The first verse of the Tao Te Ching, one of the founding texts, says "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name." My understanding of the meaning of those lines is that things don't really become "real" until we name, conceptualize, them. — T Clark

My understanding of those lines is that, the moment you try to speak of or name the Tao, you have automatically failed. Because words are limited, and limiting, while the Tao is infinite. Any attempt to use words to describe the Tao is an attempt to limit it. Which is impossible, so you cannot be talking about the Tao.

However, I never intended to claim that there are always non-linguistic ways to express any belief expressed in language. Perhaps I should have been clearer. — Ludwig V

I can't say if I disagree, or don't really understand.

Descartes' followers may have been expressing their belief in Cartesian dualism in a very strict sense. (I'm not sure "strict" is the right word, but it's the best I can do at the moment.) But they would not have come to that belief without language. Language was necessary for the belief to exist before the belief could be expressed with non-linguistic behavior.

And nobody observing their behavior would have known the belief they were expressing if someone had not used language to explain it to them.

I would be hard pressed to express any of the thoughts in this post, to say nothing of the thoughts expressed in the 39 pages of the thread, as well as the other however many threads at TPF, without language. I would be interested in hearing how all of these thoughts might possibly come to exist without language. But even without an explanation of that, now that they do exist, What language-less behavior can express them?

All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).
— Patterner
Quite so. And the behaviours that do not involve language demonstrate/express/manifest my belief just as effectively as the linguistic behaviours. The difference is that expressing beliefs in language is more detailed, more detailed, more specific, that non-linguistic behaviours. — Ludwig V

Do you not think there are things languages can express that behaviours that do not involve language cannot express?

philosophers think that linguistic behaviour is, in some way that escapes me, something different from behaviour. — Ludwig V

I don't know what anyone has in mind. The first thing that zones to mind for new is that it's a different type of behavior. For example, day someone punched me. I might:
1. Punch them in return.
2. Cry.
3. Ask them why they punched me; why they think punching is a good solution to any problem; or whatever.

All behaviors, but different kinds, with different possible consequences, and possibly different intentions (although we don't always think/intend before any type of behavior).

There is most certainly thought, belief, and meaningful experience of language less creatures. The question is what could it possibly consist of? — creativesoul

If we don't know what it could possibly consist of, how do we know it exists? If we know it exists, doesn't whatever is proof of its existence give us clues about what it consists of?

Yes, that seems to be the question. From an early age I always saw death as its own reward. Assuming death means non-existance. I have heard no convincing reason to think otherwise. — Tom Storm

There couldn't be any such reason. It's how you feel about it. Subjective. Nobody can convince me to prefer Mozart over Bach. Or strawberry ice cream to chocolate.

Most of us have an inbuilt (most would say evolved) desire to keep living. — Tom Storm

I doubt it evolved. That would mean the desire once wasn't part of living things. Things that don't act to keep living don't live long enough to reproduce.

I have rarely been a 'suck the marrow out of life' style of person and am somewhat suspicious of those who are. Overcompensating? — Tom Storm

There are obviously people who pretend everything we can name. But there are also people who are naturally like that. Again, it's how they feel. I assume it has a lot to do with bio-chemistry.

But I do find the notion that life has no real purpose intermittently exciting as it affords us creative opportunities to make our own. — Tom Storm

What more could we want?!

Acave in the wilderness? — Tom Storm

Anything is possible. But you'll probably have to put some effort into that one.

What does existential self-awareness actually consist of? Does a recognition of mortality accompany it? — Tom Storm

I wonder. i'm thinking some degree of intelligence is necessary for both of these things. But I wonder if the two things come with different degrees of intelligence. Can an individual be existentially self-aware, yet never consider the idea of personal death? Children learn about it at some point. But do they learn it without conversations about it, ultimately revealing the fact to them? Is it possible for entire species to be intelligent enough to be existentially self-aware without any member ever coming up with the concept of mortality? Are chimps self-aware, yet blissfully ignorant of mortality? Will evolution one day grant them a little more intelligence, and drop this metaphorical piano on their head? What about dogs? Mice?

Or do both ideas come to a species at the same time, one impossible without the other?

