Because of this, the only way that we can achieve with certainty any understanding of the external world, is to first produce a thorough understanding of the perceiving body. That is to say that we cannot know with certainty, the nature of the supposed independent world without first knowing with certainty the nature of the perceiving body. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your argument is well-made, but I actually disagree. I actually have a thread drafted on why epistemology is always posterior to metaphysics, but I don't know if it will ever see the light of day.

The extremely truncated argument is that it comes down to which of the two is more known: 1) That we know things (as they are), or 2) That there is a glassy perspective. Whichever is less-known must be funneled through that which is more-known, and the modern assumption is that (2) is more-known and that we must therefore begin with epistemology. I don't think that will work. Will I ever get around to addressing this more fully in its own thread? I don't know. :sweat:

(Another argument is that if our understanding is 'flawed', then our understanding of our understanding will also be 'flawed'. We can't fix (or necessarily perceive) the flaw in our understanding by reflexively applying our understanding to our understanding. Any uncertainty deriving from the faculty of the intellect will color both internal and external objects.)

I come to a slightly different conclusion. It has become evident to me that the human intellect cannot have knowledge of all corporeal things. That is where the problems of quantum physics have led us, there are corporeal things which we as human beings, will never be able to understand. The reason why the human intellect cannot have knowledge of all corporeal things is that as Aristotle indicates, the human intellect is dependent on a corporeal thing, the human body, and this in conjunction with the premise given by Aquinas, that to know all corporeal things requires that the intellect be free from corporeal influence, produces the conclusion that the human intellect cannot know all corporeal things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well for Aristotle and Aquinas the intellect is immaterial for precisely the reason you are outlining. But on the other hand, matter qua matter (or qua singular) is not intelligible on Aristotelianism, but only matter qua property (or qua universal). So Aristotle would not be surprised that something like the quantum realm begins to approach unintelligibility.

The point now, is that the human intellect, as an intellect, is deficient in the sense that it can never know all corporeal things. It is deficient because it is dependent on a corporeal body. Aquinas also argues this point when he discusses man's ability to obtain the knowledge of God. The same problem arises in that a man's intellect cannot properly know God while the man's soul is united to a body. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't begrudge you your conclusion, because it is a reasonable inference. Yet recall that for Aquinas we will know God "perfectly" (as perfectly as we can) not only in the intermediate state, but also in the resurrected state. And in the resurrected state we will have a body of some kind.

Thank you for your thoughtful and cogent post.

How would you differentiate a case where there is a mind involved, from a case where there is not? — Wayfarer

I think the easiest way is to follow your lead and talk about a pre-human age. Or a post-human age. Or if one thinks non-human animals possess knowledge, then a pre-animal age, etc.

I understand "sound or unsound" to be equivalent to "true or untrue". — Janus

Classically, a sound argument is an argument that possess both validity and true premises. An unsound argument lacks one or both.

For example, two metaphysical postulates are "being is fundamentally physical" and "being is fundamentally mental"; these two polemical posits are the basic presuppositions of materialism and idealism respectively. Can we determine which is true? No.

Empirical propositions, and arguments based on them, can be sound or unsound, when their truth is determinable by observation. That's my take, anyway. — Janus

Fair enough. I understand what you are saying. It's a common take. I am not going to engage it here, but I have said one or two things about it in "What is the nature of intuition?"

Given your perspective, I would suggest reading the OP in terms of what you call "empirical propositions" (or "empirical arguments").

I think I understand what you're seeing as a conflict. You think that what I'm saying must necessarily entail that 'the unobserved object doesn't exist'. — Wayfarer

No, I most certainly do not think that, nor does the view that "the mind cannot know mind-independent reality as it is in itself" necessarily entail that anything does not exist.

I said, "If it cannot, then there is always a reason to deny the existence of external objects a la post-Kantian philosophy (thus modern philosophy is intrinsically bound up with solipsism)." What I meant was that it is possible to deny the existence of extramental objects, but not that it is necessary. I do not think it's a coincidence that solipsism is such a common problem in modern philosophy.

Hume and Kant are chalk and cheese. — Wayfarer

Batman and Robin. :wink:

I think that physics has validated Kant's attitude in many respects... — Wayfarer

I don't think so, but some more than others. We would have to examine these in detail to give them a fair hearing.

All due respect, it is not analogous, but is a misreading. — Wayfarer

Well say why in your own words. I give simple examples so that they can be easily interacted with. In my opinion folks too often advert to abstruse quotes from philosophers rather than speaking plainly in their own words.

