Which in a way gets along with the spirit of Kant: We have knowledge of the empirical world, but that knowledge doesn't touch upon the metaphysical totality which grounds it. Or, in knowledge's multiplicity, they're all self-grounding projects which we are free to take up or leave, but which we're not really sure how to relate that to ontological claims. Or, at the very least, I'm not sure how to relate knowledge, scientific or historical, to ontological claims. — Moliere
that knowledge doesn't touch upon the metaphysical totality which grounds it. — Moliere
I'm not so sure there is a most rational rationality — Moliere
I'm at least a realist. And I like direct realism in the phenomenological sense, but I wonder what's so direct about it if all I mean is that indirect realism is false? — Moliere
With Heidegger... — Moliere
We need only pay more attention to see the world as such a 'blanket.' Neutrinos and marriages and nostalgia and premises are all part of this same single involvement network. Entities are radically semantically and practically interdependent.Heidegger introduces the term that Macquarrie and Robinson translate as ‘involvement’ to express the roles that equipmental entities play—the ways in which they are involved—in Dasein's everyday patterns of activity. Crucially, for Heidegger, an involvement is not a stand-alone structure, but rather a link in a network of intelligibility that he calls a totality of involvements. Take the stock Heideggerian example: the hammer is involved in an act of hammering; that hammering is involved in making something fast; and that making something fast is involved in protecting the human agent against bad weather. Such totalities of involvements are the contexts of everyday equipmental practice. As such, they define equipmental entities, so the hammer is intelligible as what it is only with respect to the shelter and, indeed, all the other items of equipment to which it meaningfully relates in Dasein's everyday practices. This relational ontology generates what Brandom (1983, 391–3) calls Heidegger's ‘strong systematicity condition’, as given voice in Heidegger's striking claim that “[t]aken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment” (Being and Time, 15: 97). And this radical holism spreads, because once one begins to trace a path through a network of involvements, one will inevitably traverse vast regions of involvement-space. Thus links will be traced not only from hammers to hammering to making fast to protection against the weather, but also from hammers to pulling out nails to dismantling wardrobes to moving house. This behaviour will refer back to many other behaviours (packing, van-driving) and thus to many other items of equipment (large boxes, removal vans), and so on. The result is a large-scale holistic network of interconnected relational significance. Such networks constitute worlds, in one of Heidegger's key senses of the term—an ontical sense that he describes as having a pre-ontological signification (Being and Time 14: 93).
I could dispute a belief for any number of reasons, but to call something untrue is a particular type of dispute. — Judaka
So, something like catharsis, that results in a deep shift of your self-understanding and your view of life. I'm sure that would give rise to many feelings, but it's more than simply a feeling, as it is also something that you've come to understand about yourself and the world. — Quixodian
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/articles/69400/tradition-and-the-individual-talent... if the only form of tradition, of handing down, consisted in following the ways of the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its successes, “tradition” should positively be discouraged. ...Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour.
Some one said: “The dead writers are remote from us because we know so much more than they did.” Precisely, and they are that which we know.
Shakespeare acquired more essential history from Plutarch than most men could from the whole British Museum. What is to be insisted upon is that the poet must develop or procure the consciousness of the past and that he should continue to develop this consciousness throughout his career.
What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.
There remains to define this process of depersonalization and its relation to the sense of tradition. It is in this depersonalization that art may be said to approach the condition of science.
A dog is a dog, an animal, a mammal, a loyal companion, a pet, but not a building. It's not true that a dog is a building, it's an incorrect reference. Even if dogs went extinct, it changes nothing, the rules are all made up, and they only change if we change them. — Judaka
I think a better interpretation is in terms of metacognition - the understanding of understanding. — Quixodian
There are innummerable maps and means developed in various cultures that address this. Feeling comes into it, but perhaps more as a consequence than cause. — Quixodian
Much could be said about all of this, but I think one point that needs to be made is that 'higher states' are not conceptual in nature - there can be no concept of a higher stage of jhana/dhyana, which is a barrier to our normal discursive/analytical mode of analysis. — Quixodian
Not at all. Powerful and illuminating. Highly recommended. — jgill
We can say there is a discursive self, just as we might say there is a poetic self, a feeling self or an experiencing self, but are these selves anything more than ideas which overarch fields of inquiry or practice? — Janus
but highlighting the fact that in discourse every thought is an "I-think". Is that along the lines of what you are getting at? — Janus
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-9752.12407For instance, Bakhurst (2011, 2015), following McDowell and Brandom as well as Vygotsky, characterises Bildung as a process of enculturation during which the child, by means of acquiring conceptual abilities, is transformed from being in the world to being a subject capable of thinking and acting in light of reasons, thereby taking a view on the world and herself. As Bakhurst points out, this ‘gradual mastery of techniques of language that enable the giving and taking of reasons’ (2015, p. 310) is an essentially social process, because in acquiring concepts the child essentially learns to participate in a social praxis. Similarly, by adopting an approach to pedagogy that draws on both Vygotsky and Brandom, Derry (2008, 2013) emphasises the importance of a normatively structured learning environment in which adults provide opportunities for children to engage in the social practice of giving and asking for reasons in order to gain understanding of the inferential relations that govern our use of concepts.
