what makes your view libertarian, instead of compatibilist?

Is it random? — Patterner

In my view, yeah, that's really the alternative to determinism. If we have a system evolving over time, it seems to me that any given change in that evolution must either be determined or be at least in part random.

That's not what the article in the op is about

you really don't think I've captured just about everything you've said, much more succinctly and clearly, in my plain language paraphrasings? Dang dude. If I can't paraphrase it then I definitely am not understanding it.

mate, I can't do these crazy sentences. It seems like you're going out of your way to make the most basic concepts sound as complex as possible. You've just said a sentence that basically amounts to "each alternative you choose between, you choose between". My dude, I'm going to actually go crazy if your wording is going to stay like this.

You make choices to achieve your end goal, and some of those choices are themselves smaller goals. Is that it?

Honestly it just sounds like you can skip all the jargon and say,

You've imagined a statue that you want to make. It becomes your goal to make it. You make choices to achieve that goal. The desire to achieve your goal is part of what determines your actions, while you still haven't achieved it yet.

Is that right? Is that it in a nutshell? I'm gonna get lost in the sauce if you try to force in a whole new vocabulary, especially if there's no benefit to the vocabulary over just normal words.

it's very jargon heavy. "Distal end" sounds like a fancy way of saying end goal. Is that right?

What does "not yet actualized future actualized statue" mean? That's a very difficult phrase to parse.

No, not familiar with any of it, that's why i'm asking you to explain it from the beginning my bro.

I would love to but your question doesn't make sense to me.

I can't maintain that if I don't understand what your teleological reasoning is.

Do you still maintain that there can be no teleological reasoning or determinacy? — javra

I don't think I even know what you mean. What I love about the op article is how remarkably clear and unambiguous it is. I don't think you're making yourself nearly as clear as that.

Maybe take it 1 step at a time, talk me through why teleological reasoning means that the explanation for why Bob2 did something different from Bob1 is sourced in bob himself, despite them being perfectly identical. Pretend like you never said anything before, start from the beginning. Really from the beginning, pretend I don't even know what the word teleological means.

Anyway, the article lays out a clear scenario - a Bob1 and a Bob2 who are both entirely the same as each other and in entirely the same circumstances before some decision. Then, that decision comes up and, despite the fact that they're perfectly the same and in entirely the same scenario, they choose something different from each other. Bob1 choose a different thing from Bob2 in that moment.

Now, the reasoning in that article is pretty crystal-clear as far as I'm concerned: if we're accepting that Bob1 and Bob2 are the same, then the explanation for why Bob2 chose something different can't be found inside Bob. Because nothing inside Bob2 was different from Bob1. Right? Does that make sense? Like, even if you don't think it's true, do you at least understand the reasoning there?

the "thank god" was meant to be a joke

I thought you said "theological" lol.

To be clearer, if will, volition - be it conscious or unconscious - has nothing to do with intentioning and hence with teleology (succinctly, the movement toward ends such that the not yet actualized ends pursued to some measure determine the actions taken in the present), then what is "the will" to you? — javra

None of that looks to me like it has anything to do with what I said. I never said any of those things at all, I don't think.

i was merely jesting. what was the reason?

Dang, didn't think mistaking what a brute fact was is ban worthy.

Yes, but again, you are presuming a forced choice between randomness and causal determinacy - — javra

It's my understanding that they're mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive. I've never been given a coherent reason to think otherwise, and I don't currently think there is a coherent reason to believe otherwise. I'm actually inclined to think it's basically tautologically true that, for any given evolution of a closed system from one state into another state, either that evolution is deterministic or it involves some randomness.

The argument in the OP, though, doesn't invoke randomness. We don't even have to bring up that word in this context.

Have fun doing whatever you're up to.

"would you have chosen differently than you did in the past given the same exact contexts". My bad, obviously, for having misread, but it is to that misreading that I replied. — javra

I see, I thought your repsonse sounded like that kind of tthing.

No, we can all agree that if you're in a similar circumstance at a completely different point in life, that you're likely to make a different decision. That's not part of the debate.

That's part of wha tI like about the article that I posted - it's very clear about that. Before the choice bob1 and bob2 are *exactly* the same and in the *exact* same situation. That's what the conversation revolves around. Because again, everyone agrees that you'd make a different choice if you're no longer exactly the same person as you were the first time you made that choice.

As to the second question: Some previously made choices in my life, most certainly not - not due to what I know of their outcomes but due to changes in character with which the choice was made to begin with. Other choices, most likely yes. — javra

I don't understand what you mean by this. Most certainly not what - can you be explicit please? Are you saying the choice would be free even if it was guaranteed by the circumstances and the state of your mind?

In short, if the outcome is random no libertarian free will' if the outcome is causally determined again no libertarian free will. — javra

yup

The article (and I grant I haven't taken my time in reading it) completely forsakes teleological reasoning and teleological determinacy — javra

Thank god for that

This decision, choice, is then that of a libertarian free will, for as far as you know going left, despite taking longer to drive on streets, might have been the fastest path on account of far lesser traffic. The choice was ultimately (under libertarian free will) yours as an agent. It was neither random nor fully determined by efficient causes. And you could have chosen differently under the same exact circumstances — javra

And why is that fact - that the choice could be different if everything were the same - relevant? Would you still have made a free choice even if, in that moment, you were guaranteed by the facts of the circumstance to make that choice, no matter how many times we replay that scenario?

