I removed you from my ignore list out of curiosity, a mistake easily rectified.You only mystify yourself. But have fun with that. No hard feelings.

If Mary can talk about not only the concept of colour but also what it feels like to perceive colour, then, in your own words, how would you describe your perception of the colour violet to a person who cannot see colours. — RussellA

Note that I'm not saying we have to accept Mary's talk. I'm saying that 'what red is like for me' has a genuine role in the human discussion. Mary may even say: I can never 'really' tell you what red is like for me.. She may justify this claim philosophically.

It's the same with 'God.' A theist may make claims about God, perhaps to justify other claims. An atheist may challenge the theist's use of this God concept, but the atheist can only do so because 'God' already has a kind of system of familiar uses.

Which begs the question of what is exactly rational? (Rational defined as ‘based on reason or logic’).
Or more controversially, is there a line dividing rational and irrational?
And where exactly or approximately is it?
Are emotionals or instinctive behaviors included or excluded? — 0 thru 9

In this context, rationality is more normative than instrumental.

Apel's strong thesis is that his transcendental semiotics yields a set of normative conditions and validity claims presupposed in any critical discussion or rational argumentation. Central among these is the presupposition that a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification (1980).
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/apel-karl-otto-1922

In my opinion, the ICC is the founding concept of science and philosophy, the essence of both, and the most general science just is philosophy (I prefer 'ontology' myself).

Unlike a perfect circle, which is also ideal and never perfectly present, this ideality of rationality is necessarily blurry and horizonal. This is because the ICC has no 'god' above it to tell it what it is. The rational community must itself further determine the nature of rationality, further explicate its own essence. Brandom understands Hegel to have grasped this as the giant shift in human culture.

How could we be bound by the norms that we impose in the first place ? This is where the thrown projection of Heidegger comes in, but I'll stop there for now.

:up:
I'm glad we seem to agree here. If I recall correctly, you don't love the phrase 'fundamental ontology,' but I am just reaching for something like 'big picture synthesizing talk.' As I see it, this kind of talk has to name and explicate itself, which is a big part of the weird metacognitive journey.

agree that Mary can talk about the concept of colour, ie "colour is the visual perception based on the electromagnetic spectrum. Though colour is not an inherent property of matter, colour perception is related to an object's light absorption, reflection, emission spectra and interference"

But can Mary talk about what it feels like to perceive colour ? — RussellA

I think she can. To me the big insight from Brandom/Sellars is the space of reasons. Sapient use of concepts is normative. Mary can explain a belief or action in terms of perceiving a colored object.

But the traffic light was green !

Or maybe she doesn't buy a can of paint with her husband because she was 'thinking of something a little more vivid.'

This inferential role isn't everything, but to me it looks like a big part of the grip of concepts, and these concepts need some kind of grip on ' [obviously/vividly] interpersonal space.' The actual boundaries of personal space are not fixed, IMV, as technology gets better and can even lately begin to generate images of what we are thinking about. Your toothache exists in my world inasmuch as it lives in the space of reasons. You can explain your absence from a planned meeting in terms of it, etc. Physical/mental is not absolute, though the world's being given only to our through perspectives is what tempts us toward an unnecessary dualism.

Hegel on the other hand is an absolute idealist, meaning that there is no 'thing in itself', that is itself a contradictory idea. There is nothing laying 'behind' our sensibility and the distinction sensibility and understanding cannot be made. ... Saying for instance that a door knob is not really really a doorknob, but instead a bundle of intuitions from some noumenal world, is nonsense for Hegel. A doorknob is a doorknob is a doorknob. There are just no god given doorknobs, they are a product of our interaction with the world. That is not a transcendental but an immanent logic. — Tobias

:100:

It's a relief that someone else gets it.

Zahavi interprets Husserl and Braver interprets Heidegger in this same general way, tho of course there are fascinating differences.

Husserl's discussion of how the spatial object is given, which Sartre paraphrases to kick off Being and Nothingness, is the whole idea, seemingly taken from Hegel, in a nutshell.

To me, this is somehow related to the transpersonal (as a whole including psychology, studies, and practices). — 0 thru 9

The common denominator of this otherwise rich and ramified group of phenomena is the feeling of the individual that his consciousness expanded beyond the usual ego boundaries and the limitations of time and space.

