But either way, you are now a long way from that private, ineffable sensation. — Banno

If it was not private, if it was quantifiable and able to be studied, the way the molecules and noses are, we would know whether or not your experience of red and my experience of read was the same thing.

We got us a homunculus? Somewhere inside the feedback loops of neurons there's a tiny “observer” that experiences redness and smells coffee? — Banno

I don't suspect that. I suspect the entire system (each of us) experiences its own existence in a way that cannot be studied, or even detected, from the outside, and cannot be explained by physics.

Is your point that there is a difference between the physics and the smell? But the aroma is not the qualia. — Banno

The aroma is the qualia, whether it's the smell of coffee, the color red, the taste of feta cheese, the feeling of pain, or whatever. Yes, there is a difference between the physics and any qualia. To largely quote what I just said in another thread, we can mess with subjective experience by affecting voltage gated calcium channels, serotonin reuptake proteins, and any number of other parts of neurons. But that doesn't even begin to address how those physical things don't only release ions when photons of one particular range of wavelengths hit the retina, but experience redness, and don't only act on themselves in feedback loops, but are aware of their own existence. The physics can explain how we differentiate molecules that enter our nose, how they trigger stored information regarding prior contact with molecules of the same chemical structure, and lead to a response based on experiences that took place during past exposures. But those things don't explain the accompanying subjective experiences, and could take place without them.

Molecules of the liquid floating through the air is not a private thing.

My subjective experience of it is, and it might be very different from yours. We might have preferences that are different to the point that one of us hates it and the other loves it. That's not accounted for by the physical events of the molecules landing on the mucus of the olfactory epithelium inside the nose, traveling through the mucus until they reach the olfactory receptor cells, binding to the olfactory receptor cells, which send electrical signals to the region of the brain known as the glomerulus, which sends the signals to yet other parts of the brain for identification.

I don't think preference or aroma are about anything but qualia. And why does the coffee need to be pulverized?

The discourse functions without qualia, on the basis that what we smell is the smell of coffee, regardless of whether it is the very same for each of us or not. — Banno

But what is the conversation about? What can we say about coffee that doesn't involve qualia?

This is perhaps important. Consistent with your idea that consciousness is a sort of irreducible natural kind, or property, we can view it as creating mental abilities of various sorts. What's "created" is not consciousness (it's there all along) but the mental ability. My concern about this picture is that it sounds like a shell game. We've substituted "mental ability" for "consciousness" in its traditional usages, and are now asserting the same mysterious things about mental abilities that were formally asserted about consciousness. How are they created? What are they? How do we know what has them? etc. — J

No, this isn't what I mean. I think consciousness and mental are not at all the same thing. Not even related. Thinking is just physical. I quote this frequently, and here I go again. From Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.

Accordingly, every mind requires a minimum of two thinking elements:
•​A sensor that responds to its environment
•​A doer that acts upon its environment — Ogas and Gaddam

The first mind they talk about is that if the archaea. Archaea "is an example of a molecule mind, the first stage of thinking on our journey. All the thinking elements in molecule minds consist of individually identifiable molecules."

The simplicity of this example stretches the definition of 'thinking' and 'mind' past what probably anyone is comfortable with. But it's the beginning. Going up the evolutionary ladder - neuron minds, module minds, super minds - just means adding more physical things. What else can be added, after all? Physical things that take in sensory input, store information, access information, initiate responses...

I think consciousness is always present, always giving the entity in question, whether a particle, person, or whatever else, subjective experience of itself. We subjectively experience the physical sensory input processes of a range of the electromagnetic spectrum as vision with colors and shapes. We subjectively experience the physical system that stores information as memory. You get the idea.

But consciousness does not create those things. Rather, it is the property by which we subjectively experience them. And things without any mental abilities still have subjective experiences. But they don't have thoughts or memories about the experiences.

yet one day, for no reason whatsoever . . .
— Patterner

Well, that couldn't be true. — J

It most certainly couldn't.

