What about questions like: What is my purpose? Where do I ultimately come from? Why do bad things sometimes happen? What is justice, or love for that matter? Can naturalism explain these questions in a satisfying way? I think supernaturalism gives some answer, if not a complete answer for every question.

interesting point. Why exactly not walk into a wall - what is the reason not to?

This question sounds sillier than I mean it.

I guess my point is, doesn't pragmatism always assume some goal or make some kind of commitments?

I think you are conflating the validity of formal logic with the validity of the cogito in particular.

One can maintain that cogito is valid.

Proving it is another matter.. if you don't get it you don't get it.

Maybe there is a distinction to be made between the capacity to doubt and the capacity to be certain. So I can doubt "I think therefore I am" and yet it is also a proposition I can have certain knowledge about (though not simultaneously both). Or, does certainty imply an impossibility to doubt?

I think I have some idea of what Corvus and Beverley are objecting to in the statement "I think, therefore I am." They are objecting to the "I," which is presupposed in the assertion. Perhaps Corvus and Beverley would endorse a proposition that did not include "I" such as the proposition "there is thinking happening." Perhaps they would even endorse the proposition : "there is thinking, therefore something exists." But then we can be certain of two things 1 there is thinking, and 2 something exists.

1. I think.
2. If I think, then I exist.
3. Therefore I exist.

This is my understanding of the cogito in argumentative form. Do you object to premise 1 or premise 2?

So since "it is raining" has truth table values of true and/or false then it could have been false, even though the proposition is true. Is that what you are saying?

what if it really is raining. Is the proposition still invalid?

Consider the proposition "it is raining." Will you regard that proposition as valid or invalid?

is p valid or invalid?

No. An argument is valid if the conclusion necessarily follows, as a matter of deduction, from the premises. If p then q is not an argument.

"If P then Q" is just a conditional operator, there is nothing not valid about it. I have never heard anyone claim that "if p then q" is not valid. Will you be claiming that p is "not valid" as well. Are you sure that you understand validity?

If A implies B then the falsity of B implies the falsity of A by modus tollens. Whereas the proposition "I do not think therefore I do not exist" must be false if indeed I do not think (and yet exist), the proposition "I think, therefore I exist" needn't be false in the event that I do not think. In that case, the falsity of the proposition "I do not think therefore I do not exist" does not imply the falsity of "I think, therefore I exist."

Corvus, perhaps you were thinking that if I did not think, I would not know that I existed; in that case, it would appear that my existing could not be decoupled from my thinking. While it is certainly true that if I weren't thinking, I would not know I existed, there is surely a possibility that I do still exist (even if I am not thinking), as Banno stated.

But I don't think or I think, therefore I do not exist is false — Corvus

Corvus, is the correct interpretation here that: "I don't think...or it is false that I think therefore I do not exist." (1).

Or is the correct interpretation here: "it is false that "whether I think or I don't think I do not exist." (2).

And since I really do think the argument is valid, I would ask you again whether the conclusion from my argument sounds right to you?

Any 1 line argument is invalid because it is not an argument! Even "If P Then Q" is invalid according to the program you referenced.

But Banno, of course that argument is invalid. That argument is only 1 step. My argument is three steps. I should be quite surprised to find that the argument I laid out is invalid.

Hmm, I am surprised to see that the argument is invalid and would very much like to know why it is invalid. It seemed to me to be quite a good formal argument.

Very well Banno, I shall look to see if Socrates is around. He is usually most amenable to having a discussion.

Banno, where are you going? I am quite sure we were just now on the verge of a breakthrough. Are we to turn away from the discussion at this critical juncture?

Still, I would like your opinion on the conclusion, is it acceptable or not?

Would you endorse the above conclusion, or reject it? I mean just the last line, does it seem agreeable to you?

Splendid!

Now consider this argument:

If not (if I think, then I exist), then (if I don't exist, then possibly I think).
Not (If I think, then I exist).
Therefore, if I don't exist, then possibly I think.

I do not know what your emoji means.

I just mean formally speaking, let's not worry about what our premises are for now.

It's a secret. So what do you say, does that argument look agreeable?

Here is a more formal statement of an argument:

(1) if not (p then q), then (if not-q then possibly p).
(2) not-(p then q).
(3) Therefore, If not-q then possibly p.

Can we all agree with the first conditional, or would someone object to it (and if so what is the objection).

(1) If I think, then I exist.
(2) I think.
(3) Therefore, I exist.

Premise one is not explicitly stated in the cogito argument (at least I don't think it is), but surely it is implied.

The formal structure of this argument is:

(1) If p, then q.
(2) p.
(3) Therefore q.

It is a valid argument.

Or have I missed the boat on this one?

I am reminded of the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. This is a debate that may have implications for both naturalists and supernaturalists and one that both can engage.

Nevertheless, couldn't one maintain that God is "in" the world in a non-spatial sense in addition to having a causal or sustenance role? I do not see how that would be problematic or even controversial for most theists.

