Personally, I am exploring the idea that, while objects may have a temporal position, consciousness actually has a temporal "size." Objects are three dimensional and moving through or in time, as it were. But consciousness actually exists in the past, present and future, has actual temporal dimension. — Pantagruel

I have been exploring this as well. As you can see in my bio, I am (and have been) trying to epistemically bridge the chasm of time, and if the above quote is true, it would help a ton with the pain in the ass that memory skepticism poses.

First, an important point of possible confusion. Consciousness can have "temporal extension" in two distinct ways. Consciousness can have a motion-temporal-extension and an object-temporal-extension. Most assume the former, but I interpreted your comment as pertaining to the latter, meaning consciousness itself extends into time, without any movement necessary (like a still-standing chair extending into the three spatial dimensions). In this reply, I am interested in the latter. Some might say the former necessitates the latter, but at least mathematically, that is not true. N-dimensional manifolds can be embedded into M-dimensional spaces, where M > N. So, does consciousness have a temporal dimension, or does it merely move through time?

Is the present (as a "percept") actually a duration? Looking at a river, one might think/feel so. But I am able to bring doubt to this. What would it even mean?

Does it mean that we experience multiple instants of time simultaneously? Well, if that's the case, it cannot be in the sense of squeezing durations into instants, for that would not correspond to my experiential reality. Instead, if we experience multiple instants simultaneously, we take the past x units of time with us in the experiential, spacious box that is the present, and this allows us to actually engage in temporally extended experiences. But is it the only way?

Does remembering, even in its most basic form, imply an actual experience of the past? Could it be that the present feels like a duration only because we bring with us representations of the past that we apprehend simultaneously as we do the present instant? I mean, if one is already postulating the ability of simultaneous apprehension of distinct percepts, there is no explanatory need to postulate a temporal extension of consciousness. However, if our experience of the past is merely through representations of the past, as opposed to an actual, direct apprehension of the recent past, then we incur the question of memory skepticism.

Do you have any more thoughts on this?

I am not familiar with the book you mention. However, if you think potentiality is a cause, then randomness does not imply any uncaused event.

Then we have things like the Four Color theorem which required a computer to evaluate a huge number of cases to "prove". — jgill

Are you implying the Four Color theorem is an example not within the scope of too lengthy for humans to go through? An exhaustive proof where the cases tried are too numerous is just a special case of a theorem with too many steps for a human to go through.

I don't see how there are any issues of incomprehensibility that are not ultimately an issue of length, unless these super-intelligences somehow have access to data that is inaccessible to us (though, that would be an empirical barrier, not a logical one).

Depends on what you call uncaused. Is the potential for something a cause?

In an idealistic reality, isn't everything a dream? A creation of one super-mind, or a collection of minds? Are there random events in dreams? How would that work? — RogueAI

I have some thoughts on random versus determined events that are a bit too tied up in my theory to be laid out here.

But I can respond to your comment with another question: how is physicalism any more welcoming of randomness than idealism?

How are there any random events in an idealistic reality? — RogueAI

How is randomness incompatible with an idealistic reality?

It seems you are talking about epistemological idealism. I do not see how what you say necessitates the sole existence of the mental. Instead, it only seems like you're arguing for the fact that we cannot know (of) anything but the mental. I find the latter to be trivial; thus, it is the former I am interested in exploring.

"Personally, I advocate for using the standard definitions. If the above paragraph is a correct description of your views, I would then refer to your view as epistemologically motivated ontological idealism. One must separate the contents of an axiom from its motivation, lest they be confused."

I have never heard of that term, but, yes, that seems to fit nicely! — Bob Ross

I have not heard the term epistemologically motivated ontological idealism outside of my own usage either, just to let you know that it isn't (necessarily) an established term. I think it is a practical term though.

Oh, I see. Have you looked into a priori knowledge? — Bob Ross

Yes, I study a lot of formal logic.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but to me “causality” has been reserved for ‘interaction’ in a physical sense in the literature; (...) — Bob Ross

That could be, but I am not so bothered by it. I see no issue redefining terms so long as the new definition is explicated and clear. Furthermore, I do not think physicality is a criterium for causality in any mainstream (philosophical or otherwise) definitions in the literature. Instead, the mostly physicalist application of the term is likely just because causality is typically of more interest to physicalists and because idealists are not that common/well-known. Thus, I'd say causality merely has physicalist connotations, but is definitionally not reserved for that domain of reality.

