Please look at Mariusz Tabaczek overview article about The Metaphysics of Downward Causation: Rediscovering The Formal Cause
"Jaegwon Kim notices that this characteristic of EM is related to the concept of supervenience (SUP), which simply states that the higher-level properties of a system occur only if appropriate conditions are realized on the lower-level."

A property A is called supervenient over a (subvenient) property B if a change in B has direct consequences for A.
— Ypan1944 — SophistiCat

It's amazing how you can misinterpret my definition! After all, the only correct slogan that you can connect with my definition is:
“there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”

So we agree with this last slogan. My remark that “a change in B has direct consequences for A" is just a symmetric formulation, stipulating the causal connection between B and A.
But let's stop with nitpicking in this discussion please!

Yes, this is almost identical to the definition that I quoted in my post, and it is the opposite of what you stated and then used to argue that consciousness cannot supervene on brain properties. — SophistiCat

Sorry if you misunderstood my post, but I really meant that my definition has the same meaning as Wikipedia 's definition. I am absolutely not reversing cause and effect. In the case of consciousness: this is certainly emergent and my remark that some parts of the brain are crucial for consciousness indicates that there is at least some form of supervenience.

Ironically, the looping "glitch" itself is unexpected in classical deterministic physics. Which suggests the logical necessity for "an inventor or artist to construct them". But natural or supernatural creativity of any kind is abhorrent to most scientific worldviews, that are based on the predictability of nature. So, how else can we explain the appearance of Strong Emergence in the world, without assuming either sporadic Divine Intervention, or at least a hypothetical intelligent First Cause, to design or program a dynamic system capable of creating radical novelty, such as self-referencing "featherless bipeds" with big brains, who ask recursive questions about their own origins? — Gnomon

I am not a supporter of the "Theory of everything" because such a theory can never predict the occurrence of (strong) emergent phenomena. Only some simple (weak) emergent phenomena are more or less capable to predict by mean of computer simulation. But unpredictability does't mean that you need a "Divine Inventor". Just accept that the world in essence is unpredictable!

The original title of this thread was spelled "emergency". That may have been a typo, but "Emergence" and "Emergency" are related concepts. "Emergence" usually refers to the gradual evolution of novelty within a system. But "Emergency" suggests a radical break in the chain of causation that requires special treatment. One kind of philosophically important "strong" emergence is the transition from a collection of parts to an integrated system with new properties of its own, such as the evolutionary appearance of self-animated matter, and self-referencing minds in the world. Is that what this thread is about? :smile: — Gnomon

I didn't realize the difference between "emergent" and "emergency" because I am not a native speaker. I am not convinced about the "radical causal break" you mentioned. Sure, strong emergent phenomena has an ontological meaning of their own, but that doesn't mean that such phenomena are "unphysical".
In my opinion (strong) emergent phenomena are very common in daily life and certainly not "unphysical".
An exception is perhaps the notion of qualia. Whatever physical analysis you possibly can make, you can never explain what it is to see the colour RED, because this is a typical subjective emergent phenomenon and therefore you can never give a objective explanation. I think the same is at hand with "consciousness" .

This sounds like a description of Holism, as a metaphysical concept relevant to physical things & processes. But you didn't use that controversial term. Was that ententional? — Gnomon

I am not a "holist" : holism denies reductionism and I don't do that. Nevertheless despite the deterministic physical laws who are not linear but exponential in time, not all phenomena are predictable. (f.i. the three-body-problem). At a certain complexity level new features appear who are characteristic of the collective. To describe these (emergent) features you don't need to go down to the atomic level. You need only some qualifiers which are characteristic of the macroscopic level of the meant emergent phenomenon.