If this picture of consciousness as emergent turns out to be the case, we will understand the reasons for its emergence very well. I don't think anyone is suggesting that consciousness is random or fluky. — J

If there is a reason for the emergence of consciousness, then wouldn't that mean it was intended? If it's emergent, isn't it either blind chance or not blind chance?

Think division of responsibility. Different parts of the brain are responsible for different functions. When receiving information from the world, one part of the brain translates that information into a form that can be easily processed and acted upon. Then the executive, the conscious part, uses that translated information to learn and to act. — hypericin

What I mean is, why is the form it's in not the form that it can most easily process and act upon? I've never asked this question of my own view, but certainly should.

Some versions of property dualism (I think including yours) go on to say that these are actual objective properties which can be discovered using 3rd person inquiry. — J

I claim consciousness is an objective fact. But it's not something that has physical properties, so cannot be discovered or studied with our physical sciences. 3rd person inquiry and introspection are the most obvious tools we have to work with. They are, of course, notoriously problematic.

It’s sheer speculation at this point. But it’s no more unwarranted than vague references to “emergent properties.” — J

Yes to both.

I think Chalmers is way off track when he says that a proton has “a degree” of consciousness. — J

I agree. I don't think there's any such thing as "a degree"of consciousness, or different levels of consciousness, higher consciousness, etc. I think consciousness is consciousness. What's different is the thing that is conscious. The subjective experience of a photon is extremely different from the subjective experience of a human.

Might it be proto-conscious, in your sense of having a property that, when scaled up, can result in consciousness? — J

I don't think so. I don't think anything results in consciousness. It's always there. We just subjectively experience "scaled up" mental abilities. A photon has none, of course. But our mental abilities are scaled up above those of anything we are aware of that has any mental abilities at all.

Likewise with “experiences.” We can insist on a reform of how to use that word, so that all material entities can now have them, but that’s arbitrary. If the word is used at all, it refers to events that can be perceived “from the inside,” and the constituents of your rock can’t do this. There are indeed “instantaneous, memory-less moments” involving the rock-particles, but the particles aren’t experiencing them. Or putting it differently: If you want to reform “experience” to include what particles can do, you need to explain what part of the concept of “experience” is being carried over, such that it can justify continuing to use the term. — J

It is a difficulty thing to try to imagine what part is being "carried over" such that it can be said that a particle has it. However, I think it's what is needed. It has to be there from the beginning. The alternative is that purely physical structures evolve without the presence of consciousness, without anything directing the evolution in order to bring about consciousness, yet one day, for no reason whatsoever, find themselves in configurations that gives rise to consciousness. I mean, holy cow! Didn't see that coming!!


Regarding "the same thing", is it possible to think of consciousness as another sense? There's no confusion or ambiguity with the idea of one person seeing me and another person hearing me. Consciousness happens to be a sense that only works on the self. Maybe? I don't know. I just thought of it right now. Heh

am I wrong in thinking that the content of my thought about Ann caused the next thought? — J

The alternative would seem to be that, because of the laws of physics, the physical events progress from one arrangement to the next - potassium ions gathering in neuron X, calcium ions gathering in neuron Y, dopamine building in this synapse, GABA being moved back into the axon terminal of that neuron - in the only way they can, but the meaning of a progression of ideas about Anna that makes sense to us is only coincidental.

I'm not sure I understand. It seems like you're saying the brain understands the information well enough to convert it to a different format? If it understands the information in the first place, why does it need to convert it? I can understand a computer AI understanding the code, but presenting it in a form we can efficiently process and act upon. But why does the brain present what it already understands to itself in a different form?

Or am I misunderstanding?

If qualia are private, then how is it that you and these others agree about them? How do you know that, when you use the term "qualia", you are all talking about the same thing?
— Banno

We don't know, and can never know, that the content of our qualia agree. What most of us do agree is that there is something that it is like to see an apple and smell ammonia. — hypericin

And that is what needs explanation. It doesn't even matter whether or not what it is like for me to see red is the same as what it is like for you to see red. we need to know why there's something it is like for anybody to see red, as opposed to nothing taking place other than a massively complex bunch of particles bouncing around, with some moving one way because photons of one range of wavelengths hit the retina, and some moving another way because photons of another range of wavelengths hit the retina.