I compared naturalism to idealism, not "dualism". — 180 Proof

I know; I did not claim that you did either. Instead, I just disagreed with your belief that naturalism is the most common-sensical notion by claiming that dualism is instead the most common-sensical notion among laypeople nowadays. By brining up dualism as the most common-sensical nowadays however, I then had to contend with it as well in my comment. That is why I asserted the common-sensicality of idealism in comparison to both naturalism and dualism; the latter being the contender I myself added to the mix.

Also, I did not mention "common sense as a factor in theory creation". — 180 Proof

Well, it is implied:

I think naturalism is more cogent because, as a speculative paradigm, it is more consistent with common sense (i.e. practical, or embodied, participation in nature) than idealism. I find naturalism parsimonious because it does not additionally assume that 'ideas transcend (i.e. constitute) nature' as idealism (re: ideality) does — 180 Proof

Parsimony and consistency with common sense are non-factors as far as a realist notion of truth is concerned. As far as building a practical theory is concerned however, parsimony and common sense are definitely factors. I assumed the latter context because the alternative would be assuming that you believe common sense and parsimony are prerequisites for real/absolute truth, which is demonstrably false.

I think it is only a matter of time before AI fabricates concepts, techniques, theorems and proofs in mathematics that lay beyond the grasp of human mathematicians. — jgill

Could you elaborate? Do you mean their theorems/concepts would have so many steps/components that it would take longer than a lifetime for a human to properly go through it/grasp it?

He didn't really seem like a philosopher to me, from the little I saw of his comments.

What do you take as examples of 'previous groundings'? — Paine

Well, first I just want to ground your question; I think it is (ultimately) a response to this:

If you are very fluid in your ability to shift between semiotic mappings, then you are good at pushing aside previous groundings of signifiers so as to receive the stated grounding of the speaker. This allows for a far less interrupted flow of ideas from them to you. — Ø implies everything

So, to answer the question as I interpreted it; the previous grounding is whatever referent(s) the listener tied to the term before the speaker stated their own definition. If the listener is then is able to switch perspective and communicate using the new definition that was established by the speaker, then they are demonstrating an ability to fluidly switch between semiotic mappings.

Now, what caused the previous grounding of the listener? That is a different, far more complicated question. It would depend a lot on the type of term/referents involved.

What do you mean by “empty set of assumptions”? — Bob Ross

No assumptions; from an absolutely skeptical standpoint. It may seem impossible to derive any propositions from no assumptions, but I believe I have. Nothing significant (yet) though.

What do you mean by “realizing restrictions on causality”? Idealism eliminates the possibility of causality: there is no physical interaction analogous to a physicalist worldview. — Bob Ross

In an objective idealism, there can be. If you, in addition to your idealist assumption, assume a regularity in reality (laws of nature), and a distributive awareness (God, mind at large, the simulator(s), etc.), then you can arrive back at science. Now, in such a framework, you'll have causality; and if it is restrictive enough, it will deny the possibility of non-mental objects interacting with your framework's solely mental reality.

I would not say ontological naturalism is in alignment with common sense. I believe dualism is the most common-sensical notion among laypeople, and ontological naturalism is in alignment with more scientifically-minded people.

Also, when considering common sense as a factor in theory creation, it ought to be tempered. The degree of common-sensicality of the assertion itself should be taken together with the degrees of common-sensicality of its consequences. Furthermore, common sense is arbitrarily shaped by culture, even if it is perhaps constrained on a deeper, neurological level. Thus, one ought to consider whether an assertion's alternatives could be considered equally common-sensical in a different culture (which would be, of course, considerations steeped with uncertainty). I believe objective idealism, in a different culture, would be just as common-sensical as dualism is in our current culture, and more common-sensical than ontological naturalism is in our current culture.

Perhaps a historicist's perspective is due here? I wonder if the theists of the past thought that reality was all in the mind of God, thus asserting an objective idealism?

