So, similarly, I'm guessing that consciousness will turn out to be a property of living organisms exclusively. Why? Because whatever it is that makes an entity alive is going to be turn out to be what makes it consciousness. — J

Correct. And that "whatever" is DNA. DNA is an information system. It has meaning. It is about something that it is not. DNA is two complimentary strands of nucleotides running along sugar phosphate backbones, and joined by hydrogen bonds. DNA means chains of amino acids and proteins, which, once constructed, build living organisms.

What is vitality important is that DNA is what I call active information. As opposed to static information. A book is an example of static information. A book is filled with information, but does nothing. A book about architecture does not construct buildings. It doesn't even draw blueprints. Further, I can read the book, and learn about architecture, yet I might never construct a building, or even draw blueprints. I need not act on information. The information can just sit in the book, and in my head, and nothing ever has to come of it.

DNA is active information because it must be acted upon. The laws of physics require certain things to happen under certain circumstances. When the stem of an apple hanging on a tree weakens below a certain point, the laws of physics are such that the apple falls. Likewise, the laws of physics are such that the enzyme helicase unzips DNA by breaking the hydrogen bonds that bind the base pairs. Then there's mRNA, tRNA, aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase, on and on. No part of this is optional. The laws of physics require that the information in DNA be acted upon, and that that which DNA means comes into being in physical form.

DNA is in all life, and it's why there is life.

DNA is also why there is consciousness. Information. Does any theory of consciousness not consider information to be essential? DNA isn't only the information system that began life. In every cell of every living thing, information is constantly being processed, as protein is constantly being produced. And a lot of what those proteins are being used for is to build more information processing systems. Our senses are constantly changing input into information. Inside of us, homeostasis is accomplished thanks to the constant flow of information from every part of the body. Information about germs and viruses so they can be fought off. Information about injuries so they can be repaired. An incalculable amount of information constantly being processed inside us, all because of DNA.

This is something which is barely said in the history of Western philosophy, — Wayfarer

I haven't researched it. But I have heard of one exception. in his introduction to his translation of The Bhagavad Gita, Eknath Easwaran speaks of Ruysbroeck.

I have described the discovery of Atman and Brahman – God immanent and God transcendent – as separate, but there is no real distinction. In the climax of meditation, the sages discovered unity: the same indivisible reality without and within. It was advaita, “not two.” The Chandogya Upanishad says epigrammatically, Tat tvam asi: “Thou art That.” Atman is Brahman: the Self in each person is not different from the Godhead.

Nor is it different from person to person. The Self is one, the same in every creature. This is not some peculiar tenet of the Hindu scriptures; it is the testimony of everyone who has undergone these experiments in the depths of consciousness and followed them through to the end. Here is Ruysbroeck, a great mystic of medieval Europe; every word is most carefully chosen:

The image of God is found essentially and personally in all mankind. Each possesses it whole, entire and undivided, and all together not more than one alone. In this way we are all one, intimately united in our eternal image, which is the image of God and the source in us of all our life. — Easwaran

Later philosophers explained maya in surprisingly contemporary terms. The mind, they said, observes the so-called outside world and sees its own structure. It reports that the world consists of a multiplicity of separate objects in a framework of time, space, and causality because these are the conditions of perception. In a word, the mind looks at unity and sees diversity; it looks at what is timeless and reports transience. And in fact the percepts of its experience are diverse and transient; on this level of experience, separateness is real. Our mistake is in taking this for ultimate reality, like the dreamer thinking that nothing is real except his dream.

Nowhere has this “mysterious Eastern notion” been formulated more succinctly than in the epigram of Ruysbroeck: “We behold what we are, and we are what we behold.” When we look at unity through the instruments of the mind, we see diversity; when the mind is transcended, we enter a higher mode of knowing – turiya, the fourth state of consciousness – in which duality disappears. This does not mean, however, that the phenomenal world is an illusion or unreal. The illusion is the sense of separateness. — Easwaran

However, although I believe there are benefits to viewing things that way, I don't have reason to think it's how things are. As I said, I think consciousness can examine itself. The problem is the western world is so adamant that things can only be examined using specific methods. But if the nature of something is not amenable to those methods...