To me even rationalist ( especially rationalist ? ) philosophy aspires beyond the current limited view of the ego in both senses: the ego is a view of the world, and this ego is also an entity in that view, understood more or less appropriately in its boundaries and function.

The concept of the ‘transrational’ makes one wonder (according to the etymology of transrational) what actually is beyond the rational? — 0 thru 9

To me, transrationalism is sophisticated, educated irrationalism. I mean that in a value-neutral way. Nietzsche's Christ takes 'the inner' to be first. I think we find some of Nietzsche's own 'mysticism' in that description: his sense of being behind words. Or 'under logic.' Schopenhauer celebrates the expressions on characters as present by certain painters. This mute expression also hints at a 'gnosis' that is nonconceptual. I'm strongly incline to interpret all of this in terms of Feeling. In completely nonspooky terms we can say that, obviously, the world is not only given conceptually but sensually and feelingly. Value is largely in the feeling 'dimension' or 'channel' or 'aspect' of this reality --- which makes it no less real.

since feeling is first
who pays any attention
to the syntax of things
will never wholly kiss you;
wholly to be a fool
while Spring is in the world
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/830640

Just because one must use norms to perform logic does make those norms objective. — Bob Ross

The point is just that those logical norms themselves must be real in order for you to appeal to them as authoritative, therefore making your own conclusions significant . They [these norms] are something like the essence or sine qua non of science /philosophy.

I’ve already clarified this, so I am confused why you are still straw manning moral realism: the idea is that there are true mind-independent moral judgments, which do not necessarily have to be tangible. — Bob Ross

To me, respectfully, it looks like your own biased understanding of what is real is the problem. A 'mind-independent judgment' sounds like a judge-independent judgment --- indeed an absurdity. Hence my half-joke about your demand for magic stones in another dimension.

The same style of argument reveals 'mind-independent reality' to be absurd in the same way, since the world, so far as we know from experience, is only given to subjects [who are themselves within this same world that is given to them, a strange loop.]

Looks look at a standard definition :

Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right.
...
While moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

Notice the lack of mention of mind-independence.

I am saying that we use norms as the bedrock to what we do, which includes epistemology, and that, yes, my assessment of norms is contingent on what norms I used to assess them: I don’t see any logical contradiction nor internal/external incoherency with that position. — Bob Ross

I think that there is a way to do radical relativism without contradiction, but it requires irony and disclaimers.

If it's only a private logic in which you prove the unreality of norms, your 'conclusion' is a personal 'superstition,' an opinion that doesn't aspire to any 'justification' beyond effective sophistry. The rational community is founded on (is structure by) communication norms. Claims are justified within a 'public' logic which members, as members, take for granted willingly [ autonomy ] as an authority.

I have not been able to penetrate into what you mean by “rationality”, as it seems to be some sort of logos, so please give me clear and concise definition (so that I can assess). — Bob Ross

...a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification

It's not so unlike a demystified version of logos in the sense that science and philosophy dialectically and autonomously determine / reveal / establish / revise the conceptual aspect of our shared reality.

No, I haven't read any. — Luke

If you get curious, Zahavi's brief book is dense with great stuff. There's a pdf to circumvent buyer's remorse. (I like paper, but it's nice to be sure first.)

"Rain" is a straightforward concept, it obscures most of the subjectivity at play in language and truth, which is why it's wrong to extrapolate from them. — Judaka

I think we can use the transcendent intentional object approach and just emphasize that the object can be almost impossible to see with any clarity.

If we have a community that cares about God and believe in God, then someone saying 'God is love' is sharing their own conceptual view of this entity.

I include every possible entity that can be involved in inference in my ontology. I even let in round square and fictional characters, even pineal gland gremlins. Determining their actual nature is part of the conversation, but they are welcome from the beginning as 'tokens' that humans might use to explain themselves and justify claims.

So maybe I think God is only a concept. That's my view on this entity then. Another person now claims that God is love. This metaphor is bold and vague. We need not be happy with it. But I think it still has the structure of the description of a more mundane object. How well God can be seen at all is part of the conversation. Someone may believe that God is just a projection. Some will say that there is no God, but they aren't denying the entity as conceptually accessibly, just specifying it a certain way (only a concept, etc).

