Comments

  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    From the other side, once you "grasp" the truth of a situation, have you any choice but to affirm it? This would seem to be somewhat closer to the sense of assertion intended. In other words, Moore's paradox is a simple impossibility: to see the truth of a situation or a proposition is to believe it.Srap Tasmaner

    That seems right to me.

    But I want to make a bit of a different point. On my (admittedly limited) understanding of the Tractatus, one thing a picture is entirely incapable of depicting is that it is true. A picture can show how things might be, and things may indeed be that way, but the picture cannot include itself in its depiction and vouch for its own accuracy.

    Just so, my belief that a picture is accurate does not count as evidence that it is.
    Srap Tasmaner

    Okay, and I agree that this seems accurate.

    We have talked some -- whether we should have or not, I'm not sure --- about whether there's some sense in which propositions are self-asserting. In these terms, whether a picture at least inherently claims that things stand as it shows, even if it cannot itself substantiate that claim.Srap Tasmaner

    That seems to be what Kimhi is saying:

    After a close read of Kimhi's section 2.5 I see him doing the exact same thing that Srap and I were doing. He says that both a declarative sentence and an asserted declarative sentence "display" force, but whereas the first is "a mere display" the second is "a self-identifying display."Leontiskos

    So that we then have:

    ...what is Kimhi trying to argue here?

    Simply working from Boynton, he seems to be saying that if the declarative sentence, "The cloud is raining," does not display an assertion, then it is impossible to say under what conditions the cloud would be raining or not raining. That if "the cloud is raining" and "the cloud is not raining" do not display different assertions, then they could not be associated with different truthmakers. This looks like the same argument that Wittgenstein gives in Rombout 60-62.
    Leontiskos

    So for Kimhi it is more than a matter of possible worlds. For Rombout this is also true in some sense for Wittgenstein:

    That is what Wittgenstein tries to show by means of this analogy: the difference between (Wittgenstein’s conception of) Fregean assertion and Wittgenstein’s own idea of a sentence saying that its Sinnw is true. In Tractatus a sentence cannot take a meta-position and compare the Sinnw it shows with the world. Therefore, the sentence cannot acknowledge its own truth. A sentence cannot ‘check’ whether it corresponds to the world and decide upon the truth of the claim it makes, there are no extra-linguistic acts attributed to sentences. Nevertheless, every sentence aims at truth. A sentence is a picture of reality and as such it already makes a claim about what reality looks like. That is what 4.022 expresses: a sentence depicts a situation and says that this situation is the case. Sentences are not completely neutral phenomena; in showing a situation, they already ‘support’ that situation. It would be incorrect to ascribe intentions to sentences, but a sentence depicts a possibility and embodies that possibility in the same time: the possibility may in fact not obtain, but the ‘proposal’ the sentence makes is that it does obtain. In representing a possibility, the sentence more or less puts the truth of this possibility under consideration.

    <<4.2 The meaning of the sentence is its agreement or disagreement of the possibilities of the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.>>

    It is not asserted in the Fregean sense, for this agreement is not assertion. Whether it is actually true, or whether it corresponds to reality, seems to be irrelevant to Wittgenstein, at least for logical considerations. It may be part of the natural sciences or of interest to someone, but it is not relevant when formulating the limits of our thought. The actual truth of a sentence can only be established by a subject, and it is already mentioned that a subject does not belong to logic.
    Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke, by Floor Rombout, 63
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion


    An account of what? First you say, "unless these philosophers explain WHY thought MUST reflect reality..." And then you go on to speak about "accounts." They are two very different things. A necessary argument with the conclusion that thought reflects reality is different from an account of thinking.

    Isn't it self-evident that if logic is to be meaningful then there must be some relation between thought and reality?Leontiskos

    You haven't answered this question. Are you saying that logic would be meaningful even if there were no relation between thought and reality?

    You seem to be saying, "Unless Kimhi gives a metaphysical proof for the basis of logic his book is not worth a dime." But that's not a reasonable challenge. All inquiry involves presuppositions, and "logic is a thing" is not a tendentious presupposition. Kimhi is saying, "We both agree that logic is a thing, but Frege's account doesn't account for this fact very well." It's not reasonable or relevant to come along and say, "Ah, but I won't grant that logic is a thing until you prove it!"
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Unless these philosophers explain WHY thought MUST reflect reality (via "logic"), it doesn't seem to have any force to me, except as, ironically, unsupported assertions.schopenhauer1

    Isn't it self-evident that if logic is to be meaningful then there must be some relation between thought and reality? In any case, the context here is that Frege and Kimhi accept this as a mutual presupposition:

    The rules of logic always presuppose that the words used are not empty, that the sentences express judgements, that we are not playing with mere words.

    (Gottlob Frege, “Dialog mit Pünjer über Existenz”)
    Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 157-8
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    I want to highlight a few things in Owen Boynton’s first-rate essay/review on Thinking and Being.J

    I would say that this is the most relevant part of Boynton's review for this thread:

    For any proposition, Pa, its truth value is associated with the extensional reference to something that exists (the extension is a relation between a and a fact in the world that must obtain). But what is it that creates this “association”? How is it associated with the extensional reference to something that exists, as opposed to something that does not exists?

    “In virtue of what is the forceless combination Pa associated with the truth-making
    relation that a falls under the extension of P, and thus with the claim Pa, rather than
    with the truth-making relation that a does not fall under P (or falls under the extension
    of ~P), and this with the opposite claim ~Pa? This question cannot be answered, since
    Pa does not display an assertion, and therefore there is nothing that associates it with
    the positive rather than the negative judgment.” (Kimhi, 137)

    Interestingly, this, coming near the end of Kimhi’s work, is very much where Rödl starts out in Self-Consciousness and Objectivity (p. 43: “But this second-order judgment is not a thought of its own validity. So I am not, in judging that I must judge q, conscious of anything that stands in the way of judging that I may judge ~q. And this is to say that I am not conscious of anything that stands in the way of judging ~ q.”);. . .
    Boynton's Review of Thinking and Being

    As I said above, I don't see Frege saying that Pa cannot display an assertion. Be that as it may, what is Kimhi trying to argue here?

    Simply working from Boynton, he seems to be saying that if the declarative sentence, "The cloud is raining," does not display an assertion, then it is impossible to say under what conditions the cloud would be raining or not raining. That if "the cloud is raining" and "the cloud is not raining" do not display different assertions, then they could not be associated with different truthmakers. This looks like the same argument that Wittgenstein gives in Rombout 60-62.

    Cf:

    It's tricky to switch paradigms, but in Wittgenstein's paradigm the problem is that Frege has "two phases in the assertion of a sentence." Russell struggles with the same issue from a different paradigm. For Frege it is the difference between "the True" and the judgment-stroke.

    To try to put it plainly: is it possible to see that something is true before going on to assert it? And does (the recognition of?) a sentence's truth require a subject? Is the syncategorematicity (in Boynton's sense) of the judgment-stroke already present in the truth-assessment?

    The puzzle is explicit in Frege's requirement that only true sentences can be asserted, a requirement that is incomprehensible to, and thus not even understood by, Russell and Wittgenstein. If only true sentences can be asserted, then what exactly is the difference between calling a sentence true and asserting it? Frege has an uncommonly objective notion of truth (and also assertion) (at least as far as contemporary logic is concerned).
    Leontiskos
  • Why should we worry about misinformation?
    I note that many of the fears over misinformation mention the threat to some amorphous, ill-defined order. Both China and the EU have this in common. From the EU, “The risk of harm includes threats to democratic political processes, including integrity of elections, and to democratic values that shape public policies in a variety of sectors, such as health, science, finance and more.” Or for China it threatens to “undermine economic and social order”. It’s clear to me that it is a threat to the state. Therefor, digital authoritarianism and the control of information is required.NOS4A2

    Interestingly, for Aristotle democracy is inherently unstable, especially in the direction of populism. So is a democracy that is safeguarded from "threats to democracy" still a democracy? Is democracy a threat to democracy?

    The irony here is that calls for censorship meant to safeguard democracy from threats to democracy are themselves a threat to democracy, and this seems fairly uncontroversial. At the end of the day a kind of theocracy with science or some other truth-approach at the helm is not democracy.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Put differently, in asserting, "If p then q," we are asserting something about p and q. Is the takeaway then that assertoric force is not binary? And yet, is assertion binary?
    — Leontiskos

    An interesting question. "If p then q" seems to be inherently an assertion about the relationship between p and q. It is an inherently asymmetric relation: "if q then p" is not entailed.

    "It is raining" has the form "x is y", just as "it is green" does, and yet they are not the same. To state that it is raining, I could just say "raining", which would seem to indicate that assertion is not always binary.

    I hope I've understood your question; I'm pretty confident about working out the logic of natural language, but I'm not great with formal logic.
    Janus

    It's more about intention than words. If you say "Raining," is your utterance necessarily either an assertion or a non-assertion? Or is there something inbetween? Srap is asking a similar question:

    ...Just so, I'm resistant to analysis that treats all of our declarative utterances as deserving an "I judge that ..." or "I believe that ..." in front of them. Sometimes we judge, sometimes we go out of our way to mark what we're saying as our personal belief, and sometimes, probably mostly, we just talk.Srap Tasmaner

    Is there then something between assertion and non-assertion?

