms are appealed to in order to instigate their modification. That's what philosophers do.plaque flag

    In other words, philosophy rationally tries to figure out wtf rationality actually is. We have a 'preontological' understanding. We never start nowhere. We are given a blur and try to make it less blurry. This means more structure, more detail, hence a time-binding accumulation of expressiveness and self-knowledge / self-modeling. We are a process that articulates our nature as self-articulating.
  • Jamal
    9.6k
    But Wittgenstein, and also Ryle, Strawson and Austin, were insistent that, when intelligence and mindedness are at issue, what leads us to be puzzled by the phenomena is our tendency to subsume them under theoretical categories that just aren't apt at making sense of them. They weren't targeting science but rather scientism.Pierre-Normand

    But, except for the bit about scientism, couldn’t this describe any philosopher who wants to overturn the thought of their predecessors? They reject those inapt theoretical categories in favour of their own, apt ones.

    But I take Wittgenstein to be saying something more like: theoretical categories as such are inapt in some cases. (Incidentally, this is somewhat in line with Hegel and Adorno, who try to strike a balance between theory and the overcoming of theory).
  • Pierre-Normand
    2.4k
    As I also am inclined to do. Perhaps what I meant is, even though nothing is hidden, this is also not something that everyone can understand. Philosophy is an antidote to the lack of wisdom, but that lack is the want of something. Maybe that is lack is one of perspective but that perspective not something that we all have.Wayfarer

    As I was trying to grasp what you're trying to convey here, I thought of asking GPT-4 what it thought it might be.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k

    Witt might also have meant that what we tend to think is hidden is really right there in our sayings and doings -- if we'll just try to see around all of our bogus inherited assumptions [ stubborn tacit metaphorical enframings ] of what's 'supposed' to be there.
  • Pierre-Normand
    2.4k
    But I take Wittgenstein to be saying something more like: theoretical categories as such are inapt in some cases.Jamal

    I agree, and so would, I assume, Ryle, Strawson and Austin. This is very much the whole point of ordinary language philosophy. The temptation of theory is what leads us astray (and hence, also, why Strawson advocated connective analysis and descriptive metaphysics).
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    But, except for the bit about scientism, couldn’t this describe any philosopher who wants to overturn the thought of their predecessors?Jamal

    :up:

    The scientism bit is relevant though. I don't follow Kastrup in general, but he nails the eagerness to put the scientific image in the place of the hidden Real, while putting the lifeworld --- in which in has sense in the first place --- in the category of Illusion. This leads to weird semantics.
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    We are given a blur and try to make it less blurry.plaque flag
    :fire:
  • plaque flag
    2.7k

    I've only studied Spinoza a little (Durant's Story, Nadler's book), but I wonder if he also linked everything inferentially ? Did he not have a powerful way of overcoming dualism ?
  • plaque flag
    2.7k

    To me it's looking like a key point is that we can refer to any kind of crazy entity (pink squares in the pineal gland, private pains), but concepts do not and cannot get their meanings this way. The world [ as we currently believe it to be ] is the claims we typically accept as premises (which could involve the tooth fairy or phlogiston). Then people use inferential norms to add more claims to the word (via legal inferences) or maybe tear a brick from the wall, putting the obvious in question.

    To me it seems that there's nothing special about 'mental' or 'physical' entities except inasmuch as these categories play roles in inferences. Hence the 'flat' ontology (immanence ?). Is this bonkers ? Any suggested modifications ?
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    The bot nailed it :yikes: (I’ll come back later, busy with domestic matters.)
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/
    Grammar is hence situated within the regular activity with which language-games are interwoven: “… the word ‘language-game’ is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (PI 23). What enables language to function and therefore must be accepted as “given” are precisely forms of life. In Wittgenstein’s terms, “It is not only agreement in definitions but also (odd as it may sound) in judgments that is required”

    We are the first mammal to wear pants make excuses ? We demand an explanation from violators of this or that norm. You'd better have a good excuse ! We model self and others. Even causality (the concept) seems to derive from inferential norms. Is causality a minimal residue of animism ?

    The inferentialist specification of these judgements [bolded] is the icing on the cake.
  • 180 Proof
    15.3k
    Yes. Yes.