I see no obvious reason why consciousness cannot perceive itself as an object.
— ucarr

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back. — Wayfarer

I think consciousness is sufficiently different from physical things that we cannot know that it has this same "limitation." Consciousness may be the only thing that can study consciousness. If consciousness is feeling and thinking, then that which feels and thinks can feel and think about itself. Maybe?

I am not able to simultaneously focus on what I am looking at and the idea that I am looking at it. Could just be me but I doubt it. — Janus

You are talking about not being able to think two things simultaneously? But you can see an object, and clearly think about the idea that you are looking at that object. You can even speak the words. And if, while you are thinking clearly about the idea that you are looking at it, someone blocks your field of vision, you will realize that you are no longer looking at it, even though you were not focusing on looking at it. It didn't stop you from looking at it.

It doesn't make conceptual sense to me to say that consciousness is made of particles. — Janus

Agreed. Neither is flight. Or vision.

What possible evidence could we have that consciousness cannot arise from the physical? That seems like a mere prejudice to me. All the evidence seems to point to the opposite consclusion — Janus

This is what it all comes down to. Not evidence that it can't. Just no evidence that it can. The fact that the physical properties and forces are all we can find with our science is not evidence that they are solely responsible for consciousness. And it doesn't mean they are all there is. I don't see the logic of saying a bunch of particles bouncing around, if there is nothing but the physical properties and forces, no matter how they are bouncing around, can become aware that they are a bunch of particles bouncing around. That can, and does, explain flight and vision. We can see, starting from the physical properties and forces,how these processes come about. And we can follow any aspect of flight and vision back down to the properties and forces.

Not so for consciousness. Where is it? What is the physical activity in the brain that doesn't produce a physical process, like vision or memory, but, rather, produces consciousness? We don't see physical activity that is not producing some physical process. Nothing accompanies the physical activity that doesn't seem to be doing anything, which we could speculate is consciousness itself.

If some physical activity produces vision, why is there also subjective experience of vision? If the activity that produces vision is tied up with activity that triggers stored patterns of past sensory input, why is there also subjective experience of memory?

Nobody can find anything physical to explain these things, even though some pretty smart neurologists can see remarkable detail about what's going on in our brains. Brian Greene says no physical properties even hints at consciousness.

Personally I love the idea of living forever. But only in a healthy body with all normal faculties and capacities intact. I'm 71. — Janus

Yeah, young and healthy would be a requirement. At 60, I got hearing aids for the first time today. So already too late for that. in any event, wanting to live forever is not why I don't think consciousness is solely physical.

In Scientific, Evelina Fedorenko, a neuroscientist who studies language at the McGovern Institute for Brain Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says You Don’t Need Words to Think

I don't believe it is possible for you to look at your blue shirt and be reflectively aware of yourself doing so in the same instant. Observing my own experience leads me to think that I can't do it at least. You might be more skillful than I. I can't rule that out so I speak only for myself. — Janus

What happens when you try? Is it a flickering back and forth between looking at it, and thinking about having looked at it? Or are you unable to think about looking at it at all until it is no longer in your line of sight? Something else?

I don't doubt that we experience. What I do doubt is that our experience is non-physical. I mean our experience is not a physical object to be sure but I think our intuition that our experience is non-physical is the product of a kind of illusion created by language. An illusion created by reflective thought. The alternative as I see it has to be mind/ body dualism. — Janus

Ah. I wasn't sure what you meant. Like you, I can only speak for myself. I thought it must surely be physical. Everything is made of particles, after all. At another site (for a series of fantasy books), a guy and I posted for several pages, me trying to convince him that consciousness must be physical, because everything is made of particles. Well, he ended up convincing me of the opposite. Lol

Still, everything is made of particles, right?? Everything exists because of/is built from particles and the forces. But if consciousness can't arise solely from the physical, which I don't think it can, then maybe there are things in our reality that are not physical. Like an experiential property of matter, in addition to the physical properties. So consciousness arises from matter, but the experiential property is as necessary as the physical properties.

All it takes is for me to accept the possibility that we don't know all the properties of the universe, or matter.