    I still don't know what this thread is about, but I'm pretty sure it starts in a place pretty far from me and goes in the opposite direction.Srap Tasmaner

    I was trying to think of a way to put the exact same thing, and you've captured it perfectly. Most of the posters in this thread would say that Frege is too fat. Kimhi is arguing that he is too thin.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    OK. Evidently my choice of “The grass in my backyard” was unfortunate, because it looks like its grammar may confuse the logical point. Let’s change the term to “Berlin”. If I say “Berlin,” I doubt if anyone would call it an incomplete sentence. Or, if you like, imagine Frege walking along a beach and finding a scrap of paper with the word “Berlin” written on it. In either of these cases, I’m guessing the natural response would be something like “What about Berlin?” or “I wonder why ‛Berlin’ appears here.” But what my question about comprehension is asking to you to affirm, is that in neither case would the response be “What is Berlin? I don’t understand this term” (if you’ll grant that the folks involved have heard of Berlin before).J

    Everything I said in my last post applies exactly the same here, as "Berlin" is no more a complete sentence than, "The grass in my backyard." See especially where Kimhi addresses the exact questions you are asking, as noted in my last post.

    To the second quote: I do indeed want to talk about (in the sense of "mention") some x apart from any function. I’ve just done so. You say that “Frege will not have it.” That may well be true. But again, what I’m asking is, does “not having it” mean that Frege doesn’t comprehend the term “Berlin”, or doesn’t think that I do? Or is it, rather, that he’s urging me to understand that I can’t say anything about the term without its taking its place to saturate a function?J

    Here is what Frege would say:

    Does "Berlin" have extension? If it does then it is not an object. If it does not then it is an object. All you are doing is trying to have it both ways. You want objects with inherent extension, which is impermissible.

    Natural language is not Fregian. I'm not sure what else to tell you. For the Aristotelian this is no problem given that grammatical subjects have inherent form.

    ...of course, this is not prima facie insurmountable for Frege. So "Berlin" involves a concept-function. So what?

    -

    Edit:

    KG: The grass is green
    FG: ⊢∃x(Grass(x) ∧ Green(x))
    Leontiskos

    Note that even in this post (and earlier posts) first-order logic creates a concept-function out of the subject. This is not controversial; it is just how first-order logic is done. That logic does not permit something like this: ∃(grass)(Green(grass)). Objects do not have inherent extension.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    - Yes, good.

    Frege doesn't write
    ⊢p⊃q
    ⊢p
    ⊢q
    such that each is within it's own intensional bracket; he writes
    ⊢(
    p⊃q
    p
    q)
    Banno

    You have this exactly backwards, and Rombout goes into it in detail. Frege writes the first and Russell ends up with the second. See also .

    The first is invalid; the second, brilliant.Banno

    I think you are confusing '⊢' with Frege's judgment-stroke. You still seem to be fundamentally conflating Frege with your own approach. I suggest reading some Rombout.

    Frege's system 'cannot account for the inference: “p”→ “A judges p”→ “A rightly judges p."' because it is invalid. It simply does not follow from p, that A judges p, nor that A rightly judges p.Banno

    This is an important claim, because you are conceiving of 'p' in a particular way. I just want to mark this out.

    As I said in the earlier thread, I think J needs to distinguish between committed Fregians and non-committed Fregians. I don't think Kimhi has the horsepower to convince committed Fregians (or truth-functionalists) such as yourself. So the parts of this thread that are aimed at convincing committed (post-)Fregians seem a little bit pointless to me, but whatever.

    -

    This goes back to my original question, what gives the assertion any truth-value in the first place? Whether you say "This person thinks X is true and judges correctly" or just "X is true", besides just a more efficient logical form, what does it matter really?schopenhauer1

    One represents a functional understanding of logic, the other a "psychological." One inquires into what it means to say that something is true, the other does not. For someone who sees logic as the art of human reasoning and knowledge, the question of truth simply cannot be neglected.

    Now my response is that we as a community choose to use "the sky is blue" to set out something about the way things are (or are not, when it is overcast). But you don't seem to like this answer. I suspect you want a theory that sets out, for any given sentence, if it is true or no.Banno

    Your approach is already a truth approach. "The way things are" with regard to "the sky is blue," is precisely what you rejected in your previous post, namely that "the extension is a relation between a and a fact in the world that must obtain." "The sky is blue" is not about abstract sets. As you rightly note, it is about, "the way things are."

    That's not what logic does. Rather it is about the consistency of what we say.Banno

    According to what source other than yourself? You consistently conflate metalogic or metamathematics with logic.

    -

    But I guess the bigger picture here is that Kimhi seems to think Frege is lacking something that say, someone like Aristotle captured in his logic- some sort of active engagement of the thinker and the logic. I guess I just don't see the difference really in how Aristotle adds the "active" engagement part. As far as I see from their logical forms, they are different ways of saying the same thing. I don't see anything like "Thucydides thinks that Socrates is mortal". Rather Aristotle's example would be "Socrates is mortal". I guess I don't get Kimhi's comparison and how he thinks Aristotle captures the "thinking" part.schopenhauer1

    I also think Frege is closer to Aristotle than Kimhi allows, but the point is that for Aristotle judgment is implied. Propositions do not exist apart from judging subjects, and logic has to do with judging subjects.

    -

    This might be the sort of thing McDowell and Kimhi are looking for.Banno

    If you read more of that review you will see that Kimhi disagrees rather strongly with McDowell. Boynton seems to merely be saying that McDowell is a genealogical point of departure for Kimhi and Rödl, not that they actually agree with McDowell's deflationism.

    Along the same lines, @J is quoting from Boynton in places where he is making a case against Kimhi, and using those excerpts as support for Kimhi. For example, Boynton's point with 'p' is that Kimhi falls prey to Rödl's critique, not that Kimhi reflects that critique (and I agree).

    -

    Here's a passage from T&B that talks about thisJ

    The "uniqueness of thinking" is the primary thing I agree with in Kimhi, and I think it is a helpful way to capture his project. :up:

    -

    That is to say, the "thinking" part, according to this view, is "behind the scenes". The conclusions are then taken from the "thinking part" and put forth in logical terms so as to be clear and consistent so nothing is misconstrued.schopenhauer1

    Part of the point is that thinking occurs not only in the form of intellection, but also in the form of inference. For example, drawing the conclusion of a modus ponens requires a very odd and opaque account of how the p's in the first and second premises relate. As soon as one begins to probe inferences of this kind Kimhi's project will arise spontaneously.

    I read up more on Frege's meta-logical theory, and it seems that he was a sort of Platonist about logical truths.. So finally, I think I see what the goal of Kimhi here is. It's not the FORM per se, but Frege's underlying assumptions of logic.. That logic is not psychological, according to Frege, but rather metaphysically real in some Platonic way... Ok, so this just goes back to an old debate about the nature of truth. Is "Truth" independent of human thinking, or is it "True" irrespective of the interpreter (or psychology)?schopenhauer1

    According to Rombout early Wittgenstein struggled with making sense of how logic and knowledge interrelate. He saw logic as tautological and knowledge as non-tautological (and therefore in some sense non-inferential), and never the twain shall meet. Plato and Aristotle wrestled with the same problems. But if logic is supposed to reflect correct thinking, then it cannot be divorced from knowledge (of the world).
  • Why should we worry about misinformation?


    The problem is that "misinformation" and "disinformation" are nonsense terms. What are they supposed to mean?

    Do not trust anyone who uses the words "disinformation" or "misinformation."
    What they mean is "opinions that run contrary to mine that I should be allowed to suppress."
    Jordan Peterson

    Lots of folks around here can't handle Peterson, but he's right. Such words are bogeyman stand-ins meant to justify censorship. If someone disagrees then they will have to give their definition. The only plausible definition of such terms is either 'falsehood', or 'intentional (or intentionally harmful) falsehood'. Neither one is going to stand up in this debate, which is nothing more than a debate on free speech. What is at stake here is not truth but power. Truth is a sideshow, and it has been for some time:

    So, by the middle of the 20th century, the scientific community — in the United States and many other Western countries — had achieved a goal long wished for by many of its most vocal members: it had been woven into the fabric of ordinary social, economic, and political life. For many academic students of science — historians, sociologists, and, above all, philosophers — that part of science which was not an academic affair remained scarcely visible, but the reality was that most of science was now conducted within government and business, and much of the public approval of science was based on a sense of its external utilities — if indeed power and profit should be seen as goals external to scientific work. Moreover, insofar as academia can still be viewed as the natural home of science, universities, too, began to rebrand themselves as normal sorts of civic institutions. For at least half a century, universities have made it clear that they should not be thought of as Ivory Towers; they were not disengaged from civic concerns but actively engaged in furthering those concerns. They have come to speak less and less about Truth and more and more about Growing the Economy and increasing their graduates’ earning power. The audit culture imposed neoliberal market standards on the evaluation of academic inquiry, offering an additional sign that science properly belonged in the market, driven by market concerns and evaluated by market criteria. The entanglement of science with business and statecraft historically tracked the disentanglement of science from the institutions of religion. That, too, was celebrated by scientific spokespersons as a great victory, but the difference here was that science and religion in past centuries were both in the Truth Business.