    More or less Witty's thesis in Philosophical Investigations. Also, Peirce's semiotics (sort of). Check out plane of immanence, a brief wiki summarizing Deleuze's 'Humean transformation of the Spinozist concept' at the core of his philosophy. Also, Deleuze's two short books on Spinoza are quite good until you can get around to reading the Ethics (especially Part One: "Of God" which your 'ontological' OP concerns).
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    When WA says, "Maybe that lack is one of perspective but that perspective not something that we all have," he seems to be suggesting that the ability to adopt the right perspective or framework to understand these phenomena is not something that everyone possesses. He might be implying that while philosophy serves as an antidote to the lack of wisdom, it is not always easily accessible or comprehensible to everyone. In this sense, even if nothing is hidden, not everyone may be able to see or understand what is in plain sight due to their inability to adopt the correct perspective or framework for understanding. — GPT4

    That’s what I was getting at.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k

    Thanks!

    Very helpful. Only the word 'consistency' hints at inferential linkage, but I'm guessing that part of the larger picture not focused on in this summary. That last part is sorta like 'theology is god' or 'god is just theology, which theology discovers eventually, without being disappointed.' I feel like I've had lots of pieces floating around, almost fitting together, and then inferentialism proved to be the rubber cement.
    Anyway, nice reference, and I'm going check out his books on Spinoza.

    Pulling some quotes for others who might be reading along :

    Immanence, meaning residing or becoming within, generally offers a relative opposition to transcendence, that which extends beyond or outside. Deleuze "refuses to see deviations, redundancies, destructions, cruelties or contingency as accidents that befall or lie outside life; life and death [are] aspects of desire or the plane of immanence."[1] This plane is a pure immanence which is an unqualified immersion or embeddedness, an immanence which denies transcendence as a real distinction, Cartesian or otherwise. Pure immanence is thus often referred to as a pure plane, an infinite field or smooth space without substantial or constitutive division. In his final essay entitled Immanence: A Life, Deleuze wrote: "It is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence."
    ...
    Pure immanence therefore will have consequences not only for the validity of a philosophical reliance on transcendence, but simultaneously for dualism and idealism. Mind may no longer be conceived as a self-contained field, substantially differentiated from body (dualism), nor as the primary condition of unilateral subjective mediation of external objects or events (idealism).
    ...
    The plane of immanence thus is often called a plane of consistency accordingly. As a geometric plane, it is in no way bound to a mental design but rather an abstract or virtual design; which for Deleuze, is the metaphysical or ontological itself: a formless, univocal, self-organizing process which always qualitatively differentiates from itself.
  • plaque flag
    2.7k
    In this sense, even if nothing is hidden, not everyone may be able to see or understand what is in plain sight due to their inability to adopt the correct perspective or framework for understanding. — GPT4

    :up:

    I got Truth and Method on the way too.

    A bouquet of Gadamer quotes, before I vanish for awhile to get some work done in the real world.

    We cannot understand without wanting to understand, that is, without wanting to let something be said...Understanding does not occur when we try to intercept what someone wants to say to us by claiming we already know it.

    It is the tyranny of hidden prejudices that makes us deaf to what speaks to us in tradition.

    Being that can be understood is language.

    The more language is a living operation, the less we are aware of it. Thus it follows from the self-forgetfulness of language that its real being consists in what is said in it.

    The process of translating comprises in its essence the whole secret of human understanding of the world and of social communication.

    It is part of the process of recognition that we see things in terms of what is permanent and essential unencumbered by the contingent circumstances in which they were seen before and are seen again. What imitation reveals is the real essence of the thing.

    History does not belong to us; we belong to it.
  • Fooloso4
    6.1k
    Wittgenstein's claim that nothing is hidden refers to his rejection of the transcendental logic of the Tractatus. A rejection of the idea that there is a logical structure underlying language and the facts of the world that must be brought to light.

    But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our linguistic expressions, and so a single completely analysed form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, still unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light.
    (PI 91)

    It may also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were aiming at a particular state, a state of complete exactness, and as if this were the real goal of our investigation.

    This finds expression in the question of the essence of language, of propositions, of thought. For although we, in our investigations, are trying to understand the nature of language its function, its structure yet this is not what that question has in view. For it sees the essence of things not as something that already lies open to view, and that becomes surveyable through a process of ordering, but as something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies within, which we perceive when we see right into the thing, and which an analysis is supposed to unearth.