The way I categorize objective idealism and subjective idealism is the following way:

You, under no hallucination, look at a tree, and then you look away. Does the tree still exist?

"No," says the subjective idealist.
"Potentially", says the objective idealist, "Because someone might still be looking at the tree."

An objective idealist who asserts there are certain laws to reality, which is typically the aim of objective idealism (and coupling of idealism with empiricism and logic), would likely answer: "Most likely, because there is no reason to believe I was hallucinating. Trees do not just poof out of existence (because of this and that law of nature), and thus, since my recent experience of it necessitates its existence, someone must still be looking at it." But who is looking at it? If you assert the existence of comprehensive, idealist reality that spans every place/object that has ever been experienced, whatever form those places/objects may take now, then you must assert some distributed awareness across all of reality.

You could say the difference between the weaker and stronger form of objective idealism that I just delineated is that the former says there is something objective out there, due to the existence of other conscious observers. The latter does that, and then also specifies what is objective. In so doing, the latter form typically requires an entity often equated to God, whereas the former could say all that is objective exists purely inter-subjectively between finite, normal subjects. Thus, to arrive at this:

Could it also be seen as saying that the ideas, forms and principles that comprise the fundamental elements of reason are invariant, and so are grasped by all minds in the same way? — Wayfarer

One must, in addition to claiming the existence of the objective, one must specify that the above is also objective. So, to answer your question; objective idealism does not necessitate the above be objective, but it typically would.

In my kind of style of epistemological idealism, I do not conceptualize the world that way: I do not concede that the senses are of something independent of them. — Bob Ross

I see. Would you say your style of epistemological idealism is really just ontological idealism, but based on epistemological grounds instead of ontological grounds? That is, on a first-order level, you assert only the mental exist, but on a second-order level, you assert this assertion is not certain, but rather the best assertion; as opposed to a purely ontological idealism, which would assert the sole existence of the mental on all orders.

Personally, I advocate for using the standard definitions. If the above paragraph is a correct description of your views, I would then refer to your view as epistemologically motivated ontological idealism. One must separate the contents of an axiom from its motivation, lest they be confused.

This sounds like a complication. An object is an idea regardless of the subjects experience? Why postulate an object which can (perhaps) never be encountered by a subject and also claim its ontological status beforehand? — Manuel

Objective idealism is not postulating an object that can (perhaps) never be encountered by a subject. It is saying that there is an all-experiencing subject (often equated with God), who thus gives rise to all of reality. This is a way to explain the regularity of experience, and its apparent independence of our will. I cannot will a glass to levitate, nor can I will to see or unsee the sky with open eyes directed at it. My experience evolves in a regular way beyond my control. In order to explain this, we can say that existence is not predicated on any one, finite experiencer, but rather, on every experiencer (though, to different degrees). The experiencer that experiences everything is God. Taken together with the idea that the experiencer is the medium of experience, we thus arrive at Kastrup's idea of everything being a part of the mind of God; we could be explained as the dream avatars in God's dream. I say God out of convenience here; Kastrup uses a far less loaded term; mind at large.

Also, as a side note: this all might seem very theistically loaded. I just want to say that personally, I am agnostic, and all the views espoused here are not views I hold (although I do lean towards them more than their alternatives). Furthermore, Bernando Kastrup does not advocate for the equivocation of his mind at large with God, given that he believes the mind at large does not possess meta-cognition.

Why can't idealism be monist? One could speak of the different aspects of the mental. — Manuel

You misunderstood my paragraph, which is understandable, due to my clunky chain negatives of which I take on faith to be even number xD. But yeah, I was saying the opposite; idealism is by definition a substance monism (at least, those are the definitions I've encountered).

There is a sense in which the self is an illusion, or rather, a fiction, in Hume's phrase. But beyond our own conditions of having selves, to extend that to objects and attribute to them this aspect of "self", is not warranted, regardless of ones ontology. — Manuel

I did not talk about the possibility of attributing self to objects. Instead, I was talking about the possibility of no self. It is an extremely counter-intuitive possibility, but what if reality just is? Physicalists are capable of positing objects with subjects, which means the notion of a subject-less theater of objects is already posited. Now, the theater of objects surrounding "you" is what you have defined as the subjective theater; but what is it about the objects around you that necessitate the existence of a subject? Why cannot it simply be reality?