But regarding your quote from Westacott, it seems premised on your initial idea that I think Kant must dispense with the noumenal altogether, which I do not. I think the glass example should have illustrated that, for surely there is no reason why the person who says that everything viewed through the glass has a glassy aspect is necessarily committed to the position which says that the viewed objects do not exist.

And as I say, all such statements still carry an implicit perspective. — Wayfarer

Haven't we already agreed <that it is likely false> that "boulders will only treat cracks differently than canyons when a mind is involved"? And if so, then is the claim that although boulders will act in the way described even if no minds exist, nevertheless the statement that this is so carries an "implicit perspective"? Because there is some categorical commitment to perspectives?

A statement is the affirmation of a proposition, and propositions require minds, but reality does not require propositions. Whether or not there are propositions and minds, boulders will treat cracks differently than canyons. At some point the perspectivalism becomes either strained or tautological. You could think of my argument about boulders as an argument against perspectivalism.

I want to say that the perspectivalism can only avoid tautology if "perspective" is defined as something beyond "proposition-esque." If all propositions are by definition perspectival then I should think we are lost in tautological thinking. We will at least need a middle term or an argument to connect them.

As soon as you posit such a hypothetical you have created as what phenomenology calls 'the intentional object'*. — Wayfarer

And everything hangs on the nature of that intentional object, which is like the <glass>. For example, you seem to want to claim that every intentional object "carries an implicit perspective." What sort of argument would be required for such a categorical claim?

Presumably the next step is to define 'perspective' and give an argument for why every intentional object must be perspectival.

I'm very interested in pursuing the discussion about Aquinas, but it's a separate topic, and one that I'm preparing further material on. — Wayfarer

Alright, sounds good. I don't know how much longer can sustain this pace, but even if I have to abandon ship I think we've made some headway. :halo:

I just came across this thread, so apologies if I repeat what has already been said. I don't see philosophical arguments as being true or false, but rather valid or invalid; that is consistent with their premises or inconsistent with their premises. — Janus

I agree, although I don't really mind if people predicate truth of arguments. I don't think I've spoken about arguments as true or false anywhere in the OP.

I don't see philosophical arguments as being true or false, but rather valid or invalid — Janus

Can they be sound or unsound? I hold to the common view that they can.

Much as I would like to derive a genuine, non-hypothetical “ought” from “is” here, I don’t think we can. It seems like two responses are possible. — J

Which of the two responses do you prefer?

2) There is actually no choice in the matter at all, since to understand the soundness of an argument is to believe it. This is Nagel’s position, by the way, in regard to logical truth. — J

Yes, I can see it. On my view people should be forced to submit to sound arguments, but experience shows that they can somehow manage to avoid doing so, and so I don't actually think the 'ought' disappears. But as a Christian I see this as bound up in the paradox of evil, where irrationality is a form of evil.

More concretely, we could consider the second-order question, "Ought we strive for sound arguments?" It seems that if (2) is correct, then we ought to strive for sound arguments. For example, we should be cautious in our reasoning, try to avoid fallacies and bias, and avoid drawing conclusions when we are in overly emotional states of mind. Once the teleology of the intellect is granted, it acts as a center of gravity, pulling other facets of life into a "moral" (or normative) orbit, such as this second-order question.

(Another excellent post, by the way.)

Probably a good reason why I now prefer more virtue-based ethics than consequentialism. — Jerry

:up:

While context is pretty much always required when evaluating whether a particular action is just, the idea of "This is bad, unless..." just sounds like making ad hoc excuses for a bad action. — Jerry

Oh, I wouldn't want to go that far. I think there is a lot of legitimate confusion tied up with consequentialism, and not merely ad hoc excuses. Generally speaking the consequentialist elevates a psychological theory to the level of morality. For example, the hedonist assumes that pleasure/pain provide the exhaustive basis for psychological motivation, and they then conclude that morality must be nothing more than appeals to pleasure or pain.

Why the detour into our opinions of the wise man? — Fooloso4

Because he is inquiring into wisdom, and rather than artificially stipulate a definition of wisdom, he looks at what we already mean by it, and who we call 'wise'. In the subsequent section he assesses these widespread opinions about the wise man.

Well, perhaps more than you wanted, but these meta-philosophical questions are deeply engaging for me. — J

This is great stuff, @J, thank you. Bernstein is definitely on my reading list by now, as everything you are bringing up resonates with me. I am not going to try to give a response here, in part because I am short on time and in part because we are getting off-topic for this thread. To be clear, I am not worried about derailing my thread, but I see no use hiding this topic in a thread where people will not be able to find it. I think there is a new thread to be had (or five). :wink: I have bookmarked your post, and will return to it in time.