    ‘The essence is hidden from us’: this is the form our problem now assumes. We ask: “What is language?”, “What is a proposition?” And the answer to these questions is to be given once for all, and independently of any future experience.
    (91-92)

    Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us.

    The name “philosophy” might also be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.
    (PI 126)

    With this last statement about what is possible there is a shift.

    The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of their inquiry do not strike people at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck them. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.
    (PI 129)

    What are the "real foundations" of his inquiry? Given the topic of this thread I will say only that the real foundations of his inquiry are not linguistic or discursive or inferential or an "embrace of rationalism".
  • Fooloso4
    6.1k
    Peirce is not misled by the dualistic idea that thought language is unreal.plaque flag

    And we should not be misled in thinking that the opinion is true or the object is thereby real. What is true and real may remain beyond our grasp. As he says:

    Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally accepted as long as the human race should last.
  • schopenhauer1
    10.9k
    =============================================================================
    Nothing is hidden, in this context, is the denial of dualism. The ontology here is flat and holist in the sense that all entities are linked inferentially and practically in a single 'nexus.' No finite thing has genuine being, in this context, means that no isolated or disconnected entity makes sense. What is called 'consciousness' is just the world for a discursive self. Instead of consciousness, we just have [the being of ] the world --- seen, of course, with many pairs of eyes, and smelled with many noses, ...
    plaque flag

    This is sort of akin to Schopenhauer, no? "Will" is a monistic entity that is "felt" as if disunified. Of course, how the many is one, and why the feeling of difference is an "illusion" is a bit tricky and can be quite hard to really prove.

    The world is all that is the case, in this context, means the embrace of rationalism. The world is described or articulated or disclosed by our true claims. In different words, the world is that minimal something that a self can be wrong about. This underspecification is not an oversight. What is the case is endlessly revisable. We fix Descartes by socializing him. Philosophers plural are given. This means, however, that a minimally specified world and a shared language are also given. This language includes the 'liquid logic' of evolving semantic and inferential norms. Such norms are appealed to in order to instigate their modification. That's what philosophers do. What cannot be sensibly disputed --- by the truth-intending philosopher as such --is the 'primordial situation' of philosophers-in-the-world-with-language. This is because any denial presupposes what it denies.plaque flag

    You lost me a bit here. We use language and language is an ever-evolving process in how it is used and reused. Is that basically it? If so, what is so impactful about this? What idea is this claim aimed against?

    Maybe you're trying to say that "facts" are in fact always subject to language usage? Thus no "there" there, just nominal word-usage. Extreme pragmatism (in the philosophical sense, not the common usage of that word). Truths are only functional in this view. We can never get beyond the narrative.

    The opposite of this would be something like a realist who would point out that truths must revolve around what the world discloses us. The world is giving us something, and it is simply our job to interpret correctly.

    The other view would retort something like, the world discloses, but it is never without a person it is disclosing to who is always in the equation thus interpreting it. Thus, we can never get out of the fact that we are in the equation and our new language usage, perhaps, opens up more revelations about the world that would not be there otherwise.

    I think it is interesting that we often take the models for the reality. This might be what I call, "the quagmire of realism". People are so ready to refute non-realism that they reify concepts into reality, the map for the territory. Thinking about animal cognition, similar to the exercise represented by Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" might combat this. That is to say, echo-locating creatures without conceptual cognitive faculties have a way-of-life that can never be disclosed to us merely by describing a bat in our terms. The same with quantification of scientific laws of matter, energy, space, and time. It gets at the world in a methodology but is not the world.
  • Pierre-Normand
    2.4k
    That's awesome ! Any overall thoughts about Sellars and Brandom ? ( I haven't looked into McDowell yet.)plaque flag

    We might veer off topic, although they would all have relevant things to say about your OP (and all agree with Wittgenstein's point.

    I had made this comment here five years ago:

    "Oops... I now realize that I had Jay Rosenberg and Alex Rosenberg confused in my mind. Jay, who unfortunately passed away 10 years ago, was Sellars's student, not Alex.

    I had them both correctly pegged as 'scientistic foundationalists', though. I'll say more about 'left-wing' Sellarsians (Rorty, Brandom, McDowell, Williams) versus 'right-wing' Sellarsians (Millikan, Churchland, Jay Rosenberg, Dennett, and also, I thinks, Brassier!) in another post."