Such a view has to contend with the experience of a subject however; it does that by saying that such experience is always indirect. That is, we have thoughts of being a self, but what evidence is that? Cannot a piece of paper proclaim itself as belong to a self? Thus, cannot a subject-less though proclaim itself to be belonging to a subject?

It seems the term naturalism is a bit vague (see this SEP article). I think we should explicate what we mean by the term. When I used naturalism in response to your comment, I used it as a synonym to physicalism, which according to the SEP article is correct for a fully-fledged ontological naturalism. As for how ontological naturalism compares to methodological naturalism, I am bit confused.

The SEP article says the former is a claim about reality, while the latter is a claim about the practice of science and philosophy. I interpret the latter as asserting "we can only know of the natural", without asserting the non-existence of the supernatural. This then makes the relation between ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism that of the relation between ontological and epistemological idealism.

So, what do you mean by naturalism, ontological naturalism, etc.?

Cogito, ergo sum? No: Cogitare, ergo cogitare.
— Ø implies everything
:up: — 180 Proof

Noticed that my Latin grammar was wrong, so I've edited the quoted text. I hope the message you received has not been affected.

Objective idealism, if mind is considered necessary for the mental to exist, does entail a mind at large, as Bernando Kastrup puts it. Adding a few quite sensible assumptions to objective idealism, we do arrive back at science. I assume that's what you tried to say by ontological idealism being in practice indistinguishable from naturalism. However, ontological is a bit too general for that.

I wonder, why do you find idealism conceptually unparsimonious, and why do you find naturalism more cogent?

"He is sufficiently justified in believing that p" conveys that you believe he has sufficient proof and that you are not convinced that p is true, (...) — Ludwig V

As a proposition, the sentence does not convey that I am convinced of anything. As a statement, one could argue that the omission hints at a lack of personal conviction. However, any such argument would be based on subjective experience; i.e. how a person subjectively reads into the omission of details. Personally, I would disagree, but as said, this is subjective.

I'm not quite sure I get what you mean. I might seem to be overly literal in my confusion, but their efforts cannot literally be the previous groundings themselves. I expect that's not what you mean, but I think I need a reformulation of what you said to get it.

You point to a tough challenge for idealism.

In some ontologies based on objective idealism, all thinkable, perceivable and feelable objects exist regardless of whether they are the objects of any finite subject's consciousness. Perhaps these object's intrinsic natures also exist, despite those natures being incomprehensible to said finite subjects; for example, absolute infinity is a thought/concept whose extrinsic nature is thinkable to finite subjects. For proof, see this definition; absolute infinity is a quantity of which no number could be larger. Due to its definability, it has an extrinsic nature. In an ontology based on objective idealism, there could be a "place" for its intrinsic nature to exist as well, despite perhaps our fundamental incapacity to mentally access that nature.

This brings me to subjects . In an objectively idealist reality, the intrinsic nature of subjects could, like absolute infinity, also have a place in this objectively idealist reality; it is simply that this place is not (necessarily) the theater of our experiences. Perhaps it is capable of entering the theater temporarily, though, through deep introspection/meditation. Can you bring awareness to your awareness itself? Can a subject be its own object? Even if it can, we know from experience that it is not so at all times. Thus, we need something more to explain our own existence.

Another solution is to not define the mental as the contents of mentation, but rather, the space/medium of mentation. Thus, with this definition, idealism is not postulating the sole existence of experience, but rather, only the existence of experiencer(s). However, for this to then be idealism, experience would need to be derivative from experiencer; if not, then one would not be dealing with a monism, and thus, it would not be idealism. Bernando Kastrup conceptualizes this derivativity as experience being to experiencer what waves are to water.

