I quite agree. The kinds of properties of microphysical particles that cause the emergence of wetness cannot cause the emergence of human consciousness.

You're still missing the point. You argue that microphysical particles must be conscious because consciousness is always found in certain configurations of particles. I pointed out that is like saying that microphysical particles must be wet because wetness is reliably found in certain configurations of microphysical particles. — Janus

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.

I know many people disagree with my second sentence, but that's what I think.

I do, however, consider the possibility that consciousness is a ubiquitous field that accomplishes the same thing proto-consciousness does. Whether subjective experience is due to the particles being animated by such a field, or a property of the particles, might amount to the same thing.

And I haven't said that anything just happens randomly or by chance either, so that is a red herring.. — Janus

It wasn't a red herring. I didn't know if that's what you were thinking.

Only "If everything we take to be meaningful is just the result of chemicals that can be replicated..." But maybe we are more than an extremely complicated bunch of billiard balls bouncing off of each other.
— Patterner

And if we're not? What would suggest otherwise? — Darkneos

Are particles, the forces, and the laws of physics, the reason computers exist, enabling us to communicate like this? Because computers come about naturally through chemical reactions, and other interactions of physical things?

No. Computers exist because we wanted them to exist, so that we could use them to do things we can't do otherwise. So we did things that the laws of physics would never have done, and made things that would not exist, but for our purposeful, future-serving actions.

And why we are discussing this topic? Because this topic is encoded in chemicals? If you put elements x, y, and z together, bringing about a certain reaction, and you throw some a, b, and c into it, do you get the idea that you chose to post about?

No, it's due to the potential logical conclusions of thinking about this. — Darkneos

Only "If everything we take to be meaningful is just the result of chemicals that can be replicated..." But maybe we are more than an extremely complicated bunch of billiard balls bouncing off of each other.

However, we do have a part of the brain that detects fakeness (No idea of where it is and where I read about it) so any machine that you aware was a machine would ultimately fail because you would "know" it was a fake and discount the experience. — Malcolm Parry

Indeed. Our knowing it was machine-induced, if that was the case, or even if we thought that was the case, would become part of the experience.

But that's not necessarily bad. I'm told there are amazing VR things out there. I have only experienced one brief thing in a mall. I was a bird flying way above some mountains. It wasn't high quality VR. It was just a drawing, although a very nice one. Anyway, I knew I was not a bird, and that I was in VR. It was still a great experience. Except for getting slightly nausea. I knew if was VR, and it looked like a drawing. And yet, my stomach turned at a rather tame aerial maneuver. Despite the discomfort, it was amazing that that happened to me.

very interesting that Chat GPT is saying things like this:

"However, this doesn’t mean there’s no difference on a deeper level. The "realness" of our experiences, even if they are chemically driven, carries meaning through their context. The pain we feel from a loss or the joy we experience in connection is tied to our awareness of being in the world, navigating time, and engaging with others in a shared reality. It’s not just the chemical reaction itself, but the process of experiencing and growing through life that gives our experiences richness and significance."


Anyway, I don't know terribly much about this thought experiment. Is the idea that the machines sends all the same signals to the brain from our senses that we would have gotten if the events had actually happened to us? Or does it skip all that, and "simply" implant memories of those events? Something else?

ah the plant chapter, that was honestly fascinating. — flannel jesus

Yes, that was also the parasites. Less fun, but no less fascinating.

You haven't answered the question. I'm asking about atoms not molecules. I could be asking about what properties of electrons, protons and neutrons or even quarks give rise to wetness.
All you're telling us is that wetness emerges at the molecular level. What you've given is just description of what happens not explanation. — Janus

I did answer about atoms. I even went down a level below that. I started at the top, with cohesion and adhesion. Then went down to the molecules and their hydrogen bonds. Then down to the atoms and their electron shells. Then down to the electrons and protons and their opposing charges, which attract each other.

If not for the bottom, there wouldn't be the top. There wouldn't be atoms if not for the properties of the electrons are protons. There wouldn't be molecules if not for the properties of the atom. There wouldn't be wetness if not for the properties of the molecules.

Or is it your position that wetness comes about for no reason at all? In which case, I wonder why it always exists in certain conditions. Water always makes a carpet wet within a certain temperature range. If there was no reason for that, wouldn't it happen inconsistently?

