Take me in.

It seems to me, like I am always consciously aware of many things at the same time. I hear many different things going on around the room, I look around and see many different things. Perhaps you are different from me in that respect, but don't you hear many different things going on at once? — Metaphysician Undercover

I can hear many things in a noisy place but they are garbled. I can of course focally focus on one thing to hear carefully.

Say you have a choice between two courses of action.

Consider each of the two options separately, one at a time, writing down its merits and demerits.

Now, repeatedly look from one option's merit list to the other option's merit list. Remembering how you felt about the first option's merits, do you feel as strongly about the 2nd option's merits?

Do the same with the demerits.

Follow your impression, your intuitive feeling.

Michael Ossipoff — Michael Ossipoff

This is selection based on weight.

I think that the average person is aware of about six objects at once, without having to count them. So this premise is incorrect, we are focally conscious of numerous different things at the very same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps you could. I can be only be focally conscious of one thing at any time. I of course could keep a few thing in my working memory.

I get the impression you believe nature is Newtonian deterministic and therefore free will becomes a problem. But that is a limited view of causality even within physics these days, let alone neuroscience. — apokrisis

This is basically physicalism to best of my understanding rather than only Newtonian determinism. Under physicalism we are interested to know what would be final state of a system given initial state. That is determinism too.

I am talking of a view of brain function where it accumulates many degrees of freedom - all the many things it might concretely do (and so also, not do). And then attention acts top down to constrain or bound these freedoms in useful, goal achieving, fashion.

So free will is just rational choice, voluntary action. There is a vast variety of things we could be thinking or doing at any instant. We accumulate a vast store of habits and ideas - concrete skills and notions. Then we must constrain this huge variety of possibilities during every conscious moment so that we limit ourselves to thoughts and actions best adapted to the needs and opportunities of the moment.

To speak of free will is really just to note that we have a socially constructed sense of self that lies over our voluntary behaviour - another level of filter to bound the possible variety of our behaviour. We can consciously weigh what might best suit us personally against what might best suit some wider communal identity we participate in.

So a constraints-based causality avoids the philosophical problems that a physical determinism would seem to create. — apokrisis

I agree. I can achieve this understanding by simple introspection. The question is how we could mentally reach to such a state of affair which we could act freely. Given a brain, I cannot see how free will is possible within physicalism/determinism.

Therefore compatibilism is impossible.
— bahman

No, if we assume everything before you said is true, then libertarian free will is impossible. Libertarian free will is an incompatibilist position. — darthbarracuda

Why?

Free will in another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality.
— bahman

This is the libertarian free will definition. Not compatibilism. — darthbarracuda

What is compatibilist definition of free will?

Compatibilism is a system of belief in which free will and determinism are compatible with each other.

Part of driving is learned habit (body/muscle memory). Part of it better be quite conscious as I described. You are perceiving an image and consciously making decisions based upon what you perceive. You might see dozens of cars in front of you and make a decision to leave the road, or otherwise. — Rich

Sometimes I see the car in the background. It is matter of focus. I can just focally focus on one thing at any moment. I do mistake if what I am trying to do is new otherwise things seems to be automatic.

I think that desire is an organic process in nature.

You reject compatibilism, but you are actually rejecting the concept of non deterministic free will. — charleton

I don't think so. I am aiming compatibilism. Free will and determinism are compatible under Compatibilism. One need to show that is however possible. I am showing that it is impossible.

A compatibilist is a determinist. — charleton

I agree.

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." WIKI — charleton

These are just wrong statements considering OP.

Compatibilism is a moral stance which accepts that actions are determined, and accepts free will as an instance in which a person acted according to his own (determined) motivation, but was not forced by outside forces to act in that way.

For example you have become determined by experience to be a thief, and you steal. Had you been coerced by another then you would not have been free to act.
Compatibilism is a moral stance. Punishment is delivered to the person who is determined to transgress the law. Such a person can enter into consideration mitigating circumstances, and a judge my consider them. But the judge passes sentence upon a man caused to act contrary to law.
It is not a metaphysical proposition. Compatibilism is a social proposition. — charleton

Well, lets put morality and society aside.

