1. Can force be separated from content?
Yes. It's the whole point of logic, and until proven otherwise, it is clearly successful at doing so. If Frege didn't think so, he was confused. — Srap Tasmaner
I believe it is perfectly coherent to claim that making this distinction is a strategy employed not only by philosophers, sometimes with the intent to do logical analysis, but by ordinary speakers of a language in the course of their day.
Logic is that strategy deployed wholesale, rather than ad hoc for particular, often exigent, purposes. — Srap Tasmaner
Words and then sentences arrive for children in a world that already includes tone of some kind, though it's not perfectly clear this is the same thing as force, and I assume something similar is true of human history. — Srap Tasmaner
A symbol such as a word or sentence, in contrast, has sense -- we can contemplate it for its meaning alone, think about it, play with it. It's not telling us to do any one thing in particular. So you might say that the possibility of separating force from content is essential to having a true language of symbols. — J
I also didn't come right out and say that the way logic handles language and the way we do when teaching children has a sort of family resemblance, and that's the other reason I was thinking about it. Not sure where that leads, if anywhere. — Srap Tasmaner
Aaronow: We're just "talking" about it. — Srap Tasmaner
Thinking and Being is hard to quote from in a self contained manner — fdrake
It's like someone forked the repository of philosophical knowledge just after the publication of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, then merged in secondary literature in that heritage up to 2019. — fdrake
To portray the foreclosed future the abandonment of that problematic left. — fdrake
What is common to these three views is that their critical engagement with the force-content distinction is undertaken from a broadly Wittgensteinian perspective, while rejecting the speech-act theoretic approach to the topic of force and content. . . [5]
[5] Cf. Rödl 2018: 33, Bronzo 2019: 26–31, Kimhi 2018: 39. – There is another group of contemporary philosophers who, from vantage points rooted in speech-act theory, reject the Fregean conception of force as external to content and seek to replace it by an alternative picture, cf. Barker 2004: 89, Recanati 2013, Hanks 2015: 12–20, Hanks 2016, Recanati 2016. These positions deserve separate treatment, cf. Martin 2020: appendix. — Martin, On Redrawing the Force-Content Distinction, 180-1
Yet, God could have not liked evil for He is an all good being. — Shawn
This is starting to get hair-splitty, but yes, I would still say that an "assertoric force not limited to assertions" is either incoherent or, in some sense or manifestation, also non-assertoric. — J
Which is a bit odd when you think about it, since you're supposed to be dealing with things that have no forces... but there they are in the logic. — fdrake
I don't think the notion of assertoric force is clear enough to be understood, if it is something different from denotation or illocutionary force. — Banno
4.063 An illustration to explain the concept of truth. A black spot on white paper; the form of the spot can be described by saying of each point of the plane whether it is white or black. To the fact that a point is black corresponds a positive fact; to the fact that a point is white (not black), a negative fact. If I indicate [andeuten] a point of the plane (a truth-value in Frege’s terminology), this corresponds to the assumption [Annahme] proposed for judgement, etc. etc.
But to be able to say that a point is black or white, I must first know under what conditions a point is called white or black; in order to be able to say ‘p’ is true (or false) I must have determined under what conditions I call ‘p’ true, and thereby I determine the meaning [Sinnw] of the sentence.
The point at which the simile breaks down is this: we can indicate [zeigen] a point on the paper, without knowing what white and black are; but to a sentence without a meaning corresponds nothing at all, for it signifies [bezeichnet] no thing (truth-value) whose properties are called “false” or “true”; the verb of the sentence is not “is true” or “is false” - as Frege thought - but that which “is true” must already contain the verb.
