and why aren't they?

the way you presented it it seemed like thats what you were saying. if it's not, what are you saying?

To be Christian, you need to believe that Jesus Christ is divine and died for us. Mormons aren't Christian, neither are Kardecists. — Lionino

wait, but Mormons believe both of those things (can't say I know about the Kardashians though).

From the horses mouth:

Mormons believe that Jesus Christ died on the cross and rose again so that all humankind could be resurrected and one day return to live with a loving Heavenly Father.

https://ph.churchofjesuschrist.org/do-mormons-believe-in-jesus-christ#:~:text=Mormons%20believe%20that%20Jesus%20Christ%20died%20on%20the%20cross%20and,sacrifice%2C%20a%20lamb%20without%20blemish.

We believe Jesus is the Son of God the Father and as such inherited powers of godhood and divinity from His Father

https://newsroom.churchofjesuschrist.org/article/what-mormons-believe-about-jesus-christ

Even my toddler can list off all the mediations provided by the synchro-mesh of ecology!

[/sarcasm]

Pretty much, except that under physical determinism, it is (in principle) possible to predict all future decisions given perfect knowledge of initial conditions and laws of nature (set aside quantum indeterminacy). — Relativist

I think there is, as long as when you say the words "initial conditions" and "laws of nature" you're also including the initial conditions and laws of the soul realm. You have to include it in everything, rather than treat it separately, because it's causally intertwined with the physical.

Are you familiar with Molinism? William Lane Craig is a Molinist, insisting that we have LFW despite the fact that each choice could not have differed from what it actually was - because you can't do something contrary to what the omniscient God knew you would do. He nevertheless insists choices are freely willed: God just happens to have magical knowledge of what freely willed choices you will make. — Relativist

Sounds like quite the pretzel he's twisted his brain into.

This is nearly identical to compatibilism. The only real difference is that Craig assumes the mind/will operates independently of the deterministic forces of the universe.

I would just call that identical to determinism. If the system we live in isn't just physical determinism, but physical determinism + soul determinism (or whatever independent realm he thinks the mind exists in), that's just... determinism.

He doesn't write about compatibilism...but his description of behavior seems perfectly consistent with compatibilism. — Relativist

This is actually really common. A lot of determinists have compatibilist intuitions but just don't like the word 'free will' because it's too tied up in the libertarian definition. I've even met people who argue for libertarian free will, and then upon some investigation it turns out all of their intuitions about free will are compatibilist too (but that's a bit rarer).

If you include the entire room you would have the temperature difference — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yup. So that information isn't in principle absent from knowing the position and velocity of all the relevant stuff.

In fact, to understand that sort of relationship and all of its connotations would seem to require expanding your phase space map to an extremely wide temporal-spatial region. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Only as wide as the effective stuff that makes it meaningful in the first place - which is quite wide indeed

For example, a hot cup of coffee might be a clue at a murder scene. The cup is still hot, so we know someone made it recently. However, knowing "the precise location and velocity of every particle in the cup" would not give us access to this "clue." The information that the cup of coffee was made recently lies in the variance between its temperature and the ambient environment. Likewise, if it was iced coffee, and the ice had yet to melt, we could also tell that it could not have been there long, although this information cannot be had from taking the ice cubes in isolation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Seems to me like the precise location and momentum of every particle (quantum indeterminacy notwithstanding) -- not just of the cup, but of the environment too -- would have implicit discoverable facts in it, like the variance between its temprature and the ambient encironment, or whether the ice was melted.

If you want to learn about the language and thought patterns when a certain kind of determinist talks about choices, this might interest you.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/

but the color itself probably has to do with our biology, right — frank

It depends on what you mean by "the colour itself". Our sensitivity to certain wavelengths of light, and the fact that some of our retinal cells are more sensitive to some wavelengths than other ones, is certainly a matter of biology. How we actually experience that colour, perhaps not. I mean, I still think it's biological, but not necessarily entirely biology we're born with - biology that is developed in the brain by use and adaptation.