Amen. Just some care is needed in affirming them and how they're affirmed. And recognizing what can and cannot be tested. — tim wood

Ok, so now that you know it's a thought experiment, and not a real experiment, and nobody thinks it's a real experiment and nobody is suggesting we conduct it in physical reality, you're invited to actually think about the ideas he presented, in regards to Bob1 and Bob2, or... not. You may just wholesale decline the invitation.

The argument you cite in your OP seems categorical in its conclusion, but that conclusion seeming based on what-if reasoning. — tim wood

Yup, the history of philosophy and science is full of people doing thought experiments without the ability to immediately conduct those experiments in reality. I'm comfortable with thinking about ideas, even if I can't physically test them.

If you don't like thinking about ideas you can't physically test, perhaps this post won't appeal to you much. That's okay.

I don't know what you're trying to say.

And it could be that having Bob1 and Bob2 as identical in all respects is just plain not possible - indeed, how could it be? — tim wood

just fyi, literally nobody is talking about it being actually possible for us to set this up in real life. Nobody thinks we can -actually- do that. The entire post you're reading is a thought experiment, and it can never be more than a thought experiment. He's thinking through the consequences of indeterminism, as a thought experiment.

Then neither does determinism. It would seem both are incomplete models. — tim wood

They're not models, and they're not incomplete. They're categories. For any system that evolves in time, you can categorise that system as deterministic, or if it's not deterministic you can categorise it as indeterministic.

For people who believe in libertarian free will, they would say that if you can categorise the system that is Our Universe as deterministic, we can't have free will - libertarian free will believers posit that we have free will, and that we must live in an indeterministic universe in order to have that.

But the problem that the article points out is, if you drill in to any individual indeterministic choice - which is to say, a choice that has a non 0 percent chance of happening differently under the exact same conditions, and an ontologically real chance, not just a chance based on ignorance - then if we do watch it play out differently, that different result can't be attributed to the agent.

Determinism doesn't have that struggle because determinists don't say "we only have free will if we can ontologically, really do a different thing even under the exact same circumstances".

You haven't engaged with the reasoning presented in the article.

I'd argue that determinism only makes sense if chance is eliminated. — tim wood

Determinism isn't really the alternative here.

The two alternatives at play, as far as I can tell, are "libertarian free will makes sense" and "libertarian free will doesn't make sense". The reasoning in the linked article is why I believe libertarian free will doesn't make sense - even if we live in an indeterministic world.

https://www.georgewrisley.com/blog/?p=47

In this post I will argue that libertarianism cannot actually explain or make rational why an agent chooses one course of action over another. I will do this by arguing that though libertarianism seems to be able to explain why an agent acts the way she does at some given moment in time, even though the action is not causally determined, libertarianism cannot explain why the agent does that action instead of some other action. I find this troubling, since I believe humans have free will and I believe that compatibilism is not a tenable position on free will because it collapses into hard determinism.

The main issue in the free will debate is whether or not and in what sense humans have free will. That is, are human choices or actions free, and if so, in what sense are they free? Both the hard and soft determinists endorse determinism, which is the view that all events (including human choices) are causally determined (necessitated) by antecedent conditions. Humans do what they do, make the choices they do, according to both these views because of factors outside of the agent’s control, e.g., upbringing, physiology, and interactions with others. On both views, if time were rolled back any amount and allowed to play forward again, the exact same events would occur. The hard determinist takes this to imply that there is no free no; the soft determinist says that free will is compatible with determinism. The libertarian position, on the other hand, denies that determinism applies to the realm of human agency. A person’s will is causally undetermined. According to libertarianism, if the clock were rolled back, then radically different things could happen than what happened the first time. This is because humans could choose differently the next time around even though all antecedent conditions including beliefs and desires remained the same.

One objection that libertarianism faces is that if our wills are causally undetermined, then how can we make sense of the choices that a person makes? The hard and soft determinists both make sense of human choice in relation to the desires and beliefs of an agent. Bob desires to read a book and he believes there are books on the bookshelf; so he goes over to the bookshelf. On both determinist views Bob’s desires and beliefs cause him to go to the bookshelf; the same goes for all of his other choices. But the libertarian denies that Bob’s will is causally determined by anything; so how do we explain why Bob chose to go the bookshelf? For we want to maintain that Bob’s choices and actions are rational—they don’t occur for no reason or randomly or arbitrarily.

The libertarian response is to say that Bob’s actions are explicable in terms of his reasons. Here the libertarian makes a distinction between reasons as causes and reasons as goal directed intentions. We can ask for the reason the rock fell off the cliff and we expect a causal explanation. But we can also speak of a person’s reasons for acting in terms of her goals. Bob goes to the book shelf in order to fulfill the purpose or goal of getting a book to read. Nevertheless, Bob could have also chosen to ignore the goal of getting a book to read.

