As I noted, psychology is the study of minds. — T Clark

No, you didn't. And if you want to say something like that then I would ask you what philosophy of mind studies. I don't think your arguments are very clear at all, and part of the proof is that you think you said things that you haven't said.

I prefer to think of it as using a powerful tool to help make discriminations among ideas that are often too vague in English — J

@fdrake has tried to force things into his set theoretic paradigm. It is unnatural but also unreflective, given that it fails to consider why set theory must be the controlling narrative or paradigm, or where such "tools" are located metaphysically. There is no reason to assume that set theory will be able to capture the nature of philosophy vis-a-vis other areas of study, so why assume that? I see this as the mathematical version of the Freudian psychologist.

And the argument that tries to run with such assumptions is not only invalid, it is contradictory.

Let's say this: the philosopher believes questions of justification are always legitimate and appropriate; the psychologist believes questions of "motivation," say, are always legitimate and appropriate. — Srap Tasmaner

Does the psychologist think theories of motivation need to be justified? If the answer is "yes," then the psychologist is involved in performative contradiction.

If the philosopher believes he's on firm ground demanding to know how the psychologist knows what he claims to know, the psychologist believes himself to be on ground just as firm in examining the philosopher's motives for demanding justification. — Srap Tasmaner

Aquinas does talk about the way that the intellect and the will are both infinitely recursive and intermixed, and you could think of "motive" as pertaining to the will and "justification" as pertaining to the intellect. That's fine as far as it goes, but that deep analysis of the will strikes me as philosophical, not psychological. It is certainly not psychological to the exclusion of being philosophical. The dispute between intellectualism and voluntarism has not historically been construed as a dispute between philosophy and psychology, even though it can truly be said that modern and contemporary philosophy are excessively intellectual.

Here's my problem. I'm pretty interested in what I intuit as the substantive issue in this thread. I would like to get to discussing that, and I don't know what I would say ― which for me is a big reason to have that conversation.

But I keep getting stuck on what, in my mind, I'm still treating as "preliminaries," just trying to clear up your framing of the issue. That framing keeps failing to make any sense at all, so I keep putting off getting to the supposed substance... — Srap Tasmaner

I can sympathize with this. @J has an interest in how debates ever come to an end and how intersubjective agreement is ever established. These dialogical and epistemological questions are a heavier part of the OP than I first recognized. The trouble for me is that this "preliminary" topic is very difficult to maintain at a substantive level.

But there is a question of fact about whether the Freudian psychologist is making use of what @J would call "philosophical" thinking in order to deflate the philosopher's claim. I think it should be recognized that what the Freudian psychologist sees himself as refuting and what @J sees as "philosophy" are probably two different things.

The epistemological avenue reminds me of Nagel's Last Word, which @J introduced me to. I don't think what Nagel does in that book is unimportant, but it's hard to improvise over that vamp for very long, especially without someone to take up the contra.

I think it is reasonable to say that philosophy is the study of thought, beliefs, knowledge, value, which are mental phenomena - the structure and process of the conscious mind. As such, it is a branch of psychology. Anything you claim as the province of philosophy can be trumped by a psychological interpretation. The overarching absolute presupposition of philosophy is that there is a mind which is knowable. — T Clark

Solipsism would be but one example of a philosophical position which denies the claim that there are independent minds, and therefore that there is any such thing as the field of psychology.

One might almost say that over-generalization is the occupational hazard of philosophy, if it were not the occupation. — Austin

The deeper truth here is Aristotle's mean. One can run from "over-generalization" to the opposite error, but the truth lies in neither over-generalization nor under-generalization. We have to look both ways before crossing the street, even if we are more fearful of the North.

Assume X isn't relevant to any claim whose context is philosophy, then X cannot be relevant to any Y which is related to a Z whose context is philosophy, since then X would be relevant to that Z through transitivity. — fdrake

Your argument seems to say something very different:

1 ) Take a philosophical claim X which does not have relevance to a claim in any discipline.
2 ) Take the collection of statements of which X has relevance to and call it Q.
...
7 ) Then anything relevant to X cannot be relevant to any philosophical claim.
8 ) Then all of Q is not relevant to philosophy. — fdrake

(7) does not seem to follow. Indeed the opposite would follow, where "philosophical" is replaced with "non-philosophical."