Math originally came from accounting — frank

I was not expecting this reply. I thank you for humbling me.

Still, just because one field of study uses another field of study doesn't mean the first field always "describes" the second field, does it? Accounting and math notwithstanding.

Since physicists insist on using logic, the whole of physics is an expression of logic. — frank

But why would that justify thinking physics should "describe logic"?

Accounting uses math, does the study of accountancy "describe math"?

Your comment seems to be talking as if consciousness and determinism are opposites or something.

If your entire point is "consciousness is a more widely known idea than determinism", then... it hasn't seemed like that's what you were saying up until your most recent post, but that's probably true. Yes, consciousness is probably more widely discussed. I don't know what that's an important comparison to make.

It's not a need for a word for thinking in the Determinist sense. It's the fact that there isn't one. Because the idea is not something that has been a part of humanity all along — Patterner

Do you have strong evidence of that?

Upon googling, I see that both ancient greeks and buddhists were contemplating determinist world views hundreds of years before christ, so pretty much for almost the entirety of our history of written philosophy, we've had these thoughts.

I think the stuff you're saying in this vein is speculation, and I mean this bluntly but not as an insult, it seems like speculation based on ignorance. Which is fine, it's normal to be ignorant of the things you've never heard of before. But now you've heard of it.

I think we would have words specifically for that idea if any significant number of people thought it in the language's younger days. — Patterner

Like what? Coin a new word, maybe "jiggerston", and tell me what it would mean if it were coined in that context. I'm not understand what new words you think would be useful so maybe an example would help.

Since determined thinking and thinking without consciousness were not a big part of the collective consciousness — Patterner

I don't suppose people, as a whole, have *ever* had a complete model of what it means to think. We experientially understand what thinking is like, but there's never been a complete coherent view of how thought actually works, what makes it work, how subjective experience can happen. I think you're arbitrarily carving out this exception for determinism that isn't there - like we've never understood thought for determinism, when we have understood thought from other perspectives. I think the reality is, we've had a lack of understanding of thought period, determinism or not.

what does thinking without consciousness have to do with anything? Did someone suggest that in this thread?

If, for many thousands of years, anyone had any inkling of determinism, or thought we did not have free will, they probably didn't have many serious conversations about it with many people. — Patterner

I don't think this really bears out. Many ancient thinkers were deterministic, both from a causal point of view and also a theological point of view - ie, "I believe in an all-knowing God, and all-knowing means he knows what's going to happen too". In fact many even argue that a lot of the earliest writings we have on Free Will were written by compatibilists.

It wasn't this underground idea nobody dared to say aloud.

I think it's fair to say that's not a satisfactory proof because of infinite sequences, but this is absolutely not what hand waving looks like. Whether it's right or wrong, it is an explicit attempt to work through reasoning step by step - maybe that reasoning fails, but it's not handwaving.

Thank you for expressing to me your thoughts on the matter

But how does the phrase “make sense TO ME” make sense in a deterministic world? — Fire Ologist

Once you have a fully featured model of what it means to make sense in any world, I think you'd find it means the same thing if we're deterministic or indeterministic.

That doesn't make a lot of sense to me. If it makes sense to you though, keep on keeping on.

The exact thoughts we have were intended. — Patterner

Intended by whom?

I think you've missed the context again

Worded that way sounds like a consciousness telling us what to think. — Patterner

But the context is that we do have a consciousness literally telling determinists what to do, here in the thread. So comparing THAT - a real thinking entity actually telling people what to do - to determinism "telling people what to do", just doesn't make all that much sense to me.

Okay, I made a tiny error. — I like sushi

We all do, I appreciate the acknowledgement.

Maybe they meant that determinists are less likely to fret about certain situations — I like sushi

But that's not what he said. He said he's observed that they do fret, he didn't say he's observed that they're less likely to fret. If anything, he's expressing consternation that he HASN'T observed that they fret less.

Although, to be generous, it seems all conscious states are emotional states — I like sushi

No need to be generous, just Google what it means to fret about something. First result is "to be constantly or visible anxious" for me. Anxiety is an emotion. Being anxious is an emotional state. I'm not saying anything wild with my interpretation, I'm using the very most basic straightforward definition of "fret".