When I first came to this realisation as a child my primary reaction was, why did I have to be born? In reversing the usual cliché about such matters, I often thought to myself that it might be bad luck to be born - to have to go through the laborious process of learning, growing, belonging (to a culture you dislike), experiencing loss, decline and ultimately death. It's not easy to identify an inherent benefit attached to any of this. But there's a lot of noise called philosophy and religion which seeks to help us to manage our situation. — Tom Storm

This seems like a mental or emotional health issue. There are people who aren't concerned with dying, but apparently because they simply never think about it.

For others, the knowledge of their own mortality drives them to artistic creativity. Expressing what they feel. I remember an episode of Highlander where a brilliant composer found out she was immortal. As a result, she lost her brilliance. She hadn't been composing specifically with her mortality in mind. The idea is that mortality is a part of everything we do, and when she lost her mortality, and it was no longer part of her life's expression, her music was laughing. Wolverine said much the same thing to the Beyonder in an X-Men comic.

Some make something that will make others think of them after they are gone. I'm sure some art is created for this reason. But also things like buildings, which can be artistic, but might not always be what the builder is intending. Just a big physical thing to remember me by.

Other people do not ever deal well with the knowledge of their own mortality. Some deal with it very badly.

What I wonder is, is it possible for a species to gain existential self-awareness, and the awareness of their own mortality, but NOT be able to deal with it emotionally? I don't think I would expect the ... maturity? ... to ALSO be part of the package. It seems to be asking a lot for awareness of self, awareness of mortality, and the ability to deal with it, to all arrive together.

I assume these things begin with one individual. Thinking of basic evolution. An individual is born with a new trait, passes it on to offspring, and it spreads throughout the population. So, if awareness of both self and mortality are a package deal, I don't think it would have been passed on if the individual reacted very negatively. If the individual hated it, and suffered depression because of it, it wouldn't have been selected for, and wouldn't have been passed on for its own sake. So either the ability to deal with it came with it as a three-part package, or there were other still MORE things that came with the package, maybe not as obviously related to it, but which were great advantages, and overshadowed the (pretty serious) negative.

Yes, I'm in a good place lately. :grin:

I read this awhile back. Good book. Thought it just sort of begged the question when it came to "what constitutes computation/information?" by assuming that any folks arguing for the independent existence of information must be assuming some sort of Cartesian homunculus. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not all of us. :grin:

I just posted much of this in one thread or other in the last couple weeks.

Information is sometimes naturally-occurring. Like DNA. DNA is instructions for making amino acids and proteins. The codons and strings of codons mean amino acids and proteins. Meaning, as it turns out, does not always need an interpreter to be information.

An important aspect of naturally-occurring information is - it is active. At least when it is in its naturally occurring medium and environment. The information compels its own processing. If it didn't, it wouldn't be information. If we ran across DNA just scattered around, and the strings of bases did not correspond to anything outside of themselves, they would not be information. We would just see pretty molecules. Like elaborate crystals. But DNA causes it's own expression.

Compare this with the other type of information. Information we have created. Books, for example. Books are filled with information. But only when viewed by us, and only because we created the system. This information would not exist if we had not created the system, and it would not be interpreted if we vanished. (Unless some other sufficient intelligence happened alng and found it.)

Information created by us is static. The information in a book doesn't do anything. A book about architecture doesn't cause a building to be built. Even if we read the book, and have that information in our head, a building might never new built. It's not active information.

We could have books with all the details of a living thing's DNA, and it would never build a single amino acid. The information is not in it's naturally-occurring medium and environment. It isn't active information in book form. No information in books is active. It's not an active medium. No books are conscious or living.

Then why can't you open the brain and point out where the mind is? I also said that it is possible that the mind is what the entire brain does, not just some internal part of it. What do you mean by "internal" and "external" in this respect? Do you mean the same thing as your birthday present being internal to the box with the wrapping paper and bow? If so, then why can't we open the brain to see the mind like we can open the box and see your present? It seems to me that using terms like "internal", "external", "subjective" and "objective" is evidence of your dualistic thinking making it more difficult to solve the problem. — Harry Hindu

I agree that the mind is what the entire brain does. Thinking and feeling are actions. Like other actions, you can't freeze it. If we had a room with transparent walls, and time was frozen inside the room, we could look in and see a statue, furniture, or whatever other objects. However, we could not look in the room and see things like motion, metabolism, and growth. Those things cannot exist if time is not passing.