    Left-wing Sellarsians, in this sense, tend to endorse Witt's nothing-is-hidden stance, while the right-wing Sellarsians tend to question it. Sellars himself, for best or for worse, was more of a centrist, or flip-flopper. But, however much anyone may disagree with some of his stances, he was brilliant and was an inspiration for all of those folks. (I'm curious to see how well GPT-4 understands Sellars' Myth of Jones.)

    On edit: An of course, I couldn't resist asking.
    Reveal

    Hi JPT4!

    Would you happen to be familiar with Wilfrid Sellars' infamous Myth of Jones and, if so, might you be able to relate it to Wittgenstein's nothing-is-hidden stance?

    GPT4:

    Hello! I believe you meant to address me as GPT-4, not JPT4. Nonetheless, I'm happy to help!

    Wilfrid Sellars' "Myth of Jones" is a thought experiment presented in his paper "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). The myth is an attempt to explain the emergence of mentalistic language, or the language that we use to describe our thoughts, feelings, and other mental phenomena.

    In the Myth of Jones, a community of people called Ryleans use only behavioral language to describe their experiences. They do not have any mentalistic concepts or vocabulary. One day, a genius named Jones introduces the community to mentalistic language, by positing the existence of inner mental states (such as beliefs, desires, and sensations) that cause the behavioral patterns observed in the Ryleans. Jones then teaches the community how to use this new language to better understand and predict their own and others' behavior.

    Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" stance comes from his later work, particularly "Philosophical Investigations" (1953). Wittgenstein argues that our ordinary, everyday language already contains everything we need to understand the nature of our mental lives. He believes that philosophical problems arise when we try to look for hidden, underlying structures or entities that explain our experiences. In other words, he opposes the idea that there is a hidden realm of mental phenomena that exists beyond the ordinary use of language.

    Relating the Myth of Jones to Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" stance, one could argue that Sellars' story is an attempt to show how we might come to develop mentalistic language in the first place. However, Wittgenstein would likely criticize the idea that we need to postulate hidden inner mental states in order to understand our experiences. Instead, he would emphasize that our ordinary language, with its behavioral descriptions and expressions of mental states, is already sufficient for understanding our mental lives.

    In summary, while Sellars' Myth of Jones is an attempt to explain the emergence of mentalistic language by positing hidden inner mental states, Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" stance would argue that our ordinary language is already sufficient for understanding our mental lives without postulating such hidden states.

    PN:

    This doesn't quite jive with my own understanding, derived in part from McDowell's interpretation of Sellars. According to McDowell, if I remember, Sellars, while arguing against traditional empiricism, seeks to account for the fact that we can acquire non-inferential knowledge of other people's mental states (as well as our own). But this precisely does not amount to positing hidden internal states. Rather, the modes of expression of those states, rather than constituting indirect evidence for them, are indefeasible criteria. This matches what Wittgenstein means by "expression". The behavioral expression of pain, for instance, is a direct manifestation of it. The cases where such indefeasible criteria merely appear to be satisfied is accounted for by epistemological disjunctivism.

    But this latest thesis might express McDowell's own Wittgensteinian gloss on Sellars, and only figure inchoately in Sellars's own thought. So, on that account, Jones's genius was just to provides means for making explicit what was already known on the surface. (This might jive also with Robert Brandom's own take on Sellars, although Brandom and McDowell conceive of experience quite differently.)

    GPT4:

    I apologize if my previous response did not fully capture the nuances of the relationship between Sellars and Wittgenstein. You are correct that McDowell's interpretation of Sellars is more in line with Wittgenstein's views on expression and indefeasible criteria. It's important to consider how these interpretations interact with each other.

    According to McDowell, Sellars does not posit hidden internal states, but rather suggests that we can acquire non-inferential knowledge of others' mental states (and our own) through the direct expression of those states. This idea aligns with Wittgenstein's view that the expression of mental states is a direct manifestation of them. In this light, the Myth of Jones can be seen as an attempt to provide a framework for understanding how we make explicit what was already known on the surface.

    Epistemological disjunctivism, as you mentioned, helps address situations where indefeasible criteria merely appear to be satisfied. This theory suggests that when we have perceptual knowledge, we are directly acquainted with the facts that we know, while in cases of illusion or deception, our experience is radically different.