But apparently you also believe you can drive unconsciously, and that consciously you are only aware of a single thing. — apokrisis

I normally think of something else than deriving. That is true in most of the time something bothers the field of my consciousness.

So how does it all fit together for you if you reject a more scientific view? — apokrisis

I don't see what is the problem.

Of course there are habits that one isn't always conscious of. But you are claiming you drive while unconscious - and live to tell about it. This is an entirely different matter. — Rich

I am conscious when I am deriving. I think of something else rather than deriving. Deriving seems that is is done automatically. I cannot make any memory of deriving all the time that I am unconscious of deriving too. Maybe I just cannot recall.

A conscious decision is one we know we have made.
I see no problem here at all. — charleton

If the self is by product of brain activity then it could not create a chain of causality since brain activity respects causality unless we are dealing with a magic.

Is number something realizable in external world that we experience and we try to discuss? 1 apple +1 apple=2 apple. Something just appears in our mind which we can individuate it. It shows a property of the world.

This doesn't make sense. How can the boy track the ball if he cannot individuate it? — Agustino

I agree with you. The power to individuate is a part of our instinct.

That doesn't make any sense.

Numbers are ideas. They could have instances in reality.

No, I meant in the regards to question I asked: Is it brain dependent or is something separate like soul? You don't have third option.

What is the third option in this case?

It's just there. — Rich

Come on. You just have two options.

It's what is exploring, creating, and communicating. It's us. — Rich

Is it brain dependent or is something separate like soul?

And what is mind?

I use my brain. — Rich

Come on. Please elaborate.

Yes. Have you ever heard of sleepwalker?

No - you are misconceiving it. — charleton

Could you please elaborate?

You realize that there is zero evidence for either of these statements. Your "fact" it's a belief. — Rich

What do you believe? What is the use of brain?

Farsi/persian.

No. I am saying given a situation which is defined by a set of options an agent can decide and choose one of the option only if he can initiate a chain of causality.
— bahman

You mean that an agent is free from necessity! — charleton

Did what I say not clear? Of course we are bounded with many things but we might be free given the definition of free will in OP.

Therefore we are not free given the definition of free will.
— bahman

Yes. We are not free of necessity. — charleton

But we should be able to initiate a chain of causality otherwise we are not free.

This is where the perspective of compatibilism comes in. We observe people making apparent acts of will all the time. Since we can never be party to the causal chains in side a person's brain, these acts of will are deterministic, but appear to be freely made. — charleton

Appear? I am arguing against compatibilism.

I am Bahman. I am a physicist. I love philosophy though. English is my second language. What else? Nothing.

??? Are you trying say there are no acts of will? Or that they are not apparent, but real? — charleton

I am saying that act of will is impossible in a deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is wrong.

Are you saying that individual human agents are free from necessity? — charleton

No. I am saying given a situation which is defined by a set of options an agent can decide and choose one of the option only if he can initiate a chain of causality.

The chains of causality are not initiated except by the big bang, and maybe not even then. — charleton

Therefore we are not free given the definition of free will.

I do not understand your objection. — charleton

I hope that it is clear by now.

What causes this?
Agents follow from causes too. — charleton

That is not correct. What does initiate a chain of causality if even the agent follow causality too?

Your conclusion is not warranted. Compatibilism is a deterministic picture which recognises the idea of free-will as caused and causal agency. — charleton

What is your definition of free will? I cannot comprehend what you are trying to say here.

It does not posit an agent that can act regardless of causality. — charleton

This means that the agent is not free.

It's a matter of perspective, and answers the problem of apparent acts of will. — charleton

Apparent? It is not apparent at all.

I believe that there is a doer which can initiate or terminate a chain of causality otherwise there is no free will.

I don't know if it is like this for you but I can derive miles without being conscious of deriving, unless an expected thing happen.

You seem to be working with a homuncular notion of awareness. — apokrisis

What is homuncular notion of awareness?