Nor can consciousness.

We can open the box and see things like motion, metabolism, and growth, provided any of those processes are taking place. They are physical processes, and, therefore, observable.

Consciousness is not. We can't observe it, no matter what we look at.

Let's imagine extremely intelligent beings of a very different nature stumbled upon our planet. Let's say their very different nature, and/or the science their nature allows them to develop, gives them the ability to examine us in every conceivable detail. Being the smarties they are, they come to notice how various parts of us react to various things In the environment. They notice activity in one part of us, the part we called the optic nerve, and come to see that that activity takes place because photons hit the retina, and set off chains of events. They follow the activity up to our brains, and observe all that takes place there as a result. They come to recognize the patterns of activity. They understand that the photons come in patterns; that those patterns become patterns of activity within us; that we react in various ways because of those patterns; that those patterns are stored in our brains; that new occurrences of those patterns trigger the stored patterns in our brains, and that often causes us to react to the patterns in different ways than the ways we reacted the first time we encountered the patterns.

They would realize information is being processed. Information of different aspects of the environment, detected by different parts of us, all being processed in the particular area that we call our brain.

Which processes tell them we are conscious? We might be close to a burning building. Chain of Events A is how we see the fire. CoE B is how we hear it. CoE C is how we feel it. D is how we smell it.

Do they see a CoE for our subjective experience of the fire? Perhaps activity that always accompanies all chains, regardless of the source of the input, whether only one sense is active (such as seeing a photo of a fire or smelling smoke from a great distance), as well as when combinations of chains are active simultaneously? How would they know we are conscious? Or what activity do they see that is always present, the effect of which they cannot understand?

What I am saying is that effects carry information about their causes, whether the cause starts in the world or in the mind (the mind is part of the world, so I don't see why it makes sense to talk about the mind being a different thing (immaterial vs material) than the world). — Harry Hindu

The mind is not a different thing than the world. Rather, the world is not material-only. Although I prefer to think of it as material having both physical and non-physical properties. The non-physical properties being consciousness, and that which allows consciousness to emerge when the material is in certain arrangements. But better to say physical and experiential properties.

Yes, some people do say there is no difference. But if that were true, the species homo sapiens could not be defined. The issue is what the significance of the differences is. The objection is to the idea of human exceptionalism; I mean the attitude that thinks that animals have no moral claim on us and can be treated in the same way(s) that we treat any other physical resource. — Ludwig V

My opinion is that people will find a way to justify doing what they want to do. The differences between humans and any other species don't suggest it's morally acceptable to treat other species badly, and I would be more than somewhat surprised to find out anyone who did not think it was acceptable before learning about the differences thought it was acceptable after.

Why is the idea that we are animals seemingly unpopular among philosophers? — NOS4A2

I didn't know people denied this. Certainly not here at TPF. Most here take it further, and say there is no difference between us and the other species.

I have often posted that I am entirely lacking in knowledge of most things discussed here. So I don't know when someone is saying things that are easy, commonly discussed things, and I just don't know the lingo. I can't get out of your first paragraph.

I think the difficulty here is with your assumption that understanding must be of something. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know how there can be understanding if there is nothing to understand

Consider understanding to be the relationships which create the whole from the parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's exactly my point.

As such, it is an unobserved part of the whole, which is determined through retrospect and logical analysis. — Metaphysician Undercover

I assume, by 'unobserved', you mean with eyes, or whichever sense.

Context is of the essence here, because a so-called "fact" which is learned as a fact at one time, will be at a later time, integral to an understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Entirely likely. But it is, as you just said, s fact that is learned, And if it 'will be integral to an understanding at a later time,' then it is not when learned. It is just a fact.