However, the above response does not really save libertarianism. Imagine two parallel worlds: W1 and W2. At time T1 both worlds are exactly the same in all respects, e.g., same histories, same people, objects, etc. Bob exists in both worlds; so we have Bob1 and Bob2. Assume libertarianism is true. At time T2 Bob1 goes to the bookshelf and gets a book. We explain that choice by saying that Bob1 had the goal of reading a book and believed books were on the bookshelf. At time T2, Bob2 goes to the kitchen and gets a glass of water. We explain that choice by saying that Bob2 had the goal of quenching his thirst and believed water was available in the kitchen. So Bob1’s and Bob2’s actions are seemingly explainable under libertarianism, despite the fact that they aren’t causally explainable, since the actions were not causally determined.

Despite the above appearance of libertarianism being able to adequately explain a person’s actions, there is the following problem for libertarianism. We cannot make sense of why Bob1 went to the bookshelf at time T2 and not the kitchen, and Bob2 went to the kitchen at time T2 and not the bookshelf. At time T1 both Bobs have the same exact set of beliefs, desires, emotions, etc. Now we can appeal to Bob1’s goal of reading a book to explain why he went to the bookshelf and Bob2’s goal of quenching his thirst to explain why he went to the kitchen. However, given the details of the example, Bob1 must also have the goal to quench his thirst at time T1 and Bob2 must also have the goal to read a book at time T1. According to libertarianism, each Bob is free to choose which goal to try to achieve. However, since Bob1 and Bob2 have all of the same goals, beliefs, etc., there is nothing different between them to which we can appeal to explain why Bob1 chose to go the bookshelf at time T2 and Bob2 chose to go the kitchen at time T2. Their individual actions are explainable, but libertarianism cannot explain why one choice is made instead of another.

The libertarian might say that Bob2 decided that quenching his thirst was more important than reading a book, and vice versa for Bob1. But in virtue of what did Bob2 make that decision? And the same question applies to Bob1? Their beliefs, goals, desires, etc., are all the same. So, neither Bob can appeal to beliefs, desires, etc., that the other does not have in order to explain the different weight given to the goals chosen, goals which are meant to explain their actions. So under libertarianism, the decision to do one action over the other ends up being arbitrary after all. Thus, libertarianism cannot actually explain or make rational why an agent chooses one course of action over another.

It is, instead just a brute fact. — Arcane Sandwich

That's not what a brute fact means in philosophy. A brute fact isn't just "a fact we can confirm". A brute fact is a fact you can't explain with deeper more fundamental facts.

We can explain why the bible doesn't mention those places. Simply, the civilizations that produced the bible didn't know about them.

I'm a compatibilist, so I'm actually... half way towards agreeing with you - there's no significant difference, in my opinion, between the claim that this universe is deterministic, and the claim that this world is indeterministic. I still think there would be a real difference, it's just a minor one and one that we can't test for.

However, people who believe in libertarian free will DO believe there's a very significant difference. How would you convince one of them that they're mistaken? Given that you think the difference is pointless.

That's why NoAxiom was saying there's a difference between determinism and predictability.

why is it meaningless? The word has a literal meaning. It might be untestable, but I don't think it's meaningless.

good take

As far as my reading has taken me, "consciousness collapses the wave function" is definitely something some experts believe, but the vast majority do not.

Doesn’t the basis for determining whether a particular interpretation of an image is an illusion itself rely on an interpretation? — Joshs

That's certainly true for your example, but your example is atypical. When you see a mirage in a desert that looks like a body of water, and then you arrive at where you thought the water was and it's just a pit of more sand, is it merely another "interpretation" that there isn't really water there?

I'm not sure it's right to call duckrabbit an "illusion" anyway. It's an illustration that was designed to look like a duck, and designed to look like a rabbit. Is it an illusion to perceive an illustration to be illustrating an object that it was literally designed to illustrate? I mean in a sense all illustrations can be argued to be "illusions", but that's trivial, I mean in a non trivial way - why is it an illusion to see a duck in duckrabbit?

I agree with that part of your post. I just disagree (I think) that faith can't also contradict the existence of a god. Obviously it doesn't between Christians, they share that particular faith. But surely there can be a faith that says there's no god as well.

You're absolutely right though, about the idea that faith can support anything. Because faith isn't a method for coming to a belief, it's not a method for figuring out what's true - it's more about maintaining a belief. And you can maintain ANY belief with faith. So it's weird that it's treated as a virtue in itself.

Well, it's weird until you realise why these communities have to treat it as a virtue...

I think you listed a lot of things faith can support or contradict. And then what you said about faith in god looks, to me, like you're saying there's no faith that can contradict the existence of god.

Are you sure that the thing you said, that I quoted, is true?

The only faith which one can’t undermine like this is a faith that a god exists. — Tom Storm

You sure?

Yeah, I don't think that's a left problem though. I think we're seeing that from all quarters. The left and right are just doing that in different ways.