It doesn't happen inconsistently. It happens every single time. If something happens every single time, we assume there's an underlying reason.

What is the explanation of wetness in the properties of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms? — Janus

The Hawaiians do a good, quick rundown of Cohesion, the attraction of liquid molecules to each other, and Adhesion, the attraction of liquid molecules to other substances. If adhesion is stronger than cohesion, the substance gets wet.

And cohesion and adhesion are the result of hydrogen bonds. Which gets into electron shells, and how many electrons are best for each shell's stability. And down to the negatively charged electrons circling three positively charged protons in the nucleus.

No substance just happens to have the characteristics it has. There are reasons. The properties of particles, forces, and laws of physics dictate how things are.

My cliff notes for it? Well, he doesn't seem to differentiate much between human and plant consciousness. Like they're talking about plants having a form of memory. He says, "i'll be giving a talk, and someone will say, 'Oh, no, that's not memory. They're just responding to a past event.' I just give them a look and say, 'Yeah? And what do you call responding to a past event?'."

Plants have far more photoreceptors than we do. which I've never thought about, but it makes sense. As he says, they are entirely dependent upon life for their survival. They have a "vast array" of photo receptors. They're in every cell, in different parts of the cells, and move around in the cell when they need to. They are able to "see" shapes, colored and intensity to high degrees.

Plants only have one kind of touch receptor, whereas we have many. And there's very little subjectivity in plants, so they don't feel pain. They just sense touch. Pain relievers should be called ion channel inhibitors. They work on plants by stopping the flow of electricity, just as they do humans, because it's the same molecular mechanism. So a Venus flytrap doesn't send the signal that a fly has touched one of its hairs, and doesn't close in on it.

He says the same about plants "smelling" as he did about memory. Like when one plant releases pheromones, and nearby fruity ripen. People two him, "No, they're not smelling it, they're just experiencing it." Then they say, "Ok, they're not aware of it." He compares it to involuntarily salivating when you smell the barbecue.

Really loving Lights On. Thank you for the recommendation. Just spoke with Daniel Chamovitz in Ch 4.

i'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of. Just as there is an explanation for wet in the properties of the particles that whatever the liquid in question is made out of.

My point is that not all chemical processes are processing information. That's what makes DNA so special. It processes information. And it's the basis of life.

And it's the first time a group of particles subjectively experienced as a whole, rather than the individual particles all on their own.

Physical connections aren't enough.
— Patterner

Perhaps it's more like "some, or even most, kinds of physical connections aren't enough". — Janus

Not sure if I expressed myself well. What I meant is, just joining things together doesn't mean the larger physical unit will have consciousness as a unit. A physical unit isn't necessarily a conscious unit. Most of the universe is physical units that aren't conscious units. They're just a bunch of particles, each with the experience of being a particle, even though joined together physically with other particles. Yes, the first level, and any particle might become part of a conscious unit at some point. But at the moment, not much going on.

I think the connection must involve information processing. Like taking the information encoded in DNA, and making proteins. Chemical reactions are all physical, but they don't all have anything to do with information.

Under panpsychism, nothing would be an automaton, right? - for everything would in one way or another be endowed with psyche (rather than being a psyche-less mechanism). — javra

Only if consciousness equals psyche. I think they are different things.

If one entertains some form of proto-experience for subatomic particles and the like (this proto-experience being a something which we hardly can comprehend) why then necessarily exclude the possibility of a "proto-understanding" which would be innate to this very proto-experience? — javra

Only if experience equals understanding. I think they are different things.

According to my ideas, everything has subjective experience. The nature of the thing that is subjectively experienced is what determines whether or not there is awareness, self-awareness, understanding, psyche, intelligence, sense of self, and other things. I thought I just recently posted this somewhere, but can't find it. I might compare it with vision. I can look at a blank wall. Or I can look at the Grand Canyon, an Escher drawing, or the Aurora borealis. My vision is the same, no matter what I'm looking at. The thing I'm looking at determines what I see. I know that sounds silly. But the thing experienced is what's different, whether it's a particle, a worm, or a human. The analogy is flawed because I can't experience being anything other than myself, the way I can look at different things. But consciousness is unique, and no analogy can work.

I don't agree with all the things you think have a sense of self. But I have considered the question enough to have fully formed thoughts about it, or a way to articulate it. But now you've got me thinking.