I don't think it makes sense to say that we know single facts. Knowing requires understanding. So there is always some type of understanding which underlies any instance of knowing. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's true. But I don't always learn any amount of any type of understanding underlying anything each time I learn a new fact. I know what metal is. I know what a penny is. I know who Lincoln was. I know about the calendar. Learning that a particular penny in my pocket was minted in 2003 does not give me any new understanding of anything.

That's how I see it, also. I don't think it makes sense to say we understand single facts. I can know many facts, but not understand how they are related. This spherical thing is a baseball. This long, thin, tapering thing is a bat. That mound of dirt is called the pitcher's mound. That's three facts that have no obvious connection. Many more facts can be added without any obvious connections.

But I understand the game of baseball.

Well, do not place too high of a standard on "higher level of understanding" then. If you learn something new everyday, then aren't you reaching a higher level of understanding every day? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. I might learn a brand of shirts, X, is manufactured in country 1. Next day I learn brand Y is manufactured in country 2. Next day I learn Z is country 3. Is my understanding increasing?

If I learn how brand X is manufactured, maybe I've reached a higher level. If I learn how Y is manufactured, and it's a different method than X, maybe I've reached a higher level. If I learn the different manufacturing methods are due to historical, cultural, or geographic differences, I'm in all kinds of levels!

What an excellent name!!!

It took thousands of years for us to develop the idea that there is something wrong with slavery and racism, and it seems absurd to think that all those people were morally deficient in some way. — Ludwig V

Sadly, they were. There are still many people like that. Slavery and genocide are still with us.

So your experience of hitting your thumb with a hammer is the same as my experience of seeing you hit your thumb with a hammer?

But I don't know that this mannequin is not you. When seeing it, I believe it's you.

It doesn't matter, though. The question at the end of the road is, do you think what it's like for me to experience seeing you is the same as what it's like for you to be you?

What about my hypothetical mannequin of you. Is my experience of seeing it like what you are like?

I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like.
— jkop

What is the cat like when it is not being seen?
— Patterner

More or less like it is when it is seen (disregarding Schrödinger's cat). :smile: — jkop

Let's use you as an example. If I see you, would you say my experience of you is like what you are like?

They could make a mannequin to look exactly like you, and so lifelike that it would fool me if I see it from even several feet away, but do not try to interact with it. I would agree that my experience of the mannequin is like what the mannequin is like.

They could make a drone to look exactly like you, which you would control, so it would behave exactly as you behave. I would agree that my experience of the drone is like what the drone is like.

But you? Surely, what it is like for me to experience you is not what you are like. I think I am missing every important quality/aspect of what you are like when I experience you.



Well done, re Schrödinger's cat. :grin:

Right. Chalmers assumes that an experience is accompanied by a property of what it's like to have the experience. That's property-dualism.

As if seeing the cat consists of two experiences, one of the cat, and another of what it's like. — jkop

Photons bounce off of something > hit a photon detecting device > the device responds by sending a signal to an information processing and storage unit.

That is not an experience. That is just physical events that take place due to the properties of particles and laws of physics. We have robots that fit that description. We don't wonder what the robot experiences/what it's like to be the robot, any more than we wonder what a pool table experiences/what it's like to be a pool table.

Photons bounce off of something > hit my retina > my retina responds by sending a signal to my brain > I see red.

Seeing red is my experiences of the same thing that happens to and within the robot. The same physical events that happen to me happen to the robot, but the robot doesn't have an experience of the events.

I believe that seeing is the experience, and what the experience is like is what the cat is like. — jkop

What is the cat like when it is not being seen?

So, similarly, I'm guessing that consciousness will turn out to be a property of living organisms exclusively. Why? Because whatever it is that makes an entity alive is going to be turn out to be what makes it consciousness. — J

Correct. And that "whatever" is DNA. DNA is an information system. It has meaning. It is about something that it is not. DNA is two complimentary strands of nucleotides running along sugar phosphate backbones, and joined by hydrogen bonds. DNA means chains of amino acids and proteins, which, once constructed, build living organisms.

What is vitality important is that DNA is what I call active information. As opposed to static information. A book is an example of static information. A book is filled with information, but does nothing. A book about architecture does not construct buildings. It doesn't even draw blueprints. Further, I can read the book, and learn about architecture, yet I might never construct a building, or even draw blueprints. I need not act on information. The information can just sit in the book, and in my head, and nothing ever has to come of it.