I also think that much of the attachment to the idea that experience is non-physical has to do with the wish for immortality which can make us averse to the idea that this life is all there is. — Janus

I'm sure many people believe it for that reason. I'm not among them. I'm 60. I'm not unhappy, looking forward to death, or anything. But the thought of myself going on forever is veeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeery unappetizing.



My humble thanks. I'm much less well-read than most of you on most of the topics discussed at TPF. I don't always know what anybody is talking about. There's a thread about someone Frege that looks interesting. Problem is, I never heard of Frege. So I'm happy I'm at least writing well about what I think or know.

And right back at you! It's a pleasure.

Indeed, we disagree, and neither is likely to switch sides. Heck, we even disagree on which of us is more focused on 'what we want' and 'what is most likely'. Hehe. It's that kind of topic, eh?

Not sure it's possible for the two of us to not talk about it, though. If you say something I disagree with, I'll often want the other person to know there is another pov.

Everything points to consciousness being physical by every measure of behavior we know. — Philosophim

Behavior isn't consciousness. Behavior can take place without consciousness. It does so in things we have made, and in simple forms of life that nobody would think has anything but the most rudimentary consciousness. An ant in the Amazon get infected with a certain fungus. The fungus causes the ant to climb to the top of a tree, at which point the fungus, which has been growing inside the ant, bursts out, and spreads far and wide, infecting more ants. Every autumn, monarch butterflies migrate to a very specific place in Mexico, from as far away as Canada. They have never been to Mexico. Their great grandparents lefty Mexico on the spring. This generation returns to three same place - literally the same trees - to continue the cycle. I would not think the behavior of either the ant or butterfly has anything to do with consciousness.

Just because we can't figure out the subjective portion of it in no way entails that its suddenly made of some new non-physical material. — Philosophim

It isn't sudden.

Consciousness is 'something'. The best explanation from what we know is that it is the first person experience of matter and energy when it is organized in a particular way. — Philosophim

That is not an explanation at all. An explanation would tell us why matter and energy organized in a particular way has first person experience. As opposed to it doing whatever it does without first person experience. No physical-only explanation amounts to anything more than "It just happens."

So far, we understand human consciousness is the brain. — Philosophim

We understand that consciousness takes place in the brain. And, since, as far as we know, brains are the only places consciousness takes places, it doesn't make sense to think that the brain isn't essential for consciousness. But that is a different thing from "the brain is consciousness."

You alter the brain, you get reports of people saying their first person experience is altered. — Philosophim

Yes. Change what is happening in the brain, and you will change what consciousness experiences. Just as if you cut off my arms, you will change what my consciousness experiences.

Don't get so wrapped up in theory that you forget the decades of medicine and neuroscience behind this. — Philosophim

I can't imagine a way to test the idea I'm talking about, so I can't call it a theory. Still, it is at least an attempt to explain it the way we explain all other macro characteristics and processes. Physicalism simply says, "It just happens. Put things together in a certain way, and you get consciousness. It doesn't have anything to do with the properties of the things you put together, the way every other macro characteristic or process does. There's no connection between the properties of matter/energy and consciousness."

A symbol is a kind of sign but not all signs are symbols. Smoke is a sign of fire, but smoke does not symbolize fire. An animal cry may be a sign of whatever but it does not symbolize whatever it might be a sign of. — Janus

Interesting. That makes sense. But I've barely read anything on the topic, and don't seem to have an intuitive understanding of it all. My first thought was that a stop sign is, just as it says, a sign. It doesn't symbolize a stopped car. I was thinking a symbol would depict, even if the depiction was stylized, the thing. But then I looked up 'symbol', and the first example is:
for example, a red octagon is a common symbol for "STOP"

I am aware of seeing something red as I am seeing it.
— Patterner

I would still say you cannot see something and be reflectively aware of seeing it in the same moment. Self-awareness seems to me to be always post hoc. — Janus

I suspect you are making a point that I haven't yet caught on to. I don't know why you say this. I just looked at my blue shirt. As I was looking at it, I said, "I'm looking at my blue shirt. And I am aware that I am looking at my blue shirt." And I was aware that I was looking at my blue shirt as I was looking at it. You can't think I only became aware that I had been looking at it after I looked away from it, can you? You are saying something else?