In short, the worm, just like any other organism (even prokaryotic ones), does have a (non-conceptual) sense of self. This as is empirically verifiable (at least when granting that no lifeform is an automaton). — javra

There you go. Automatons. What's the line between automatons and ... not automotive?

As I've said, I think the key is information processing. That's what makes the proto-consciousness in all the particles into a unit with consciousness. But that needs to build before there's any sense of self. The system processing of the information in DNA, the first step of all, isn't felt as a self. How about single-celled organisms? I don't think archaea or bacteria have a sense of self. But where does it kick in? How many information processing systems, or kinds of IPSs, does an organism have to have before there's a sense of self? Maybe worms do, I just used them as an example.

But I really don't know what you mean by "non-conceptual sense of self", so not sure where we agree and disagree.

I am done with your nonsense. I have literally read my last post of yours.

Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be (this having read the OP's quotes - thanks for reposting them) - such as when devoid of any sense of self (which, as a sense of self, would then proto-experience or else be proto-conscious of that which is not self). But I'll here put those questions aside. — javra

Put aside?? Seems like important stuff to me! :smile: Not sure it's anything we could describe. But I think it's there because, a) I think human consciousness needs to be explained by the properties of the particles that we are made of, but none of the physical properties fit the bill, and b) if the primary particles that we are made of are interchangable with any other primary particles anywhere else in the universe, then all particles must have the property in question.

I think, though, that I can imagine there is something it is like to be, let's say, a worm, but that the worm has no sense of self. Does a worm know it is not the dirt through which it digs? I'm not saying it thinks it is the dirt through which it digs. I'm saying maybe it doesn't have any concept of itself, the dirt, or anything else. Yet, it feels. Cold, warm, hungry, danger... It may react to any of those feelings without thought, via what, in Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious, Antonio Damasio calls "non-explicit competences—based on molecular and sub-molecular processes".

The property dualism although it can explain bottom-up causation, the existence of experience for example, cannot explain top-bottom causation, for example, how a single experience like a thought you have can lead to you typing the content of your thought. — MoK

Sez you :grin: I'll tell you what I think about causality asap. Hopefully tomorrow. And everyone reading this who already thinks I'm off my rocker will want to call the men in the white coats after that.

Hm. I somehow missed your recent post that begins with "Although its been a few days now..." I do everything on my cell phone, so I sometimes miss things. (I also have a ton more spelling errors than I would typing, because my phone"corrects" me a lot.)

OK, but then you might want to explain what “subjective awareness” can possibly mean when completely devoid of any kind of tacit understanding*. — javra

I have some quotes in my OP. They are at the end here. The idea is that understanding isn't intrinsic to all consciousness. I think that idea is a mistake.

I’m not antithetical to panpsychism, btw, but if it were to be real, I don’t so far deem it possible that a rock, for example, would have a subjective awareness of its own and thereby be endowed with subjectivity - this for reasons previously mentioned. — javra

Long to explain...

I don't think a rock has subjective awareness. I apologize. I know I said it that way, but it was just for the sake of posting sooner than later. Busy day. Rather, each particle has subjective awareness. Physical bonds don't make a rock a single unit, as far as consciousness is concerned, so they're all on their own in that regard. A rock doesn't have consciousness, and breaking a rock in half doesn't give you two rocks with consciousness. An old grandfather clock is not one unit, as far as consciousness is concerned. Physical connections aren't enough.

Information processing is what makes a group of particles one unit, in regards to consciousness. A system processing information subjectively experiences as a unit. I use the term proto-consciousness when referring to the subjective experience of particles, and consciousness when referring to the subjective experience of units.

It all started with DNA. DNA is extraordinary beyond words. DNA, mRNA, tRNA, ribosomes, aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases, and other things, are part of the information processing system that produces the amino acids and proteins that are coded into DNA. One unit that is processing information. Therefore, subjectively experiencing as a unit.

Add more information processing systems, all one unit/one organism, all working to keep the group of systems/the organism alive. Therefore, subjectively experiencing as a unit. And what that unit is experiencing is much more than what the unit in the previous paragraph is experiencing.

Add any kind of brain, an information processing system that controls and coordinates all the others, and we're talking about consciousness of something serious. Building up to the human brain, which is obviously capable of thinking things, and kinds of things, no other species is. Even thinking about information. Even thinking about information just for the sake of thinking about information.