    When science becomes so extensively bonded with power and profit, its conditions of credibility look more and more like those of the institutions in which it has been enfolded. Its problems are their problems. Business is not in the business of Truth; it is in the business of business. So why should we expect the science embedded within business to have a straightforward entitlement to the notion of Truth? The same question applies to the science embedded in the State’s exercise of power. Knowledge speaks through institutions; it is embedded in the everyday practices of social life; and if the institutions and the everyday practices are in trouble, so too is their knowledge. Given the relationship between the order of knowledge and the order of society, it’s no surprise that the other Big Thing now widely said to be in Crisis is liberal democracy. The Hobbesian Cui bono? question (Who benefits?) is generally thought pertinent to statecraft and commerce, so why shouldn’t there be dispute over scientific deliverances emerging, and thought to emerge, from government, business, and institutions advertising their relationship to them?
    Harvard historian of science Steve Shapin, Is There a Crisis of Truth?
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    but there is a sense in which Frege's system automatically narrows the the field of true statements to statements about real things, and that does seem relevant to Kimhi's whole invocation of Parmenides. Somehow.Srap Tasmaner

    This seems right. Kimhi often mentions the problem of referring to non-existents. What he doesn't seem to recognize is that Frege inoculates himself against even Kimhi's more subtle objection by saying that assertion is always tied up with truth. So Frege will say, "It is true that not-x," but he will never say, "It is false that x." Part of Kimhi's project turns on the difference between falsity and negation (or denial and negation), but like Wittgenstein and Russell he fails to understand that Frege will have nothing to do with claims of falsity per se. Now for me this gets at a different problem with Frege's system, but Kimhi is not recognizing how thoroughly the Fregian paradigm sidesteps Parmenides' koan. His argument that Frege is inconsistent is very difficult to maintain. On my view Fregians tend to be wrong but not inconsistent.

    ...and there is an interesting way in which Frege's decision to speak about truth but not falsity is more monistic than Kimhi's idea that truth/falsity and affirmation/negation are balancing forces (albeit with the first term receiving a primacy). But I digress.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    ...my case that Frege only means, literally, that we can't speak in Logicalese about the existence of entities or the non-existence of entities. I don't take him to mean that we can't understand the difference, or that we can only understand what can be said in Logicalese.J

    For Russell and Frege, logic trumps natural language, and is not "logicalese." This is very clear in Novak. Frege does not renege on his opposition to the existence-predicate when it comes to natural language. He does not think, "Oh, well you can't predicate existence in logic, but you certainly can in natural language."

    Consider this: if you can predicate existence, can you also predicate non-existence?Srap Tasmaner

    That's right. Frege says the exact same thing in the second quote I gave in <this post> on page 1.

    -

    Are you saying that, because “The grass in my backyard” is an individual term, not "Fregean," not part of a proposition, Frege would be reduced to silence about it? Would he say, “Sorry, I don’t understand that term”? This seems unlikely. I’m deliberately asking a question about an individual term because I’m trying to build up an argument about Frege’s views on existence.J

    As I said, you are presupposing subject-predicate logic, which Frege explicitly rejects. "Terms" are not part of Frege's system (where ‘term’ means a subsistent thing with a nature, that can bear predications).

    Your response goes on to imagine what Frege would say about a different bit of language, “The grass is in my backyard,” but that of course is a proposition and not at issue.J

    No, I don't think this is true. For Frege, "The grass in my backyard," would seem to parse as I described it. "The grass in my backyard. . .," parses as, "∃x(Grass(x) ∧ Backyard(x)). . ." Else, if you want to talk about some x apart from any function then Frege will not have it. So if you want to conceive of your "term" of "The grass in my backyard" as a proper name, then Frege will ask you to say something about the proper name. You could say something like, "[The grass in my backyard] is long," where "...is long" is the function and "The grass in my backyard" is the proper name of an object. But in common use the reference, "The grass in my backyard," already involves predication, and is therefore not a proper name. That you were able to predicate without using the word 'is' would seem to be to the point.

    (The disjunctive syllogism allows us to avoid Russell's question, for "The grass in my backyard" either involves implicit predication or else it does not.)

    And the question remains for you as well: You are not a Fregean, so what account would you give of that term?J

    I don't think Frege's positive analysis is altogether incorrect. When we predicate (apart from predications of existence/non-existence) we commit ourselves to the "existence" of the objects in question (whether vacuously, as in Frege's case, or substantially, as in the common case). I differ from Frege insofar as I have no qualms about predicating existence and non-existence, although Novak's topic is admittedly difficult.

    Are you asking what your incomplete sentence is supposed to mean without any verb? Suppose you begin speaking a sentence very slowly, "The grass in my backyard..." We have a subject ("the grass"), an accidental modifier of place ("in my backyard"), and we are awaiting the verb and predication. For Aristotle the subject of a predication is basically never propertyless, and this is because substances have natures, and a reference to a substance includes its nature.

    Kimhi actually makes my point for me:

    Every syllogistic term must have an extension—must signify a concept in Frege’s sense. And this violates commitment (3). — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 45

    A syllogistic term such as, "The grass in my backyard," must have an extension and therefore signify a concept in Frege's sense, and therefore it violates Frege's commitment, "To keep in mind the distinction between concept and object."

    I’m happy to have both Novak and Rombout on tap. As I mentioned yesterday, my time is a bit curtailed this week but I’m sure they are both worth reading, and I’ll do so.J

    That’s fair. It’s just that we’re stuck on this topic and you don’t seem to want to take Frege at his word that he denies the existence-predicate. I’m not sure how you intend to argue otherwise without adverting to primary or secondary Fregian sources, and Novak is the source that is already in play on this issue. Is the goal to show that the denial of a substantial existence-predicate is incoherent, and therefore Frege either did not hold to such a position or else held it and was incoherent? What is the thesis you are aiming at? As for me, I think it is clear that he does hold to such a position; I do not think it is incoherent to do so; but I do think it is silly and mistaken.

    This goes back to what I said in my first post:

    All the objections to Frege's logic that I have seen are metalogical objections, and yours is no exception. ↪Srap Tasmaner says that there is no (counter)-argument being offered, and this is true at least insofar as there is no counter-argument which adopts Fregian presuppositions. What is being questioned is the presupposition.

    So how does one offer an argument against logical presuppositions? The most obvious way is to argue that the presupposition fails to capture some real aspect of natural logic or natural language, and by claiming that natural propositions possess a variety of assertoric force that Frege's logic lacks, this is what you are doing. Yet this is where a point like Novák's becomes so important, for logicians like Russell, Frege, Quine, et al., presuppose that natural language is flawed and must be corrected by logic. This moots your point.
    Leontiskos
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    In other words, your paraphrase ("such sentences have an inherent assertional logical or grammatical structure") may capture the idea just fine.J

    This is what and I were talking about earlier, namely the way that a declarative sentence has an inherent assertoric force even before it is asserted. For example:

    The question is whether the "other uses" of a statement are truly independent of its assertoric nature.Leontiskos

    That line of inquiry ended this way:

    But I worry that this tangential "hair-splitting" may have no force against Frege, and so I don't want to develop it too far. It's more that, "Here's something I hold, which sounds a lot like what Kimhi is saying. Maybe Kimhi could be interpreted this way? But I don't see how it intersects with Frege."Leontiskos

    After a close read of Kimhi's section 2.5 I see him doing the exact same thing that Srap and I were doing. He says that both a declarative sentence and an asserted declarative sentence "display" force, but whereas the first is "a mere display" the second is "a self-identifying display." This language is odd, but he is apparently trying to make it line up with his consciousness-claims.

    Yet my point gets louder and louder, "But I don't see how it intersects with Frege." Kimhi is wed to the idea that Frege's point commits Frege to the claim that a declarative sentence cannot display assertoric force. Is that really right? For example:

    ...But it is also supposed to corroborate Frege’s point. For if a thought can be conveyed without assertoric force, assertoric form must be external to a proposition’s semantical character. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 44

    Now Kimhi has introduced another term, "assertoric form." The difficulty with all this hair-splitting is that Frege apparently never considered and rejected Kimhi's idea of "assertoric form," and Frege's judgment-stroke is closer to Kimhi's monism than anything we see on the post-Fregian scene.

    Apparently Kimhi wants to trace truth-functional compositionalism back to Frege's dissociation between assertoric force and predicate:

    The textbook account of truth-functional propositional complexity begins from Frege’s point. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 47

    I am open to the idea that the following 70% of Kimhi's book shows why it matters that Frege did not have a precisely correct representation of assertoric force, but set in isolation the point seems uninteresting. It's like Kimhi is pointing to an incredibly dull star in the night sky, and we can't tell whether it is there or not. After straining for so long, the question arises, "So what if it is there? Does it matter?"