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is not.
— Patterner

That's true. We just don't know. Maybe we cannot ever know the answer to that question. Perhaps subjective experience is nothing more than an idea—a perennially after the fact idea.

If that were so then consciousness, as Dennett argues, would not be what we think it is.I don't have a firm opinion on this either way. But I do argue against those who claim that the (purportedly self-evident) reality of subjective experience proves that physicalism is necessarily false. — Janus

'Purportedly self-evident'? Do you doubt that you subjectively experience?

I subjectively experience. I do not believe physicalism can explain it. Physicalism tells us there are micro physical properties, like mass and charge. We know how the micro physical properties give rise to macro properties, like liquidity. To characteristics of macro objects, like height. To macro processes, like flight. To characteristics of macro process, like speed.

But we don't have any idea how the micro physical properties give rise to subjective experience. We can't figure it out. And, as I've quoted a few times, Brian Greene, who Has a BA in physics from Harvard, and DPhil (PhD) in theoretical physics at Magdalen College, says the micro properties don't seem to have any connection to consciousness.

Might we find a new physical property of matter that explains it? Although I don't see how objective physical properties could, even in principle, explain it, I can't say it's not possible. But, the mystery being so total, I think trying to find another explanation isn't the moist illogical idea.

I did see something red. And I don't need post hoc reflection on such an experience. I can look at something red right now, and reflect on the experience as I'm having it.
— Patterner

I don't see how any reflection on any experience is not after the fact. — Janus

Fair enough. Wrong choices of words on my part. You said:

We reflect on experience and say things like "i saw something red". Perhaps it is that post hoc reflection that makes us think we are sometimes consciously aware. It is only the moments we recall that could make us believe that. Those moments are in the tiny minority. At least for me. — Janus

I am aware of seeing something red as I am seeing it.

The different nature of subjective experience, on the other hand, suggests something different is involved.
— Patterner

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is so. — Janus

That subjective experience seems somehow radically different is not a guarantee that it is not.

They're fundamentally different under the assumption that consciousness is non-material, which implies dualism, i.e. that we split the world in two, which is implausible. — jkop

What do you mean by 'split the world in two'? My thought on dualism is that maybe all matter/energy has physical and mental properties. Just as you can't remove the physical properties from matter/energy, you can't remove the mental property. If the mental property is a necessary ingredient of consciousness, then matter/energy is a necessary ingredient of consciousness. And the mental property isn't the only thing needed. What the matter/energy is doing physically is also vital. Not every clump of matter is conscious, despite all of the particles having the mental property.

I had almost hourly nightmares when I was about 6, and those where repetitive, predictable, and utterly horrible. I occasionally do reruns of old remembered dreams, but you could keep the nightmare ones, each of which I had named. — noAxioms

Sheesh. I've had a couple recurring dreams. Rather bland, but kind of nice to visit on occasion. Not sure I've ever had what would qualify as an actual nightmare.

Flying is pretty easy if you know you're dreaming, but not so easy if you don't know. — noAxioms

I always know how, remembering how I've managed in past dreams. Just freestyle swimming through the air. But I can't make it work when I know I'm dreaming and should be able to. Just as well, I suppose. Only very rarely have my flying dreams been satisfactory. I'm always running into power lines, no matter how high I go. I could be a mile up, and still hitting them. :rofl:

The weirdest ones are experiences that put memories in your head that are not marked 'dream'. Maybe days later you suddenly realize that it was just a dream and say your car wasn't actually totaled. — noAxioms

That's fascinating. I don't remember that happening. I think there's a scifi/fantasy story with some aliens that communicate by implanting memories into your mind. You remember a conversation that didn't actually happen, but you now have the information they wanted to give you.

For instance, I cannot read anything, because it is an attempt to acquire information that isn't there, and making up fiction is unacceptable. — noAxioms

I also cannot read in my dreams. I assume I'm simply lacking in imagination, cognitive ability, or a combination of the two. In my life, I've had dozens of dreams with tornados. (I've had more dreams with snakes.) I've always wanted to see a tornado, so am always happy in these dreams. Then I wake up to disappointment.