You cannot say "it is raining" in a non-linguistic way. There is no "actually raining" or "actual state of raining" — Judaka

:up:
I basically agree with you. And I was trying to say something like this is my own way. The world is only given perspectively. It's like an object seen from many angles, through many pairs of eyes. But in this case the eyes are linguistic and conceptual, gazing at the intelligible structure of world.

'My' current beliefs about the world are how the world is for me at that time ---my view on the world and not some private image in my head. For this idea of the image 'only in my head' assumes some Real World apart from and behind the way it appears to discursive subjects ---literally nonsense. Belief articulates the world (not an image of the world) from a certain perspective, possibly very badly, very 'incorrectly' from someone else's perspective.

Direct realism with 'fallibility' [disagreement, revision of beliefs] and perspectival limitation is much better than indirect realism.

If 'you' tell me that I am wrong a belief, that 'I' am daydreaming, then you simply see the same world differently. You call one or my beliefs false. I call your own differing belief false. No one gets to look around their own linguistic perspective to see the world absurdly from no perspective at all.

All we ever have is belief. But we use 'true' and 'false' to endorse or dispute beliefs. Establishing which beliefs are warranted/ justified is where the real work happens, except that our discussion is valuable for making all of this clear to ourselves, getting the power cord untangled.

How does that sound ?

However, I'm not sure whether there is much left to say if W is correct in saying that the private sensation is "not a Nothing", but "a Something about which nothing could be said." — Luke

Excellent quotes again. Did you ever check out Husserl ? Might be relevant to this issue.

but didn't want to interrupt — Luke

Well @Joshs and I have been off topic (we could be debating rationality in a more appropriate thread), so I hope you stop in and help us get on track.

@Art48 seems to adopt a 'Kantian' idea that God is hidden from us by our own looking at him. This is like saying that the trees are in the way of us seeing the forest. Having only ever known a world and anything it from a perspective, through eyes and as a personality, we can't know what we mean when we speak of an object from no perspective at all. The spider's perspective fixes this problem, but it's not clear why the spider should have a better view than human being.

Our language intends the God and not our private images of God. The 'private images' are the trees. God is just 'the trees' seen properly, from an ideal vantage point. I don't claim to see God from such a vantage point. What I'm saying applies to spatial objects seen perspectively, and I think Husserl's description of such seeing can be generalized to nonspatial entities like God, justice, and rationality. The entity is not behind or hidden by its appearances. It is this 'transcendent' system of appearances, transcendent because it is never seen from all sides at once, and it cannot be reduced to any single perception of it. We see that we only see it partially. We try to move closer, clean our 'glasses.'

What give "introspection" meanings is not what lies hidden within the self, but what is expressed and understood between others. — Richard B

I claim it's both, and I'm happy to debate the point in a friendly spirit. I invite you to join this thread:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14582/sensational-conceptuality

I don't want to mess up anyone's blog.

Thanks for the quote ! I didn't mean to imply that W denied it. Just that a stereoscopic view makes sense.

If you want to dig into this, I started a thread on it.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14582/sensational-conceptuality

That's a fascinating notion and rings true for me. — Tom Storm

:up:
Thanks, and it's nice to feel understood.

I am ADHD and thus struggle to follow even small essays, but I am going through it. How much of this paper coincides with your understanding? Anywhere you notably disagree with it? — Judaka

This might be the essence:

So long as we pay sufficiently close attention to the reasons that can be offered for and against various claims, their truth will take care of itself—or at least, we will have done everything we can do about it.

As philosophers we seek the best beliefs. I can tell you about my belief by saying that a claim is true. Or I can just make the claim. 'True' is useful for talking about beliefs in complicated situations. 'If that is true, then so is this other statement, which we thought was false.' As we talk to one another, we can only discuss beliefs ---sometimes using the word 'true.' Our duty is to be careful about the beliefs we hold and try to get others to adopt. That's all we can do. A warranted or justified belief tends to be acted upon. If I believe that it is raining, then I prepare for rain.

I see 'the way things are' to include the fact that it is raining. To believe something is to experience the world in a certain light. The world for me is structured by my beliefs.

I think there is a single world out there, but it's only seen from perspectives. So it's like an object that's seen imperfectly from billions of perspectives at once. I can persuade you to see the world differently than before, and you can change my perspective.

