The issue is whether you ought to believe whatever I tell you. In short, I'm trying to get you to account for the normative dimension of the project of establishing beliefs rationally. — plaque flag
Another way to put it: why would a person be proud of being a scientist ? of trusting science ? Why would a person be proud of living an examined life ? — plaque flag
Why don't you just take my word for my claims ? Why don't you just believe what I tell you to believe ? — plaque flag
I'd say they couldn't do so rationally. Recall what I actually claim. — plaque flag
Note that you are asking me to justify my claims (which also involves their clarification) as an expression of your autonomy. — plaque flag
I would not have thought that I have been giving the impression that that’s what I believe. I was stating a position that some people believe that makes no sense to me. — Patterner
Did you the sign the 'member of the English speaking community' contract ? Or did you absorb its semantic norms mostly without trying ? — plaque flag
Autonomy means [ approximately ] self-rule. Rejecting the unjustified claims of other is part of that. — plaque flag
The notion of being 'rational' is essentially normative (ethical). One prides oneself on not being credulous, on [autonomously] thinking for one's self. One is ashamed to contradict oneself, embarrassed to find oneself caught in a performative contradiction. One resents being described as a kind of 'machine' that did not reasonably (autonomously) decide but was rather 'programmed' by its environment. 'You are just saying that because you are white/black, male/female, rich/poor, straight/gay.' — plaque flag
Rationality is universal. It applies to all of us in the rational community. You don't get your own logic. Neither do I. It's an aspect of a humanism which has liberated itself from scripture. Both the species and its individuals are grasped as autonomous beings, ideally subject only to the laws they themselves recognize as legitimate. Basically, rational people all agree that they have a sort of better self in common, namely a rationality that binds them all. 'May the best human win [ may we fallibly defer for now to whoever makes the best case.]' — plaque flag
If the same events would take place due to the laws of physics if I did not have the false belief that what I think is at all relevant, then why have the false belief that what I think is at all relevant? It is difficult to understand why evolution would select for this. — Patterner
Phantom pains exist. Those aren't functional. — Marchesk
It actually does contradict what we know, you know need to know how light works to know that's an illusion. This is just wrong and we know the water is fooling us by "bending" the stick. — Darkneos
I don't resent functionalism as a mapping strategy, but on a more serious ontological level it looks absurd to me. — plaque flag
You seem to imply that your words are as empty of meaning as those of a stochastic parrot. — plaque flag
Do you not see that you are making the bold controversial claim here ? — plaque flag
You seem to miss that science and philosophy exist within a 'field' of normatively. Speaking of human speech acts as merely causal is a self-subverting psychologism. — plaque flag
Contentious claim indeed, sir ! Could you justify it carefully with one hand in an open flame ? — plaque flag
It doesn’t matter what the origin of thunder is. You can claim it’s an act of god. That doesn’t stop an atheist from hearing thunder. — Patterner
Have you looked into Popper's idea of basic statements ? — plaque flag
I don’t think I feel pain. I feel pain. — Patterner
If you think I don’t, I would like to hear your argument. — Patterner
If you think I am laying claim to the words, I would like to hear what you think a more accurate claim for them is. — Patterner
I think Husserl is correct in that we have a sort of categorial intuition. As humans, we live among concepts as much as colors. — plaque flag
You do not experience blueness or pain? — Patterner
I did. We can explain things like perception, language, behavior, and memory in terms of things like neurons, circuits in the brain, feedback loops, and algorithms. Neurons, circuits in the brain, feedback loops, and algorithms explain it all without the need conscious experience, like blueness and pain. And they don’t explain blueness and pain. Blueness and pain are qualia. They are unnecessary subjective experience. and unexplained. — Patterner
1. If qualitative element/subjective experience doesn’t do anything, and everything works without it, why does it exist? — Patterner
And for any given cc of matter I suppose? Anyway, all of those things are the steps/building blocks of, in this example, taking my hand away from the fire. How are those physical events/processes also the steps/building blocks of the subjective experience of feeling pain and pulling my hand away from the flame? — Patterner
Do you mean that I'm using tricks of the mind to express my doubts? — Ludwig V
What do you mean? Why do I think I see blue? And taste sweetness? — Patterner
Not sure I am following you. Are you saying Ludwig V is a Jedi? — Patterner
H'm. We're talking about slightly different things. "Phenomenological properties exist" and "Phenomenological properties do not exist" are indeed contradictories. Whichever is true must be a contingent, empirical statement. Right? So where does the evidence that they exist, or not, come from? — Ludwig V
An illusion can only be defined by its difference from reality. — Ludwig V
If the deliverances of consciousness are illusions, what is the reality? Oh, yes, physics. — Ludwig V
You still have the appearance of colors, pains, etc that need explaining. Claiming they don't have phenomenal properties doesn't explain away their appearance — Marchesk
What Chalmers argues is that if the hard problem is an illusion (that we have phenomenal experiences), then this illusion needs to be explained. How does the brain produce such an illusion? — Marchesk
But the very fact of having an inner experience is evidence in favor of the hard problem. — Marchesk
Calling them interpretive illusions doesn't dissolve the matter. Just shifts it over to explaining how the brain accomplishes these illusions. — Marchesk
It is better (i.e. less misleading) to say that when we see an illusion of a bent stick in water we don't see an image of a bent stick, but we see a straight stick as bent. No image is required. I think this is what ↪goremand is saying. I also think that disposes of illusions. — Ludwig V
It is very hard to maintain that when Macbeth hallucinates his dagger he is misinterpreting something that he is really seeing. — Ludwig V
we have consciousness, and the physical interactions are accompanied by subjective experience/phenomenal properties. — Patterner
I don't think it's trying to lay claim to words inappropriately. (Love your last sentence!) — Patterner
It is only an illusion to those of us who know the stick is straight, but see the image contradicting what we know. — Patterner
If consciousness is an illusion, then what is it that knows what's really going on, but perceives a contradiction? — Patterner
"1. Something that deceives by producing a false or misleading impression of reality.
2. The state or condition of being deceived; misapprehension."
See the "space" that these definitions open up?
In the second case, although there are different theories of "illusionism" in philosophy, I think that the most common and what I personally came to know about is one that has to do with the nature of consciousness. A view belonging to "eliminative materialism", which considers and describes phenomenal consciousness as an illusion. — Alkis Piskas