    I think Kimhi makes interesting and correct observations on many topics (and errs in others), but this point of the OP would seem to require more leverage to function as something of interest.

    -

    There are also places where Kimhi follows Wittgenstein into incorrect interpretations of Frege, such as here:

    But this construal of concept expressions rests on an incoherent association of the unity of a contradictory pair of assertions with the duality of truth and falsehood, understood as two objects with contrary properties (see TLP 4.063). — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, footnote 34

    Frege simply does not make this error, given his constraint that only true sentences can be asserted. Kimhi appeals in places like this to Wittgenstein, and Rombout explains how Wittgenstein makes this exact same error. Along similar lines, calling Frege's distinction between truth and judgment/assertion "dualistic" seems to obscure the very close coupling between those two things in Frege's thought.

    -

    Edit:

    I was addressing 'if p then q'.Janus

    It's also interesting to note that Kimhi's point can invert against himself, for if Frege did not admit that in the assertion, "If p then q," the antecedent and consequent have some sort of latent assertoric force which can be actualized in the context of a modus ponens, then he would not be able to draw a modus ponens. Put differently, in asserting, "If p then q," we are asserting something about p and q. Is the takeaway then that assertoric force is not binary? And yet, is assertion binary?
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Well, here we are back to the vexing question of "assertion" a la Kimhi. To push you down the rabbit hole, I'd need to persuade you that your use of "say" and "says" is not innocent, but brings with it an entire apparatus involving what it is for a consciousness to think (and possibly assert) a proposition. I'm still working on the best way to talk about this (and I'm not sure it's true, but Kimhi makes it plausible at least).J

    A lot of this seems to revolve around the question of whether a modus ponens is conceived as tautological. For Rombout I want to say that Frege says no, (early) Wittgenstein says yes, and Russell bridges the two. P must be both the same and different if true knowledge is ever to be gained.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Who dug this rabbit hole? Lewis Carroll, apparently.bongo fury

    On page 305 of Dummett's book:

    In order to understand a sentence which is either assertoric or imperative, then, we have to know two things: under what conditions it is correct and under what conditions incorrect; and whether it is used to make an assertion or to give a command. [...] The conditions for the correctness or incorrectness of a sentence could then be considered as endowing it with a certain descriptive content, which is in general independent of whether it is being used to make an assertion or give a command; this descriptive content corresponds precisely to what Frege calls the sense of a sentence, or the thought it expresses. In order to understand the sentence, to know its use, it will be necessary that it should contain another symbolic element conveying the force with which it is used; something playing the part of an assertion sign or command sign. Here the assertion sign is doing much more than merely marking the beginning and end of the sentence [pace Wittgenstein].Michael Dummett: Frege, Philosophy of Language, page 305

    I wish 308 was included in the preview.

    ---

    - :up:
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Broadly -- I think everyone knows this, but here we are -- the two principal strands of thought about language are: language as symbol system (which facilitates thought); language as communications system. Frege is generally treated as part of the former camp, and early Wittgenstein, and the latter camp includes later Wittgenstein, Grice, et al. (David Lewis makes an heroic attempt to marry them in Convention, and admits that he cannot.) For what it's worth, I'm in the latter camp, but see the sort of analysis the former produces as a useful strategy in some cases.Srap Tasmaner

    I'm not convinced that we have to choose, and Rombout's discussion of performative language gets at this starting on page 38. In fact I tend to wonder if Wittgenstein's irrecoverable mistake was choosing and shoehorning language in this way. For Aristotelians natural language is something that can never be fully accounted for or categorized, and I tend to think that this is essential to philosophy. As soon as you try to enforce rules on language you're screwed, even if your rules are true 98% of the time.*

    language as symbol systemSrap Tasmaner

    It is said that Peirce and Frege created the same system independently, but I am curious whether Peirce's robust focus on semiotics would have produced a better logic than Frege's. Peirce also seems less invested in mathematics, which investment is another kind of rule or determination over language. Aristotle explicitly opposed the mathematization of knowledge and logic.

    But language is easy (!) compared to logic. It appears to me that research overwhelmingly supports the communication-first view, but there is no simple path from there to a similarly robust take on logic, not that I've found anyway. That's uncomfortable for me, but oh well.Srap Tasmaner

    I would start with the idea that a symbol or sign is a kind of self-communication. Apparently Russell talked about the usefulness of written symbols along these lines.

    And Kimhi seems to me mostly to be talking about a pretend world, or at least mistaking the simplifications (that is, fictions) we employ, like "grasping the truth of a proposition", for reality.Srap Tasmaner

    This is where we disagree, but the disagreement runs so deep that it deserves another thread. :wink:

    I may as well respond to this, even if it is better fitted to your new thread:

    Shrug. That's how simplification works. It's a model; all models are wrong.Srap Tasmaner

    Frege is not giving a simplification or a model, and it is essential to understand this. Whether it makes sense to say that every conception of logic is necessarily a simplification (a simplification of what?) is something that I think would fit a new thread (or the old Sider thread, which was closely related to these questions).


    * See, for example:

    One of the interesting points that Novák makes is that there is a characteristic divide between the scholastics and the analytics with respect to natural language:Leontiskos

    In scholasticism the matters are rather more complicated. Generally speaking, the scholastics lacked the Russellian revisionist attitude towards natural language, and therefore they rarely explicitly challenged the obvious capacity of the natural language to refer to non-existents. Their approach was, generally, to explain and analyse, not to correct language – and so the standard scholastic theory of supposition (the mediæval counterpart of reference) naturally allows (via devices like ampliation etc.) for reference to non-existents.[18]Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not?, 168-9
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    It's ironic you say this.

    My deep dissatisfaction with everything I've read of Kimhi was precisely the emphasis on assertion, judgment (a word I've never had any use for because of its libertarian aura), and this "I" of logic.

    I've been thinking a lot the last few days about the "we" of logic, but so far it's not in good enough shape for the thread I promised.

    Anyway, this "I" stuff is why I'm not bothering about Kimhi anymore.
    Srap Tasmaner

    Rombout's section on Kant (2.2.2) seems very related to this issue. Instead of trying to comment further I will await your thread (although I will say that I think something more radical than a shift to "we" is required to displace Frege's presuppositions).

    But the thread fosters "thinking together" insofar as the premise is something like, "Frege says this, and Kimhi critiques it. How might we understand Kimhi's critique? What exactly is it that is wrong with Frege's claim?" That creates a common project and thinking together.

    But I am now seeing the relevance of some of your earlier comments, such as those about Wittgenstein's picture theory and his emphasis on "showing."

    -

    What that gets us, I'm not sure. If you say, for instance, that assertion "aims at truth" (which, perhaps mistakenly, I suppose is the sort of thing Kimhi will want to say), then a declarative sentence must be the sort of thing that can be aimed at truth, whatever that means.Srap Tasmaner

    Compare:

    “in order to express a thought, I have to realize that thoughts aim at truth"Michael Potter as quoted in Rombout, 61

    I always read the "language-game" analysis as an expansion of the context principle, so I have some sympathy with this view.

    I do want to note the alternative approach, though, which is Grice's, and which I also have considerable sympathy with. Grice distinguishes sentence meaning from speaker's meaning, and defends the usual logical analysis of the meaning of a sentence as essentially correct, even if in a given context a speaker means something else by saying it.

    An example I've used before: you're driving somewhere with a friend and ask, "Should we stop here to eat?" Your friend checks his phone and says, "The next town is like 70 miles." What he means by saying this is "yes", but that doesn't change the meaning of the sentence he uttered or of any of the words in it. --- Nor is "yes" logically implied by what he said; it is only implicated, and he might in fact be willing to wait.

    I say all this because if you want to identify the meaning of a sentence with its use, as a move in a language-game -- what I think Kimhi might be pointing at with "actual occurrences" and so on -- you can get speaker's meaning right but skip entirely over sentence meaning, which in this case is a verifiable claim about geography.

    It does seem like the principal subtext here is the picture theory of the Tractatus and its abandonment.
    Srap Tasmaner

    This seems right to me.

    -

    Eek. Not only is this part redundant but it requires classes to be objects, which pill, though bitter, even Quine swallowed for the sake of mathematics. But we don't have to go there just for this.Srap Tasmaner

    I agree it is redundant. That has sort of been my point. And maybe Frege would reject it on the basis that classes are not objects, but from what I understand he vacillates on this a bit. I am not averse to the conclusion that he rejects it. That seems most consistent.