Aftet having had so many of these dreams, my dream-self began to realize it was a dream, and not get hopeful. It dawned on me that I can't read in my dreams. Now, whenever I see a tornado, I look for something to read. If I can't make out what it says, I'm dreaming, and don't get excited about the tornado.

Unfortunately, on several occasions, I've managed to trick myself into thinking I could read. When I woke up, disappointed again, I realized I wasn't reading anything. Just gibberish, sometimes more weird scribbles than actual letters.

I'm also very annoyed that, on several occasions, when I realized I was dreaming, it occured to me that I can do anything I want, but I really couldn't. I try to fly, but can't get going. So I wake up doubly annoyed.

Right, conscious states are different from unconscious states, but are they fundamentally different? — jkop

I am conscious as I type this. In a couple hours, I will be unconscious. The states are fundamentally different. Aside from differences in brain activity, however, a physical exam of me in each state of consciousness would find very little different.

:up:

Space is a concept we use in relation to matter. We measure it with matter, yet space itself is not matter, but the absence of it. — Philosophim

Would matter warp space if space was merely the absence of matter?

Time is not an existent 'material' concept, but it is is determined by watching and recording the differences in materials. — Philosophim

The differences in materials come over time.. Without time, nothing would change.

Every being we know of is 'physical' in the fact that it is made up of matter and energy. — Philosophim

Right. And maybe all matter/energy has physical and mental properties.

There has never been a discovery to my mind, of some 'thing' which is not matter and energy at its core. — Philosophim

I agree. And maybe all matter/energy has a mental property that is a necessary ingredient of consciousness. That would mean consciousness is matter/energy at its core.

I decided to get Chalmer's words himself.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=yHTiQrrUhUA — Philosophim

Thanks for this! I've seen several of his videos, but hadn't seen this one before.

As long as one does not conclude from this that consciousness exists as some essence apart from the physical reality we live in, its fine. — Philosophim

I can't watch it now. Pushing midnight. So I don't know exactly what he's says, although I've heard and read some of him. But no, that's not there idea. The idea is that, in addition to the physical properties of matter we're familiar with - mass, charge, spin, etc. - properties that we can measure and study with our physical sciences, there is a mental property. Not being physical, we cannot measure and study it with our physical sciences. It is no more removable from matter than mass is. Even though it is not physical, it is not "apart from the physical reality we live in."

Vitalism used to be a solution to a "hard problem" based on the assumption that... — jkop

That hard problem was solved. The HPoC has not been. And the fact that it turned out inorganic and organic compounds are not fundamentally different is not evidence that the same answer will apply to the HPoC.

Now I don't think we're anywhere near a synthesis of consciousness from unconscious compounds, but if seems fairly clear that consciousness is a biological phenomenon. — jkop

All we know is that we are not aware of any consciousness that exists apart from biological entities. We don't know what the connection is between the two things.

I'll leave it to you to read it, but it's a deep question. — Wayfarer

I have. Biosemiotics, beginning with that page in particular, was one of the first things I learned after coming to TPF.

But the interpretation of information is not a physical process, — Wayfarer

Not information created and interpreted by humans. And I know that's what you're talking about. But what about other kinds of information?

For many tiny critters, light hits an eyespot, which sends signals to flagella, which react according to that information.

DNA is a better example. The information encoded in it is the blueprint for amino acids and proteins. The interpretation of that information and the production of the amino acids/proteins is the same process.

Please don't take my disagreement as hostile. :) — Philosophim

It had not crossed my mind. No worries at all.

How would the thought "I am consciously aware" be possible without language? — Janus

I don't know if it is. It seems very difficulty to separate human thought from human language. However, animals have thoughts that don't seem connected with language. Danger. Safe. Food. Mate. Protect. We would have had at least as many before we developed language. (No way to know, but maybe our ability to have thoughts without language reached the point where it couldn't increase further. One day, something finally triggered in someone's head, and they started creating language.)

We reflect on experience and say things like "i saw something red". Perhaps it is that post hoc reflection that makes us think we are sometimes consciously aware. It is only the moments we recall that could make us believe that. Those moments are in the tiny minority. At least for me. — Janus

I did see something red. And I don't need post hoc reflection on such an experience. I can look at something red right now, and reflect on the experience as I'm having it.

