I don't take that kind of feedback from someone who doesn't understand the difference between a normal implication and a bidirectional one. Maybe suggest that again to me in a year when you've grown beyond basic logical fallacies

That's not what "coherent" means at all. That's just a bidirectional implication.

the thing I said wasn't an explanation didn't have any because.

Yes, we can explain it. The explanation is this: The banana turns blue when someone reads that sentence. That explains it. So it's not magic. — Quk

That's not an explanation, that's just a sentence describing the phenomenon you want to explain.

ease of access to referenced information is actually pretty important I think. There's a reason academic journals require cited sources.

too right. I've seen this pattern too, people just posting videos (sometimes hours long videos) without explaining anything about why they're posting it, how it's relevant to the topic, anything.

Like they think they're so important that other people should dedicate hours of their life just to find out if this video this random person posted online might be worth watching. The conceitedness of it... exhausting.

Yeah humanity will likely never know for sure.

I'm partial to the Mathematical Universe / Ruliad class of ideas, which are both just different ways of expressing "everything that's possible to exist does exist", where "possible" is defined by some domain like mathematics or computations.

In that view, the rules of this universe are simply a system expressible in mathematical or computable terms, and the beginning of this universe is just some starting conditions.

Apart from the obvious? — Benkei

The boundaries are a little fuzzy. Facebook is the poster child of social media. Then Instagram. Twitter, but that seems a bit less strong. Reddit even less strongly still, because the majority of Reddit is anonymous. Reddit is arguably as much social media as this site is.

Some people say any site with a comment section is social media, but that would include many news sites.

What counts as social media?

i said "if it's ontologically true". I didn't say "it's ontologically true". This is a conditional statement.

i don't know what a "fundamental and general ontology" is. What I do know is that, when you have a turing-complete system, other emergent systems can come about which are best understood at a different level of abstraction than trying to understand them through the fundamental constituents of the system.

Conway's game of life is turing complete. That means you can implement the Haskell programming langauge inside conway's game of life. But trying to understand the abstract concepts of Haskell, by understanding them in terms of conways game of life, is a failure. Even if it's ontologically true that some specific instance of an implementation of haskell is implemented in conway's game of life.

Pyschology is like that. Psychology is best understood at a layer of abstraction that makes no (or very little, at least) reference to quantum physics. Even if it's ontologically true that every psychological being is composed of quantum objects.

mhm. notice how specific it is. i didn't say "does not explain", i said "does not explain this specific set of abstract principles." See where you went wrong?

ok, you inferred incorrectly. you overgeneralized. That generalization isn't the case, it's not applicable.

this ontology does not explain — JuanZu

Too general. I said something specific. I didn't say "does not explain".

psychology cannot be reduced to physics, but must nonetheless share a physical ontology.
— SEP

I'm curious, what is the difference between physics and a physical ontology? — JuanZu

The trick there is what they mean by "reduce". I think there's perhaps, and this is arguable, but a difference between abstract explanatory reduction, and ontological reduction.

So when he says it can't be reduced to physics, he's saying you'll never be able to understand the abstract principles and general patterns of human psychology by speaking in terms of quantum fields, basically. But that can (arguably) be true, even if it's still true ontologically that every instance of a psychological event in our universe is the direct consequence of quantum fields doing what they do.

But when it happened, it wasn't a conscious decision? Seems very suspicious. — Patterner

I personally don't care if that particular movement was conscious or not. I've come to view conscious decisions as something separated in time from when they're actually realized. I believe the majority of actions are subconscious, and the conscious part of us is almost like a feedback system for our subconscious decision mechanisms.

So imo it's pluasible that your conscious mind has almost no direct control of what your body does, but it can command your subconscious to do it. Most of the stuff your body does doesn't get mediated by the conscious part at all, it's mostly subconscious, but your conscious mind can choose to send immediate commands (which have to be mediated first by the subconscious, and then go to your muscles), or - and this is even more important - can tell your subconscious when it did something wrong, and should do something different the next time a similar scenario arises.

I actually think the point of consciousness is mostly that last thing, somehow signaling to your subconscious to do something different, because your conscious analysis determined it wasn't optimal.

We wonder what qualia are good for, since consciousness comes too late in the process for it to be causal (of the result already formed by the subconscious brain analysis object 500 milliseconds previous); — PoeticUniverse

I think this is a mistake. The idea that consciousness is not causal. It seems to me that it would be a very strange for the world to be full of people writing about consciousness, writing about qualia and the ineffable experience of consciousness, if consciousness were not casual.

It may not be the immediate cause of any action, but it doesn't need to be immediate to be causal.

You are right to think that the T clause is not doing any work if you are asking yourself whether you know that p, given that you believe it. — Ludwig V

Not just about your own beliefs, about anybody else's too.

If someone else believes something, and they call that belief 'knowledge', you're going to judge that statement by the same criteria as your own so-called "knowledge", which is to say, you're going to judge the justifications for it being true. You don't have access to the T, you can only access the J.

I want to follow this thread but I don't care to have a debate about it - I don't think it would be productive. I think P2 probably needs more detail, and the leap to C2 is unjustified from the preceding premises. I very much doubt I'm in a position to either convince or be convinced, and I don't forsee the ensuing conversation to be enjoyable or enlightening, so I'm going to watch.

that's exactly right! If you have two beliefs, both with equal and very strong epistemic justification, but one of which turns out to be true, one of which turns out (obviously unbeknownst to you) to be false, you're going to call both of them knowledge. Because... why wouldn't you? You don't know the false one is false. By what criteria could you decide to call the false one not knowledge? You can't decide what to call it based on information you don't have.

