"Personally, I advocate for using the standard definitions. If the above paragraph is a correct description of your views, I would then refer to your view as epistemologically motivated ontological idealism. One must separate the contents of an axiom from its motivation, lest they be confused."
I have never heard of that term, but, yes, that seems to fit nicely! — Bob Ross
Oh, I see. Have you looked into a priori knowledge? — Bob Ross
Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but to me “causality” has been reserved for ‘interaction’ in a physical sense in the literature; (...) — Bob Ross
I compared naturalism to idealism, not "dualism". — 180 Proof
Also, I did not mention "common sense as a factor in theory creation". — 180 Proof
I think naturalism is more cogent because, as a speculative paradigm, it is more consistent with common sense (i.e. practical, or embodied, participation in nature) than idealism. I find naturalism parsimonious because it does not additionally assume that 'ideas transcend (i.e. constitute) nature' as idealism (re: ideality) does — 180 Proof
I think it is only a matter of time before AI fabricates concepts, techniques, theorems and proofs in mathematics that lay beyond the grasp of human mathematicians. — jgill
What do you take as examples of 'previous groundings'? — Paine
If you are very fluid in your ability to shift between semiotic mappings, then you are good at pushing aside previous groundings of signifiers so as to receive the stated grounding of the speaker. This allows for a far less interrupted flow of ideas from them to you. — Ø implies everything
What do you mean by “empty set of assumptions”? — Bob Ross
What do you mean by “realizing restrictions on causality”? Idealism eliminates the possibility of causality: there is no physical interaction analogous to a physicalist worldview. — Bob Ross
Could it also be seen as saying that the ideas, forms and principles that comprise the fundamental elements of reason are invariant, and so are grasped by all minds in the same way? — Wayfarer
In my kind of style of epistemological idealism, I do not conceptualize the world that way: I do not concede that the senses are of something independent of them. — Bob Ross
This sounds like a complication. An object is an idea regardless of the subjects experience? Why postulate an object which can (perhaps) never be encountered by a subject and also claim its ontological status beforehand? — Manuel
Why can't idealism be monist? One could speak of the different aspects of the mental. — Manuel
There is a sense in which the self is an illusion, or rather, a fiction, in Hume's phrase. But beyond our own conditions of having selves, to extend that to objects and attribute to them this aspect of "self", is not warranted, regardless of ones ontology. — Manuel
Cogito, ergo sum? No: Cogitare, ergo cogitare.
— Ø implies everything
:up: — 180 Proof
"He is sufficiently justified in believing that p" conveys that you believe he has sufficient proof and that you are not convinced that p is true, (...) — Ludwig V
I think there's an unstated problem in this description, which is how to grasp 'the mental' as an object of cognition. — Wayfarer
Yes its is irrational. — TheMadMan
I am not sure what the 'fluidity' you mention refers to. — Paine
In that case, I think we are both in the same boat then: the only valid ontological position in philosophy of mind is in principle agnosticism. — Bob Ross
I do think, however, that epistemological idealism is obtainable by the argument from parsimony. — Bob Ross
Do you have arguments that humanity is the thorn. — TheMadMan
Readers have to interpret a meaning to even have an inkling of what is being said. The movement from first guesses to better ones is a commitment to learn the lessons as they are presented. — Paine
The problem of environmental damage is real but the solution of antinatalism and misanthropism is irrational. If you have a thorn in your foot the solution is not to cut it off. — TheMadMan
It conveys that I have evaluated his justification and believe (but do not know) that his justification is, indeed, a justification, but not necessarily a sufficient justification. — Ludwig V
"He is justified in believing that p" does not convey that I have proof that he has a proof. It does not convey that p is true, only that it might be true. — Ludwig V
I am interested in statements. — Ludwig V
When I say "idealism" I mean philosophies similar to Plato's — T Clark
I find a value in struggling and becoming familiar with a thinker that cannot be replaced by skillful summation. — Paine
I hear many of the differences between philosophers as a problem of translation. — Paine
The encyclopedic method of putting views into a common language where they can be readily compared to each other has a value but makes it all too easy at the same time. — Paine
In order to do math or logic, you would have to be able to see the world through idealist lenses. — T Clark
The answer to the first question is Yes. — Ludwig V
First, you assume that "justify" means "conclusively justify". That's not obvious and not universally accepted. I waver somewhat on this. — Ludwig V
Welcome to the boards. Do you have a "lay of the land" you'd share about yourself? — Moliere
I am interested in epistemology and ontology, and am currently trying to create my own theory of everything (un)knowable, all derived from the empty set of propositions. As such, I employ absolute skepticism in my theory creation, and in-line with this, I am currently trying to bridge the justificatory chasm of time.
In philosophical conversation outside of my theory creation however, I do make various assumptions, lest I be bored as hell.