In fact there is a contradiction in your own proof:

1 ) Take a philosophical claim X which does not have relevance to a claim in any discipline.
...
5 ) Relevance is reflexive, X is relevant to X.
...
7 ) Then anything relevant to X cannot be relevant to any philosophical claim. — fdrake

From (1) and (5) we get <X is relevant to X, and X is a philosophical claim, therefore something relevant to X is relevant to a philosophical claim>, and this contradicts (7).

(I thought that in (1) the omission of "any other discipline" was innocuous, but it may not be. You seem to be involved in a contradiction in (1), for you are simultaneously treating philosophy as a discipline and a non-discipline.)

Either philosophy is related to all domains, and thus co-extensive with each of them it is related to. Or philosophy is not relevant to some domains - that is, philosophy is of no relevance to any claim in them. — fdrake

Note too how your logic here is invalid as it hitches up to your argument. "If philosophy is not relevant to some domain, then philosophy is not relevant to any claim in that domain."

You want this to support your:

1 ) Take a philosophical claim X which does not have relevance to a claim in any discipline. — fdrake

But irrelevance to some domains is different from irrelevance to all domains. In fact:

There is no such X. — Leontiskos

- Yep, pretty much.

Either philosophy is related to all domains, and thus co-extensive with each of them it is related to. — fdrake

This is a good example of the problematic set-theoretic assumptions you are working from. Is the engine car related to the train? Is H20 related to biological life? Relatedness/relevance is not a univocal notion, as you have made it.

There are two conceptions of philosophical foundationalness in this thread. The first says that philosophical justifications are the linear foundation of all justification-claims. The second says that philosophy (in terms of logic or metaphysics) permeates all justification-claims or domains of study. The difference is very similar to Aristotle's difference between a per accidens causal series and a per se causal series.

I think both are defensible, but I am more interested in the latter. — Leontiskos

Collingwood says that for every question there is at least one presupposition. Collingwood also talks about "absolute presuppositions" which are the underlying, often unrecognized, assumptions that are the foundation of a way of looking at the world. Is this what you're talking about? — T Clark

Something like that.

In every discipline other than philosophy there are unallowed criticisms of the form, "You are presupposing X, but I deny X." For example, Parmenides cannot go to the physicist and say, "You are presupposing motion, but I deny motion." To offer such a criticism is to have stopped doing physics. In philosophy there are no such unallowed criticisms. In philosophy there are no such presuppositions.

Assume X isn't relevant to any claim whose context is philosophy, then X cannot be relevant to any Y which is related to a Z whose context is philosophy, since then X would be relevant to that Z through transitivity. — fdrake

Sure, but why in the world would we assume that X isn't relevant to any claim whose context is philosophy?

1 ) Take a philosophical claim X which does not have relevance to a claim in any discipline. — fdrake

There is no such X.

Does this have to be an argument, if I can put it this way, that philosophical maximalism is equivalent to philosophical minimalism?

Does it also function as an argument that no boundary between philosophy and the sciences (and possibly other empirical disciplines, and possibly the arts, ...) is definable much less enforceable? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't see these as problems.

There are two conceptions of philosophical foundationalness in this thread. The first says that philosophical justifications are the linear foundation of all justification-claims. The second says that philosophy (in terms of logic or metaphysics) permeates all justification-claims or domains of study. The difference is very similar to Aristotle's difference between a per accidens causal series and a per se causal series.

I think both are defensible, but I am more interested in the latter.

What is the sort of characteristically philosophical claim that is required by the first conception of philosophical foundationalness? This would be a deep metaphysical or epistemological claim, such as the idea that reality is intelligible, or that motion exists, or that sense data is reliably informative. Even on this first conception, the philosophical claim has relevance to claims in other disciplines, but it is distinctly philosophical rather than simultaneously philosophical-and-something-else. In this case its relevance lies in constituting the foundation for more specific kinds of knowledge.