    (It's also Quine who pointed out that names for individuals are eliminable. You just make a predicate like "Socratizes" that is satisfied by a single individual. That might not strike you as either intuitive or felicitous, but it's a typical math move, to subsume a particular problem into a more general one.)Srap Tasmaner

    Yep:

    However, in his reception of Russell’s ideas Quine makes one inconspicuous but crucial modification: any mention of “genuine” proper names is left out, to the effect that all proper names are in fact disguised descriptions. In this way, our language is finally devoid of any means whatsoever to genuinely and uniquely refer to a fixed individual; in Quine’s conception, individuals can only be reached via (quantified) variables. Thus, according to Quine, we are not only denied the capacity to speak of that which is not, but we also cannot, directly and by name, speak of individuals that are: this is manifested e.g. in Quine’s rejecting not just “possible entities”, but de re modalities in general.[13]Lukáš Novák, Can We Speak About That Which Is Not? Actualism and Possibilism in Analytic Philosophy and Scholasticism, 166

    -

    Indeed it is so incomprehensible that I didn't even remember this was Frege's view.

    Which suggests to me that "assertion" is really not a word we should be using at all here, given its modern meaning.
    Srap Tasmaner

    I don't find the usage beyond the pale, but I now see how it can be confusing. For example, you are certainly thinking of assertion differently than Frege in passages like this:

    One adjustment to this I would probably make is to say the goal of assertion is to aim someone else at truth -- at what you take for truth, anyway, so that's another adjustment.Srap Tasmaner

    For Frege one asserts even when they are working out syllogisms in their room alone. On page 38 and following Rombout has a very interesting discussion of performative aspects of written language, such as the judgment-stroke.

    I may have missed it, but I suppose this applies to "judgment" as well, that you cannot judge as true what is false.Srap Tasmaner

    Yes, all we are ultimately talking about is the judgment-stroke.

    All of which points toward that favorite (never defined) word, "grasping". So it's about grasping the meaning of a proposition, grasping its truth, the difference between those, and so on.Srap Tasmaner

    Yep!
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    One way to phrase the problem is as follows:

    The issue of two phases in the assertion [of] a sentence is also discussed in Wittgenstein’s Philosophische Untersuchungen [§22].Rombout, 61

    It's tricky to switch paradigms, but in Wittgenstein's paradigm the problem is that Frege has "two phases in the assertion of a sentence." Russell struggles with the same issue from a different paradigm. For Frege it is the difference between "the True" and the judgment-stroke.

    To try to put it plainly: is it possible to see that something is true before going on to assert it? And does (the recognition of?) a sentence's truth require a subject? Is the syncategorematicity (in Boynton's sense) of the judgment-stroke already present in the truth-assessment?

    The puzzle is explicit in Frege's requirement that only true sentences can be asserted, a requirement that is incomprehensible to, and thus not even understood by, Russell and Wittgenstein. If only true sentences can be asserted, then what exactly is the difference between calling a sentence true and asserting it? Frege has an uncommonly objective notion of truth (and also assertion) (at least as far as contemporary logic is concerned).

    So a better rewrite of the words addressed to Frege that I put in Kimhi’s mouth: “I disagree, if you’re saying that the only thing which gives the predicate its force is assertion. But as I read you, you needn’t be saying that at all. But you do, and Geach and other Fregeans have emphasized this additional point without seeming to realize that you could have stopped with your ‛observation’ and all would have been well.”J

    This seems cumbersome, but certainly better. And now we are correctly speaking about assertoric force rather than non-assertoric force, which was my point. Remember though that Kimhi does not think one can stop with Frege's observation. He thinks we need to go on to draw Wittgenstein's point instead of Frege's point.

    I interpret Frege differently here. To show how, let me start with a question. What do you think the status is of the term ‛The grass in my backyard’? Are you able to understand it? And now a second question: What do you think Frege would say?J

    My very first sentences in the thread:

    The closest Frege's system can get to modeling something like this is to say, "There exists something which is both grass and green." Fregian logic has an especially hard time with individuals since it is built for concepts or classes. Given that the statement is not Fregian in the first place, it raises a whole host of issues.Leontiskos

    Frege will say, "There is something which is grass, and is in my backyard, and the class of things which are thus and so is not empty." He will not say, "...therefore, backyard-grass exists." He will say, "...therefore the class of backyard-grass is not empty." What is being rejected is the subject-predicate approach, such as Aristotle's where grass is a substance and "in my backyard" is an accident. For Frege it is a matter of applying two functions to a single 'argument', and the argument does not sub-sist as something independent of the functions.

    I take it that Novák is required reading at this point, and is deeply related to one of Kimhi's central theses, regarding speech about that which is not.

    I’m starting to think so too, and see Boynton. He does a far better job than I thought possible at giving the term some intuitive appeal, especially when he likens it to “metaphysical”.J

    Yes, I agree. I have been meaning to look at Kimhi more closely on this subject.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Who dug this rabbit hole? Lewis Carroll, apparently.

    ...

    I'm not falling down it. Maybe I need a push?

    Yes, 'Peter is a Jew; if Peter is a Jew, Andrew is a Jew; therefore Andrew is a Jew' says that Peter is a Jew.

    Whereas, 'If both Peter is a Jew and if Peter is a Jew, then Andrew is a Jew, then Andrew is a Jew' doesn't.

    So what? Why deny, in the latter case, that the sub-string 'Peter is a Jew' (considered as such, apart from its context) still says so? You could perfectly well admit that it does but still say the whole, larger sentence doesn't.

    And if you have a reason, why shouldn't it equally well apply for sense, and disqualify the inner occurrence of the sentence from having the same sense as a free-standing occurrence?
    bongo fury

    This is excellent, and it has everything to do with the OP. :up:

    See Rombout:

    Where in Frege the premises and the the conclusion, as well as the connection between them need to be asserted in order to constitute an inference, this demand is dropped [by Russell and Whitehead]. What is asserted in a syllogism is the connection between premises and the conclusion, not the sentences themselves. This seems to be an explanation for allowing for an abbreviated form, but in order to conclude so, it has to be considered whether a syllogism is an inference.Rombout, 44-5

    That entire section in Rombout's paper discusses this issue, which seems central to the OP.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    @J

    So I finished reading Rombout’s thesis, “Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke” (but I did skip the section on Kant). English is certainly not Rombout's first language, so there are errors of grammar and spelling, but it was on the whole very good. It sheds a lot of light on this issue, and interacts with Kimhi in a very odd way.

    The thesis is something like this: “Wittgenstein’s understanding of Frege and especially Frege’s judgment-stroke is flawed. Anscombe thinks this is because Wittgenstein was reading Frege through Russell. Was she right, or was it flawed for some other reason?”

    This raises two possibilities with regard to your thread. First, that Kimhi simply followed Wittgenstein in his misunderstanding of Frege. In that case Rombout’s survey of Wittgenstein’s response to Frege inevitably captures Kimhi himself. Either way, that section is very helpful, both in itself; because Kimhi seems to be building on Wittgenstein’s critique; and because the Wittgenstein/Kimhi critique may be successful even if they are both failing to really understand Frege’s position. It also has some overlaps with Banno’s misreading of Frege, probably because Banno is a Wittgenstenian.

    The second possibility is that Kimhi rightly understands Frege and avoids Wittgenstein’s misunderstandings, and nevertheless utilizes, augments, and improves Wittgenstein’s critique.

    I don’t know which is true: probably some of both. Kimhi includes no mention of the historical debates about Wittgenstein’s interpretation of Frege that are presented by Rombout, and he certainly would have had he known about them. On the other hand, he seems to have a better grasp of Frege than Wittgenstein did. If the first possibility holds then the ‘Frege’ referred to in the OP is really Wittgenstein’s interpretation of Frege, which is a possibility that must be held in mind. My own sense is that Kimhi misunderstands Frege along the same lines as Wittgenstein, but with some mitigation, and in a way that might not undermine his sub-thesis.

    I find it a bit odd the way Kimhi places Aristotle and Wittgenstein in the same bed. If Aristotle and (early) Wittgenstein both disagree with Frege, it is for wholly different reasons. And while I find Wittgenstein’s alternative to Frege quite terrible, his critique is nevertheless acute and worthwhile. That critique via Rombout may be a good way to get the thread on track without appealing too strongly to Kimhi. It is found in Rombout 4.3.1, and to a lesser extent in the following sections.

    (I should also say that in general it proves difficult to navigate the various logical paradigms, even before Kimhi is brought in. It is also worth checking out PI #22, which Rombout references and Kimhi does not include.)

    ---

    I pointed out where Rombout gives context for Kimhi’s short quote from Wittgenstein, but the same holds for Kimhi’s short quote of Russell:

    In grammar, the distinction is that between a verb and a verbal noun, between, say, “A is greater than B” and “A’s being greater than B”. In the first of these the proposition is actually asserted, whereas in the second it is merely considered. But these are psychological terms, whereas the difference which I desire to express is genuinely logical. It is plain that, if I may be allowed to use the word assertion in a non-psychological sense, the proposition “p implies q” asserts an implication, though it does not assert p or q. The p and the q which enter into this proposition are not strictly the same as the p or the q which are separate propositions, at least, if they are true. The question is: How does a proposition differ by being actually true from what it would be as an entity if it were not true? It is plain that true and false propositions alike are entities of a kind, but that true propositions have a quality not belonging to false ones, a quality which, in a non-psychological sense, may be called asserted. There are grave difficulties giving a consistent theory on this, for if assertion would in any way change a proposition, no proposition which can possibly in any context be unasserted could be true, since when asserted it would become a different proposition. But this is plainly false; for in “p implies q” p and q are not asserted, and yet they may be true. Leaving this puzzle to logic, however, we must insist that there is a difference of some kind between asserted and unasserted propositions.