A faithful simulation of the human brain will, somewhere in its workings, faithfully process all the state associated with a full qualitative experience.
-hypericin

Not if dualism is true. It would be like perfectly simulating a physical radio and expecting it to play music. It just wouldn't because you're missing something that is more than the physical radio, and the simulated radio would have zero access to real radio waves. — noAxioms

I don't know which types of dualism would agree, but the property dualism I have in mind, with consciousness a fundamental property, does not.

this is the closest I've come here.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15877/property-dualism/p1

But it's kind of sloppy in ways. Working on getting my thoughts down better.

Thank you.

Right, simply saying "Subjectivity is neurochemical" is like saying "Consciousness is an emergent property" or "The brain is the seat of the mind." It gives the illusion of understanding something but no actual content. — J

Right. and, even though I suspect consciousness is something very different than what you think it is, it needs to be explained either way. It can't just be "Put enough physical stuff together, and it just happens."

Of course it's the brain. Nobody's questioning that. But that's where, not how. We know that wings make an airplane fly. When we ask how, simply repeating "the wings do it" isn't an answer. Certainly, we can mess with subjective experience by affecting voltage gated calcium channels, serotonin reuptake proteins, and any number of other parts of neurons. But that doesn't even begin to address how those physical things don't only release ions when photons of one particular range of wavelengths hit the retina, but experience redness, and don't only act on themselves in feedback loops, but are aware of their own existence.

Secondly, without all knowledge as already given in the active mind via noesis (direct non sensible intuition), our passive minds would be incapable of generating any thought by themselves since they only have the POTENTIAL for thought. — Sirius

Can you tell me anything about the 'passive mind'? I don't know what you mean by that.

But even this analogy falls short, since subjectivity is way more different from the brain than a football game is from its constituent physical parts. — J

That's Such an amazingly important thing. No analogy works. Of course, no one is perfect, and people always point out the problems with an analogy. The point is what is common, not to find what is different. but when trying to find an analogy for anything dealing with consciousness the differences are hard to get past.

Yes we don't have a good understanding yet of how the brain makes subjective experiences.
--------------------
We don't yet understand how the brain creates subjective experiences like "redness". — Mijin

We don't have a hint of understanding how the brain makes subjective experiences. Which means we don't know that it does. You cannot claim to know that X causes Y if you don't have the slightest idea how X causes Y. And that is why what you are talking about is not empirical verification that this is what's happening. As you say, we know where. Where isn't how.

Secondly, I just said that my position is that thoughts and neural firings are two descriptions of the same phenomenon — Mijin

How does that work?

You may as well be asking me whether ball causes sphere or does sphere cause ball? They're two descriptions of the same thing. — Mijin

You are trying to make an analogy between two words for the same physical thing, and two things of completely different nature, one physical and one not.

First of all, that wording half implies that we can only detect the physical. I do admit that you don't explicitly deny the ability to detect anything non-physical. — noAxioms

I am glad you admit that, because I do not deny the ability to detect anything non-physical. Consciousness is non-physical, yet we detect it. As I said, I think 'detect' is too week a word for this, but it will do.


I'm reversing the order of your next two paragraphs. I don't think it changes your meaning in any way, and I'm not intending to do anything like that. It's just that putting them in this order seems a more natural progression for my point.

Secondly, the point I keep making: This fundamental nature of consciousness cannot be undetectable. It may itself be non-physical, but it has to cause physical effects, because you are physically responding to it. That's the part that's self-inconsistent with your suggestion. — noAxioms

I don't know how I am being inconsistent when I agree with everything you just said. And I have never said otherwise.

I would like to draw attention to what you just said about consciousness not being physical, which I have been saying for several weeks in conversations with you and others.