DNA is active information because it must be acted upon. The laws of physics require certain things to happen under certain circumstances. When the stem of an apple hanging on a tree weakens below a certain point, the laws of physics are such that the apple falls. Likewise, the laws of physics are such that the enzyme helicase unzips DNA by breaking the hydrogen bonds that bind the base pairs. Then there's mRNA, tRNA, aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase, on and on. No part of this is optional. The laws of physics require that the information in DNA be acted upon, and that that which DNA means comes into being in physical form.

DNA is in all life, and it's why there is life.

DNA is also why there is consciousness. Information. Does any theory of consciousness not consider information to be essential? DNA isn't only the information system that began life. In every cell of every living thing, information is constantly being processed, as protein is constantly being produced. And a lot of what those proteins are being used for is to build more information processing systems. Our senses are constantly changing input into information. Inside of us, homeostasis is accomplished thanks to the constant flow of information from every part of the body. Information about germs and viruses so they can be fought off. Information about injuries so they can be repaired. An incalculable amount of information constantly being processed inside us, all because of DNA.

This is something which is barely said in the history of Western philosophy, — Wayfarer

I haven't researched it. But I have heard of one exception. in his introduction to his translation of The Bhagavad Gita, Eknath Easwaran speaks of Ruysbroeck.

I have described the discovery of Atman and Brahman – God immanent and God transcendent – as separate, but there is no real distinction. In the climax of meditation, the sages discovered unity: the same indivisible reality without and within. It was advaita, “not two.” The Chandogya Upanishad says epigrammatically, Tat tvam asi: “Thou art That.” Atman is Brahman: the Self in each person is not different from the Godhead.

Nor is it different from person to person. The Self is one, the same in every creature. This is not some peculiar tenet of the Hindu scriptures; it is the testimony of everyone who has undergone these experiments in the depths of consciousness and followed them through to the end. Here is Ruysbroeck, a great mystic of medieval Europe; every word is most carefully chosen:

The image of God is found essentially and personally in all mankind. Each possesses it whole, entire and undivided, and all together not more than one alone. In this way we are all one, intimately united in our eternal image, which is the image of God and the source in us of all our life. — Easwaran

Later philosophers explained maya in surprisingly contemporary terms. The mind, they said, observes the so-called outside world and sees its own structure. It reports that the world consists of a multiplicity of separate objects in a framework of time, space, and causality because these are the conditions of perception. In a word, the mind looks at unity and sees diversity; it looks at what is timeless and reports transience. And in fact the percepts of its experience are diverse and transient; on this level of experience, separateness is real. Our mistake is in taking this for ultimate reality, like the dreamer thinking that nothing is real except his dream.

Nowhere has this “mysterious Eastern notion” been formulated more succinctly than in the epigram of Ruysbroeck: “We behold what we are, and we are what we behold.” When we look at unity through the instruments of the mind, we see diversity; when the mind is transcended, we enter a higher mode of knowing – turiya, the fourth state of consciousness – in which duality disappears. This does not mean, however, that the phenomenal world is an illusion or unreal. The illusion is the sense of separateness. — Easwaran

However, although I believe there are benefits to viewing things that way, I don't have reason to think it's how things are. As I said, I think consciousness can examine itself. The problem is the western world is so adamant that things can only be examined using specific methods. But if the nature of something is not amenable to those methods...

I see no obvious reason why consciousness cannot perceive itself as an object.
— ucarr

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back. — Wayfarer

I think consciousness is sufficiently different from physical things that we cannot know that it has this same "limitation." Consciousness may be the only thing that can study consciousness. If consciousness is feeling and thinking, then that which feels and thinks can feel and think about itself. Maybe?

I am not able to simultaneously focus on what I am looking at and the idea that I am looking at it. Could just be me but I doubt it. — Janus

You are talking about not being able to think two things simultaneously? But you can see an object, and clearly think about the idea that you are looking at that object. You can even speak the words. And if, while you are thinking clearly about the idea that you are looking at it, someone blocks your field of vision, you will realize that you are no longer looking at it, even though you were not focusing on looking at it. It didn't stop you from looking at it.