That said, any new thread(s) would need to be carefully constructed and contained. I am fairly new here, but I haven't seen anyone delve into the complex realities that someone like Habermas was interested in. I haven't seen many threads on these sorts of deep cultural issues.

Hi, Leontiskos — plaque flag

Hello, @plaque flag,

The boulder's shape is independent, in some sense, from this or that individual human perspective. So it transcends the limitations of my eyesight or yours. But it seems to me that what we could even mean by 'shape' depends on an experience that has always been embodied and perspectival. — plaque flag

Yes, we learn about shape through experience. My earlier comment may be worth quoting, "Opposing various forms of idealism, I would claim that reality exists and minds are able to know it. This is not to say that all knowledge is objective, but lots of it is" ().

Speaking as someone who embraces perspectivism and correlationism, I'd would not call the world 'mind-created' or basically mental. But I would insist... — plaque flag

Okay. Can you give a quick overview of what you mean by perspectivism and correlationism? I have seen these words used in different ways. Generally speaking, I am inclined to lump you, Wayfarer, and Mill together. :razz: It seems like you are all saying that reality cannot be known as it is in itself. Or in Wayfarer's words, "Reality has an inextricably mental aspect."

- Yes, I think Berkeley misses the mark, although I am speaking from the perspective of secondary texts. Really, I think modern philosophy tends to be <shades of grey> with respect to this topic, with the possible exception of Husserl and certain figures in his school.

Here is a concise text from Aquinas that @Wayfarer may also want to read. It situates my view and gives an initial outline of the problem:

It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color. Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Question 75, Article 2

(The point is not that the power of the intellect is entirely unrelated to the body, but rather that it has an operation which is apart from the body.)

Note that modern philosophers would presumably just disagree with Aquinas that "by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things," but if his point is granted then I believe his conclusion follows, and scientists are liable to grant his point (especially to the degree that they are ignorant of modern philosophy).

Another, related more to Hume but highlighting a relevant danger:

Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood.

This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons.

First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [I:84:1].

Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true", and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Question 85, Article 2

A good introductory resource for classical realism is the first issue of Reality, especially the introduction and initial essays (link).

As I said in the OP ‘there is no need for me to deny that the Universe (or: any object) is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect…’ — Wayfarer

But you seem to be holding to two conflicting principles. Either the mind can know mind-independent reality as it is in itself, or it cannot. If it cannot, then there is always a reason to deny the existence of external objects a la post-Kantian philosophy (thus modern philosophy is intrinsically bound up with solipsism). If it can, then reality does not have an inextricably mental aspect a la western science.

It seems to me that the scientists got tired of the post-Kantians and their solipsism (or quasi-solipsism). The philosophers were preoccupied with trying to figure out whether the external world exists, and the scientists decided to ignore them and build cars so that we could travel from city to city. I'm sympathetic to the scientists, and I'm not very impressed with post-Kantian philosophy. I'm not convinced that any philosophy that takes Hume or Kant's starting point has ever worked, or ever will work, even if that starting error is mitigated as far as possible.

Suppose there were an argument about a piece of glass. One person says that anything perceived through the glass has "an inextricably glassy aspect." Another person disagrees, holding that this piece of glass is perfectly translucent. As far as I can tell, that's analogous to the argument over the intellect between Realists and Anti-Realists. If the former person is right, then nothing viewed through the glass can be seen as it is in itself. If the latter person is right, then things viewed through glass need not have a glassy aspect.

(Note that the analogy limps: glass is material, and therefore inherently imperfect. Hence the classical realist's claim that the intellect is immaterial.)

I was going to also add, that measurements of space and distance are also implicitly perspectival. You could, theoretically, conceive of the distance between two points from a cosmic perspective, against which it is infinitesimally small, and a subatomic perspective, against which it is infinitesimally large. As it happens, all of the units of measurement we utilise, such as years or hours, for time, and meters or parsecs, for space, ultimately derive from the human scale - a year being, for instance, the time taken for the earth to orbit the sun, and so on. Given those parameters, of course it is true that measures hold good independently of any mind, but there was a mind involved in making the measurement at the outset. — Wayfarer

This is the same problem from a different angle. Units of measurement are arbitrary, but this does not prevent comparison of finite objects.

But this need not be inherently human-biased. The point about shape, with boulders and cracks, has to do with the relative size of mind-independent objects, and these relative sizes will hold good whether or not they are measured. It must be so if boulders treat cracks differently than canyons whether or not a mind is involved.