Physical processes don't suggest conscious awareness, unless you mean behavior. The physical processes that don't suggest awareness don't suggest the absence of conscious awareness either. Nor do they suggest that awareness could not arise from physical processes.

You ask why subjective awareness at all. Presuming it is a real thing then why not? We have a subjective prejudice that physical stuff could not have subjective experience. Exactly what would be the argument supporting that conclusion? We have nothing to compare our situation with so it remains just an assumption based on intuitive feelings I think. — Janus

You are right about all that. But here's how I see it. I've used this analogy before.

If I saw a skyscraper made entirely of liquid H2O, I'd be awfully suspicious. To my knowledge, the properties of liquid H2O cannot explain a skyscraper. Do those properties suggest the absence/impossibility of skyscrapers? I suppose not. But I'm still thinking it's suspicious.

Of course, we should look into the properties of H2O. It seems to be the only thing we have to work with, after all. Maybe we just aren't aware of all its properties. Maybe we haven't yet thought of all the ways the properties we're aware of can be combined.

But we try and try, and can't find anything to explain it. We don't even have a theory for how it can be. We just keep assuming it must be nothing but liquid H2O, since we can't find anything else involved. So we assume if we gather enough water, we'll eventually see how it makes skyscrapers.

I think the case for consciousness is even more difficult to explain. At least H2O and skyscrapers both have physical properties, and no suggestion of non-physical properties. Even processes like flight, metabolism, and vision can be seen to come from purely physical foundations. Subjective experience cannot. The properties of matter that we know of, and have measured to an amazing degree, do not suggest subjective experience.

The argument for reductionism I hear most often is, just because we haven't figured it out with our sciences yet, doesn't mean we won't. My opinion is the fact that we haven't should not be considered evidence that we will. Nor is there evidence that the things we are aware of because of our sciences are the only things that exist. The different nature of subjective experience, on the other hand, suggests something different is involved.

The HPoC is why the unconscious responses are accompanied by the conscious awareness, rather than going on "in the dark." They can go on in the dark, as they do in the non-biological machines we've made that can perceive and differentiate different frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum, and act in different ways in response to different frequencies. The physical processes that take place within us don't suggest conscious awareness. The physical properties of particles (mass, charge, spinn, etc.) don't suggest conscious awareness. So why the redness of red, or the sweetness of sugar? Why subjective experience at all?

How would those different frequencies be "perceived" if not in the form of different colours? — Janus

We have machines that can differentiate different frequencies. For them, it's binary code.
BLACK
00000000
00000000
00000000

RED
11111111
00000000
00000000

WHITE
11111111
11111111
11111111

BLUE
00000000
00000000
11111111

I don't know nearly enough of how our visual system works. My Behe quote stops with a current being transmitted down the optic nerve to the brain. I don't know what happens there. But nothing red or blue happens.

As you say, re: the rock's possible subjective experience, we simply assume not. So, possibly (but unlikely) the rock could be suppressing it's selfhood from expressing as behavior so as to keep its selfhood hidden from observers. — ucarr

Another (unlikely) possibility is the rock subjectively experiences, but has no capability of expressing any behaviors. Maybe it's exactly what we think it is, but conscious.

Ludwig said,
"The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure."
If you try to build your hut's support beams out of jellyfish, Shaka, when the walls fell. If you think rationally, you'll try something else. If you are a poor swimer, it would be irrational to try to swim home. You don't have to attempt to explain anything to anybody.

Most of our memories just come when we want them. "Trying to remember" is possible, though I don't find that I know exactly what I do when I'm trying or even succeeding. It just happens - or not. — Ludwig V

I wish I could remember the tv show I saw one time, lo these many years ago. Sadly, decades. One charter told another that she could remember much greater detail if she tried to walk through it slowly, step by step. That's why I do it the way I do. Only a few days, before any memories fade away. I start with a detail that I remember well. Then I move forward. As slowly as I can. When I do that, I remember little things you wouldn't normally. Glance over because someone coughed, and notice their blue shirt. You never know what you'll dredge up.