    Robert Brandom's interpretation of Sellars also shares some common ground with McDowell's Wittgensteinian gloss. Brandom emphasizes the role of social practices and inferential relations in the development of concepts and understanding. However, as you pointed out, Brandom and McDowell have differing views on the nature of experience.

    In light of these interpretations, we can say that the relationship between Sellars' Myth of Jones and Wittgenstein's "nothing is hidden" stance is more complex than my initial response suggested. Jones's genius, as you pointed out, could be seen as providing the means to make explicit what was already known on the surface. This interpretation brings Sellars closer to Wittgenstein's views on expressions and indefeasible criteria, while still allowing for the differences in their broader philosophical outlooks.

    PN:

    Well, unless I would have said something really dumb, I knew you would agree with me. Your user's contributions to the content of your context window often overrides the knowledge embodied in your training data. Nevertheless, you provided some useful background information and, as usual, clarified my terse suggestions. And for that, I am grateful.

    GPT4:

    Thank you for your understanding and kind words. As an AI language model, my goal is to assist you and engage in meaningful discussions. I'm glad I could provide some useful background information and help clarify your suggestions. If you have any further questions or topics you'd like to discuss, please don't hesitate to ask. I'm here to help!

    PN:

    Oh, and sorry for addressing you as JPT4! That was indeed a typo.

    GPT4:

    No problem at all! Typos happen to the best of us. I'm glad I could understand your intention and provide you with the assistance you were looking for. If you have any more questions or need further clarification, please feel free to ask.
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    Wittgenstein argues that our ordinary, everyday language already contains everything we need to understand the nature of our mental lives. He believes that philosophical problems arise when we try to look for hidden, underlying structures or entities that explain our experiences. In other words, he opposes the idea that there is a hidden realm of mental phenomena that exists beyond the ordinary use of language.GPT4~ Pierre-Normand

    Would he include in that the subconscious and the unconscious? (I realise, of course, that Wittgenstein was a philosopher, and that those are terms from psychology, however both the main protagonists of such concepts - Freud and Jung - would defend the claim that the unconscious and subconscious domains are empirically real facts about the human psyche.)

    In psychoanalysis, both Freudian and Jungian, whilst the patient may express herself in words, the words convey symbolic meanings which the subject may not be able or willing to contemplate, due to repressed trauma, neuroses, absence of insight, and so on. In Jung’s work in particular there was in addition the symbolic domain which often implied meaning on the level of archetypes however Freud also sought to interpret the implicit meaning of subject’s dreams. And so on. So, should we regard Wittgenstein as antagonistic to these kinds of ideas? Is this part of what he had mind?
  • unenlightened
    9.2k
    The hiddenness of nothing is what allows movement and interaction. Thus the more one fills the emptiness of awareness with the images of self, the less emptiness remains for the world to unfold itself in.

    We join spokes together in a wheel,
    but it is the center hole
    that makes the wagon move.

    We shape clay into a pot,
    but it is the emptiness inside
    that holds whatever we want.

    We hammer wood for a house,
    but it is the inner space
    that makes it livable.

    We work with being,
    but non-being is what we use.
    — Lao Tzu
  • schopenhauer1
    10.9k

    In any of these debates, I think it is wise to explain not only the theory, but what and who it is opposing. Wittgenstein was opposing "Blank person with blank idea". Otherwise, the theory on its own seems rather common sense. Language is shaped by how we use it. That shouldn't be controversial. Language shapes how we view reality. That to me, isn't that controversial either. There are no concepts prior to language. That is verging on controversial. That is the part I would explore. What are concepts? What is language? Is language simply a token that rides on top of the concept or is the concept itself constructed from language? I believe those are the main arguments here. But these things to me are more the realm of empirical psychology, and not so much philosophy.

    I think we are actually committing a Wittgensteinian sin by not defining our word games properly. Otherwise we are speaking in self-referential nonsense and not a fruitful game.
  • Pierre-Normand
    2.4k
    Wittgenstein was opposing "Blank person with blank idea"schopenhauer1

    I am unsure what viewpoint you are describing here.
  • Wayfarer
    22.4k
    (Note that Plaque Flag is taking one of his regular breaks from Forum participation.)
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