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It is also very close to Brandom's view, which interprets intentionality as a fundamentally social phenomenon, namely as the ability for deontic score-keeping, that is the ability to ascribe and acknowledge justifications to others and oneself. Thus, on this view, human thinking, understood in terms of the possession and use of concepts, consists essentially in the ability to participate in the—necessarily social—game of giving and asking for reasons.
A central idea in philosophy is fairness, but arguably, this term tells us absolutely nothing about the world. — Judaka
I understand truth as a correct reference, in other words, it can't be disentangled from language. — Judaka
My conclusion: There are no common internal perspective foundations. Even common beliefs vary from person to person.
Two cents worth. — jgill
Instead of an old man in Colorado, I found "myself" in the mind of a woman living in a cabin in Ireland. The experience goes beyond words to express, and it lasted only a few brief moments. "I" looked out the window onto rolling green hills and everything was changed for me - I saw through another's eyes what I would not see through mine. — jgill
I agree that all we ever have is belief, but truth is technically a function of logic, the term does not endorse or dispute but affirms or denies the conditions as being met. — Judaka
You cannot say "it is raining" in a non-linguistic way. There is no "actually raining" or "actual state of raining. — Judaka
:up:Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion and his Critique of German Idealism by Nicholas Linares
Both philosophers and theologians claim the authority to evaluate metaphysical principles, but the standards by which they conduct those evaluations are very different. Schopenhauer concludes that philosophers are ultimately in the position to critique principles that are advanced by theologians, not vice versa. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion and his Critique of German Idealism by Nicholas Linares
He nonetheless recognizes that the metaphysical need of most people is satisfied by their religion. This is unsurprising because, he contends, the vast majority of people find existence “less puzzling and mysterious” than philosophers do, so they merely require a plausible explanation of their role in the universe that can be adopted “as a matter of course” (WWR II 162). — Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion and his Critique of German Idealism by Nicholas Linares
we can come to see that philosophers start from different places through the humble method of comparison and contrast after having read the philosophers. And that's why I have doubts on ultimate foundations: seems like there's a lot of possible foundations to go around claiming as ultimate foundations. — Moliere
It's just the "foundations" part I'm questioning. — Moliere
I should stress that I am miles away from being an orthodox Hegelian. But I love certain passages in him, but I largely enjoy him transformed and in some ways purified by Kojeve, Brandom, and Heidegger. Braver's A Thing of This World is a tale of the journey of ICS, the impersonal conceptual scheme, at it set sail from Kant and only got freer and looser and finally fused with the world, so that this conceptual scheme was simply the conceptual aspect of the lifeworld, not some mediating image internal to a person or even a community. In Hegel, who managed the fusion mentioned above, it was evolving toward a goal. In the later Heidegger, the fusion is maintained, but it (now the lifeworld's way of being) drifts aimlessly.But I don't think he's as guilty of stepping out to construct the world as much as Hegel is. — Moliere
At the very least I think you'd have to say it's what all our sense-organs do with respect to a sensible-intuition. — Moliere
What could “accurately” mean in such a case of private experiences/sensations. — Richard B
it's trivially true that feeling just is not concept. A sentence is not really a painting. We include feelings in our 'inferential ontology' all the time. We can be more or less confident that someone 'gets it.' — plaque flag
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective correlative"; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked — plaque flag
We need words associated with particular circumstances; we need a common language to understand those circumstances; we need our fellow human being to react similarly to those circumstances — Richard B
But as you imply, much of life’s experience would be diminished if everything ‘outside of logic and reason’ were ignored or devalued. — 0 thru 9
Striving to have some kind of supreme, impossible, godlike perspective of the world? — charles ferraro
Who the hell would know what "the best possible view" of anything was, even if it existed or they encountered it? — charles ferraro
Your last statement, " ... 'seeking the truth' is best made sense of as seeking the best possible 'view' on the 'infinite object' of the world -- in terms of becoming the/an ideal viewer.", I find overflowing with impossibility and delusions of grandeur. — charles ferraro
which is given to us through the combination of the categories through the schematism into the sensible intuition which we all share. — Moliere
What could “accurately” mean in such a case of private experiences/sensations. — Richard B
No-one knows the true colours of these two objects. — RussellA
:up:How will I know what you think if your argument is not coherent, consistent and does not contradict itself? This has nothing to do with faith, but with coherency and intelligibility. — Janus
You and I can see the same object at the same time. We see the same object in the intentional sense (it's that one shared object we talk about), and yet this single object is given to us differently, as a function of our perspective in a generalized sense, not just in terms of spatial location, but also in terms of a 'prejudicial' position in 'personality space.' And of course I might be nearsighted and you might be colorblind.I offer what I hope is a solid perspectivism within a 'phenomenological direct realist' framework. — plaque flag
This passage from Nietzsche is extremely close to Zahavi's understanding of Husserl's direct realism. I haven't emphasized entanglement yet, but to me the subject only makes sense within the same world that it perceives, so that seen and the seer are interdependent like a donut and donuthole, like up and down...let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as 'pure reason', 'absolute spirituality', 'knowledge in itself': these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 'objectivity' be...
:up:(Times of doubt and exhaustion from the Apollonian-Dionysian dual may be soothed by the jovial and husky voice and insights of Joseph Campbell, along with some fine brandy). — 0 thru 9
You mean, how did we invent writing and other means of information exchange? Do you believe that without qualia, the invention and use of writing becomes inexplicable? — goremand