    (Russell, Principles, §38)
    Rombout, 33

    Rombout basically looks at Frege's judgment-stroke, and then at the ways that Russell and Wittgenstein wrestle with Frege's judgment-stroke. It is both helpful and freely available.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Good post, .

    I have a copy of Kimhi’s book on loan and I tried to put it down given the constraints that J laid out in the OP. Of course I picked it up again when the thread began stalling. On picking it up again, I am struck by the fact that it is primarily a Wittgenstenian book. This is true not only because Wittgenstein is the main source, but also because there is a lack of overly clear answers and theses. It is allusive and elusive.

    Perhaps Wittgenstenians can comment on Kimhi’s use of Wittgenstein. We could look at a few of the things that Kimhi appeals to in Wittgenstein. I already gave one here:

    [11] This dissociation is the target of TLP 4.063, which purports to show that “the verb of a proposition is not ‘is true’ or ‘is false’ as Frege thought: rather that which ‘is true’ must already contain the verb” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears and McGuiness [Oxford: Blackwell, 2001], 29).Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 8

    (Rombout gives the fuller context and an analysis of this quote on page 60 and following)

    A second is footnote 27 from the excerpt given in <this post>:

    [27] For Geach, Frege’s observation is meant to be restricted to occurrences of propositions in logical contexts that are identifiable as extensional or truth-functional. But understood as Wittgenstein’s point, Frege’s observation is not limited to a truth-functional context, and it implies semantic innocence, p is the same in p and in A thinks p. An expression of a generalized version of Frege’s observation, one that assimilates intensional and extensional contexts, can be found in the following note from Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic:

    <<When we say A judges that, etc., then we have to mention a whole proposition which A judges. It will not do to mention only its constituents, or its constituents and form but not in the proper order. This shows that a proposition itself must occur in the statement to the effect that it is judged. For instance, however “not- p” may be explained, the question “What is negated?” must have a meaning. (96)>>
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 39

    A third:

    Since the subordinate propositions in a compound are treated as logical building blocks, so to speak, I will call this a spatio-logical account of truth-functional propositional complexity.[35]

    [35] G. E. M. Anscombe uses the term “logical chemistry” to describe such an account:

    <<Consider the explanations of propositions and truth-functions, or logical constants, which are commonly found in logic books. It is usual for us to be told: first, propositions are whatever can be either true or false; second, propositions can be combined in certain ways to form further propositions; and third, in examining these combinations, i.e., in developing the truth-functional calculus, we are not interested in the internal structure of the combined propositions. . . . Is there not an impression as it were of logical chemistry about these explanations? (An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus [New York: Harper & Row, 1965], 53)>>

    Anscombe correctly rejects a reading of the Tractatus that ascribes to it this “logical chemistry.” My suggestion is that the main features of such an account arise from Frege’s point.
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 48

    A fourth:

    The notion that logic is not concerned with actual, historical occurrences of linguistic expressions but only with symbolical occurrences of expressions within larger symbolical contexts lies at the heart of Wittgenstein’s early work. Later he would note, for example, that the common or regular agreement between speakers in what they describe by the use of the predicate “. . . F,” is not logically external to the assertoric act of describing something as “. . . F.” And he insists that, in saying this, we do not lose the integrity of logic—we do not give in to psycho-logicism.[36]

    [36] Compare Philosophical Investigations §242:

    <<If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definition but also (queer as this sounds) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. It is one thing to describe a method of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call “measuring” is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.>>

    The remark seems addressed to his own earlier separation of logic and psychology.
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 51
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion


    The thread has flaws. I freely admit it. But I still think it is a good thread, precisely because it does not easily fit our preconceived categories and is not reducible to the standard tropes of TPF. It is an exploratory thread which favors a kind of thinking together. And at the very least it will generate many interesting thoughts, and probably also interesting threads.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Agreed. Good analysis. I'd only add that whether there is indeed a "wholeness of KG" is a central question, and Kimhi is trying very hard to argue for it, using pre-Fregean concepts of logic.J

    Yes, that's right. But it seems clear enough to me that the assertoric nature of KG is different from the assertoric nature of FG. That is where I think one should begin, and it moves us into the syncategorematic question.

    ---

    minutia-mongeringschopenhauer1

    That's an understandable read. But as Aristotle noted, small errors do add up over time. Kimhi is thinking in terms of decades and centuries.

    But [logic is] simply a toolschopenhauer1

    Not for Frege or Kimhi (or Aristotle). If Kimhi or Frege thought logic were just a tool or an approximation or a pragmatic matter, then Kimhi's book would be completely moot.

    To be fair, Aristotle would probably admit that his "syllogistic" maps human inference only imperfectly, but if you read that syllogistic in context it is not meant to be self-supporting.

    ---

    Frege, and logic, moved from prefixing"I know..." to something more like "I can write..." over time.Banno

    You are still conflating Frege with your own approach and a post-Fregian trend in logic. Frege never does this. See Rombout, sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. Frege never prefers consequence to inference. In fact he explicitly opposes such a move. For Frege such an approach is, "playing with mere words."

    Satisfaction, and so to a great extent truth, enter into the process if at all at the level of interpretation.Banno

    Not for Frege. Not for Kimhi. See, for example, the abstract of, "Truth and Satisfaction: Frege Versus Tarski."
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    As Banno points out, above, Frege didn't think in terms of actual illocutionary acts such as the one you're using as an example.J

    Banno is clearly incorrect:

    So we have two different things, sense and reference on the one hand, and illocutionary force on the other. The distinction between them is not, I think, explicit in Frege. It seems instead that the idea of illocutionary force was developed in Oxford and Cambridge in the thirties.Banno

    The assertoric force of Frege's judgment-stroke is one kind of illocutionary force. Therefore Frege is clearly thinking "in terms of actual illocutionary acts" such as @Janus' assertion.* Frege need not be thinking in terms of the various illocutionary forces that we now recognize in order to be thinking in terms of the illocutionary force of an assertion. Even Banno recognized that assertion is part of illocutionary force in his first post:

    What's salient here is that making an assertion is as much part of the illocutionary force of an utterance as is asking a question or giving an instruction. One might see this as setting aside the "assertoric" aspect of the sentence in order to deal with other aspects of its structure - what it is about.Banno

    And the idea that Frege did not distinguish assertoric force from sense and reference is simply wrong.

    * See Rombout 2.1.2
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Could you say more about this? I’m not sure what sentence reification would be.J

    Behind that distinction is the claim that asserting something and affirming a sentence are two different things. But what else does it mean to affirm a sentence than to assert something? And how do we assert something without sentences?

    You seem to want to say that when you say, "The grass is green," and I say, "I affirm the sentence that J has just asserted," we have done two different things. In order to say this we must reify the sentence and say that an affirmation of the sentence is not the same as an assertion of the sentence. I have never been able to make sense of this move. I see how we can speak about a sentence qua sentence, but I don't see how we can affirm a sentence without asserting it, or what that would even mean.

    No, you’re right. In part, this thread for me has been a process of clarifying terminology. I now think it’s better just to speak of “force” understood as positive or negative predication rather than using the term “assertoric force.” This (my) sense of "force" might be close to what you’re calling intentional force, but I’m still not sure whether you mean “intentional” or “intensional”. Interestingly, either meaning might apply on this point!J

    Okay, but I think you were right to speak about assertoric force. I think what is at stake is assertoric force specifically, not more general considerations such as force or illocutionary force or intentional force. Continuing:

    Yes, you’ve got it, as your later post with the extensive Kimhi quotes shows. Kimhi agrees with what he calls “Frege’s observation” but not what he calls “Frege’s point.” His line of dialogue should read, “I disagree, if you’re saying that the only thing which gives the predicate its force is assertion. But as I read you, you needn’t be saying that at all. That’s a conclusion that Geach and other Fregeans have imposed on you.” And that’s what I’ve been saying too.J

    So Kimhi doesn't disagree with Frege after all? He only disagrees with Geach? Then why does he call it "Frege's point" instead of "Geach's point"? No, Kimhi is explicit that he is critiquing Frege and Geach:

    However, for Frege and Geach the observation amounts to something different.Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 38-9

    This is the sort of mistake that occurs when one tries to make Kimhi speak about force rather than assertoric force, namely the mistake of claiming that Kimhi is critiquing Geach but not Frege. I worry that Banno is leading you into a pit.

    Page 44 seems to be very good evidence against your view, for Kimhi presents a passage where Frege attempts to show that (assertoric) force is stripped from an assertoric sentence when uttered by an actor in a play, and Kimhi goes on to argue—in a manner very similar to what I have argued in dialogue with Srap—that the assertoric nature of the sentence is still present in a latent sense. I would argue that each time 'force' appears on that page, it is just shorthand for 'assertoric force', and that in his final paragraph Kimhi consummates this by speaking very explicitly about assertability and assertoric force.