You're being the exact opposite of generous if you are arguing this much about not fretting being a matter of controlling emotions.

You think none are or cannot be zen monks? — I like sushi

I think they aren't all zen monks. Some are - in fact Zen Buddhists generally believe in determinism - but clearly not all determinists are zen monks

Plus, I am not really sure why you would think anyone is suggesting 'more conscious control'? Maybe someone else suggested this. — I like sushi

The entire context of this conversation is one person suggesting determinists not fret about decisions - that is the same as saying "determinists should have more conscious control of their emotions". It requires control over emotions to not fret over decisions. You've been talking past me this whole time because you've missed the context apparently.

Granted, when we are talking about 'choice' itself then maybe you feel this comparison is ill-fitting? — I like sushi

It hasn't been made to fit yet. I still don't see any sensible lines to draw between determinists and non determinists in regards to fretting. Either it's beneficial or it's not - if it's beneficial, it makes sense for everyone to do it. If it's not, it makes sense for no one to do it.

And determinists aren't zen monks, so talking about determinists as if they have more conscious control of their emotional state seems entirely unjustified to me.

As to why folks who believe humans can't actually choose between options would "fret" about making "wrong" choices, I have no answers (never did). It's just a question. — LuckyR

I answered that, but I'll try to answer it more clearly:

Either a) fretting about decisions frequently produces better decisions than not fretting, in which case it makes perfect sense for EVERYONE to fret about decisions

or b) fretting does not produce better decisions, in which case it doesn't make sense for ANYONE to fret about decisions.

Determinists share the same basic human psychology as non determinists. They react emotionally to the same types of things in the same types of ways. They aren't zen monks who spend a lot of time meditating and gaining complete control of their emotional state. If they fret, they fret for the same reasons as non determinists, and if it's not beneficial, it's also not beneficial for non determinists. This whole "fretting" conversation doesn't seem to have any sensible lines to draw in the sand between determinists and non determinists.

Also glad my observations (despite your, warrantless as it turns out, concern) turn out to also be accurate. — LuckyR

No idea what this means

Not in the way that this person was telling determinists what to think. If someone wants to make an argument that it "tells" us things, they should disconnect it from the thing that started this conversation, which was a person who isn't a determinist saying determinists should stop trying to think, or something equally silly.

Determinism isn't whispering suggestions on what or how to think in anyone's ear.

You can prove it pretty succinctly

.9999... = x
9.9999... = 10x
10x-x = 9.999... - .999...
9x = 9
x = 1

what part is “you” specifically — Fire Ologist

the part here, now, where i am. I'm not some addition that someone decided to add in, that wasn't previously there. Everything that is "me" has always been part of the causal chain of the universe, and is now "me", and will continue to exist after I'm dead and those parts are no longer "me". The thing I call "me" is not separate from everything else. I don't think that's a contradiction.

I’m saying, once you admit there is a “you” - a thinking, deliberating, believing thing - you have individuated a thing that can be free to choose — Fire Ologist

I actually DO think I'm free to choose - I just mean something different by 'free to choose' than you do, because 'free to choose' to me doesn't involve negating my place in the causal chain. What it means for me to choose is precisely for the part of the causal chain that is "me" to causally go through a decision making process, and then interact with other things that are also part of the causal chain to enact (or try to enact) the output of my decision making process.

What do “you” add to the causal chain, if “your choice” is determined? What happens when the chain bumps into “you” if the effect of “you” is determined? — Fire Ologist

I'm not adding to it, i'm part of it, I'm a piece of it. It defines me, I am defined as a part of it.

If “my choice” is caused by something that is not my choice, it is not “my choice”.

If your choice is not part of the causal chain, then you're not causaing it.

Not the causal chain without me. — Fire Ologist

Without? No, of course not. We're part of the causal chain, not merely victims of it.

I prefer to have my beliefs caused by rational thought and evidence, not beliefs without causes.