It seems like if it is obligatory to do certain good things, even within your means, then you're almost a slave to the world around you. — Jerry

Historically morality has been concerned first with "Thou shalt not." Prohibitions. Consequentialism obviously takes a different route, and Hedonism is one variety of Consequentialism. What's curious is that Consequentialism seems to preclude absolute prohibitions. Rape and murder, for example, can apparently always be justified on consequentialist systems in one way or another.

Of course, this seems not to be the complete picture, because one could imagine an agent who truly believes in the righteousness of their action, despite it seeming wholly unethical from a different perspective. — Jerry

So I think the first thing to realize is that Consequentialism does not provide prohibitions for unethical acts. The closest Consequentialism ever gets is, "Don't do this unless..." If you think there are unethical acts, then you will have to find a better system than Consequentialism.

Well, Aristotle articulates a kind of non-intentional teleology. However we are again begging questions. The notion that there could be purpose without intention to me is just "autologically unsound." As soon as you allow purposiveness, you have intention. — Pantagruel

For William Paley "teleology" is purposive and intentional, but not for the Aristotelian tradition. Given that you talk about Aristotle in your OP, I didn't think you would be basing your notion of teleology on an 18th century Protestant theologian.

It’s safe to assume not, but then it is an empirical matter isn’t it? — Wayfarer

Well, it's not a directly empirical matter, because it could never be directly empirically studied. But if we can have knowledge about the mind-independent world, then we can have knowledge about this. As you say, "It's safe to assume not."

It's often helpful to place the two things side by side and assess our certainty:

1. Boulders will treat cracks differently than canyons whether or not a mind is involved.
2. Boulders will only treat cracks differently than canyons when a mind is involved.

I'd say we have a great deal more certainty of (1) than (2), and you seem to agree.

I suppose ‘smaller’ and ‘larger’ are a priori categories, though — Wayfarer

We are conceiving of a crack as something much smaller than a boulder and a canyon as something much larger than a boulder. I don't think the definitions are problematic.

Yes and no respectively. — Wayfarer

So again, here's the argument in question:

The second point, regarding shape, is that if a boulder rolls over a small crack it will continue rolling, but if it rolls into a "large crack" (a canyon) then it will fall, decreasing in altitude. This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, and this is because shape is a "primary quality." A boulder and a crack need not be perceived by a mind to possess shape. — Leontiskos

So you are saying that boulders will only treat cracks differently than canyons when a mind is involved?

Is ‘shape’ meaningful outside any reference to visual perception? — Wayfarer

Yes, because boulders fall into canyons and do not fall into cracks on account of their shape. Thus shape is meaningful, irrespective of visual perception.

What's the point of specifying a time? — Banno

I haven't worked that out either.

Call me old-fashioned, but I think it would be helpful if @creativesoul provided a compass like, "Banno believes X. I believe Y. X contradicts Y."

I don’t know if I said ‘there are no mind-independent objects’ — Wayfarer

I think you are committed to the idea, or something like it. For example, "By investing the objective domain with a mind-independent status, as if it exists independently of any mind, we absolutize it. We designate it as truly existent, irrespective of and outside any knowledge of it." I am not using the word 'object' in any specialized sense. You could replace it with 'thing' if you like.

I feel as though your response is made on the basis of a step after the suppositions that inform mine. You’re saying that given that objects exist - boulders, canyons, and so on - then we can say…. — Wayfarer

I am claiming, "This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, [and therefore shape is mind-independent]."

So though we know that prior to the evolution of life there must have been a Universe with no intelligent beings in it, or that there are empty rooms with no inhabitants, or objects unseen by any eye — the existence of all such supposedly unseen realities still relies on an implicit perspective. What their existence might be outside of any perspective is meaningless and unintelligible, as a matter of both fact and principle.’ — Wayfarer

But is my claim about the boulder meaningless and unintelligible outside of any perspective? Does not the idea that a boulder has a shape transcend perspective?

And how does the existence of the universe prior to the evolution of life rely on an implicit perspective? If the universe's existence at that time relied on a perspective, then whose perspective was it relying upon? I would say that the proposition, "The universe exists," relies on a mind, but the existence of the universe does not rely on a mind.* Thus the universe truly exists in a mind-independent way, even though the true proposition, "The universe exists," would not exist without minds. The common meaning of 'existence' does not connote minds or perception.

This is why that additional conclusion, "...and therefore there are no mind-independent objects," is tricky. It is equivocal, having various different meanings.