    There’s an important question here. Yes, once an argument is attached to a predicate, we say it exists. But the question is, What was the status of the argument term before something was predicated of it? A rather Zen-like question, but what I’m arguing is that an infinite number of nouns (just to simplify it to nouns) are floating around in our language, their status unknown. To place one into a function grants it existence in the only way that Frege thought made sense.J

    That's right, and therefore it does not make sense to ask Frege about the status of an argument term before something is predicated of it.

    So I do think it’s meaningful and important to speak about entities/nouns that may or may not exist – it will depend on whether they become arguments in a function.J

    I don't think you're grasping the seriousness with which Frege excludes existence as a predicate. My second quote here literally has Frege explaining why it makes no sense to speak about the existence of entities or the non-existence of entities. I don't see how this claim of yours can be saved:

    2) we have to start with a logically grammatical proposition that fills the argument slot with a term, thus creating what Frege called a “name,” before we can say whether it exists or not.J

    If "before" means "before" and "say whether" means "say whether," then Frege will deny this claim.

    You apparently want to say, "The grass is green, therefore the grass exists." For Frege, "The grass exists," is always uninformative or empty. It doesn't matter that it is presented as the conclusion of an argument. Therefore the inference is not substantial, and for Frege is no better than, "The grass is green, therefore the grass is green." The redefinition (or eradication) of existence-predication is total. See Novák, who is explicitly focused on this topic.

    Now I don't know that Kimhi's sub-thesis that this thread is considering requires us to understand Frege's position on existence as a predicate, but it is possible that I am wrong. The reason I brought some of this up is because I see an Aristotelian argument against Frege, but I am now unconvinced that it is Kimhi's.

    I’m afraid this is probably true, but I’m still going to avoid as much of Kimhi’s terminology as possible, out of consideration for others following the thread. The “good reason!” you mention isn’t just his odd use of singular terms like “syncategorematic,” but his whole style of writing, which is dense, lacks examples, and asks you to remember his labels for complicated arguments (“Frege’s observation” vs. “Frege’s point,” for example). I agree that the ND review is a help. And everything you’ve cited from Thinking and Being here is absolutely on the mark, and important; I’m just afraid it will be opaque without context and a lot of reflection.J

    That's fair, but the concept of the syncategorematic may need to be introduced, even if the word is not.

    If folks want to circumvent Kimhi it may be possible to do so via Aristotle or Wittgenstein. I tried to provide a handle by pointing to Wittgenstein here.

    ---

    This is his “psycho / logical monism” put quite plainly.J

    Okay. :up:

    ...but it’s the same question about what, if anything, important follows from this.J

    Yes, it's a good question.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    - Thanks, I will keep an eye out for it. :up:
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    I'm going to propose what I hope is an alternative view in a separate post, so as to please no one.Srap Tasmaner

    Would it be better placed in the thread that generated this one? Or else the Quantifier Variance thread?
    Many of the broader issues that people want to discuss—with positions which presuppose that both Kimhi and Frege were wrong from the start—would seem to be better placed in one of those earlier threads. These questions of logical nominalism and logical pragmatism are certainly interesting, but I don't see them as relevant to this thread and I don't know that others who would be interested in discussing them will look for them in this thread.

    Ultimately I would love to see such presuppositions presented as theses in a new thread, but those older threads would also be an option.

    Edit: I get it: Kimhi is opaque and (literally) inaccessible. So then the TPFer reads Frege, inevitably disagrees with Frege, and wants to express how and why they disagree with Frege. Still, given that the topic of the OP is not dead, I think tangential critiques of Frege along the lines of logical nominalism or pragmatism are better placed in the other threads where they are more relevant.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion


    There are a number of posts I need to respond to, but at this point I am inclined to think that we have been on the wrong scent all along. I am starting to think that the sub-thesis of Kimhi's that the OP reflects can be accessed through a consideration of these two assertions/statements:

    • KG: The grass is green
    • FG: ∃x(Grass(x) ∧ Green(x))
    Reveal
    [math]\vdash[/math]
    


    And for reference, consider also a declarative sentence (as @Srap Tasmaner has usefully called it):

    • FGH: —∃x(Grass(x) ∧ Green(x))

    ...Where "" is Frege's judgment-stroke combined with the horizontal stroke, and "—" is Frege's horizontal stroke.

    Much of this thread has been comparing FG to FGH, and conceiving of KG in terms of either FG or FGH. That's understandable, for we are probably all Fregians.

    But KG is not FG, and this is not merely because Fregian predicate logic struggles with individuals. KG is not FG because KG is pre-Fregian (i.e. it is Aristotelian). Again, both KG and FG are assertions or statements, but their assertoric natures differ considerably. The assertoric nature of FG consists entirely and only in the syncategorematic . The assertoric nature of KG is at least centered on the verb 'is', but the entirety of the sentence is required in order to understand its assertoric nature. Like Humpty Dumpty, once KG has been separated into FG and FGH it becomes very difficult to put the pieces back together again and find the wholeness of KG.

    ...I have limited time at the moment so I am going to leave it there instead of trying to make the differences between KG and FG more clear and precise.

    [Kimhi] is saying something like this: "Frege sucks all of the assertoric force out of its natural context within a statement and then plops it at the beginning of the declarative sentence in the form of a judgment-stroke."Leontiskos

    Or in Frege's own words:

    The languages known to me lack such a sign, and assertoric force is closely bound up with the indicative mood of the sentence that forms the main clause.Frege, Posthumous Writings, 192
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    - I may not be telling you anything you do not already know, but Frege's distinction between assertoric force and predicate is very different from sense and reference. Like Russell, when that question reared its head Frege tried to adapt his system to account for it, but this had little to do with his judgment-stroke (it has to do with the horizontal stroke, not the vertical stroke). See Rombout, "2.1.4 Sinn and Bedeutung."

    There is a temptation in this thread to anachronistically place some variety of current logical practice prior to Fregian logic. @Banno has been exemplifying this in his methodology by making his own conception of logic the norm against which Frege is to be measured. Banno seems to be trying to give a course on logic, saying, “This is how you do logic, and these are the ways that Frege deviates from logic.” One thing Rombout addresses is the differing conceptions of logic between Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Banno's conception of logic includes things like this:

    But [Fregian "judgment"] is something added on top of the logic. It's just not at the core, which is about manipulating symbols.Banno

    This is an interesting thesis that Banno is presupposing, but in fact it is a thesis that Frege, Kimhi, Aristotle, and presumably even Kimhi's interpretation of Wittgenstein all disagree with. A thread which argues for that thesis would be interesting and popular, but that debate has nothing to do with Frege and Kimhi. A logic which presupposes judgment is something fundamentally different from a logic that does not. Frege and Kimhi both maintain that logic presupposes judgment. A methodology which simply presupposes that Frege and Kimhi are both fundamentally wrong reflects a desire for a different OP, a different thread.

    Of course one will approach Frege and Kimhi through their own lens, but we must avoid pigeonholing them into our paradigm, especially given the way that Frege is a historical antecedent of lenses like Banno's.

    (I had already anticipated this problem in <this post> and others within that thread)
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    - I think this is a good general account of Kimhi's book, but not a good account of his critique of Frege (because Frege also thinks judgment is internal to logic). For that reason this line of more general inquiry may be better suited to the more general predecessor thread, "References for discussion of truth as predication."
  • References for discussion of truth as predication?
    - At this point I am guessing that Kimhi is an Aristotelian Wittgenstenian. As I said elsewhere, his index has about 50% more references to Wittgenstein than Aristotle. This will doubtless shape his interpretation of Aristotle. I find that Aristotelians enjoy sometimes engaging Wittgenstein, and although they are often favorable towards him it is also not uncommon to find disagreement. Kimhi seems to interpret each in favor of the other.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    It does seem like the principal subtext here is the picture theory of the Tractatus and its abandonment.Srap Tasmaner

    Kimhi speaks about motives which he shares:

    . . .in the fifth chapter the simple logos apophantikos is characterized as revealing or showing (dêlôn) a single thing (pragma).

    These motives [from Aristotle's De Interpretatione] will be familiar to readers of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, with its account of propositions as pictures. There is, I believe, an affinity between these works. . .
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 73

    Kimhi's index contains 50% more references to Wittgenstein than Aristotle, both of whom are surpassed only by Frege.