The last solution is to simply reject the premise that experience necessitates an experiencer. What have we to support this notion, really? If we can envision a lifeless physicalist reality, why not a lifeless idealist reality? What if it is all an illusion; what if the self is just a construct of thoughts that belong to no-one, but that insist on belonging to someone? Can I not write on a paper, "Hey, I (this paper) am alive!". Perhaps an idealist reality can have objects that falsely proclaim the existence of a self. One can summarize this view with the following:

Cogito, ergo sum? No: Cogitatio est, ergo cogitatio est.

I think there's an unstated problem in this description, which is how to grasp 'the mental' as an object of cognition. — Wayfarer

Well, I have many questions regarding how to grasp anything as an object of cognition, but I do not think that the category of the mental poses a lot more difficulty than any other concepts. There is some added difficulty due to its primitiveness however; it is only understood through pointing to experience, and the successful reception of that requires a non-verbal leap in the mind of the receiver. That said, all concepts derive from primitives and thus inherit this difficulty; however, the difficulty is less visible at these higher levels of conceptual aggregation, and there are also likely more sources of meaning rushing in to ground the concepts; though, that amplifies another issue, the issue of signifiers having distinct groundings between speaker and recipient.

It seems we probably share quite similar ideas of the self. Though, my ideas are quite vague and underdeveloped, still.

@Wayfarer Are IDs generated by the email account used to sign-up with? If so, cannot email accounts be automatically blocked? In any case, banned IDs could be blocked, right? Or at least, there could be an automatic detection of the IDs?

Yes its is irrational. — TheMadMan

On what basis?

I am not sure what the 'fluidity' you mention refers to. — Paine

If you are very fluid in your ability to shift between semiotic mappings, then you are good at pushing aside previous groundings of signifiers so as to receive the stated grounding of the speaker. This allows for a far less interrupted flow of ideas from them to you.

I find philosophers are typically at either end of this spectrum. Some philosophers get caught up in the history and baggage of words, thinking it relevant to the actual conceptualization communicated by those words despite the speaker clearly redefining them. Other philosophers understand that words are intrinsically empty* vessels of meaning and that the concepts they carry are the target; unless you're a semantician, you don't care about the map, you care about the land!

*They may have phonaesthetic properties that factor in on what meanings are more likely to be given them; see the Bouba/Kiki effect. Even then, certain definitions of intrinsic in this context may relegate even phonaesthetic properties to the set of extrinsic properties of words.

In that case, I think we are both in the same boat then: the only valid ontological position in philosophy of mind is in principle agnosticism. — Bob Ross

Well, I am in that boat, but only reluctantly so. I have been able to derive things from the empty set of assumptions, and as such, I might be able to derive ontological idealism. I think it might be possible via realizing restrictions on causality.

I do think, however, that epistemological idealism is obtainable by the argument from parsimony. — Bob Ross

I think epistemological idealism is obtainable through quite simple logic. All knowledge is directly derived from the mental (by definition of the mental), and in order to know that we can know of the non-mental is to know that there is a completely reliable mapping between the mental and non-mental. However, any such knowledge would be mediated by the mental. How can we know of a mapping if we do not have access to both the domain and its image?

Do you have arguments that humanity is the thorn. — TheMadMan

One does not necessarily need an argument. What if the misanthrope simply values all non-human life more than humanity, and thus their anti-natalist views are not irrational in that they defeat their purpose.

Basically, I am claiming that you're making the implicit assumption that anti-natalist hold their views because they want what's best for humanity. What if they do not? Perhaps you think not wanting the best for humanity is itself irrational, but then you'd have to answer to Hume's Guillotine.

Readers have to interpret a meaning to even have an inkling of what is being said. The movement from first guesses to better ones is a commitment to learn the lessons as they are presented. — Paine

There is definitely much value inherent in this process. It exercises many things; one's discipline, one's ability to comprehend and reason, one's ability to fluidly shift between semiotic mappings, etc.

However, in the aftermath of a widespread adoption of a precise and static philosophical lingua de franca, there would still be many exercises of discipline, comprehension and reasoning left. There would be little to no exercising of one's ability to fluidly shift between semiotic mappings (except for during one's learning of the language), though there would not be much need for this ability anyways, given that discourse would now happen with precision and clarity. Multi-layered and interpretative discourse could be relegated to art.