It doesn't make conceptual sense to me to say that consciousness is made of particles. — Janus

Agreed. Neither is flight. Or vision.

What possible evidence could we have that consciousness cannot arise from the physical? That seems like a mere prejudice to me. All the evidence seems to point to the opposite consclusion — Janus

This is what it all comes down to. Not evidence that it can't. Just no evidence that it can. The fact that the physical properties and forces are all we can find with our science is not evidence that they are solely responsible for consciousness. And it doesn't mean they are all there is. I don't see the logic of saying a bunch of particles bouncing around, if there is nothing but the physical properties and forces, no matter how they are bouncing around, can become aware that they are a bunch of particles bouncing around. That can, and does, explain flight and vision. We can see, starting from the physical properties and forces,how these processes come about. And we can follow any aspect of flight and vision back down to the properties and forces.

Not so for consciousness. Where is it? What is the physical activity in the brain that doesn't produce a physical process, like vision or memory, but, rather, produces consciousness? We don't see physical activity that is not producing some physical process. Nothing accompanies the physical activity that doesn't seem to be doing anything, which we could speculate is consciousness itself.

If some physical activity produces vision, why is there also subjective experience of vision? If the activity that produces vision is tied up with activity that triggers stored patterns of past sensory input, why is there also subjective experience of memory?

Nobody can find anything physical to explain these things, even though some pretty smart neurologists can see remarkable detail about what's going on in our brains. Brian Greene says no physical properties even hints at consciousness.

Personally I love the idea of living forever. But only in a healthy body with all normal faculties and capacities intact. I'm 71. — Janus

Yeah, young and healthy would be a requirement. At 60, I got hearing aids for the first time today. So already too late for that. in any event, wanting to live forever is not why I don't think consciousness is solely physical.

In Scientific, Evelina Fedorenko, a neuroscientist who studies language at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says You Don’t Need Words to Think

I don't believe it is possible for you to look at your blue shirt and be reflectively aware of yourself doing so in the same instant. Observing my own experience leads me to think that I can't do it at least. You might be more skillful than I. I can't rule that out so I speak only for myself. — Janus

What happens when you try? Is it a flickering back and forth between looking at it, and thinking about having looked at it? Or are you unable to think about looking at it at all until it is no longer in your line of sight? Something else?

I don't doubt that we experience. What I do doubt is that our experience is non-physical. I mean our experience is not a physical object to be sure but I think our intuition that our experience is non-physical is the product of a kind of illusion created by language. An illusion created by reflective thought. The alternative as I see it has to be mind/ body dualism. — Janus

Ah. I wasn't sure what you meant. Like you, I can only speak for myself. I thought it must surely be physical. Everything is made of particles, after all. At another site (for a series of fantasy books), a guy and I posted for several pages, me trying to convince him that consciousness must be physical, because everything is made of particles. Well, he ended up convincing me of the opposite. Lol

Still, everything is made of particles, right?? Everything exists because of/is built from particles and the forces. But if consciousness can't arise solely from the physical, which I don't think it can, then maybe there are things in our reality that are not physical. Like an experiential property of matter, in addition to the physical properties. So consciousness arises from matter, but the experiential property is as necessary as the physical properties.

All it takes is for me to accept the possibility that we don't know all the properties of the universe, or matter.

I also think that much of the attachment to the idea that experience is non-physical has to do with the wish for immortality which can make us averse to the idea that this life is all there is. — Janus

I'm sure many people believe it for that reason. I'm not among them. I'm 60. I'm not unhappy, looking forward to death, or anything. But the thought of myself going on forever is veeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeery unappetizing.



My humble thanks. I'm much less well-read than most of you on most of the topics discussed at TPF. I don't always know what anybody is talking about. There's a thread about someone Frege that looks interesting. Problem is, I never heard of Frege. So I'm happy I'm at least writing well about what I think or know.

And right back at you! It's a pleasure.

Indeed, we disagree, and neither is likely to switch sides. Heck, we even disagree on which of us is more focused on 'what we want' and 'what is most likely'. Hehe. It's that kind of topic, eh?