To me it's no small fact that the world is only given perspectively. We have the useful fiction of the scientific image which is a model of the world seen from nowhere or anywhere in Euclidean space. But this is just a highly important cultural product. A tool. Or it's fair to view at as an extra layer of beliefs that help us see tables as also lots of atoms and so on. But all of our beliefs exist in a single inferential network. Because we explain toothaches in terms of protons and protons in terms of experiments on roomsize instruments and scientific norms and university restrooms, etc.

Could you clarify what you mean? — Judaka

More of the above. People make 'assumptions' that they don't even realize they've made. Maybe there's a trapdoor under the rug, but no one has bothered to check, because it never occurred to anyone to postulate the possibility.

For Gadamer, following Heidegger, our interpretative prejudices are otherwise invisible to us. — plaque flag

What do you mean by "glasses we can take off"? — Judaka

Personality is a lens. We always project/expect as we interpret. We read in the light of these expectations. Our whole past, what we think of as behind us, leaps ahead in the form of prejudicial expectation.

These prejudices are at the same time, as a system, the organ of understanding itself.So doing away with all prejudice is doing away with the self altogether as a system of interpretive habits --- like understanding what a screwdriver is for. I 'am' my past in the mode of no longer being it. So prejudice is simultaneously enabling and limiting. Because I know without even thinking about it how this or that 'must' be used, what he or she 'must' mean. I always project my best guess of the total meaning of a person's message as I decode the details in terms of this projection. I have to continually revise this blurry total interpretation as the details confirm or threaten it.

I can remember how my total interpretations change and learn to see my own 'automatic' self in my only-now-visible 'assumptions.' I took certain aspects of reality to be necessary rather than optional. I assumed maybe, without even thinking about it, that all numbers are rational, but then someone shows me a proof that $\sqrt{2}$ is not.

I don't think truth is a word about describing the world accurately. — Judaka

:up:

Yes. Tricky issue, but 'true' describes belief. To call a statement true is to tell you about my belief. If you trust me, it's also telling you about the world. From your perspective, the world is changed by the news I bring. You see the world differently, perhaps in a way you'll come to regret or further update.

... it's just a matter of whether it's correct to reference the weather as raining. The nuances of this are far more apparent when dealing with a word such as oppression. — Judaka

If you clarify this I might agree.

But let me offer this:

Does
The assertion that it is raining is warranted.
mean
It is raining.
?

I'm sure you're not extrapolating as though there's zero difference, but I'm unsure about the differences you do perceive. — Judaka

I see the difference as massive, so it's largely a logical point about how language works. 'Oppression' has a role as a token in a 'game.' It's like a virtual object in conceptual space. People see this object differently. The word has different meanings for people. The argument is about how the token/word ought to be understood and used. It's my private perspective on this 'object' that I want foisted on everyone else. I want 'them' to see oppression as I do ('correctly.')

No one sees it apart from all perspectives. So the 'truth' about 'oppression' is what oppression looks like from an ideal subjectivity --- from a purified or unbiased or fully informed and rational perspective.

That is why any real spirituality requires participation, not just empty words, and requires an inner transformation, metanoia, real conversion (and not just flag-waving). — Quixodian

The issue of real spirituality is, in a certain sense, the real issue period. This was my basic concern when I took up philosophy, and I've never stopped thinking about it.

I try to look through the surface associations of terminology with my X-ray structuralist goggles. The passionate communist is as 'spiritually' motivated as the born again Christian on fire with Jesus.

The heroic is the numinous. Or call it the ego ideal. Many phrases are good enough once the structural role is grasped. Stirner called it the sacred and the highest essence. It's as if we are programmed to decide upon and enact a heroism.

Sacred, then, is the highest essence and everything in which this highest essence reveals or will reveal itself; but hallowed are they who recognize this highest essence together with its own, i. e. together with its revelations. The sacred hallows in turn its reverer, who by his worship becomes himself a saint, as likewise what he does is saintly, a saintly walk, saintly thoughts and actions, imaginations and aspirations, etc.

In the foremost place of the sacred, then, stands the highest essence and the faith in this essence, our "holy faith."

It's nothing personal. It's a philosophical observation. — Quixodian

Sorry, I didn't mean to sound annoyed. I wasn't. I was razzing you is all.

I think you aren't reading me as charitably as you might. I'm perfectly able of just asserting a theology which would, without any justification, come off as sentimental.