4.064 Every sentence must already have a meaning [Sinnw]; the affirmation [Bejahung] cannot give it a meaning, for what it affirms is the meaning itself. And the same holds of denial, etc. — Rombout quoting Wittgenstein, 60
So what is the force in assertoric force? Is what you are claiming that the assertoric force is how "The cat" denotes the cat? Than it's about denotation, and fine. But that's not ↪Leontiskos's "some kind of latent or dormant assertoric force which is inseparable from the sentence itself." It's picking stuff out. — Banno
Could that be becasue the question is muddled? — Banno
But you can imagine learning English without anyone ever having resorted to veridical descriptions of the situation shown in a picture or plainly visible to you? — Srap Tasmaner
So it is making an assertion. Attaching an illocutionary force. Doing something with the proposition. — Banno
...Accordingly, the primary problem with Frege’s understanding of force is not that he fails to explain the absence of assertoric force from the use of declarative sentences in certain contexts but, rather, his failure to account for the unity of thought and force in assertions, be they logically simple or propositionally complex. — On Redrawing the Force Content Distinction, by Christian Martin, 180
I think we do have a tendency to treat every word as a term of art, with a specific technical meaning. Hence I have been treating as equivalent 'assertoric force', 'judgment', and 'assertion'. — Srap Tasmaner
This is starting to get hair-splitty, but yes, I would still say that an "assertoric force not limited to assertions" is either incoherent or, in some sense or manifestation, also non-assertoric. — J
For Kimhi Frege's Fa displays assertoric force and therefore is not independent of it. It is not a judgment, but "displays" one. As I said earlier in the thread, I am not convinced that Frege would disagree with such claims. There is a possible equivocation on "assertoric force." — Leontiskos
Then it does turn on what is understood by "use". Is there a real sense in which a word is just there in a sentence -- and thus "used" in it -- without someone "using" it in a sentence? What can a verb do on its own? — Srap Tasmaner
Does a Fregean formula like "Fa" display the independent existence of a thought or a state of affairs? Or is it a judgment? — Srap Tasmaner
Frege/Geach's adoption of the force / content distinction allowed them to construe a 'proposition' as having its own existence independent of that conferred upon it through the veridical use of the verb “to be," — Leontiskos
His argument is very similar to Wittgenstein's argument that Rombout presents in 4.3.1. In fact it is almost identical except for a mild upgrade. — Leontiskos
What do you make of his use of the word "existence" in the first quote?
I suppose "allowed them to construe" is ambiguous. I took it as a rhetorical denial of the claim that truth-bearers have some existence besides what is conferred upon them by judgment. Do you read that differently? — Srap Tasmaner
But unless you're reading "use" creatively, he does say what I said he did. — Srap Tasmaner
Thought I had quoted it somewhere, but no. — Srap Tasmaner
The adoption of the force / content distinction allowed them to construe that which is true / false or is / is-not the case (e.g., a thought, a sentence, a state of affairs) as having its own existence independent of that conferred upon it through the veridical use of the verb “to be.” — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 9
Kimhi says that existence is conferred on propositions by the veridical use of 'to be', so that's judgment or assertion. — Srap Tasmaner
I take the veridical use of 'to be' to be 'assertoric force'. — Srap Tasmaner
The second predicative or two-place sense is the veridical or copulative sense. The verb understood in a veridical sense displays a judgment or assertion, namely, an act of a two-way logical capacity or form. The judgments "Helen is beautiful" and "Quasimodo is not beautiful" are positive and negative acts of the syncategorematic (or logical) form "___ is beautiful." — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 22
Kimhi says that the proposition "The orange is good to eat" has existence conferred upon it by someone affirming or denying that the orange is good to eat.
...
When Kimhi says "conferred" there is some ambiguity.
...
Except that he explicitly says that P does not persist as a truth-bearer with no force, and that seems to deny its availability for being governed by the other propositional attitudes that might come along.
...
