if my above explanation isn't sufficient to make it clear why single-world Copenhagen type interpretations require faster than speed of light communication to happen, I'm happy to illustrate in much more detail.

Also, just clarifying something I said a couple posts ago - the phrase "speed of causality" means "slower than or equal to the speed of light".

Fair enough. I find the definition unsatisfying because it looks to me like randomness fits the bill. That's just my take.

so randomness might actually fit the bill for your definition then, right?

if it happens at the speed of causality in your interpretation, then you're left with explaining what's happening on Alice's side when she measures DOWN after Bob measured UP. Do 2 Alices exist at once, one who saw down and one who saw up?

Many worlds does, in fact, have 2 Alices, and 2 Bob's, which is why the worlds don't have to split globally immediately. But in your idea, there aren't 2 real Alices in 2 real worlds, which means you've got some tricky things to deal with.

If you believe there's only ever one real Alice and one real Bob, then the worlds CAN'T just split at the speed of causality. They have to split fast enough so that Alice's result is guaranteed to be opposite to Bobs, but the split can only begin happening as soon as Bob has measured. It takes near instantaneous casualty to make that happen.

what constraint is randomness subject to?

I never said randomness exists. You've asked that question multiple times now. That's not what I said

yes, world splitting is not a global event. World splitting in MWI actually happens at the speed of causality.

How does randomness fit into my definition of free will? — Truth Seeker

Randomness seems free from determinants and constraints to me. — flannel jesus

Do you not agree that randomness fits the description "free from determinants and constraints"?

How do you know that randomness exists? — Truth Seeker

There's no context for this question. I never suggested that I know that.

I'm going to reiterate something I said before: this is purely about the definition on offer. You've put forth a definition, I am exploring that definition. Exploring the definition is separate from questions about if I think anything in particular exists or not.

My definition does not mention the concept of randomness, nor does it require it. — Truth Seeker

Yes, neither did lucky R's, and yet randomness fit the bill all the same.

I think randomness also fits the bill for your definition. Randomness seems free from determinants and constraints to me.

Okay.

I might be incorrect but my intuition says, your definition allows for "randomness" to meet the criteria given as well.

"My definition of free will is a will that is free from determinants and constraints."

Can you talk a little bit about why you think randomness doesn't meet this criteria?

great, you and I agree. Free will is contrary to determinism, AND it is contrary to free will.

So, the definition on offer which just says "define determinism, and free will is just not-that" actually cannot be a sufficient definition. I have an example of something that is not-determinism, and so if the definition were valid, it would have to be free will.

Does that make sense?

But you would agree randomness is contrary to determinism, right?

And is there any possible world where they share it with that person, that person rejects the evidence for rational reasons, Biden wins the election and you're satisfied that everything was fair?

who is they? Mike pence? Share it with whom?

and you're sure all of these propaganda driven knaves, Mike pence in particular, didn't look at the reports and determine with a team of experts that they're not credible? Like every court that has seen them since?

They're propaganda driven knaves for NOT overturning an election?

Since there is no ether identified as the medium within which the waves exist, the only substance which this concept is grounded in is the body which the field is a property of. Establishing the correct relationship between body and field is problematic in current conceptualizations. If the ether which is logically required to support the real existence of waves, was identified such that its real properties could be tested, this would allow us to conceptualize independent existence of the waves, enabling us to properly conceive of the waves as prior in time to the body, and therefore the appearance of a body (particles, atoms, molecules, etc.) as property of the waves. But this implies a conception of the waves which would be completely distinct from the current "field". — Metaphysician Undercover

You got me interested, so I googled this up:

https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/308413/ether-vs-quantum-field-theory

Just posting it here because it's interesting. Maybe you'll find it as interesting as I did.

I do think the usual idea of the fields is that the waves aren't distinct from the field, the waves are literally perturbations of the field. I don't know if there's any conception of quantum fields where the waves are somehow distinct from the field, never heard of that idea before.

My definition of free will is a will that is free from determinants and constraints. I clearly don't have free will because my will is both determined and constrained by my genes, environments, nutrients, and experiences. I clearly have a determined and constrained will instead of a free will. — Truth Seeker

Ah, you're referring to this as the answer.

So, any amount of genuine randomness in the brain would mean that brain has free will then, right?

Can neurological processes be semi-deterministic? I don't think so. As far as I know, neurological processes are completely deterministic and therefore, we do not have any free will. — Truth Seeker

This is why I clarified that I'm not asking you if you think free will is real or possible. My question is about the definition on offer, not your opinion about if it's real or not. You have still not answered the question.

the conversation is about the definition of free will that lucky r offered, and you agreed with. Here's round 1 of the definition:

"define what Determinism is and just say, Free Will is not that.