The problem of environmental damage is real but the solution of antinatalism and misanthropism is irrational. If you have a thorn in your foot the solution is not to cut it off. — TheMadMan

You assume humanity is the foot; what if the life on Earth in general, and/or some notion of nature, is the foot in which humanity is the thorn?

Could you elaborate?

It conveys that I have evaluated his justification and believe (but do not know) that his justification is, indeed, a justification, but not necessarily a sufficient justification. — Ludwig V

I am not interested here in propositions regarding people with insufficient justification. That's why I said I (from then on) would only use justified as meaning sufficiently justified. I guess I'll stop being lazy and just write sufficiently justified from now on to avoid any and all confusion.

"He is justified in believing that p" does not convey that I have proof that he has a proof. It does not convey that p is true, only that it might be true. — Ludwig V

If we change it to He is sufficiently justified in believing that p, then it does convey that I have proof that he has proof. That then also conveys that p is true. Thus, the truth criterion is, in cases of sufficient justification, redundant.

Of course, my proposition (1) = He is sufficiently justified in believing that p could be false; however, its truth-value will always be the same as (2) = He is sufficiently justified in believing that p and p is true (2). That is, (1) $\iff$ (2).

I am interested in statements. — Ludwig V

I think that explains a lot of our misunderstanding. The intuitive content of (1) is different from (2), even if they strictly speaking carry the same information. To use an analogy; the propositions He thinks his shoes are cool and He thinks his shoes are cool and someone thinks his shoes are cool have the same informational content, yet the second inspires an imaginative leap; is that someone perhaps someone else than 'him'?. By adding that p is true, that (in normal conversation) inspires one to think that the speaker holds additional knowledge regarding p, outside of their knowledge that the subject knows p.

Do you think that explains our misunderstandings?

When I say "idealism" I mean philosophies similar to Plato's — T Clark

That is not the typical definition, no. Though, I feel like I have a vague memory of it being used in that way; in any case, I do believe there is a tradition of using terms Forms and Ideas interchangeably.

However, the typical definition of ontological idealism is that it is the view that all of reality consists solely of the mental. On this point, Platonism is explicitly not; take what I say with a grain of salt, but I think Platonism is a substance pluralism, in that it claims there is a mental substance, a physical substance and an abstract substance (the latter consisting of Plato's forms).

Note also that epistemological idealism is the view that we only know (of) the mental.

I find a value in struggling and becoming familiar with a thinker that cannot be replaced by skillful summation. — Paine

I find value in struggle too. A universal and precise language would not eliminate struggle; it would increase the fruits of it, however. And what is value in becoming familiar with a thinker if not the value of their ideas?

What theory are you using in your reference to the ego and self? Freudian, Jungian, etc.?

I hear many of the differences between philosophers as a problem of translation. — Paine

I definitely agree with that.

The encyclopedic method of putting views into a common language where they can be readily compared to each other has a value but makes it all too easy at the same time. — Paine

I would disagree there. We would still have many fundamental differences left to have fun with, and at the same time, a lot of unnecessary (and sometimes deadly) conflict would have been removed through such a language.

In order to do math or logic, you would have to be able to see the world through idealist lenses. — T Clark

I would disagree. In order to do classical mathematics or certain types of logic, one has to view it through the lens of Platonic forms (or some other non-mental, non-physical substance). There is no way to experience absolute infinity, for example. We can define it, but to invoke it as an object/property without constructing it, one would have to postulate or imagine some kind of realm in which it exists merely because it was definable.

One can contrast this to constructive mathematics, in which one must use an idealist or dualist lens (probably the latter, due to them designating the aid of computers performing calculations (necessarily) outside our experience as valid).

The whole point of the argument appealing to the problem of interaction is to argue that interaction between the mental and non-mental is impossible. Thus, even if the non-mental exists, it does not affect us and could, in one sense of the word, be called unreal. The argument basically says there are two possibilities:

1. The non-mental does not exist.
2. The non-mental does exist, but it cannot interact with the mental at all.

Both of these possibilities are practically identical, but to arrive at 2., one must invoke the problem of interaction. Basically, it side-steps the issue of proving the non-mental non-existent by arguing that it does not matter whether it exists.