Your argument instead hinges on the lack of explanation. Physicalism might indeed not have an full explanation, but neither does your alternative, which lacks even the beginnings of one. So positing something undetectable isn't an improvement. — noAxioms

It isn't merely the lack of a physicalist explanation. It's the lack of any hint of what a physicalist explanation might look like. The reason for that is because it is trying to build something non-physical out of physical components. That's worse than trying to build a wooden house out of water, because at least wood and water are physical things made out of the same primary particles. if I told you I saw somebody pour a bunch of water on the ground, and suddenly there was a house, you would be skeptical. If you saw it happen yourself, you would still think somebody was pulling a fast one. But building something non-physical out of physical components is unquestionably the answer, despite the fact that many brilliant people have been failing to even get a vague idea of how it might work?

No, there is no evidence for what I'm suggesting. But at least I'm positing something from which this non-physical phenomenon can be built. A fundamental property. We don't know whatmass is. We don't know what charge is. We only know what those things do, and the proof is all around us. We don't know what dark matter is, and cannot detect it in any way. But we assume it exists because we can see what it does. The evidence is all around us. I'm suggesting another fundamental property. We don't know what consciousness is, but we know it exists because we feel what it does. The proof is ourselves.

Just to understand the terminology, shape and color are not Qualities? Blue and red are different qualities of color, and square in circle are different qualities of shape?

Alright, since you've been using 'consciousness', are you saying that you cannot detect your own consciousness? That it has no physical effect?
Funny that you're straight up refused to answer a question asked so many times now. — noAxioms

Well, twice, anyway. and I haven't answered it because I've been trying to make you understand what I actually said. But first I'll answer, and then I'll try to make you understand.

Yes, I detect my own consciousness. Although 'detect' is too weak a word for this. I am my consciousness. I would give up quite a few body parts before I would give up consciousness. I am still me without an arm, or a leg, or both, or even all of my arms and legs. But, at some point, I'm sure I would wish I no longer had subjective experience. Wayfarer and I recently posted these two quotes:

the world is opened up, made meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable apart from consciousness. — Routledge Intro to Phenomenology

Everything begins with consciousness, and nothing is worth anything except through it. — Albert Camus

What I said is:
If what we can detect cannot explain something, then we should consider the possibility that there is something we can't detect.

To try to clarify, let me try it this way:
If what we can detect (the physical) cannot explain something (consciousness), then we should consider the possibility that there is something we can't detect (the fundamental nature of consciousness).

But yes, they are different facets of the same thing; this is trivially demonstrable from the fact that physical changes to our brain have a corresponding effect on our conscious experience (e.g. taking an opioid and the effect it has on dopamine receptors and what that feels like). — Mijin

Noting correlation is not the same as explaining how one causes the other. There is nothing about the physical events that suggests subjective experience, and there is no wild guess of an explanation. Dopamine binds to the dopamine receptor. The dopamine receptor is coupled with a G-protein. The binding changes the shape of the dopamine receptor, which activates the G-protein. activating the G-protein stimulates or inhibits enzymes, depending on what kind of receptor cell we're dealing with. But the functioning of ion channels is key. So a channel mighty open, and sodium ions flow in.

Where do you suspect the subjective experience shows up?

Neuron firings, changes to action potentials, release of chemicals, other bodily activities. Of course, none of these measures apply to what we consider thought processes. But that would require knowing exactly how thoughts are produced in a brain. — Relativist

I don't know how alone I am in this, but I think they do apply to thoughts. I think thinking is a physical process. But consciousness is things like the experience of seeing red and tasting sugar, as well as those physical processes being aware of their own existence. The descriptions of the physical events beginning with photons hitting retina and ending with the discrimination of electromagnetic frequencies can certainly be quantified in various ways. But they don't suggest the existence of consciousness.

In terms of ontology, things have properties, processes do not have properties. — Relativist

Still, we can measure them. Flying is a process. How far did the plane fly? In which direction? How much fuel did it user? How long did it take?

DNA replication is a process. How many base pairs were copied? How many ATP molecules were needed for energy? How long did it take?

If consciousness is a physical process, what are the answers to these kinds of questions?

A physicalist would say that all mental properties are physical properties. — noAxioms

Do you equate mental and consciousness?