Opposing various forms of idealism, I would claim that reality exists and minds are able to know it. This is not to say that all knowledge is objective, but lots of it is.


* Presupposing naturalism for the moment.

Oh, I don’t know. If you read on to the section about Pinter’s book Mind and the Cosmic Order, he says there are quite valid scientific grounds for his proposals, which I hope my arguments conform with.

I’m not saying that everything is a matter of perspective, but that no judgement about what exists can be made outside a perspective. If you try and imagine what exists outside perspective, then you’re already positing an intentional object. — Wayfarer

Right, but it seems that you would then go on to draw a further conclusion, "...and therefore there are no mind-independent objects," and that is where things get tricky.

For example, I agree with Locke that shape is a "primary quality," and disagree with Pinter. Yet Locke and Pinter are in agreement that color is a "secondary quality." The first point is that there really is a distinction to be had between primary and secondary qualities.

The second point, regarding shape, is that if a boulder rolls over a small crack it will continue rolling, but if it rolls into a "large crack" (a canyon) then it will fall, decreasing in altitude. This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, and this is because shape is a "primary quality." A boulder and a crack need not be perceived by a mind to possess shape.

At the tail-end of this is the idea that intentional objects can represent real properties, and this is called Realism. It's also the thing that scientists take for granted. So if one extreme says that only the spatio-temporal exists, and another extreme says that there are no mind-independent objects (or that the mind is not capable of knowing mind-independent realities), then I want to navigate the middle path and avoid both extremes.

Maybe your position is not as clear as you suppose. — Banno

For what it's worth, Banno's position is much more clear to me than creativesoul's. Creativesoul's posts aren't providing me with a great deal of insight into the position or the arguments. In fact I really don't understand what creativesoul is saying or getting at.

But someone who believed the clock was working would say that it was working. Not following you at all. — Banno

Right. I wonder if it would be easier to sort out past beliefs about working clocks before bringing in broken clocks, or at least to place the differences side by side. I mostly don't think false beliefs are a great starting point for these discussions (nor a great re-starting point).

:sweat:

- Oh, okay. Teleology is not purpose-driven in the sense that the entity necessarily devises its own purpose and its own means to that purpose. For example, teleology is present in the plant's being ordered to reproduction, even though there is no instrumentality of means. Thus a teleological entity need not possess intention.

I'd say that reason is ultimately instrumental. Basically, consciousness is teleology. — Pantagruel

Reason is surely teleological. It is ordered towards truth. It is not ordered to falsity in the same way it is ordered to truth.

This is one place where Hume's is-ought theory seems to break down. Reasoning implies 'oughts' because we are ordered towards truth. If I present you with a sound argument, then you ought to assent to the conclusion. Thus when Hume was giving his no-ought-from-is argument, he was ironically deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. "This is a sound argument, therefore you ought to believe it." Or, "This is true, therefore you ought to believe it."

That said, I don't quite see how teleology and instrumentality are the same thing. Perhaps you can elaborate?

I think you've largely just used the word "transparency" to refer to having an argument. — Judaka

No, I don't think that's right at all.

An assertion with no argument = there was no argument, surely. — Judaka

That claim was that to move from asserting to arguing involves an increase in transparency.

It would be just semantics, but it's the entire premise of your OP. That transparency, which seems to be nothing more than sharing/giving your argument, is a prerequisite for a good argument, and by your own logic, it isn't. — Judaka

I don't think you will find anything in the OP to support these ideas of yours.

If I argue that "This is the best way of doing X", — Judaka

You're conflating practical knowledge with truth. Not all propositions are about how to get something done.

To change what someone else thinks is true requires one to be compelling, intellectually and emotionally, to help someone see the merits of a different approach or flaws in theirs. — Judaka

Yes, and that requires transparency.

This is such a drastic oversimplification that it's misrepresentative and incorrect. — Judaka

Then name the third way instead of being opaque and contentious.

To sum up, truth without an argument is useless and irrelevant. If one doesn't know why something is true, and they don't feel those reasons are compelling, then they won't care. A truth's value is dependent upon the quality of the argument, and what the argument succeeds in doing. — Judaka

I could grant this naive epistemology for the sake of argument. So what? What does it have to do with the OP? You are trying to oppose my claim that argument helps us arrive at truth, but your arguments are invalid. Your claim that <only argument is able to arrive at truth> is not at odds with my claim that argument helps us arrive at truth. You're engaging in eristic, and you're not even addressing the OP. Bad day?