So since you can't actually use the T to actively decide what to call knowledge, but you can use the J, the T seems.... weird. It's not clear what it's doing there.

We call stuff knowledge, and some of the time, that knowledge is wrong.

I don't know what you're getting at here. If someone knows something is false, they don't believe it, and if they don't believe it they don't know it.

it's funny that we both took that quote to be supporting our respective sides.

My side is saying, "belief" already means "I think it's true", and justified means "justified in thinking it's true", so to me, knowledge is just a belief that we're sufficiently justified in - that's what the quote is saying to me. So we don't call a belief knowledge when it's JTB, we call a belief knowledge when it's JB and the J is strong enough. T is the aim of the justification, we and the aim of knowledge, rather than an element inside of it.

the T is implicit in the J. Idk what you mean by jettisoning truth, we're just getting rid of it as a criteria for what we call knowledge. We know a belief when it's reached a particular threshold of justification.

when you say "no possible further indicator", you're saying "nothing further than the justification we currently have", so it's still the J doing all the work. The T is redundant.

I mean, what does J mean? Obviously justified, but justified in what? Justified in thinking the belief is true.

So what work is T doing in JTB, since the only access to truth you just laid out is a matter of justification, and not truth itself?

Maybe knowledge should be SJB, sufficiently justified belief.

nope

no direct evidence, but I don't think there's direct counter evidence either so I think about what seems more likely

I do think it's pretty likely that violence in general, and sexual violence against women in particular, was more common the further back from "societies" we go.

if you think a thought, the fact that you're thinking that thought is straight up factual, but only in that moment. If you think in a later moment, "I remember having that thought 2 seconds ago", you could be mistaken. Lastthursdayism

is that a thought about the external world?

the content of thoughts can and should be doubted, at least as far as they pertain to thoughts about the external world. Obviously there are some thoughts where "doubt" would be a category error. Probably.

When someone writes that “women are a disappointment,” “a waste of time,” or that “hopefully there won’t be any female humans in 10,000 years,” that’s not an “unusual perspective” – it’s clearly misogynistic — DasGegenmittel

I guess I missed the full extent of everything he said. I didn't realise he was hoping for their extinction, what a bizarre idea.

This is a philosophy forum. There should be a reasonable tolerance for off-beat or even strange views. — Tzeentch

I generally agree with this. Of course I also agree that there's a limit to that. I think most people agree that there's a limit to what kind of speech can be tolerated, it's just a matter of disagreeing on where the tolerance should end.

I probably wouldn't end it where they chose to in this case though. But that's just me. Every forum owner / moderator team has their own prerogative to foster the community they want to see I guess.

is the workshop free? Do you have a link to anything explaining how to join that?

dynamic knowledge aka "we're doing the best we can, and according to the best we can, this seems right right now".

Honestly yeah, I don't think there's all that much to it. We have degrees of confidence, things we're almost certain of and things that are a bit more speculative.

As long as you're self aware enough to tell when you should be certain, when you should be very confident, and when you should have a belief that's easily shaken by new evidence, you should be okay.

The people that use it in the D1 way (it seems pretty prevalent) just call it 'determinism'. — noAxioms

If people are saying determinism is compatible with randomness, they're doing something extremely strange. Wikipedia lists randomness as "an extreme antonym" to determinism.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism

A more extreme antonym of determinism is indeterminism, or the view that events are not deterministically caused but rather occur due to random chance.

Lumping it with the others is perhaps confusing, but the word is very much used that way — noAxioms

You said it's your term. Now you're saying it's "very much used that way". My head's spinning. Which is it? Is it in common use or is it your term?

[edit] Ignore the above, I'm happy to just let it drop given that you want to find something else.

The style of reasoning — javra

What style of reasoning is it? I just think he's (a) trying to name a concept that already has sufficient names, and (b) naming it in a misleading and confusing way. Hopefully he takes the feedback and just doesn't continue to insist on calling this "philosophical determinism". Seems like an easy fix.

Philosophical determinism' is my term, and is often the sort of determinism referenced by the dualists. It means naturalism, but that sounds good, and they don't want their stance to be 'unnaturalism', so they pick a word 'determinism' that means that your decisions are determined by natural physics and not by you (the immaterial thing they envision themselves to be). So D1 boils down to 'not dualism', and has nothing to do with the presence or absence of randomness in natural law. — noAxioms

Ah, I don't think javra was assuming you're just making the term and the meaning of it up. I agree with @javra that calling such a concept "determinism" is very confusing, and is probably not the best name for that idea. In fact, you said it's basically just not-dualism, and that already has a name: monism. Physicalism or materialism also seem to cover it, if I'm understanding it correctly

Quine on modalities... modalities resist substitutivity for reasons like this... swapping the modality in this case brings a falsehood. — DifferentiatingEgg

Sorry, I'm not sure what you're talking about buddy.

this thread started because corvus was applying denying the antecedent like it was a general rule. He even gave an explicit example in his first few posts.

If it's raining, the ground is wet, he said. A fair enough implication, no reason to reject this.

Then he says, therefore if it's not raining, the ground is not wet.

The man completely forgot that there's other ways for the ground to get wet. Maybe the sprinklers were on, maybe someone just watered the lawn.

So what corvus failed to realize was that, if a implies b, that doesn't always mean not a implies not b. That's why his thinking is terribly fallacious.