To me, Determinism is believing that antecedent state A leads each and every time to resultant state B, never C. Free Will is believing that antecedent state A can lead to resultant state B or C."

When I pointed out that this definition casts too wide of a net, because it implies things have free will even if they're not conscious, as long as they're also not deterministic, the definition was clarified and narrowed down a little bit:

"Determinism vs Free Will specifically refers to complex neurologic systems governing animal decision making"

So round 2 of the definition of free will on offer by Lucky R looks to me like "Any complex neurological system that isn't deterministic is free will".

My question to lucky r, which you responded to but I believe did not answer, was just clarifying that - is that what's on offer here as a definition of free will?

Please note that I'm not asking you or him if you think free will exists or is real. This is purely about the definition being put forth.

Do you think that's a reasonable definition of free will? If not, how would you change it?

I thought it would be worth potentially elucidating why the non-local causality of Copenhagen was problematic for Einstein (why he called it spooky action at a distance) and why it remains problematic for other physicists. None of this is meant to be proof that it can't be correct, only an explanation for why it isn't taken at face value as obviously the correct interpretation.

Physicists, for what you might call "aesthetic" reasons, have I think always tended preferred local causality rather than instantaneous-across-distances causality since physics was even a thing. Einstein himself changed that from a mere aesthetic preference to something a bit more substantial.

Einstein is of course credited with Relativity, and specifically of interest to this conversation is Relativity of Simultaneity. If you observe two events, one over here and one over there, you may be able to say "this event happened before that event". Einstein's relativity of simultaneity says there is some other observer in some other reference frame who can say the opposite "that event happened before this event" - and in relativity, it's not that one of you is right and the other is wrong. You're both right, in your own reference frame.

Now, when events are happening locally, everyone agrees which one happened before the other one. This problem of disagreeing order of events only happens with events that are separated in space.

So, back to Bell's Theorem. You're at a reserch facility. At the middle, you have an apparatus that generates entangled electrons and sends one east, to you, 50m, and one west, to your research partner Alice, 50.000000001m - she's very slightly further away from the middle than you. So, you generate an entangled electron pair, you measure the spin as Up, Alice measure's the spin as Down just a tiny fraction of a second later. The causal narrative of Copenhagen says, you measured your electron as Up, then immediately, faster than light, the virtual worlds collapsed and guaranteed that Alice would measure her spin as Down.

Relativity of simultaneity says, there's some equally valid reference frame where actually, Alice measured the spin as Down first, and that's what caused the collapse of the virtual worlds, the wave function, which caused you to measure yours as Up.

When you combine Relativity with Copenhagen, you get this strange picture of causality. You can't objectively, universally say A caused B, because it's equally valid to say B caused A. THIS is what "spooky action at a distance" means. This is what's spooky about it. This is why Einstein couldn't stand QM when he first learned of it.

Again, this doesn't mean Copenhagen is incorrect, it's just meant to give you some context as to why some people aren't satisfied with Copenhagen.

Uummm... no, as you correctly pointed out, a possible system is a random one. — LuckyR

Ah okay, so that original definition, "define what Determinism is and just say, Free Will is not that" is not what we're going with then right? You've established that randomness isn't determinism, but randomness also isn't free will.

How do you think the definition should be adjusted to match up with your intuitions of free will?

I'll take it you don't want to answer the question asked for some reason. That's fine, I was just trying to understand the implications of the definition you were agreeing with.

if the community of physicists is anything to go by, Copenhagen-type interpretations are certainly valid and worth consideration. I definitely consider them a genuine possibility.

I'm no expert, take this with a grain of salt, but I do believe you've described Copenhagen to a t. Including the virtualized worlds concept (it may not be standard to call it that in Copenhagen, but I believe the idea is basically that).

Or, perhaps it's a flavour of Copenhagen. Basically, it has a lot in common with Copenhagen, from my point of view.

the virtual worlds collapse to an actual state of affai — hypericin

collapse *immediately*?

I never said that complex neurological systems can't be deterministic — Truth Seeker

I agree, you didn't say that. That's not the implication of my question.

but it's also not determinism. So that would seem to create a problem for the definition on offer here, I think.

so, would it be fair to say than that in your view, any biological organism making choices has free will if it's not completely deterministic?

So in the Bell experiments the two particles don't have a definite spin, the actual, resolved world is consistent with an infinite number of potential spins they may have. When they encounter a magnetic field, these virtual worlds collapse to an actual one where one has one definite spin, and the other the opposite. Since there is no consistent world where the particles have anything but opposite spins, the collapse creates the appearance of action at a distance.

This combines the genuine randomness of Copenhagen with the "out" for non-local causality of MW, without the egregiousness of gigatons of matter being created every nanosecond, at every point in space (I don't know if anyone actually believes that last bit).