Or maybe I didn't say it clearly. I'm saying we can detect the physical.
— Patterner
Are you saying you can't detect the mental? That seems odd for somebody pushing it as a separate fundamental thing. — noAxioms

No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying we can detect the physical.

Because consciousness is not physical, meaning has no physical properties...
Of course it has physical properties. It is the cause of physical effects. If it couldn't do that, you would not be going on about it. It therefore very much can be detected by our science. How do you not see that? — noAxioms

Can you tell me what the physical properties of consciousness are? Are they like the physical properties of particles; things like mass, charge, or spin? Are they like the physical properties of objects; things like length, weight, or hardness? Are they like the physical properties of processes; things like speed, duration, or distance? Can we measure how much energy is required to taste sweetness or see red?

Yet, in ordinary language, if someone asks you, "Do you believe the TV is on?" you'll answer yes. — J

I might respond, "No. The TV is on." I've said that kind of thing at times.

You might also point out that it's a rather strange question: "Why would I not believe it? It's on; see for yourself!" This highlights one of the uses of "believe". We tend to emphasize believing something when there could be doubt. — J

Right. I think we should not. Where does it end? I believe I have ten fingers and toes. I believe my name is Eric. I understand the idea that I can't very well not believe something that I know is factual. But is not not believing it the same as belief? I don't, uh, believe it is.

Is there some mental event that occurs while I watch TV, that's the equivalent of giving credence to the existence of the TV? This seems far-fetched. — J

I agree it's far-fetched.

More likely is the opposite case, when we're watching, say, a pack of elves. The mental event "I don't believe this" is probably present, wouldn't you say? Or least "I don't know whether to believe this or not." — J

How about, "That's not real."? The flip-side of the above. Knowing something is not factual is not the same as not believing it.

There's a fantasy series called The Chronicles of Thomas Covenant, the Unbeliever. He had to consciously not believe something he knew could not be factual, even though he was living it.

So, all this time, I keep asking myself "Why I won't kill myself tomorrow?". — GreekSkeptic

You don't know what has been worth staying alive for? A few weeks ago, you came up with an idea for an approach that, while not specific, you hope will eventually be shown to have been a good decision. But you don't know why you didn't end it over the previous several years?


And you are not aware of any specific thing that has been lacking, that you have never been able to achieve, that is the root cause of your feelings?

I haven't found a single thing to "save" myself, but helping and uplifting others is a whole new world to me now. Being good for society is interesting. Since I can't help myself, I'll help others. Now I would say for sure that that's something that keeps me here, and for the first time it does not feel superficial or illusionary - at least for now. — GreekSkeptic

An excellent idea. We don't help others only for their benefit. It is of great benefit to ourselves.

1) If what we can detect cannot explain something, then we should consider the possibility that there is something we can't detect.
-Patterner

But we can detect it, else you wouldn't know about it. Something physical must detect it, else there could be no physical effect. — noAxioms

I don't know what you mean. Or maybe I didn't say it clearly. I'm saying we can detect the physical. That's what our sciences are all about. But if the physical can't explain consciousness - at this point, there is no theory. Because consciousness is not physical, meaning has no physical properties, so it can't be detected by our sciences, much less tested. So maybe something non-physical is at work.

If consciousness coming into existence only when physical structures have some level of complexity, without it having been the goal, does not make sense, then maybe we should consider that it was there all along.
-Patterner

Better. It kind of has been the goal, since it makes one more fit, so I'd leave that part out. — noAxioms

Physical processes with no element of consciousness evolve with the goal of achieving arrangements that produce consciousness?

How does not understanding what the physical events are doing grant the knowledge that they are doing this thing that is unexplainable by what we do know about them?
— Patterner
I don't know, but it seems to be the dualists that are claiming this knowledge in the absence of understanding. I never made such a claim. Perhaps you took my double-negative as a single negative. — noAxioms

You said I couldn't find our subjective experience of heat in physical events because I glossed over many of them, and made assumptions about them. Does that not mean I can find our subjective experience of heat in physical events if I don't gloss over many of them, and make assumptions about them?