Imagine that X is relevant to Y and that Y is relevant to some philosophical claim P, then X is relevant to Y, Y is relevant to P, then X is relevant to P. — fdrake

I don't think your sentence here is grammatically coherent. Not sure what it is supposed to mean. Same with your argument given earlier.

When you try to make substantial metaphysical points with a formalism or set theory, you are baptizing the formalism and the set theory into metaphysics. It is natural enough that by limiting your thought to such forms you limit your conclusions to formalisms. Philosophy qua thinking, as @J has described it, cannot be captured in terms of set theory or formalisms. What is probably happening in your posts is that subtle form of question-begging that we often see on TPF: Everything must be capturable in formalism (such as set theory or equivalence relations); what @J is saying isn't capturable or sensible when viewed through the lens of formalisms; therefore what @J is saying isn't substantial or sensible. This is the sort of petitio principii that tries to exempt certain methodologies from relevance or scrutiny, as if everyone would just agree that if it can't be captured in terms of equivalence relations then it must be insubstantial. (And yet I don't yet perceive validity or even grammatical coherence, which would need to come first.)

The point you were responding to had to do with the U.S. electorate's view of a DNC which moves left. You responded with a non-sequitur about European standards. — Leontiskos

- Fair points on the whole. :up:

Not economically no. Now, or as of the removal of Roe, not even socially. If they manage to get Roe back in, then we can speak about the Democrats being left on world standards. — Manuel

Who cares about your "world standards" (which conveniently and arrogantly exclude most of the world)? The point you were responding to had to do with the U.S. electorate's view of a DNC which moves left. You responded with a non-sequitur about European standards.

7 ) Then anything relevant to X cannot be relevant to any philosophical claim. — fdrake

Why would this follow?

If they move any further to the left, they would just be centrist or maybe center-right. They would not be left in any European country. — Manuel

"If the Democrats move left they would only be centrist in Europe, therefore such a move would not make them left."

The U.S. is not Europe. This is not a good argument.

I disagree that Trump has moderated alot of his positions. In fact he seems to be moving to the extremes on issues like immigration (where he wants mass deportations) — Mr Bee

"Majority of Americans support mass deportations" (CBS).

and trade (where he wants to impose a global tariff on all goods) — Mr Bee

Trump's love of tariffs is idiosyncratic from all political angles, true. But because of that it is not polarizing in any partisan manner.

The only area where he's moderated is on abortion and social security but apart from that he's a standard Republican and governed like one in his first term. — Mr Bee

Abortion, social security, IVF, LGBT... Trump is also moving the party towards non-interventionism. RFK and Gabbard are former Democrats, to name two within his administration.

The Democrat platform isn't the problem since it remains popular (while Trump's ironically enough isn't) but Democrats aren't able to sell it as well as Trump is able to sell himself which goes back to the main problem I see for Democrats. — Mr Bee

This seems backwards to me. Trump's public persona was a liability in this election, not a boon. The Democrat platform was bad enough to strongly neutralize that liability. I am amazed at how completely it was neutralized.

Losing to Trump twice after barely eeking out a win in 2020 when they ran their "safe" candidate should be a clear sign that what they're doing isn't working. — Mr Bee

So what needs to change if "the platform isn't the problem"? A more impressive candidate and a focus on the policy proposals? I am not sure what golden policy proposals the Democrats are supposed to have in their back pocket.

By "truth" I mean to refer to people who are honest and who value, care about, truth and honesty. — tim wood

By "truth" you mean people who care about truth?

I'd say an OP which cares about truth would have a more truthful first sentence. :grin:

A ) If X is a subdomain of Y, then studying Y is studying X. — fdrake

I'm not opposed to that, but what I said was the opposite.

it leaves unexamined how context would need to distribute over the nesting of contexts — fdrake

I don't think I've left that nearly as unexamined as you have. You seem to be committed to your same implicit claim that there is no contextless 'context', or no "context of contexts." Why think such a thing?

- It's not a subset, it's a ratio (Latin).