Edit: If you want a real-time example of what I am talking about, look at my post <here>. What I am proposing in that post is a means to transparency, a transparency that I propose is severely lacking in the previous two pages. If you read those two pages and agree that my suggestion would aid the dialogue by introducing more transparency, then you should have a key to the meaning of the OP, which you seem to have misunderstood.

To put it in blunt vernacular terms, it is the assessment of life in general, and human life in particular, as being basically the product of mindless laws and forces. — Wayfarer

So this is where the axiom of 'the reality of mind-independent objects' has its origin, and it is precisely that which has been called into doubt by the 'observer problem' in quantum physics, — Wayfarer

Okay, thanks for that explanation! I missed a few days and this thread seems to have gotten away from me, so maybe what I am saying has already been covered. In any case...

So for Nagel the 17th century brought the idea, <That which is real is spatio-temporal; the human mind is not spatio-temporal; therefore the human mind is not real>.

Yet your 'perspectivalism' seems to be a quasi-rejection of mind-independent objects, and that strikes me as an overcorrection, like falling off the other side of the horse instead of regaining balance. It's a bit like moving from the extreme of nominalism to the extreme of Platonic idealism. Of course rejecting mind-independent objects will avoid Nagel's conclusion, but it will do more than that!

It seems to me that the 17th century spatio-temporal error is a variety of scientism, and in particular a reduction of external reality to that which is measurable (and able to be manipulated). Notably, though, it is not an error to accept the existence of mind-independent objects. That was being done long before the 17th century. So I'm wondering if we need a smaller scalpel to excise a smaller portion of the 17th century's presuppositions.

Surely that line wasn't meant in the context of a private (!) philosophy forum, was it? — baker

I would say that in Burr’s context and mine the proximate motivation is fear of criticism. Criticism is of course feared because of its connection with adverse consequences. That is itself a perfectly workable definition of fear: anticipation of future evil.

In any interaction, it is vital to discern what type of interaction it (potentially) is. — baker

The topic of this thread is argument, particularly in the context of a philosophy forum.

I think it's easy be ambivalent or hostile towards Dawkins and like many atheists, he is often a polemicist. — Tom Storm

Persona non grata, in the well-deserved sense. Even his scientific colleagues began speaking out against him and distancing themselves, wary that he was dragging the scientific community into ideological skirmishes. He is a kind of zealot who lost himself in battles with those he considered to be the foes of science. At each point the proper remonstrance from his colleagues could have been, “Richard, stop stooping down to their level! Your zeal for science is only harming it.”

Fine’s paper is an illustration of the divide between Analytic and contemporary Continental ways of thinking about metaphysics. — Joshs

I don’t think this is plausible, and largely because Fine’s construal of metaphysics is the classical construal, stretching back thousands of years. It predates the curious dichotomy between the analytic and continental schools.

By contrast, for contemporary Continentalists of various stripes, logic is not more general than metaphysics, it is the contingent product of a certain era of metaphysics. — Joshs

You seem to be defining logic differently than Fine does. You seem to have in mind particular logics or particular epochs in logic. Fine is thinking of logic as that which pertains to the structure of thought itself.

I should probably note that Heidegger is a fairly poor historian of philosophy, and a fairly poor exegete. His merit and his intention lies in creativity and originality, but to take his pronouncements on the history of philosophy at face value is to be led astray. Thus, when Heidegger talks about “metaphysics,” he is talking about something almost entirely different from what that word has historically been used to convey. Fine is at the very least being attentive to historical usage.

(I wanted to offer a response, even though I will probably be unable to sustain this conversation.)

But thanks for agreeing that Wayfarer was exaggerating the truth, if only by .1. Exaggeration is a misrepresentation. Why exaggerate and misrepresent if you have no agenda? — praxis

No, Wayfarer was not saying that Dawkins has a 7/7 certainty. That was your strained misinterpretation. You missed the point, just as you consistently missed Hanover's points. Do you have a desire to understand?

"Science disproves God"

A. True
B. More true than false
C. Neither true nor false
D. More false than true
E. False

For Dawkins & co. the answer is "B". If you want to understand why your posts are sophistic, then consider the fact that they have consistently obscured this fact with rhetoric and hair-splitting. A newcomer to Dawkins would come away with a more accurate understanding if they attended to Wayfarer's posts rather than your own.

Interesting essay. Thanks for sharing.

(Caveat - so far I have only read the portion of the essay contained in your OP.)