I am less concerned whether someone else' argument is fallacious or ill-reasoned, of greater concern to me is that someone (including myself) can understand and represent the argument stated. If they can't do that, or if I can't do that about someone else's argument, then that is a sign of not comprehending. Further, there can be no "meeting of the minds" if the others' argument is not stated and represented as that individual has stated it. In other words, social reason collapses if no attempt is made to understand (even a fallacious reasoner).

So in summary, I would give less prominence to the "reasoning" abilities of an individual (because that may assume a criteria of knowledge or rationality to which the interlocutor may not agree), and greater prominence to their ability to re-assert and understand another's view. If someone won't do that then there is simply no discussion to be had.

We also must distinguish between an argument's soundness and its validity. An argument can be valid without being sound. If so, that's not a reasoning error, that just means an assumption is wrong. I am not sure that someone can be "reasoned" out of an assumption.

Unless they do not accept the law of noncontradiction

I think it is important to understand the "other side " of an argument. If someone can't do that , that's a sign they do not have understanding of the "other side." And in that case, they can't reasonably object to it. Someone with understanding of both sides is in a much better position to adjudicate.

I think the proper theist response is not to try prove that God is something that exists, but is the ground or cause of anything that exists. That is not an empirical argument.

So, for those who are supernaturalists in this forum: what phenomena do you believe cannot be sufficiently explained naturalistically? — Bob Ross


Phenomena are appearances - that is the origination of the word. And from a non-theistic philosophical perspective, something this doesn’t account for is the nature of the being to whom phenomena appear. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer, looks like your answer to Bob Ross regarding the phenomena that are not accounted for on a naturalistic account is just this: everything.

I find that just a bit humorous.

If reason functions as a social product (I think Habermas says something like that (perhaps Fichte to some extent too)) then it may be that reason can be instilled into this individual viz. interaction with other rational individuals. In that case, patiently correcting someone for their logical infelicities may be best. Also, logic classes help. Lastly, I think epistemic humility is important.

Also, I assume this post is not about me, otherwise...irony!

You might be interested to read Shamik Dasgupta, especially what he has to say on "Absolute Velocity" -- http://shamik.net/papers/dasgupta%20symmetry%20as%20an%20epistemic%20notion.pdf

I think you will also find discussion of the "Invariance Principle" as it pertains to physics interesting and perhaps quite agreeable. -- I think Nozick talks about it to some extent.

Let me sum up my point about a vicious infinite regress. In a YouTube video, Dr. Craig says that without creation, God is timeless and temporal after it. On the other and, classical theists believe that God is absolutely simple with no parts of any kind. And potentials are metaphysical parts. So, if God is purely actual, there's no potential in him. But Dr. Craig implies that God is metaphysical parts when he, Craig, says that God went from being possibly in time to being actually in it. Any object with potential is a composed object. And each composed object needs cause to put the parts together. So you end up with infinitely many composers but no composed object. — BillMcEnaney

Time aside, would it not be the case that God as pure actuality is "in" the universe in only a "potential" way prior to creation, and in a "non-potential" way once creation has occurred? How do you make sense of that? (Note: I guess it would not have been a problem for Aquinas if Aquinas thought the universe was eternal/infinite).

Perhaps it is a mischaracterization to describe the state of God outside creation as "potentially" in time? In wonderer1's quote, Dr. Craig does not use that term.

If creation does not yet exist, can God bear any relation to it viz. potentiality? But if not, then God needn't be a composite of potentiality and actuality and there is not infinite backpedaling.

Hi,

I would begin by questioning the soundness of accepting a principle such as the principle of parsimony. Why would a simpler theory be prima facie preferable? What virtues does it espouse over a more complex theory? It may be easier to understand a simpler theory, so maybe there are practical reasons to choose it; but in terms of the veracity of a theory, I don't see why a simpler one is of greater import.

Secondly, I do think there are some phenomena that are not accounted for by the naturalistic thesis. What I have in mind are much the things you would expect me to say as a supernaturalist: places like Heaven and Hell, entities such as angels and demons, but also events such as the miracle of Fatima, and other miracles that I believe in as a Christian, such as the resurrection. I realize that the occurrence of such supernatural phenomena may provoke incredulity from a naturalist. Belief in these things is not only through testimony, but also an article of faith for me.

Time has nothing to do with it though, so the principle of plenitude is not doing any work in your argument. Not to mention, you are describing Aquinas' Second Way: if everything is contingent and contingent things require a cause, then there would be nothing because nothing would cause all the contingent things (even if there were an infinite number of them); that is approximately the Second Way.

Oh I see, so then you are saying that there would have been nothing today if everything were contingent because there would have been nothing before any contingent things and that that nothing would have prevented all the contingent things from existing entirely. Do I have that right?

Therefore the proposition "all things are contingent is incoherent", and there is necessary being. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. I am asking you: "if everything is contingent, would there have been nothing today because there would have been nothing after all contingent things existed, or because there would have been nothing before all the contingent things began to exist?"