We could study a deer according to its totality, and we could study a deer according to its aspect of movability, and we could study a deer according to its aspect of longevity. The two latter studies are co-implicative with the former. When we study the movability of Deer we are being informed about the totality of Deer, even though our object is not the totality of Deer.

The analogy of course limps given the sui generis character of being.

Similarly if "philosophy" in @J's sense has to do with logic, or thinking qua thinking, or justification qua justification, or explanation qua explanation, then any contextualized instance of logic/thinking/justification/explanation will implicate philosophy. When a biologist makes an argument about the digestive system of deer, the philosopher is not barred from the argument in the way that an astronomer is. The philosopher's input cannot be a priori excluded, and this is because he deals with the "context of contexts."

Why though? — fdrake

Why does the study of being qua motion (physics) implicate the study of being qua being (metaphysics)? Because motion is a kind of being.

I am putting philosophy and metaphysics together. Really there is an analogy. We are talking about philosophy in terms of justification or inquiry, and in that sense it is the justificatory "context of contexts" that parallels metaphysics' foundational character.

So if we put it in @J's terms, where philosophy is fundamentally bound up with thinking, we would say that the art of thinking qua thinking is implicated in every contextual form of justification, given that justification is a form of thinking. I would call this "thinking qua thinking" logic, which is the art of discursive reasoning. Thus whenever we operate in some justificatory context, we are presumably implicating ourselves in logic; and logic pervades all justificatory contexts as water pervades the ocean, not as a foundation underlies a house. There are strong commonalities between philosophy, metaphysics, and logic.

- :up:

How do you argue that the convergence goes to philosophy without already arguing that philosophy interrogates the context of all contexts. — fdrake

I see this as fairly simple. There is a context of all contexts and that which pertains to it is what we call "philosophy."

contexts tend to relate to each other even if they are distinct (but have fuzzy boundaries) — fdrake

You are relying on a very linear justificatory scheme, where the boundaries aren't overly fuzzy. Classically the boundary of philosophy or metaphysics is not fuzzy, it is non-existent. The context of contexts is not a linear terminus that is hermetically sealed. It is encompassing.

If at the end of our cogitating, all we have is the Q recursion as our "termination in philosophy," that’s not much of a result. The problem is how to shape it into something more significant, something actually about the nature of philosophy as a pursuit of wisdom, or at least knowledge. — J

Why isn't it "much of a result"? Is there some argument other than, "Because it's inevitable?" Because I don't see why an inevitable justificatory aspect must be unimportant. I actually think the inevitability of philosophy is largely what makes it important. Philosophy is necessarily unavoidable, and that is why it is important.

There is a sui generis aspect of philosophy here given the way it is being defined. Instead of defining it according to its principles and object—as we do with other sciences—philosophy is being defined as the study pertaining to the "context of contexts," to use fdrake's language. Or for Aristotle, "The study of being qua being." Philosophy or metaphysics is not limited in the way that every other science is limited. It is not contextualized; it is not bound by a priori principles or presuppositions.

Aristotle's depiction is instructive. Sciences other than philosophy/metaphysics study being under some aspect other than being. For example, physics is the study of being qua movement. But the study of being qua being will be implicated in every other study of being (qua X). Thus philosophy does not stand merely as a linear foundation, but rather as a porous and encompassing ocean for all aquatic life.

- :up:

The elites navigated the 2008 financial crisis extraordinarily well, but the "morality card" has now been overplayed and the broader political movement has become trapped in oppressor-oppressed quicksand.

Deduction should allow you to pass, by valid inference, from what you know to what you did not know. Yes?

In mathematics, these elements are well-defined. What do we know? What has been proven. How do we generate new knowledge? By formal proof.

Neither of these elements are so well-defined outside mathematics (and formal logic, of course). There is no criterion for what counts as knowledge, and probably cannot be. And that defect cannot be made up by cleverness in how we make inferences.

I see no reason to question the traditional view. "Our reasonings concerning matters of fact are merely probable," as the man said. There is deduction in math and logic; everyone else has to make do with induction, abduction, probability. — Srap Tasmaner

Are you claiming that knowledge does not exist outside mathematics? I don't see why "the elements being less well-defined" results in any serious problem here. This comes back to the Meno question I have posed to you elsewhere. One could answer that question by denying that knowledge exists.