As for my dualism, I'm just trying to come up with a system that is internally consistent. There may be many other guesses that are internally consistent, and there may be no way to falsify or verify any, as is the case with physicalism. But I have a couple starting points.

1) If what we can detect cannot explain something, then we should consider the possibility that there is something we can't detect.

2) If consciousness coming into existence only when physical structures have some level of complexity, without it having been the goal, does not make sense, then maybe we should consider that it was there all along.

That would be my answer too. And how, exactly, does an assertion add something to a belief? — J

How, indeed. Although maybe "add" isn't the right word. Maybe it's two things at once, one of which is a belief. The other is... What? The possession, or awareness, of a fact?

Is there such a thing as possession/awareness of a fact that is not also belief? I would say so, if I am experiencing the fact. If I'm actually looking at the TV, it's not a belief that there's a TV there. If I hear it from the other room, it's not a belief that the TV is on.

I might often use those interchangeably, but they certainly can be different things. Perhaps every assertion is a belief, but not every belief is an assertion. So an assertion is something in addition to a belief.

And what about, "The TV was on when I left the room five seconds ago"? Can I know that without having the belief, even unexpressed, even unthought, that the TV is still on?

You said I couldn't find our subjective experience of heat in physical events because I glossed over many of them, and made assumptions about them.
- Patterner

Well, you can't find subjective experience of heat in physical events possibly because you don't understand what the physical events are doing. I don't claim to have this knowledge either. It's besides the point of illustrating that it cannot be done, which probably isn't going to be accomplished by not understanding what does go on. — noAxioms

How does not understanding what the physical events are doing grant the knowledge that they are doing this thing that is unexplainable by what we do know about them? Which is not negligible, especially for those whose lives are spent learning and experimenting in these areas.

But I think your point is rather that belief doesn't enter into it at all. — J

Right. I'm not stating, or even thinking of, it as a belief. But is that what it is? Even if it amounts to the same thing, is it actually the same thing?

it's a fascinating topic. I find it mind blowing that DNA doesn't determine every detail, but allows for as much variability in response to circumstances as it does.

I just didn't write out 50,000 physical events. But now you can say which of them convert physical events to subjective experience.
— Patterner
That's like asking which transistor state change is Tomb Raider. Subjective experience is not one neuron event (and 50k is way short). — noAxioms

"Which of them" doesn't necessarily mean "which one of them", and the thought that just one neuron event is our subjective experience of heat is preposterous. I think we agree on that, so let's move on. You said I couldn't find our subjective experience of heat in physical events because I glossed over many of them, and made assumptions about them. I assume that means you are familiar with how physical events produce subjective experience, when explained in more detail and without assumptions, so please map it out for me.

I think I'm not sure about the word belief in this context. I don't think I believe there's a television in my living room. It's a fact that there's a tv in the living room. What's the difference between belief and certainty of facts?

If I go in and the tv isn't there - that is, there isn't a tv in the living room...? Was it only a belief? Is that what being mistaken of the facts is?

What would be an example of a belief that you wonder if a cat might have?
— Patterner

The one Dawnstorm offered would be a good example:

for the cat to want to catch that mouse over there she would have to believe there's a mouse over there.
— Dawnstorm — J

I don't know about this. When you play with little kittens who have never seen a mouse, have never hunted for anything, and never been threatened because they were born in your closet a couple months ago, they have the instincts. It's so adorable when you play with them and they play with each other, but what they're doing is practicing hunting, killing, and ripping thing apart. I wonder if, as they get older, and put this stuff to actual use, it clicks in their head. "Oh! That's why I've been doing that! Now I see that little thing over there, and I know what to do with it.". from then on, do they do it with the belief that there's a mouse somewhere around the corner or in the wall? Or do they just do what they were instinctually doing all along, they just have more practice now?

I hope you enjoy Hoffmeyer's writings. Signs of Meaning is the earlier, more accessible work. — Janus

Good to know. Thanks.