So Kimhi is an anti-realist. — Srap Tasmaner
What propositions never do is just hang out bearing truth or not. — Srap Tasmaner
And the kind of theorizing people do everyday is my kind, not Frege's or Kimhi's, and I would call it modelling because people know that most of what they think is only true "for the most part" or "usually" or "depending", and that you have to be willing to adapt and adjust, and the strategic choices we make in thought and speech and action don't have guaranteed results, just chances. My sort are for this kind of probabilistic modelling because it works. — Srap Tasmaner
Nowhere that I've noticed in Frege or Kimhi is there any recognition that ordinary people, who do most the thinking and asserting (and working and paying, and living and dying), also think about what they're doing, not from off to the side as philosophers, except maybe sometimes, but in the midst of doing it, because thinking about how you're speaking, for example, or how someone else is, whether they mean what they say, whether there's something else implied by what they say or the way they say it, whether you might be giving the wrong impression, all of this matters tremendously to understanding each other (or manipulating each other, etc). This kind of theorizing is not optional, but an important part of everyday thinking and talking. — Srap Tasmaner
And the kind of theorizing people do everyday is my kind, not Frege's or Kimhi's, and I would call it modelling because people know that most of what they think is only true "for the most part" or "usually" or "depending", and that you have to be willing to adapt and adjust, and the strategic choices we make in thought and speech and action don't have guaranteed results, just chances. — Srap Tasmaner
To say it, all Frege needs to do is put a judgment stroke in front of it. Does this mean that Frege is the subject, in the sense of "the one who is acknowledging the objective truth"? Is this really what he means? — J
of course the jury is still out — J
Of course he is not giving a model, but there is still truth in such an objection. I would phrase it as something like, "Frege did not give a perfect account of the mystery of thinking, but it is not a bad account, and in order to critique it we would need to get much clearer on what should be thought to constitute a better account." — Leontiskos
I don't know the contemporary landscape well, but I think the dominance of something recognizable as analytic philosophy was already slipping in the 70s and 80s. Rorty, Stanley Cavell, Annette Baier (I think also of the Pittsburgh crowd) and others seem distinctly post-analytic. — Srap Tasmaner
But Frege and Husserl, this is the last moment before the split. So if you want not to join one side or the other, you might go back to the most recent common ancestor. — Srap Tasmaner
It's painful reading. — Srap Tasmaner
When I started reading Kimhi I received the impression that he knew what he was doing or where he was going. The more I read, the less sure of that I am. I think it was Boynton's review which questioned whether Parmenides was central to Kimhi's argument or more tangential, and that is one example of the difficulty. — Leontiskos
Quite the opposite. I'm just forcing myself to try to understand the damn book. Although maybe you're right, in the sense that I'm just picking out the bits that seem to address The Tradition. — Srap Tasmaner
That was an hypothesis — Srap Tasmaner
I believe Kimhi wants to say these are the same thing, in the following (although there's some labor over it): extensionally, ~p is a complex proposition dependent certainly for truth-value but perhaps also for sense on p; intensionally, to consider p at all is also to consider ~p, to think or judge or say one is also to take a position on the other. — Srap Tasmaner
Another way to get there has been discussed earlier in the thread, but I don't know if it's Kimhi's way or equivalent, and that's to deny that ~p is a component of an intensional complex like "A thinks ~p", and construe this instead as "A thinks-not p" or "A denies p". — Srap Tasmaner
...nor what any alternative might look like. — Banno
The preceding discussion of the force-content distinction shows that there is, on the one hand, ample motivation for drawing such a distinction, while at the same time indicating that the way in which it is drawn in the Fregean tradition, namely, such as to make it appear as though force were external to thought, is problematic. Holding these two observations together instead of merely focusing on the diagnosis of confusion suggests that one cannot do away with the problems surrounding the force-content distinction by “abandoning” it. For in light of the profound motivations that have led to its introduction, the distinction seems doomed to re-emerge in some guise or other. Therefore, in order to come to terms with force and content, the distinction needs to be redrawn... — On Redrawing the Force Content Distinction, by Christian Martin, 194-5 (my emphasis)
In short, if you take this detour through intensional complexes, you get a specific failure of atomicity, which extensional complexes just require. — Srap Tasmaner
So how does that lead to "in and of itself true or false"? I think it's just the claim that for p to work in an extensional context it has to be ready to provide a truth value. In particular, that truth value cannot depend on the truth value of any other proposition, so --- atomicity. — Srap Tasmaner
In a sense, this claim alone solves the Parmenides puzzles! Or at least the second one. By speaking, we can bring into existence an atomic proposition; we need only say that something is or is not the case. There is no reliance on anything else here, nothing that would be needed to support the existence of our atomic proposition (no "negative fact" for instance, no missing truthmaker). It is entirely within our power. — Srap Tasmaner
Most competent speakers would have no trouble explaining it. We would say, “ ‛Assert’ can mean ‛say something that is true,’ or it can mean ‛say something purporting to be true’. It depends on the context, and usually it’s clear which meaning is intended.”