The basis of rationality is the discovery of what brings success and what brings failure. Then there's all the learning from those around us, including what counts as success/failure. — Ludwig V

But therr are irrational proper. I wonder how many different reasons there are for that. The baby's brain grows/is wired as those things are happening, because that's what the DNA designed it to do. What if it gets no interaction? Does the brain wire badly? Does a time come when it is too late for things to work out well, no matter what happens? And what about irrational people who got the interaction that works best in the vast majority of cases?

What is really weird is that I've noticed that sometimes I know that I've remembered before I've remembered the details. — Ludwig V

Sure. I don't have to sing Hey Jude to know I know all the words, or recite my children's birth dates and Social Security numbers to knows I know them.

Surely it is possible to remember a sequence of events without visualizing them? Actually, for me, it's not a choice. The sequence of events since I last had it occurs to me without pictures. — Ludwig V

I don't know. it never occurred to me to try. I just automatically start visualizing the events. I don't know how I would do it. Lol.
"Ok, after I paid, I put the card back in my wallet. When it was in my wallet, I put it in my back pocket. I grabbed my bags, a couple in each hand, and walked to the car. I opened the car door, put the bags in, took my wallet out and threw it on the passenger seat. I don't remember taking it off the seat when I took the groceries in. AH!! Maybe it fell between the seat and the door!"

How would I know I did those things if I wasn't picturing the sequence of events in my head??

It is NOT that we don't understand that the brain causes subjective experiences. — Philosophim

Yes and No. Yes, we know that it happens in the brain. No, we do not know HOW. That's the HPoC.

And I'll note again, the only reason we cannot figure out how physical processes give rise to the subjective experiences of the mind is because we have no way of objectively knowing what it is to hold that subjective experience, because you must BE that being having that subjective experience. — Philosophim

I am the being having the subjective experience. That does not help me understand how it is achieved.

These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.
— Patterner

No, that's the easy problem.
"For Chalmers, the easy problem is making progress in explaining cognitive functions and discovering how they arise from physical processes in the brain. The hard problem is accounting for why these functions are accompanied by conscious experience." — Philosophim

That quote explains it nicely. But you are misinterpreting it. Let me try this approach. This is from Darwin's Black Box, by Michael Behe. (Think what you want of his overall conclusions regarding a designer. But her knows the science.).

Here is a brief overview of the biochemistry of vision. When light first strikes the retina, a photon interacts with a molecule called 11-cis-retinal, which rearranges within picoseconds to trans-retinal. The change in the shape of retinal forces a change in the shape of the protein, rhodopsin, to which the retinal is tightly bound. The protein's metamorphosis alters its behavior, making it stick to another protein called transducin. Before bumping into activated rhodopsin, transducin had tightly bound a small molecule called GDP. But when transducin interacts with activated rhodopsin, the GDP falls off and a molecule called GTP binds to transducin. (GTP is closely related to, but critically different from, GDP.)

GTP-transducin-activated rhodopsin now binds to a protein called phosphodiesterase, located in the inner membrane of the cell. When attached to activated rhodopsin and its entourage, the phosphodiesterase acquires the ability to chemically cut a molecule called cGMP (a chemical relative of both GDP and GTP). Initially there are a lot of cGMP molecules in the cell, but the phosphodiesterase lowers its concentration, like a pulled plug lowers the water level in a bathtub.

Another membrane protein that binds cGMP is called an ion channel. It acts as a gateway that regulates the number of sodium ions in the cell. Normally the ion channel allows sodium ions to flow into the cell, while a separate protein actively pumps them out again. The dual action of the ion channel and pump keeps the level of sodium ions in the cell within a narrow range. When the amount of cGMP is reduced because of cleavage by the phosphodiesterase, the ion channel closes, causing the cellular concentration of positively charged sodium ions to be reduced. This causes an imbalance of charge across the cell membrane which, finally, causes a current to be transmitted down the optic nerve to the brain. The result, when interpreted by the brain, is vision. — Michael Behe

That is the Easy Problem. That is how we perceive a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. There is TONS more detail in this, and we could go much further, mapping out how we can differentiated different frequencies within that portion of the spectrum. And how our perceptions are stored in the brain, and how that stored information can then be compared to future perceptions of that portion of the spectrum. And how we report on our perceptions.