Deduction should allow you to pass, by valid inference, from what you know to what you did not know. Yes? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, and haven't we achieved that with Billy?

I was referring to a situation such as the one involving the neo-Freudian. He attempts to short-circuit philosophical discourse by explaining it in terms of his discipline, abandoning any philosophical vocabulary about reasons, arguments, or truth. Another example might be a theological coup, in which someone insists on translating all talk of reasons, truth, etc., into a discussion of the speaker's salvation status (i.e., "You're only saying that because you're saved/damned"). It's a kind of ad hominem argument, but more general and potentially sweeping because it claims to invalidate not only a particular argument but all the premises of philosophical discourse. Many positivist/ordinary-language attacks on metaphysics also have this same characteristic, I think. And I'm claiming they can all be answered with more philosophy. — J

Okay. In that case I agree with you that, "...the starting point of philosophy is in fact the realization that its inquiries cannot be brought to an end by absorption into another discipline" ().

And I would say that these cases like the neo-Freudian rely on philosophical thinking to debunk philosophical discourse, and therefore result in a kind of performative contradiction. Thus philosophy could here be considered "highest" because it does not require these sorts of performative contradictions and rational gaps/incoherence.

The solution isn't that hard, it really isn't. However I worry that the problem isn't that the Dems are incompetent but that they're incompetent by design. It's not like there weren't opportunities these past few election cycles, but the party always made sure that the candidate that was nominated was the candidate that wouldn't rock the boat. — Mr Bee

The parties are in disarray. 2016 saw two populists make waves, Trump and Sanders. If I recall, when Sanders was checked by the powers of the DNC, 4/10 Sanders voters moved to Trump. Of the two populist hijackings of 2016, one worked and one didn't, and the effects were predictable. The Democrats paid a price in votes and palatable candidates, and the Republicans paid a price in policy. There is pressure to reshape the two parties. For the Republicans the reshaping is already well underway; for the Democrats it looks inevitable.

But Trump moderated the conservatism of the Republicans and he now holds the center. So I don't agree that "the solution isn't hard" for the Democrats. Concede to Trump and adopt the same core positions? Move left and abandon the center? Oddly, the Democrats find themselves in a strange pickle just 8 years after Obama left office. Their only grievous mistake was running Clinton in 2016.* I don't think they would've won the election any other way in 2020, given Sanders' head start. (Cue the Bernie Bros' protestations...)

* And perhaps letting Sanders run as a Democrat in 2020. But they did not want to risk him running as an independent.

Yes, that's an important distinction. I think the problem I'm proposing in the OP is more about termination than justification. Self-reflection -- that is, the ability of philosophical discourse to always reply with more questions that can only be answered philosophically -- is literally interminable. That's the aspect that I said cannot be brought to an end, and that many philosophers regard as evidence of something important and special about such discourse. — J

Yes, I think we are on the same page. I was thinking of that as justification, but as your post indicates, if an answer to an inquiry cannot be definitively justified then that inquiry cannot come to a term (or be terminated). Similarly, an answer which cannot be satisfactorily/definitively justified for a community cannot be terminated/concluded by that community. The history of philosophy shows that even where agreement and termination occurred, it did not occur universally (cf. Holmes' dissent in Abrams, "...time has upset many fighting faiths...").

I suppose I am wondering what you meant when you talked about an inquiry being, "brought to an end by absorption into another discipline."

This is going to sound paradoxical, but perhaps the starting point of philosophy is in fact the realization that its inquiries cannot be brought to an end by absorption into another discipline. — J

Sure, but isn't it that there is no end because there are no presuppositions? If an inquiry requires support and presuppositions are the ultimate supports, then an inquiry without presuppositions cannot ultimately be brought to an end in any obvious way.

But one could speak about "bringing an inquiry to an end" via justification or via termination. I am thinking about justification, where an answer to a question is definitively justified.

This is similar to our exchange here about the uniqueness of metaphysics.