A property A is called supervenient over a (subvenient) property B if a change in B has direct consequences for A.
— Ypan1944

This is an incorrect definition of supervenience: the relationship goes in the opposite direction. And you go on to make an incorrect argument from it: — SophistiCat

Sorry, but look at Wikipedia for this definition:
"In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible."
This has nothing to do with your "downward causation" conception

In his seminal work, Incomplete Nature, Terrence Deacon addresses both of those controversial topics. Yet, the Information Philosopher goes into even more detail, and both use the language of Information Theory to explain how the "magic" works. Are you familiar with these authors? :smile: — Gnomon

Thanks for your link to Terrence Deacon.

To some, Strong Emergence seems to imply a violation of Determinism, and Downward Causation implies a violation of physical Cause & Effect. Is this seemingly "magical" appearance of novelty the crux of your OP? — Gnomon

I think there is a lot of confusion about definition and features of (weak/strong) emergency. I am a physicalist, so a belief that all phenomena (even mental phenomena) are in principle reducible to known physical interactions. However that doesn't mean that - the other way round - all phenomena are predictable, because of deterministic physical laws. This is especially true for the collective features of complex systems (magnets, superconductors, soap bubbles, chemical systems, biological systems, etc.). These features are more or less easier described by macroscopic features by means of "course graining". You don't need to go down to a lower (sub)atomic level to achieve a satisfactory explanation for this collective behavior. It is called emergent behavior for it is new because it is unpredictable.
Therefore I like also to call artifacts emergent (even strong emergent): they need an inventor or artist to construct them, and they are in essence unpredictable.
I dislike the self-evidence of Bedau's connection between (strong)emergence and "downward causation". Roger Sperry's example of a rolling wheel has nothing to do with downward causation and is not even emergent. In my opinion with "downward causation" is always ment: "feedback". This is a very common feature of complex systems and requires always a suitable context where such a feature can happen (f.i. condensation, crystallization, self-organizing systems, evolution, leading to entropy reduction). In the case of artifacts feedback is leading to improvements and correcting errors. However feedback is never self-evident: it only happens under special conditions.
On the other hand is supervenience strongly connected with emergence. In the case of strong emergence every component is subvenient to the apparent emergent behavior. In the case of weak emergency there are only some subvenient component who are crucial for the emergent behavior.

I do know your valuable links to informationphilosopher.com, however I think that most philosophers are not up to date about developments in complex systems theory of the last 20 year. See for recent achievements f.i. https://www.d-iep.org .

You emphasize the strong versus weak emergence distinction, saying there's little difference, thus implying strong emergence is only slightly stronger than weak emergence.

Since supervenience -- whether strong or weak -- evidences emergence of mind, you presumably accept it as fact. Is your goal in this conversation denial of strong emergency? — ucarr

My goals are:
* Explain the difference between weak and strong emergency
* Explain the difference between "downward causation" and "supervenience"
* Show that there is a close connection between "strong emergency" and "supervenience" (and not with "downward causation") in the sense that every constituting component is crucial for the emergent event is happening.

In the case of consciousness: not every neuron in your brain is crucial for your consciousness (in fact, a lot of neurons die as you get older). In the case of Alzheimer disease, you can show that some neurons or combination of neurons are essential (subvenient) for your consciousness. So you can say that the whole working of your brain is weak emergent and some parts of it perhaps strong emergent.

Do you accept selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors -- SSRIs -- an established medication treatment for major depressive disorder -- as an example of the deep interweave of mind and brain via supervenience? SSRIs can greatly relieve long-term depression, a state of consciousness embedded in the empirical experience of some individuals. They achieve their effect by increasing the volume of serotonin, a neurotransmitter that carries signals between neurons. — ucarr

In my opinion this is certainly a case of supervenience. But supervenience can both exist in weak and strong emergency.

