A1. Green sees blue
A2. Therefore, if I don't see blue then I must be blue — Michael
So you say, and yet if blues were to follow this reasoning and browns were to follow comparable reasoning then they would all correctly deduce their eye colour — Michael
P1. I know that green sees blue
P2. Therefore, if I don't see blue then I must be blue and will leave on the first day — Michael
It's the same reasoning — Michael
Each blue reasons: green sees blue, and so if the two blue I see don’t leave on the second day then I must be blue — Michael
And yet every blue-eyed person leaves knowing they have blue eyes and every brown-eyed person leaves knowing they have brown eyes. So what do you mean by it “not being correct”? — Michael
One guy, I don’t know who, it might be Baden, takes one of his eyes out, looks at it, and then leaves the island. — T Clark
I’m not sure, but my reasoning does allow all brown and all blue to leave knowing their eye colour, so either it’s sound or it’s a very lucky coincidence — Michael
But as a question to you, why would it require green saying what everyone already knows? — Michael
I don’t think that’s a comparable scenario. I think a minimal example requires 3 blue, 3 brown, and 1 green. — Michael
Every person on the island already knows that the Guru sees at least one person with blue eyes — Michael
Notice that he doesn't mention the Guru or what she says at all. — Michael
But as I said to flannel, the Guru doesn't even need to say it — Michael
Using the reasoning given by unenlightened, on day 100 every blue-eyed person would leave knowing that they have blue eyes, every brown-eyed person would leave knowing that they have brown eyes, and the Guru would stay knowing that they have neither blue nor brown eyes. — Michael