Physicalism and naturalism are the assumed consensus of modern culture, very much the product of the European Enlightenment with its emphasis on pragmatic science and instrumental reason. Accordingly this essay will go against the grain of the mainstream consensus and even against what many will presume to be common sense. — Wayfarer

I must confess that the way you are using 'Idealism' is somewhat foreign to me. I am trying to understand the general thrust of your position, and specifically the way in which it contradicts physicalism and naturalism.

Would I be correct if I said that the crux is the idea that <the objective domain has a mind-independent status>, and that you are rejecting this idea whereas physicalism and/or naturalism accept it? That this is your central claim over and against physicalism and naturalism?

On my view there is clearly a cleavage between the scientific paradigm and post-Kantian philosophy, and it does revolve around this question of realism, but I tend to see more problems with the post-Kantian approach than with the scientific approach. Granted, there are problems with both, as both seem to provide only a partial account. In any case, why think it is the scientific-physicalist-naturalist half that is especially problematic?

(It's curious and encouraging to me how strongly this forum focuses on metaphysics. I haven't seen that on other philosophy forums.)

Can you please define what you mean by ‘metaphysics’? — Bob Ross

Here is a paper by Kit Fine on the topic, "What is Metaphysics?"

Hope this gives you a sense of Bernstein’s interests in this area. — J

It does, thank you! That’s actually very interesting and it seems like I would have a lot of sympathies with Bernstein’s project. In fact at this point I doubt anyone could look around at the state of our culture and deny that his foretellings had come to pass.

I am fond of Joseph Ratzinger, who seems to come from a similar school, and who was in dialogue with Habermas on many of these issues. Actually Ratzinger seems to align very nearly with the position you’ve outlined. The difficulty for Ratzinger (and presumably also for Berstein) is that it is not clear whether one can complete the project without a “metaphysical foundationalism.” I don’t know that he ever moved beyond vacillation on this point.

What then is Berstein’s alternative to metaphysical foundationalism? Does he attempt to go the way of a coherentism that could resist the “will to self-assertion”? Does he attempt to avoid metaphysics altogether?

Except for the quote that addresses my complaint. — praxis

Okay, fair enough. I apologize for overlooking that quote.

Do you believe that Wayfarer was merely paraphrasing and it was a happy coincidence that the paraphrasing supported his assertion so well? — praxis

But what assertion are you talking about? You seem to have taken a fairly simple assertion and applied a great deal of pedantry in order to make a mountain out of a molehill. Here is what Wayfarer actually said:

There's a great deal of pseudo-scientific nonsense spouted by the 'new atheists' such as Dawkins, Dennett and Sam Harris who all mistakenly believe that 'science disproves God' or some such, leading none other than Peter Higgs (of Higgs Boson fame), no believer himself, to describe Richard Dawkins as a 'secular fundamentalist'. — Wayfarer

Now you apparently read the phrase, “that ’science disproves God’ or some such,” in a very strange way, especially given the context. You want to read it as if Wayfarer were talking about strict proof of God’s non-existence, and as if the new atheists were in violation of a tautology, but obviously that’s not what Wayfarer was saying. That your interpretation is strained could have been known by the immediate context, “...or some such.” It could also have been known by considering the concluding attribution of “secular fundamentalist.” No one was talking about strict or formal proof, and neither was there any equivocation on this point.*

Then cited a source to the effect that Dawkins possesses a certainty of 6.9/7 that God does not exist. Dawkins makes this point precisely in order to block the inference that a lack of proof implies a significant possibility of God’s existence. Dawkins thinks the people who harp on this point about “proof” and “complete certainty” are misguided (people such as yourself). He thinks there is excessive scientific justification for rejecting “the God hypothesis,” and that a lack of strict proof is neither here nor there.

So it seems to me that your quibble here amounts to, “No, Wayfarer, Dawkins does not believe that science provides a 7/7 certainty that God does not exist. He only believes that it provides a 6.9/7 certainty that God does not exist. How intellectually dishonest of you.” Both the quibbling and the interpretation of Wayfarer’s statement are silly.

* Note too that when one wishes to concisely convey the ancillary point that a group of people believe science provides excessive justification for rejecting God and religion, this phrase is perfectly adequate: “that ’science disproves God’ or some such.” That is a much smoother and easier way to convey the simple idea than anything else that comes readily to mind. It is not Wayfarer’s fault if someone manages to parse the words in a strained and implausible fashion. (An entire thread could be devoted to the general problem of uncharitable interpretation and the lack of effort to ascertain intended meaning.)