Not sure it's possible for the two of us to not talk about it, though. If you say something I disagree with, I'll often want the other person to know there is another pov.

Everything points to consciousness being physical by every measure of behavior we know. — Philosophim

Behavior isn't consciousness. Behavior can take place without consciousness. It does so in things we have made, and in simple forms of life that nobody would think has anything but the most rudimentary consciousness. An ant in the Amazon get infected with a certain fungus. The fungus causes the ant to climb to the top of a tree, at which point the fungus, which has been growing inside the ant, bursts out, and spreads far and wide, infecting more ants. Every autumn, monarch butterflies migrate to a very specific place in Mexico, from as far away as Canada. They have never been to Mexico. Their great grandparents lefty Mexico on the spring. This generation returns to three same place - literally the same trees - to continue the cycle. I would not think the behavior of either the ant or butterfly has anything to do with consciousness.

Just because we can't figure out the subjective portion of it in no way entails that its suddenly made of some new non-physical material. — Philosophim

It isn't sudden.

Consciousness is 'something'. The best explanation from what we know is that it is the first person experience of matter and energy when it is organized in a particular way. — Philosophim

That is not an explanation at all. An explanation would tell us why matter and energy organized in a particular way has first person experience. As opposed to it doing whatever it does without first person experience. No physical-only explanation amounts to anything more than "It just happens."

So far, we understand human consciousness is the brain. — Philosophim

We understand that consciousness takes place in the brain. And, since, as far as we know, brains are the only places consciousness takes places, it doesn't make sense to think that the brain isn't essential for consciousness. But that is a different thing from "the brain is consciousness."

You alter the brain, you get reports of people saying their first person experience is altered. — Philosophim

Yes. Change what is happening in the brain, and you will change what consciousness experiences. Just as if you cut off my arms, you will change what my consciousness experiences.

Don't get so wrapped up in theory that you forget the decades of medicine and neuroscience behind this. — Philosophim

I can't imagine a way to test the idea I'm talking about, so I can't call it a theory. Still, it is at least an attempt to explain it the way we explain all other macro characteristics and processes. Physicalism simply says, "It just happens. Put things together in a certain way, and you get consciousness. It doesn't have anything to do with the properties of the things you put together, the way every other macro characteristic or process does. There's no connection between the properties of matter/energy and consciousness."

A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of. — Janus

Interesting. That makes sense. But I've barely read anything on the topic, and don't seem to have an intuitive understanding of it all. My first thought was that a stop sign is, just as it says, a sign. It doesn't symbolize a stopped car. I was thinking a symbol would depict, even if the depiction was stylized, the thing. But then I looked up 'symbol', and the first example is:
for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP"

I am aware of seeing something red as I am seeing it.
— Patterner

I would still say you cannot see something and be reflectively aware of seeing it in the same moment. Self-awareness seems to me to be always post hoc. — Janus

I suspect you are making a point that I haven't yet caught on to. I don't know why you say this. I just looked at my blue shirt. As I was looking at it, I said, "I'm looking at my blue shirt. And I am aware that I am looking at my blue shirt." And I was aware that I was looking at my blue shirt as I was looking at it. You can't think I only became aware that I had been looking at it after I looked away from it, can you? You are saying something else?

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is not.
— Patterner

That's true. We just don't know. Maybe we cannot ever know the answer to that question. Perhaps subjective experience is nothing more than an idea—a perennially after the fact idea.

If that were so then consciousness, as Dennett argues, would not be what we think it is.I don't have a firm opinion on this either way. But I do argue against those who claim that the (purportedly self-evident) reality of subjective experience proves that physicalism is necessarily false. — Janus

'Purportedly self-evident'? Do you doubt that you subjectively experience?

I subjectively experience. I do not believe physicalism can explain it. Physicalism tells us there are micro physical properties, like mass and charge. We know how the micro physical properties give rise to macro properties, like liquidity. To characteristics of macro objects, like height. To macro processes, like flight. To characteristics of macro process, like speed.