Maybe AI has consciousness, because it processes information. But maybe it needs more information processing systems before it will subjectively experience anything like we have. We aren't just pure information, as AI is. We are several times more information processing systems than I know about.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.) — javra

You and everybody else in the world. :grin: All speculation.


-------------------------------------

In this article, Philip Goff writes:

Panpsychism is sometimes caricatured as the view that fundamental physical entities such as electrons have thoughts; that electrons are, say, driven by existential angst. However, panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

Of course in human beings consciousness is a sophisticated thing, involving subtle and complex emotions, thoughts and sensory experiences. But there seems nothing incoherent with the idea that consciousness might exist in some extremely basic forms. We have good reason to think that the conscious experiences a horse has are much less complex than those of a human being, and the experiences a chicken has are much less complex than those of a horse. As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely, but rather fades as organic complexity reduces, through flies, insects, plants, amoeba, and bacteria. For the panpsychist, this fading-whilst-never-turning-off continuum further extends into inorganic matter, with fundamental physical entities – perhaps electrons and quarks – possessing extremely rudimentary forms of consciousness, which reflects their extremely simple nature.

In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

Are you then maintaining that "consciousness in its most fundamental sense" can well be fully devoid of all understanding/comprehension - irrespective of how minuscule - regarding that of which it might be aware/conscious of? — javra

Yes, that is my thought. Consciousness is always the same. It's just the subjective awareness of the thing in question. A rock's consciousness is extremely limited. Certainly no understanding/comprehension. Nothing I would even know how to discuss. Skrbina's "instantaneous memory-less moments of experience." But it's there; the basis of all, including human, consciousness.

8 chapters away, but I'll get there.

Although as you get later (spoiler alert), you discover that she DOESN'T think mass is fundamental, primarily because she doesn't think space-time itself is fundamental (and mass is itself defined in relation to space time) — flannel jesus

Well it will be interesting to hear how she thinks of space-time if it's not fundamental!

Thoughts are not the same.
— Patterner

Yes, describing things from the outside seems so far removed from what it feels like to be inside. Experience does seem drastically different, hence the hard problem.

I've been listening to a new audio book, a so called "audio documentary" that touches on this. It's called Lights On by Annaka Harris. Perhaps not up your street because she's an unabashed physicalist, but she explores concepts of fundamental consciousness because she's become increasingly convinced that that's more the right approach to talking about experience. — flannel jesus

This is one if the reasons I started this thread. Whether or not my thinking agrees with Harris', I'm sure she's not a substance dualist, so didn't want to further derail MoK's thread.

Thank you for the recommendation! I'm loving it! I'm a few hours in, talking to Sean Carroll atm. I wish there was a ebook version. I usually have audio and ebook versions of things, so when I want to discuss a particular thing, I can just copy & paste the quote.

I don't know why she calls herself a physicalist if she thinks consciousness is a pervasive, fundamental field. I could say I'm a physicalist for thinking proto-consciousness is a property of matter, as mass and charge are. But I don't think it's a physical property, and I wouldn't think her idea is that it's a physical field.

In any event, based on the little I know, I can't disagree with her. It might amount to the same thing I have in mind. The fields could be why every particle has the property of proto-consciousness. But then we could also suggest that mass is a pervasive, fundamental field, and that's why all particles have mass.

About an hour after my post to you, I happened to stumble upon this video of Annaka Harris. At 3:20, she says:

And when i use the word consciousness, I'm not talking about higher order thinking, or complex thought, or things that we think of in terms of human consciousness. But when I use the word consciousness I'm talking about consciousness in the most fundamental sense. Um, this, this bare fact of felt experience. — Annaka Harris

That's what i have in mind.

You argue that the macro is nothing other than a composite of the parts in an arrangement, but now you qualify with "under the conditions it is in", — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it's under the conditions it is in. I said that back in this post:

"Less heat means less motion, and the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily. So it freezes."

"Less heat" means the conditions have changed. The degree of heat is a condition. Initially, I described liquid water. Then I mentioned different conditions - less heat - under which the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily.

If I say someone weighs less on the moon than they do on earth, because the moon has less mass than the earth, and, therefore, the attraction between the person and the body they are standing on is not as strong, do I really have to specifically say "These are different conditions"??

Finally working my way through your post.