No the chemical properties are not exactly the same. For example, the pH of heavy water is 7.44 instead of 7.0. — wonderer1

I should say that pH is a physical feature of the ion-concentration of a solution. Chemics - in my opinion - is more about the characteristics of a reaction between different molecules. But I don't bother about more refinement of definitions about physics versus chemistry

Supervenience is indicative of a dependence of a higher order entity on its constituent components. Strong emergence, on the other hand, is defined precisely in terms of non-reducibility (the whole is more than the sum of its parts). So, for example, if a man was able to build a neural computer, and transfer his consciousness to that computer, his consciousness would definitively be strongly emergent and not supervenient. This would also be an example of downward causation. — Pantagruel

Again: "supervenience" has nothing to do (in my opinion) with "downward causation" Supervenience is upward causation, not downward. To be strong emergent every component has a subvenient causal effect on a supervenient resulting emergent feature but not "downward".
Nevertheless "downward causation" in the sense of "feedback" is of course important: that is the learning capacity of your brain.
I doubt if our consciousness is strong emergent: it seems too rigid in my opinion.

See also: Michele Paolini Paoletti and Francesco Orilia (to disturb you).

For a good summary of the aforementioned problems, see: the article of Mariusz Tabaczek

Of course: nuclear reactions have emergent aspects by themselves, but you should distinguish these from emergent chemical features.
You can of course lump everything together and say that the universe, with everything in it, is emergent as a whole. But that means that the various properties of the universe are obscured.

Yes, you are right, but the chemical features of "heavy water" are exactly the same as "normal" water. The features you mentioned are just physical, not chemical. These physical aspects are not emergent (they are the direct result of the fact that it is a heavier atomic nucleus). The chemical features are indeed emergent, depending on the specific electron configuration.

I think just the opposite is true: strong emergency and supervenience are strongly connected. With weak emergency supervenience sometimes happens (like Lorenz butterfly effect) but several other effects on components doesn't have this effect. F.i. throwing a stone in an emergent whirlpool doesn't disturb the water movement in general.

Nuclear reactions have nothing to do with the features of an atom or molecule. For reactions between atoms or molecules, only the "outside" of an atom (i.e. the outermost electrons of the atom) plays a role. The emergent feature of an atom or molecule depends only on its outermost electron configuration.

The same problem arises if you consider the behavior of a bee or ant colony as strong or weak? emergent. Are those bees really independent of each other? After all, they are doomed to death on their own. The same problem arises with your neurons who are dynamically connected with each other.

I don't agree with you. The features of an atom are totally dependent on the electron configuration of the atom, which you can describe with quantummechanics (harmonic oscillator etc.). The internal structure of the nucleus is irrelevant. You only need to know the electric charge of the nucleus.
Also in chemical reactions, only the electron configuration of the participating atoms or molecules is important.
I agree that there is a lot of confusion and mystification about the meaning of "downward causation". I opt for a "simple" definition here.

To argue that our consciousness is highly emergent you must show that the features of our consciousness are supervenient over the underlying complex structure of neurons. This would mean that any damage to the brain has consequences for consciousness. I didn't think this is the case. But I admit that the distinction between weak and strong emergence is not a strong one.

I would say: try to design a crucial test (which should be more sophisticated as the Turing Test) to decide which is conscience and which is not.

I am happy with your interesting comments.
But one aspect remains underexposed so far. A system like our brain has many components (neurons). A characteristic of a set of related components is that it exhibits emergent behavior, which is absent from any of the components. This is how algorithms are created: the whole has different properties than each part.
If you consider a lot of related algorithms (biological or computerized) , they can also show new emergent behavior. Such as "being able to look back on one's own behaviour", "adjusting behaviour", "considering which behavior has the best chance of success", in short "being aware".
As it grows in biological systems consciousness will grow also and even become self-consciousness .

When will a growing child become conscious?

Do you agree that performing algorithmic actions are unconscious? (that is : automatically, without thinking). Then the difference with conscious actions may be clear (such as participating in this forum).
A transitional unclear form may be "dreaming".

I am interested in the transition from unconscious algorithmic thinking to conscious thinking. How does consciousness emerge from a algorithmic basis?