Clearly we couldn't know that reflection is endless until we'd discovered it to be so, which is a process in time, but having learned this, we can posit that feature as the feature which makes philosophy unique... — J

I think we could know this "a priori." That given the principles at stake, philosophical investigation can have no concrete end.

Is it left-leaning to ban homophobia, transphobia and racism? — Christoffer

It is left-leaning to simply assume that something is homophobic, transphobic, or racist, which is precisely what you are doing in failing to address the arguments at hand. The left is exceedingly accustomed to using these labels to shut down speech and debate.

(Is "presuppositionaless-ness" translated from the German? :wink: ) — J

:lol:

Oh, I didn't realize that's what you meant. — J

I see it more as an aside, since your OP is not centered on this topic. My first post only touched on it in my first two sentences.

I was referring merely to the "gotcha" aspect, where any questioning of philosophy becomes yet more philosophy. Do you think this has to do with the lack of presuppositions? I'd like to hear more about that. — J

I don't know if this answers your question, but I see the presuppositionaless-ness of philosophy as substantive because it represents one of the basic reasons why philosophy is so difficult and so useful. It is what gives philosophy an undeniable sovereignty. Other disciplines have fairly clear starting points, but not philosophy. Other disciplines have a fairly clear Overton window, but not philosophy. ...Or at least, much less so with philosophy.

But I don't want to distract from the more central topic of the OP, which seems to be, "Is philosophy 'highest' in some way beyond having no presuppositions?"

Americans just absolutely hate the establishment. And they hate to be told what to think especially by the liberal elite. — ssu

Yep. And this has become built-in to culture in a remarkable way. I think of movies like The Matrix. The odd thing is that the DNC hasn't at all figured this out. They depend on superficial cultural currents to overcome deeper cultural currents.

- Right, but I am uncomfortable with viewing the presuppositionaless-ness of philosophy as "an argumentative trick." There is something substantive about the uniquely presuppositionaless discipline. I find that aspect of philosophy interesting and important, albeit inevitable. So we could ask whether there is something more without denigrating that aspect.

The support relation is also notoriously tricky to formalize (given a world full of non-black non-ravens), so there's a lot to say about that. For us, there is logic woven into it though:

"Billy's not at work today."
"How do you know?"
"I saw him at the pharmacy, waiting for a prescription."

It goes without saying that Billy can't be in two places at once. Is that a question of logic or physics (or even biology)? What's more, the story of why Billy isn't at work should cross paths with the story of how I know he isn't. ("What were you doing at the pharmacy?")

As attached as I've become, in a dilettante-ish way, to the centrality of probability, I'm beginning to suspect a good story (or "narrative" as Isaac would have said) is what we are really looking for. — Srap Tasmaner

Good post. I may have fallen too far behind in this thread, but I don't think we have to choose between logic and physics to explain such an argument. Physics provides us with a particular kind of logic which makes the argument sound.

I want to say that "flows from" or validity in logic is a specific kind of inferential relation and justification. Your story about Billy fulfills that inferential relation, albeit with some tacit premises.

Well, the thing is, deducibility is for math and not much else. — Srap Tasmaner

But why? Given the explanation, can we deduce that Billy is not at work?

I agree that the consequence relation ("follows from") is hard to formalize. Or rather, I think it is impossible to formalize.

(Feel free to ignore this post if the thread has moved too far away from it.)

I hear you,but one has to read the room. — Swanty

Right, and Lionino would have probably returned and said something even more provocative, which is why it isn't worthwhile to defend. Or like says, there are probably more provocative things that have already been deleted.

- Yep. :up:

I think Lionino could be defended. After all, an inflammatory style is not against the rules on TPF. I think Lionino had a way of highlighting a left-leaning bias on the forum. At the same time, I don't expect a forum to be perfectly objective, and TPF is better than most. What is needed though, is a clear line so that the bias has a measure of transparency. We conservatives are accustomed to wrestling with one hand tied behind our back in progressive spaces, but clear guidelines are helpful in setting expectations.

(I messaged Lionino 2 months ago encouraging him not to get impatient. I think he made a choice to flirt with being banned.)