But I'm done debating Dawkins, I shouldn't have brought him up — Wayfarer

The manner in which you brought him up is pertinent. The "conflict hypothesis"—that religion and science exist in an inherent conflict—has now been dead in the water for quite some time. Yet, as you pointed out, folks like Dawkins, Dennett, and Harris cling to this outdated hypothesis with all of the emotion they can muster. I don't think this is controversial or even overly interesting, but it is true and pertinent to a thread on the topic.

You should be honest when bringing him up. It’s probably a good idea for the moderators of a philosophy forum to be intellectually honest. — praxis

The irony. :groan: You are the one misrepresenting Dawkins, and you are doing so with bald assertions, apart from sources or quotes. Everyone you are disagreeing with has provided sources, with quotes. You have provided neither. Your accusations of intellectual dishonesty are truly absurd at this point.

You're making a strained epistemological argument. — Hanover

If we suggest that Dawkins is an agnostic because he's left open the possibility that the earth might be flat, pigs might fly, and God may possibly exist, the only true atheist would be the dogmatic atheist, who rejects the existence of God regardless of the evidence, but that would reject the scientific epistemology most atheists rely upon. — Hanover

I think this is exactly right.

Am I the only one who finds this odd? — creativesoul

No:

This is a bit tricky. I would want to say that it is something I do not believe, but not something I do believe. Or rather, it was. Now that you have brought it to my attention I have assented to it and I believe it. That I believe you are sitting at a computer on Earth explains why I would assent to any entailed propositions that are brought to my attention, or which become generally relevant. — Leontiskos

Incidentally, I am presuming the reference to 'incontinence' is actually to celibacy or lack thereof. — Wayfarer

The incontinent man (the akratēs) is one who desires correctly but does not act correctly. For example, the alcoholic who wishes to be sober but, overcome by his bad habits, is unable to act thusly. Nowadays we think of akrasia as relating to psychology, but for Aristotle it was central to ethics.

Some of the other proximate categories are helpful in situating the idea. The depraved man (akolastos) desires incorrectly and acts in accord with his desires. Then comes the akratēs, described above. Then comes the continent man (enkratēs), who desires correctly and acts correctly, but only with difficulty or effort. Then comes the temperate man (sophron), who desires correctly and acts correctly (primarily in relation to pleasures), and without difficulty or effort. At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). The commonality between the akratēs and the enkratēs is that they are both divided internally, at odds with themselves. Contrariwise, the akolastos and the sophron are both internally unified, acting as they see fit without internal contradiction.

:up:

From Wikipedia:

In The God Delusion, Dawkins contends that a supernatural creator, God, almost certainly does not exist, and that belief in a personal god qualifies as a delusion, which he defines as a persistent false belief held in the face of strong contradictory evidence. He is sympathetic to Robert Pirsig's statement in Lila (1991) that "when one person suffers from a delusion it is called insanity. When many people suffer from a delusion it is called religion." — The God Delusion | Wikipedia

It's simply not tenable to hold that Dawkins does not see science as undermining religion and the belief in God. Hell, just read the title of his book, "The God Delusion."


You almost made it to October. :razz:

But then he goes on to say (around 8:00) that Harman doesn't see it this way -- that he regards it as basic ontology, something that could be shown to be right or wrong, not just a useful idea. So I'm still unsure how Harman would argue for this. — J

Yes, quite right. :up: The same thing occurs towards the end of the video, in the wrapup. Maybe it's better to say that Hohipuha sees a fundamental contradiction in the work, and attempts to reconcile it by recourse to a kind of pragmatism.

A look and poem, I suppose so, yes.

An action? Unless it is an act of communication, it wouldn't seem so. The same for a life, I don't see how a human life can be treated as a sign. — hypericin

If an arbitrary phoneme can be a sign, then why can't an action or a life? Photographers capture actions and use them as signs or even symbols. Biographers capture lives and help people see these lives as signs of one thing or another. But people always do this same thing even without photographs or biographies. For example, the life of Martin Luther King Jr. is a sign of hope and progress in the realm of racial discrimination, and it had already taken on this signification long before a biography was written.

Now I wonder if in fact there are two distinct meanings of meaning: sense, and significance. Or, is significance conveyed with "meaningful", a distinct word from "meaning"? — hypericin

I think they shade into one another. For example, a distinction that is not meaningful for Sue will, at least at some point, not have sense for Sue. For most people the arcane distinctions that analytic philosophers make are not perceptible precisely because they are not meaningful, and it is only by helping the person understand the significance of the distinction that one can get them to see what the distinction even means. Usually this is done by illustrating the historical disputes that gave rise to the distinction.

There surely is a distinction to be had, but the word "meaning" is clearly used for both of them.