An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect, — javra

I'm thinking otherwise. Let's take the world's best AI. We have conversations with AI. It gives us very good information. In speed and multitasking, it surpasses us. But, despite it's capabilities, it is not conscious. So there can be intelligence on par with ours, in at least some ways, without consciousness.

Although I don't know where along the evolutionary ladder consciousness begins, I believe many animal species are conscious. Depending on definitions, many or all species are intelligent, though none with our abilities. So there can be consciousness without our intelligence on par with ours.

I think intelligence and consciousness are different things. I think all conscious things are conscious of whatever intelligence they possess.

I agree with Nagel's view in What is it like to be a bat?

...an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism. — Thomas Nagel

Subjective experience. Not simply physical objects and/or processes.

What is it like to be a bat? A human? A fly? An amoeba? An oak tree? A fungus? A rock? A length of rope? I wouldn't be surprised if all agree that there is nothing it is like to be a rock; that a rock is not conscious. Some might agree that only living things can be conscious. Some might agree that we cannot know where the line between living things with and without consciousness is. That is, we don't know exactly what minimal observable physical characteristics or behaviors are proof of consciousness.

I'm going to plagiarize from something I wrote a few years ago. — T Clark

I think that's allowed. :up: :grin:

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this.
— Patterner

So, you're disproving what you are asserting? — Metaphysician Undercover

H2O's macro physical characteristics, under any conditions, are explained by how's it's micro physical properties behave under those conditions. Every physicist, website, and book that explains its characteristics, under any conditions, including why ice floats on water, will say the same. It's because of the properties of its molecules, like its weak hydrogen bonds, and the angle of the arrangement of its atoms in the molecules. These things, in turn, due to the nature of electron shells.

If you know otherwise, that the reason ice floats on water has nothing to do with the properties of its molecules, please share.

Or point me to any other macro characteristic that is not explained by how the micro properties of its constituents behave under the conditions it is in.

Also you have to take into account emergent properties. That is the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Though a cat is made up of carbon it is not identical to it as it now has a function such as life. — kindred

Sure. But do you think the emergent property of life would be the same as it is if carbon's properties were other than they are?

Participants in this thread have demonstrated two problems with this statement. First, a lot of the characteristics of the "big things" are due to the variety of different ways that the "little things" can be arranged, therefore many of the characteristics of the big things are not "because of the properties of the little things", they are bcause of the way that the little things are arranged. The next problem is the reason why the little things get arranged in the way that they do. This is the issue of causation, the arrangements are not random chance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this. It's solid form floats in its liquid form. Very unusual. And it's because of the ways the molecules are arranged in the two different forms. In this case, temperature is key.

Let's take another molecule. How about NaCl. Does that behave the same at the same temperatures? No. NaCl's melting point is 801°C/1474°F. There's one difference. Does solid NaCl float in it's liquids form? No. Another difference.

Why don't water and salt have the same characteristics under the same conditions?

In your example of iron, a path of decomposition, reduction and reconstruction is still possible. In these paths you find the parts that constitute the whole and with which you can reconstruct it. That does not happen with experience. You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes. So the idea of composition and decomposition is not useful for understanding this matter of experience and physical matter. — JuanZu

I agree. I used iron and water to show that, although macro physical characteristics are not identical to the properties of the particles that the macro object is composed of (which is a ridiculous notion), those macro characteristics are exactly as they are because of the micro properties. If the micro was different, the macro would be, also. It's impossible for things to be otherwise.

Patterner seems to want to leap from low level properties to high level properties, that there's some direct correspondence there. The problem with that is, there's intermediate steps that are super important that get missed by that approach. — flannel jesus

flannel jesus seems to want to say Patterner is claiming the opposite of what he has clearly said more than once, in order to weaken his position.

I just discussed water. The electron shells of oxygen are such that hydrogen atoms bond to it in a certain way, with a certain angle between the atoms. The hydrogen bonds between water molecules are weak, So they break easily in liquid form. but, because of the angle between the atoms of the molecule, when the temperature goes down, and the hydrogen bonds do not break as easily, they solidify into a lattice arrangement that is less dense than when they are in liquid form. Therefore, A solid form floats on top of the liquid form.

DNA is the beginning of life. It is an information processing system. It is coded information of amino acids and proteins. The system assembles the amino acids and proteins, creating an environment in which it replicates itself. Then the process repeats. The environment is the living organisms. Because of evolution, more coding has been added to DNA, resulting in more information systems being added to organisms, which often means greater intelligence.