I suggest that we might think of God/Jesus as an object seen from different 'perspectives.' A personality is a position in 'interpretative/hermeneutical space.' — plaque flag

Something like a cosmic film director or super CEO who can be conveniently blamed for all the bad stuff that happens in the world.

This is why any authentic spirituality, I contend, must necessarily be apophatic - the way of negation, the cloud of unknowing. — Quixodian

Note that you are giving another perspective on the same intentional object referent of 'God.' You say : some people are seeing God incorrectly --- or not as well as they could. I see better, namely that :

The point is to enact loving-kindness, not to make it object of a theory about it. — Quixodian

But I already quoted Feuerbach, who pointed toward :

a belief in ...the inexhaustible love and creative power of Spirit — plaque flag

Would you say that about any other person? In what context is a person an object? — Quixodian

You are way too touchy about entity or object as mere pieces of terminology. Yes I myself am an entity or an object. Does not hurt my feelings at all.

Not everyone. — Bob Ross

:up:

Not everyone, but we --- people in freeish societies -- inherit Socratic software. As discursive subjects we largely are that software.

Yes. Norms are “real” irregardless of whether they are objective or not; but that’s not what “real” means in the metaethical debate: it means something which exists mind-independently. — Bob Ross

Like I said, respectfully, magic stones in a hidden dimension, assumed to be cognitively inaccessible from the very beginning. It's (nonobviously) mystic talk about a round square. What does the world look like from no perspective at all ? Who hath seen it ? But we can rationally create mathematical models that we look at with working eyes.

I think it's less confusing to talk in terms of the 'transcendence' of this or that individual person --- and not the species as a whole. I don't think humans can talk sensibly about that which by definition they can't talk sensibly about. Hence the famous criticisms of Kant's mystical X.

So you do think rationality somehow produces objective norms, correct? — Bob Ross

The philosopher as such can't earnestly question the reality of normativity. The mystic or the sociopath can, but they could only argue for its unreality ironically.

That’s fine. I am appealing to epistemic norms, fundamentally, to demonstrate how those epistemic norms are either (1) not fundamental or (2) are tastes. What is wrong with that? — Bob Ross

If they aren't fundamental, your own claims about them lack leverage or 'force.' It's like going before the court to argue that argument itself is not to be trusted.

Not at all. I am saying that one’s fundamental obligation is always a taste (and not objective): it is mind dependent (and more specifically will dependent). — Bob Ross

But the problem is the status of that claim itself. It suits you (it's pleases your taste) to believe that it's all just taste.

I think you are imagining a kind of logic that is untainted by normativity, so that you can get logical leverage on normativity itself. But instrumental rationality can't give you this leverage. Only 'ethical' rationality (the essence of science) can do this.

Then what do you mean? Can you please define “rationality” for me (in the sense that you are using it)? — Bob Ross

Sure. But I already did. Maybe you missed it ? I gave a nice, long quotation above.

Regarding Kant, Schopenhauer noted that since we are a thing-in-itself, it should be possible to directly experience at least one thing-in-itself, i.e., our own existence. — Art48

If we already are the 'hidden' thing, then it's not hidden ? To me the deepest meaning of the incarnation metaphor is that we are God in mortal flesh --- timebinding softwhere/softwhen in an hardwhere (and a hardwhen) that's gory and wet and mortal. As symbolic being, discursive subject, I am an immortalish vampire cyborg.

I'll share [ part of ] my own vision of Incarnation, which is basically Feuerbach's, who is like a sunnier Schopenhauer, alive to the self-love of the human species, its delight in itself in the mental and bodily beauty of others.

What we experience are the perceivable features of individual objects. It is through the act of thinking that we are able to identify those features through the possession of which different individuals belong to the same species, with the other members of which they share these essential features in common.
...
Unlike sense experience, thought is essentially communicable. Thinking is not an activity performed by the individual person qua individual.
...
The species has no existence apart form these individual organisms, and yet the perpetuation of the species involves the perpetual generation and destruction of the particular individuals of which it is composed. Similarly, Spirit has no existence apart from the existence of individual self-conscious persons in whom Spirit becomes conscious of itself (i.e., constitutes itself as Spirit).
...
Arguing thus, Feuerbach urged his readers to acknowledge and accept the irreversibility of their individual mortality so that in doing so they might come to an awareness of the immortality of their species-essence, and thus to knowledge of their true self, which is not the individual person with whom they were accustomed to identify themselves. They would then be in a position to recognize that, while “the shell of death is hard, its kernel is sweet” (GTU 205/20), and that the true belief in immortality is

a belief in the infinity of Spirit and in the everlasting youth of humanity, in the inexhaustible love and creative power of Spirit, in its eternally unfolding itself into new individuals out of the womb of its plenitude and granting new beings for the glorification, enjoyment, and contemplation of itself. (GTU 357/137)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/