Language demands that we speak of the “I” who is the self behind every mental doing. And so when we are attending and consciously deciding, there is this elusive “we” now apparently an extra part of the picture. We lose sight of the fact that this we-ness is part of the process, part of the construction, part of the action. It describes the fact that the brain was doing something, and that included taking a point of view, and a point of view implies “an observer with a choice”. — apokrisis

I agree.

So you seem to accept functional talk. There is what it is like to be behaving habitually or to be behaving attentionally. However you also want to assign a further identity to the doer of any doings. Language demands that there be an efficient cause. — apokrisis

I agree.

And you believe grammar more that you believe psychological functionalism. — apokrisis

Could you please elaborate on this part?

Of course. There is an image in my mind and I consciously decide to take action in a certain direction. What's going on in your mind? Are you groping in the refrigerator and removing what ever you touch? Don't you see all of the choices and choose one? Maybe your mind works differently? — Rich

That is how I make a decision: (1) I collect options one by one and memorize them, (2) I retrieve option one by one and contemplate about each option separately and then (3) I decide about an option while I am not aware of anything but my decision.

I have no idea what you are experiencing in your mind but I described what I am experiencing in my mind. It is quite conscious and deliberate. — Rich

Are you conscious of the options at the moment you decide?

One is simply conscious of alternative possibilities. I look in a refrigerator. I see several foods that creates an image. I then might gradually widdle it down to two or three possibilities, all envisaged as a single image in memory. Then I choose one course of action. Reach and grab the apple. — Rich

I think you are explaining unconscious decision. You can neither be conscious options as an coherent image nor you can consciously give them a weight.

Your argument seems to boil down to the observation that the experience of contemplating two things together, whether simultaneously or in quick succession for sake of comparison, is vague and hard to describe in contrast to the two things contemplated separately. — sime

I don't think if we can focally experience two things together. I am familiar with the experiencing options sequentially but that doesn't help when it comes conscious decision since you cannot compare options simultaneously.

But why should experiential vagueness be interpreted epistemically? — sime

What do you mean?

Take another example; the problem of identifying colours that are poorly illuminated. One reports that the hues are ambiguous. But why should colour ambiguity under poor illumination be considered 'evidence' that poorly illuminated colours are hard to determine? For if the illumination is increased we are no longer comparing like for like. — sime

How this example is related to the topic?

Even so, we can be conscious of a decision. We can attend to a choice presented to us. The choice could be whether or not to hit a button. The choice could consist of a whole panel of buttons, as in a vending machine. — apokrisis

Yes, we can conscious of a decision. The question is whether we can decide consciously: having both option at the same time in mind and deciding. How could we possibly decide on a situation when only one of options are consciously available to us? There is even moment that we are conscious of non of options, when we switch between options.

So yes, attention is a thing. It narrows our focus on the world, or even out thoughts, by suppressing whatever seems extraneous. So attention itself involves a decision. It is the choice not to be focused on anything else at some moment. And that choice could exclude a vast range of other possibilities already. — apokrisis

This is an area which is very confusing for me. We need the attention for specific purpose and for attention we need attention. Paying attentions seems to me that is enforced unconsciously, like when you are deriving and something disturb your deriving.

Then conscious of some particular area of action or choice, like the bounteous variety of a vending machine, we might narrow our attention still further to the Mars bar. And even then, there is the choice to buy it, or not. — apokrisis

Yeah, but the process of narrowing down always involve two choices.

If buying the bar is our daily habit, then we could just hit the right button with little attention. There is also habit or automaticism. As much as possible, we want to make our choices in a learnt and routine fashion. Attention is there to deal with choices and decisions that are surprising, novel or significant. — apokrisis

Yes, I agree.

The fact that attention is a narrowing of awareness - an active exclusion of many alternatives - is the feature, not the bug. It is how we avoid just acting out of unthinking habit, even if mostly we want to learn to act out of unthinking habit. — apokrisis

Well, I think we are not evolved enough to perform conscious decision.