I say again: properties of higher levels are often, if not always, different from properties of lower levels. However, the properties of higher levels are exactly what they are because the properties of lower levels are exactly what they are. For example, the properties of hydrogen atoms are such that, within a certain temperature range, hydrogen is a gas. The properties of iron are such that, within that same range of temperature range, iron is a solid. Three states of matter are not properties of particles. But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.

Where am I leaping?

The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle.
— Patterner

Isn't mind a necessary condition for subjective experience? — RogueAI

My position is that it is not. I'm saying subjective experience is in all things. But a rock, for example, doesn't have a mind, so the subjective experience isn't noticed.

The reason I go this route is, of course, that the particles we are made of are indistinguishable from any other particles in the universe. So what is in us that makes us conscious must be in all the other particles.

Perhaps the fallacy of division is more apropos to panpsychist thinking than the fallacy of composition? — wonderer1

Finally got to read your link. No, many things that are true for a whole are not also true of all or some of its parts. But what is true for a whole is due to the properties of all or some of its parts.

H2O is one of the rare things that is less dense in its solid form than its liquids form. The hydrogen bonds between molecules are weak. In liquid form, they break easily, and the molecules move around and pack together.

Less heat means less motion, and the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily. So it freezes. And, because of the properties of the electron shells, and the "empty spaces" on the oxygen atom where the hydrogen atoms bond, the molecule has a 104.5 degree angle. SO! When it freezes, the molecules form a lattice that is less dense than the jostling molecules in liquid form.

So ice floats. Surfaces of bodies of water freeze, and, instead of sinking in it's liquid form like most solids, it stays on top insulating the water beneath, where life goes on.

Can you think of an example of anything that is composed of other things that has characteristics that cannot be explained by properties of those other things?

Semantics — 180 Proof

I suppose. But I'm trying to explore my thinking, and think being precise will help me do that.

What I'm thinking is, you wouldn't say:
just as particles of (any) X are not "mass".

"Proto-consciousness" is the name of the property; not what it does. What it does is subjectively experience.

"Mass" is the name of the property; not what it does. What it does is produce and respond to a gravitational force.



The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle.

Consciousness is the collective subjective experience of information processing systems. The particles act as a unit to physically process the information, so their subjective experience is also a unit. Just as their collective mass generates gravity that can be measured as one unit.

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me: — 180 Proof

At least I get credit for grandiose! :grin:

atoms which constitute strawberries do not themselves in any way taste, smell or feel like strawberry, for example — 180 Proof

I agree. But I don't see how's that's counter to anything I said.

just as particles of (any) X are not "proto-conscious". — 180 Proof

Well, maybe this has to do with the rewrite I need to do. No, they are not proto-conscious. One of their properties is proto-consciousness, which means they have subjective experience. Just as another of their properties is mass, which means they produce and respond to a gravitational force.

Sounds like "smallism" to me. The problem is, there is no prima facie reason for smallism to be true. A sort of "bigism" where parts are only intelligible and definable in terms of the whole seems to have at least as much to recommend itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus

While that's true, do you think those big things would have the specific parts that are only intelligible and definable in terms of the whole if the atoms and molecules they are made of did not have the specific properties they have? That would be the same as being made of different atoms and molecules. Either way, those "parts of the whole" would not exist. An iron rod can be heated and bent. Although you can't do that with iron atoms, it is some of the specific properties of iron atoms that make it possible with the rod. If iron atoms did not have those specific properties, you wouldn't be able to heat and bend the rod. You might not be able to make a rod at all.

Instead, I think a lot of high level things are explained by the processes that are happening at a lower level, processes that are enabled perhaps in part by properties. — flannel jesus

Yes. Processes cannot take place if the properties do not allow them. The properties of iron do not allow it to burn if you put it in your fireplace. The properties of wood do not allow it to be magnetized.

Macro things are regularly explained by properties that the building blocks do not possess. For example bits of iron don't float on water, yet iron (as steel) is regularly formed into ships that float on water. — wonderer1

The properties of iron don't allow it to float when it is formed into certain shapes and sizes. But its properties allow it to float when it is formed into other shapes and sizes. A ship does not float in violation of iron's properties.