But we don't have any idea how the micro physical properties give rise to subjective experience. We can't figure it out. And, as I've quoted a few times, Brian Greene, who Has a BA in physics from Harvard, and DPhil (PhD) in theoretical physics at Magdalen College, says the micro properties don't seem to have any connection to consciousness.

Might we find a new physical property of matter that explains it? Although I don't see how objective physical properties could, even in principle, explain it, I can't say it's not possible. But, the mystery being so total, I think trying to find another explanation isn't the moist illogical idea.

I did see something red. And I don't need post hoc reflection on such an experience. I can look at something red right now, and reflect on the experience as I'm having it.
— Patterner

I don't see how any reflection on any experience is not after the fact. — Janus

Fair enough. Wrong choices of words on my part. You said:

We reflect on experience and say things like "i saw something red". Perhaps it is that post hoc reflection that makes us think we are sometimes consciously aware. It is only the moments we recall that could make us believe that. Those moments are in the tiny minority. At least for me. — Janus

I am aware of seeing something red as I am seeing it.

The different nature of subjective experience, on the other hand, suggests something different is involved.
— Patterner

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is so. — Janus

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is not.

They're fundamentally different under the assumption that consciousness is non-material, which implies dualism, i.e. that we split the world in two, which is implausible. — jkop

What do you mean by 'split the world in two'? My thought on dualism is that maybe all matter/energy has physical and mental properties. Just as you can't remove the physical properties from matter/energy, you can't remove the mental property. If the mental property is a necessary ingredient of consciousness, then matter/energy is a necessary ingredient of consciousness. And the mental property isn't the only thing needed. What the matter/energy is doing physically is also vital. Not every clump of matter is conscious, despite all of the particles having the mental property.

I had almost hourly nightmares when I was about 6, and those where repetitive, predictable, and utterly horrible. I occasionally do reruns of old remembered dreams, but you could keep the nightmare ones, each of which I had named. — noAxioms

Sheesh. I've had a couple recurring dreams. Rather bland, but kind of nice to visit on occasion. Not sure I've ever had what would qualify as an actual nightmare.

Flying is pretty easy if you know you're dreaming, but not so easy if you don't know. — noAxioms

I always know how, remembering how I've managed in past dreams. Just freestyle swimming through the air. But I can't make it work when I know I'm dreaming and should be able to. Just as well, I suppose. Only very rarely have my flying dreams been satisfactory. I'm always running into power lines, no matter how high I go. I could be a mile up, and still hitting them. :rofl:

The weirdest ones are experiences that put memories in your head that are not marked 'dream'. Maybe days later you suddenly realize that it was just a dream and say your car wasn't actually totaled. — noAxioms

That's fascinating. I don't remember that happening. I think there's a scifi/fantasy story with some aliens that communicate by implanting memories into your mind. You remember a conversation that didn't actually happen, but you now have the information they wanted to give you.

For instance, I cannot read anything, because it is an attempt to acquire information that isn't there, and making up fiction is unacceptable. — noAxioms

I also cannot read in my dreams. I assume I'm simply lacking in imagination, cognitive ability, or a combination of the two. In my life, I've had dozens of dreams with tornados. (I've had more dreams with snakes.) I've always wanted to see a tornado, so am always happy in these dreams. Then I wake up to disappointment.

Aftet having had so many of these dreams, my dream-self began to realize it was a dream, and not get hopeful. It dawned on me that I can't read in my dreams. Now, whenever I see a tornado, I look for something to read. If I can't make out what it says, I'm dreaming, and don't get excited about the tornado.

Unfortunately, on several occasions, I've managed to trick myself into thinking I could read. When I woke up, disappointed again, I realized I wasn't reading anything. Just gibberish, sometimes more weird scribbles than actual letters.

I'm also very annoyed that, on several occasions, when I realized I was dreaming, it occured to me that I can do anything I want, but I really couldn't. I try to fly, but can't get going. So I wake up doubly annoyed.

Right, conscious states are different from unconscious states, but are they fundamentally different? — jkop

I am conscious as I type this. In a couple hours, I will be unconscious. The states are fundamentally different. Aside from differences in brain activity, however, a physical exam of me in each state of consciousness would find very little different.