The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism I'm a physicalist, of sorts. Especially in regards to the mind. I don't see any reason not to be. We know physical stuff exists, we know physically affecting the brain changes mental function, and the closest we've ever come to constructing an artificial mind (LLMs can pass turing tests now) was by constructing a physical machine and implementing software in it (which is implemented physically) which in a simplified way mimicks the physical processes of the neuronal structures of our brain.
There's no non-physical model, period. No model at all. Just the english sentence, "the mind can't be physical" - that's what nonphysicalism has, but no model. So it's not like I'm accepting physicalism and rejecting other models - there simply aren't other models. Nobody's made one. No non-physicalist in the entire history of the world has made a compelling nonphysicalist model of a mind, of how a mind might work.
Maybe physicalism is wrong, I'm not 100% sure it has to be right, but I'm okay believing some things which have some tiny probability of being wrong.
Keep this in mind though: this universe is turing complete, which means that if minds are possible to implement in any way, they're almost certainly possible to implement here, out of physical stuff. The turing completeness of the universe makes non-physical ideas of the mind kind of obsolete - however you could implement them non-physically, you could just do that physically too. That's how I see it. We know we have physical stuff right here, we know it's turing complete, and we know when we mess with our physical brains we're messing with the functions of our minds. I don't see any reason to even entertain the model-less world of nonphysical minds. I imagine my reasoning above has a lot in common with why physicalism is the status quo among scientists.