Which meaning does Frege have in mind with the judgment stroke? — J
I think that in order for the critique to make sense it must be linked up to some goal of Kimhi's. Kimhi must be made to say, "This point in the OP matters because it can be linked up to my larger concern of X." — Leontiskos
I guess that's the target you asked about. — J
On Redrawing the Force Content Distinction, Christian Martin — Pierre-Normand
This analogy seems problematic for the following reason: A mimetic gesture can indeed be performed as a basis for another act, while it can as well be performed without providing the basis for anything further. In contrast, an assertoric gesture is not such that it merely can occur as a basis for a further act. For if it were, it would amount to a forceless while logically contentful act on its own, which is exactly what seemed problematic about the Fregean conception. — On Redrawing the Force Content Distinction, by Christian Martin, 184
I am pointing to a fourth point, and it requires moving from the equivocity of the indicative mood to the univocity of statements. The idea is that we never handle statements independent of assertions, even when we are not asserting them. In that way a statement is like a tool with only one purpose. — Leontiskos
By assuming that assertoric gestures can either occur “with” or “without” being assertoric acts Kimhi has subscribed to a view that allows for the occurrence of logical acts – namely, mere assertoric gestures – which, albeit generically tied to assertoric force, are not qua particular acts tied to an overarching logical act whose force they actually partake in. — On Redrawing the Force Content Distinction, by Christian Martin, 186
5.132 If p follows from q, I can infer p from q; conclude from q to p.
The method of inference is to be understood from the two sentences alone.
Only they themselves can justify the inference.
Laws of inference, which - as in Frege and Russell - are to justify the conclusions are meaningless and would be superfluous. — Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke, by Floor Rombout, 57
I have gotten so frustrated with Kimhi over the past month that I've literally screamed, trying to untangle him. But I insist it's worth it. — J
the magnitude of the platonism at issue. The old war still rages — Srap Tasmaner
but I truly don't think platonism (including Fregean platonism) needs to be anyone's opponent. — J
Kimhi talks about "pragmatic contradiction" as the reason you can't attach a judgment stroke to "p & ~p"; if you use the stroke, you show that you know what it means to understand a logical expression. — J
If thoughts as such are tied to some force or other, while embedded thoughts (e. g. p qua part of not-p) do not directly come along with a force of their own, it must be clarified how the indirect connection to force, which embedded thoughts must indeed come along with, is to be understood. That is, it must be clarified how dependent logical acts that have an embedded thought as their content, and the overarching logical act that does indeed bear a force of its own interlock with each other such as to provide for the unity of a propositionally complex thought." — Pierre-Normand
I would assume it does, until something stops it. — bongo fury
Is it my imagination, or is Frege sounding a bit defensive here? — J
whether their accounts of this self-conscious propositional unity constitutes an improvement over the charitable accounts, put forth by Evans and McDowell, of what Frege was trying to accomplish when he sought to individuate thought/proposition — Pierre-Normand
It might be closer to the argument given to say that Frege, in particular, does not set aside force (even if other and later logicians do) but that he brings it in in a way that is somehow at odds with the unity of force and content in our utterances. — Srap Tasmaner
I just think we should quit throwing around 'proposition' and 'judgment' and 'inference' in ways that allow people to give those words their preferred reading. — Srap Tasmaner
Kimhi believes that Fregean logic doesn't permit the inference (1) S is F; (2) A thinks that S is F; (3) Thus, A truly thinks that S is F. — J
So the words are a bit wooly because Frege's allegedly made a model of something wooly that has no wool in it, and our fellow travellers are seeking and analysing the wool. — fdrake