Is this kind of interpretation a "thing", or am I talking out of my ass? — hypericin

It's an interesting idea, but on the surface I'm not actually sure how it functionally is different from Copenhagen. At the moment one particle gets measured, by exactly what mechanism does the other particle know to come out measured the opposite? If it happens immediately, it's spooky action at a distance. If it doesn't happen immediately, then what does the narrative look like?

First, everyone agrees that when speaking of simple physical systems, like billiard balls, that their behavior is governed by (determined) physics. In a Philosophy Forum (not the Physics Forum) discussion on Determinism vs Free Will specifically refers to complex neurologic systems governing animal decision making. — LuckyR

Ah okay, so any complex neurological system that isn't deterministic is free will, is that the idea?

Many worlds is worth my favour because it provides the clearest account of what happens across the variety of quantum experiments, without resorting to too many unsavoury assumptions.

You might think a multiplicity of worlds is an unsavoury assumption already, but the alternatives are arguably, and in my estimation, even worse.

The major alternative is Copenhagen, which has the following features:

* genuine randomness
* non local casualty
* an additional arbitrary postulate on top of non local causality to explain why you can't use that non local causality to communicate faster than light

The first of the above isn't that bad, but the other two are pretty undesirable in a physical theory.

Another alternative to MWI involves accepting retro causality, which I don't like.

Basically, every alternative to MWI involves accepting stuff that is even harder to stomach than invisible alternate worlds. And believe it or not, MWI is actually *simpler* than the alternatives. So it deserves a couple points from Occam's razor

And TPF being the kind of site that it is, I am asking you what you think. Does MW make sense to you as a real thing? — tim wood

Yeah. I'm not religious about it. I'm not certain of it, I don't think people are going to hell for disagreeing with it, I don't think only stupid people reject it. I just think it's the most compelling option.

You're certainly allowed to think many worlds is nonsense. Many experts in QM agree with you.

And many experts in QM also disagree. Many worlds is, as far as I can tell, the second most popular interpretation among experts. I think you'd find the first most popular also disagreeable, though, so...

John Bell himself, after which this thread is named, interestingly thinks simultaneously that Many Worlds is absurd and simultaneously a promising approach to qm. He respects it and thinks it's nonsense at the same time (or did, anyway)

I have no means of convincing you, or interest in doing so. All I can do is chat a bit about it. I think it's interesting.

The use of many worlds is arguably the same use as quantum mechanics. It's a natural interpretation of quantum mechanics given the mathematics. In fact quantum computing was partly developed by a guy who had the idea to do it because he wanted to prove many worlds. So if you think quantum mechanics is useful, and especially if you think quantum computers have the potential to become useful, you have a framework for understanding why many worlds might be part of something useful.

"Instantaneous creation of worlds", I think creation is the wrong word there. This is one of those points where there's interpretations within interpretations. Are worlds created, do they already exist, are they just splitting? I'm not into the "created" phrasing, but I guess for a casual conversation it's close enough.

Yes, worlds are splitting or getting created or however is the proper way to word it (decoherence is the central concept here), due to quantum events, constantly. But again, that doesn't necessarily mean every choice you can imagine is realized in some world somewhere. I don't think so, anyway. There are cases where worlds are split at the joint of human choices, but I think those are the exception rather than the rule.

If you want a canonical answer on that, I'm not the guy to provide that. This is just my opinion.

One of you said "True, it is easier to define what Determinism is and just say, Free Will is not that." and the other one of you agreed with it. My comment is meant to point out that I believe you have cast far too wide a net with that definition.

That definition implies that anything with any amount of randomness is free will.

I know for a fact that the wealthy (most of them, anyway) wouldn't do even the bare minimum unless they were forced. I've spoken with people who find it literally mind boggling to think that someone would pass on having their very own yacht or cruise ship because of environmental reasons.

"You would avoid doing something just because doing that thing contributes significantly to climate change? Wow, that's inconceivable." Literally the mindset of at least like half the planet. Not just the wealthy.

you brought the tone of the conversation too low with that "shameful" bit. You gotta grow up a little bit man. You shouldn't get so worked up about qm, it's not that big of a deal that someone likes one interpretation or another. Please relax about it.

I'm happy to humour your curiosity about many worlds, but not if I'm just being insulted. I don't believe I insulted you.

Trump supporters who defend this are disingenuous. It's like defending a mob boss who says, "You have a real nice family... It would be a shame if something happened to them..." We all know what that means in a certain context, but the supporter would say, "What? He was just showing concern!" — GRWelsh

That's... fucking exactly what it's like. Thank you. What a beautiful analogy. It would be a shame if something happened to it.

I don't know what any of that means, I'm sorry