All of that is the Easy Problem. Not "easy" as in "a piece of cake." But easy as in we understand how to go about it.

We do not know how to go about the HP. That's why it's named the Hard. Because we don't know. How is all of that subjectively experienced? People like Tse, Damasio, and Gazzaniga begin their books by saying we do not know. Koch just paid off his 25 year bet to Chalmers because we haven't figured it out. Physicist Brian Greene says there are no known properties of matter that even hint at such a thing. Why do I see red, rather than just perceive different frequencies, the way a robot with an electric eye might? Why do I feel pain, rather than just perceive damage to my body, the way a robot that's wrapped in a sensory web might? These things can, and do, take place without any subjective experience. How is the subjective experience accomplished in us?

Is factually incorrect. Chalmer’s argument is directed at the inadequacy of physical accounts to accurately capture first-person experience, yours or anyone else’s.
— Wayfarer

Didn't you and I already address this on your first response to me? My point was that the heart of why this was is because we cannot know what its like to be another subjective individual. — Philosophim

You may have addressed it, but you are still using an inaccurate definition of the HPoC. As J pointed out early on:

The hard problem is, "Will we ever know what it is like to BE a conscious individual that isn't ourselves".
— Philosophim

Just for the record, that isn't the standard way of stating the problem, and it isn't David Chalmers' way (he coined the phrase). You can listen to Chalmers describe it here: He defines the problem as "how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experiences in the mind." When we solve this problem (I do believe it's when, not if) we may or may not know "what it's like" to be someone else. That's a separate, though perhaps related, issue. — J

Alright, then try to counter these points, because these points note that our autonomy is physical.

1. Drugs that affect mood and decisions. A person getting cured of schizophrenia by medication for example.

2. The removal of the brain or physical processes that result in life from the brain, and the inability of autonomy to persist.

3. Brain damage resulting in differing behaviors and consciousness. — Philosophim

These things change various aspects of how the brain works, and, therefore, what we subjectively experience. They don't address how it is that we subjectively experience them at all. That's the HPoC.

Cool. At least we got one thing settled. :rofl:

I'm thinking maybe the capacity to think rationally is hardwired in. But we must learn how it works.

That is indeed different from the situation I was thinking of; yours is a much longer-term problem. In that case, you are adopting the same approach as me, excepting that I don't visualize. — Ludwig V

How do you approach this without visualizing? I will picture in my mind my exact movements, to whatever degree I'm able to remember, like trying to watch a movie of the events.

The ground for my rational thinking or beliefs is the training and education that I got in my youth.
— Ludwig V
Sorry I don't see a logical link between the ground for your rational thinking or beliefs and the training and education in your youth. Could you elaborate further? — Corvus

Can you give any examples of what might constitute a ground for someone's rational thinking or beliefs?

When I'm at a cash desk, the range of possibilities is limited, so I just start checking them all. — Ludwig V

We maybe talking about different things. This sentence makes it sound as though you are physically checking the pockets. I'm talking about sometime later, possibly several days. (So, it might not be a wallet, since I would probably notice that was missing much sooner.) I can't physically check every possible place where something might have been left between the last time I know I had it and now. So I think back to that last time I had it, and start visualizing everything that I can from that point forward.

Is that what you're talking about?

FTR, Bach did not write any symphonies.

Very interesting. I wouldn't know if I put it in a pocket, or wherever, if I didn't visualize. I wouldn't even know how to approach the problem.

If I can't find my wallet, I think back to the last time I remember having it, then replay as much of what I've done since then, and hope to remember enough detail to "see" where I left it. I do that in images, not words.
— Patterner
I do the same thing, but in words, not images. — Ludwig V

That's fascinating. If the last time I'm sure I had my wallet was at the register in the grocery store, I'll picture taking my debit card out of the keypad, and try to see exactly what I did with it. Put it in my wallet? Then what? Did I put my wallet into my pocket? Jacket or pants? Did I put the wallet down and bag some groceries? Did I put my wallet into a bag that I was packing? Did the cashier say or do anything to distract me? If so, was it before I put my wallet into my pocket? On and on. But always picturing the scene. I'll usually close my eyes, so what's in front of me doesn't distract me.

No. They're usually in the neighborhood of $20/dozen.