Does the basic style of communication transcend its theoretical products, or do its theoretical products redefine the very nature of the tradition? Does paradigm switching happen WITHIN science as it is understood under the terms of the old paradigm , or does the old guard, protecting its interpretation of the tradition. reject the heretical paradigm as non-science? — Joshs

To me it's a given (absolutely fundamental) that rationality (phenomenology, philosophy, ontology, science in the highest sense) determines its own essence. This is implicit in the firstness of First philosophy.

The 'most burning issue' for phenomenology first philosophy is...itself, in a recurring return to its radical founding intention, which is never finally clarified or fixed. Heidegger's early lecture courses are great on the 'methodology' of 'pre-science.'

Be we as thrown projection don't start with nothing. Habermas and Apel fallibly articulate our heritage within that very heritage.

We inherit tradition as possibility rather than [ only ] substance, or 'substance' as possibility.

Some musings.

I write in the present moment. The past is thoughts and memories. The future is memories. The present is real. It’s tangible. It’s here and now. It’s reality. The past doesn’t exist at the moment. Neither does the future. Only the present is here and now. Only the present is real.

It has always been so. I have always been in the present. The present is where I am now and where I’ve been my entire life. The present never ends. I am always in the present, even if my mind is elsewhere.

I do not exist in the past or the future. I exist now, in the present. If God is real, I can only experience God in the present. Excessive thought and concern about past and future takes me away from where I really am, takes me out of reality, takes me away from God.

The humble, ubiquitous present. So often ignored and undervalued. Yet it’s the only thing I have. It’s reality itself. — Art48

Nice issue. Husserl makes a case that the present isn't pointlike. The 'living present' is a kind of stretched apriori structure.

He used our experience of melody. I am the fading memory the note before, the sound of the note now, and the expectation of the note to come.

We can also use conceptual melody. As you read this sentence, you remember and anticipate at the same time. You are stretched between what you've gathered and an evolving projected completion that structures that gathering throughout the movement.

This apriori structure 'is' the space or matrix of experience in a certain sense, the transcendental ego which is also just the being of the world from a perspective. (?)

FWIW, I embrace perspectivism.

Perspectivism (German: Perspektivismus; also called perspectivalism) is the epistemological principle that perception of and knowledge of something are always bound to the interpretive perspectives of those observing it. While perspectivism does not regard all perspectives and interpretations as being of equal truth or value, it holds that no one has access to an absolute view of the world cut off from perspective.[1] Instead, all such viewing occurs from some point of view which in turn affects how things are perceived. Rather than attempt to determine truth by correspondence to things outside any perspective, perspectivism thus generally seeks to determine truth by comparing and evaluating perspectives among themselves.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perspectivism

As far as we know, the world is only ever given perspectively. I'd just say that it's the world that is given. The nearsighted person sees the same ball as the colorblind person with 20/20 vision. And this is the same ball that the blind person can talk about. The intentional object is part of public discourse. Any denial of this is a performative contradiction. Rational discussion tacitly assumes the conditions of its possibility. The discursive subject is always already among others, sharing in a language that intends objects and concepts in common, in the world.

If it were abolished as a discipline, people would still attempt to make sense of life. — Pantagruel

Indeed. It really doesn't matter if we call it 'philosophy' or 'fundamental ontology' of 'big picture synthesizing talk.' There's a mode of discourse that digs deepest, sees from the highest height --discourse at its most radical and abstract and synthesizing. If William James is right, the individual needs a vision of existence as a whole for sanity. Whether academia means anything in the first place is the kind of thing that might come up in this discourse. Whether longevity is the proper goal of a life. Basic questions about the meaning of being or logic or justification.

Your glue metaphor is excellent, and I think priority and authority are also crucial.