    I don't actually know Wittgenstein very well. Can you say a bit about his picture theory and its abandonment, and how it might relate? Kimhi seems fond of the theory, and I'm not sure he wants to abandon it wholesale. He notes that there are different interpretations of Wittgenstein.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    This phrase "criteria for truth" -- what could that possibly mean? How can anyone have one of those?Srap Tasmaner

    Right:

    The assertion [or judgment-stroke] symbol is a composite. But unlike every other composite sign in the Begriffsschrift, the composition of this symbol is not itself functional. The nature of its composition remains mysterious. Presumably it is unanalyzable in the same sense that “acknowledgment of something as true” is unanalyzable. — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 40

    ---

    I think I am starting to get a sense for the sub-thesis of Kimhi's that the OP is talking about. He is saying something like this: "Frege sucks all of the assertoric force out of its natural context within a statement and then plops it at the beginning of the declarative sentence in the form of a judgment-stroke." Further:

    This distinguishes it, within the Begriffsschrift, as the sole syncategorematic expression. The whole symbol governed by a judgment-stroke, for example, “⊢p,” is itself a syncategorematic unit since it cannot be embedded as a functional or predicative component within a logically complex whole. (In particular, it cannot be either a subject or a predicate term in a proposition.)

    ...

    The categorematic / syncategorematic difference will emerge as the major concern of this work. But at this point it can be described simply as the difference between expressions that can and cannot be functionally embedded as part of a larger significant expression. For example, in the Begriffsschrift “-p” is a categorematic propositional sign because it can occur as a subordinate expression within a compound proposition. And, as I already mentioned, “⊢p” is a syncategorematic propositional sign.
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 41-2

    (See the review and quotes from <this earlier post> for context)

    Another summary of the project can be found in the following excerpt, and note that Kimhi is fond of the quote from Wittgenstein in the footnote, which occurs a few times throughout the book:

    In order to see how this Fregean attempt to make our puzzlement vanish in fact fails to come to terms with the real difficulty, we shall need to appreciate how it turns on the assumption that being true or false originally involves a dissociation of what is true or false from the activity of thinking or saying that such-and-such is or is not the case; or in other words, on a dissociation of the intrinsic propositional unity of veridical being from its veridical being or non-being.[11] It will be essential to the project of this inquiry to show that this assumption is incoherent.

    [11] This dissociation is the target of TLP 4.063, which purports to show that “the verb of a proposition is not ‘is true’ or ‘is false’ as Frege thought: rather that which ‘is true’ must already contain the verb” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Pears and McGuiness [Oxford: Blackwell, 2001], 29).
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 8

    The obvious question is then, "Isolating the assertoric force in that manner is admittedly strange, but what's the concrete issue here?" I have some ideas but no clear answer at this point, but what I want to say is that this critique of Kimhi's applies to post-Fregian logic as much as it does to Frege. These "functionalist/compositionalist assumptions" are alive and well. That is, propositional logic apparently still dissociates assertoric force from sense in this more subtle manner. This then helps to answer the question that many of us have been asking, "Supposing that the judgment-stroke has been dropped in the meanwhile, does Kimhi's critique apply to anything after Frege?"

    I think this does raise the question, "How exactly does post-Fregian logic conceive of assertoric force?," and I am hoping that a clear answer will be found in that Master's thesis, "Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke." On the face of it it would seem that assertoric force moved into a metalogical position. (Note well that assertoric force (or judgment) and "truth" conceived as the '1' value in the internal 0/1 binary system of propositional logic are two different things, and Frege's recognition of this fact is part of what caused him to include the judgment-stroke in the first place.)

    (@J)
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Isn't this just the difference between validity and soundness? In computer science, for example, all that matters is the structure can be parsed using the correct language structure to manipulate the 0s and 1s when it is compiled to machine code/binary. That doesn't convey truth. Something else needs to be added.schopenhauer1

    What you say here is too simplistic, but there is something to it. In section 2.1.3 of, "Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke," Rombout is discussing the difference between an inference and a consequence. Frege's Grundgesetze is quoted:

    It is necessary to recognize the truth of the premises. When we infer [schliessen], we recognize a truth on the basis of other previously recognized truths according to a logical law. Suppose we have arbitrarily formed the propositions

    ‘2 < 1′

    ‘If something were smaller than 1, then it is greater than 2’ Without knowing whether these propositions are true. We could derive[16]:

    ‘2 < 2′

    from them in a purely formal way; but this would not be an inference because the truth of the premises is lacking. And the truth of the conclusion is no better grounded by means of this pseudo-ineference than without it. And this procedure would be useless for the recognition of any truths.[17]

    [16] Note that Frege is using the word ‘schliessen’ (to infer) here, rather than ’ableiten’, which would mean something like: ’to deduce’.
    Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke, by Floor Rombout, p. 14

    What's interesting here is that in favoring inference over consequence Frege adheres to an older tradition, and in my opinion thereby avoids some the errors of modern logic-as-mere-symbol-manipulation. Before J's thread on QV I had mistakenly believed that this modern approach could be traced to Frege.

    @Banno's posts are indicating that he doesn't like Frege's emphasis on truth given the way it disagrees with modern logical practice, but this seems to have little to do with the OP given that Kimhi is in no way critiquing Frege for his emphasis on truth or inference. Kimhi is not saying that there is a problem with Frege's judgment-stroke because judgment is no longer part of logic. Kimhi seems to agree with Frege that judgment/assertion is essential to logic. Banno's focus on this issue would seem to derive from his own personal interests rather than from the OP.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Leontiskos - that masters thesis you linked is a good read.fdrake

    Okay, good. I want to have a proper look at it today, but I think it may be helpful to bring the question into sharper relief first.

    The idea is that we never handle statements independent of assertions, even when we are not asserting them.Leontiskos

    @Srap Tasmaner - Similar to this, the Original Post tries place Kimhi's thesis in a cage so we can talk about it without talking about Kimhi (and for good reason!), but this can never be fully carried out by those who do not understand Kimhi's thesis as well as he does. I want to bring him in a bit given that we are trying to sort out how Kimhi's critique relates to Frege and the tradition that follows Frege, especially with respect to the dissociation of assertoric force from predicate.

    In the other thread a useful review of Kimhi's book came up, which is publicly accessible and gives the very large scope:

    It is also not so clear, on a closer look, that a conception of thought and judgment along Fregean lines is able to dispose of the Parmenidean puzzle. Judgeable content is introduced as the highest common factor shared by thought and judgment. One can grasp a judgeable content without yet taking the further step of judging it to be true or false ("advancing to a truth-value"). Judgment is logically more complex than thought: it consists in a content grasped plus the recognition of the truth of what is thus grasped. This means that the logical unity of the content of an assertion, as conveyed by the predicative use of "is", precedes and is independent of the logical unity of the judgment to which this assertion gives expression, as conveyed by the assertoric use of "is" (8, 18). As Kimhi points out, however, it is far from clear that the notion of a judgeable content that is at once forceless and truth-apt is coherent. How can content show how things are if it is true prior to and independently of saying that they do so stand?

    ...

    It is Kimhi's contention that the fundamental obstacle resides in the assumption that "All logical complexity is predicative or functional in nature" (15, 22), i.e., that every dimension of the logical complexity of a proposition can be rendered in function-argument form. Let us call this assumption the Uniformity Assumption (UA). This assumption, in turn, fuels the assumption that a simple proposition enjoys a unitary being, and so is individuated as the proposition that it is, prior to being true or false (39). On this assumption, the veridical being or non-being of what is said by a proposition (i.e., its being the case or not being the case) is extrinsic to its predicative being (i.e., the being expressed by the predicative use of "is") (8, 18). Let us call this assumption the Externality Assumption (EA). Correlatively, the veridical sense of being and non-being (i.e., being as being-true and being as being-false) is held to be at best secondary (69-70). Finally, EA induces a twofold thesis: it is countenanced (1) that every assertion articulates into two components, one of which conveys its semantical content and the other the force with which it is put forward (39); and (2) that the contexts in which a proposition can occur divide into two radically different kinds of contexts, namely, extensional, "transparent", truth-functional complexes, on the one hand, and intensional, "opaque", non-truth-functional complexes, on the other hand (12). Thus, UA is the ultimate source of the "psycho/logical dualism" (as the book calls it) that was systematically advocated by Frege and is nowadays more or less taken for granted (33-34). This dualistic view of judgment as decomposing into a subjective act and a truth-evaluable content drives a wedge between the psychological and ontological versions of the principle of non-contradiction (PPNC and OPNC respectively) (39). It is supposed to be the only way of steering clear of the pitfall of psychologism about logic (33).

    This overall diagnosis is at once profound, original, and controversial. . .
    Review of Kimhi's Thinking and Being, by Jean-Philippe Narboux

    It is hard to quote from Kimhi's book on this topic, as the topic is very complex and interconnected to other issues. For those with access to the book, or who want to use a preview site like Google Books, two places where it seems to come up are page 37 and following, and then especially page 82 and following.

    Here is an attempt at some relevant quotes:

    This proposition is what Kimhi calls "Frege's observation" (which is in fact enunciated by Peter Geach):

    a proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same proposition.

    (Peter Geach, “Assertion,” reprinted in Logic Matters (London: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 254–255.)
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 37

    It is worth noting that Geach is not using the term proposition in the Fregean sense of a thought or content, but rather, as he puts it elsewhere, “in a sense inherited from medieval logic, a bit of language identifiable in a certain recognizable logical employment.”[25] It is a bit of language—but not just a “string of words.” Different occurrences of the same words are recognizable as occurrences of the same proposition only within the larger logical context. (This is also what I mean when I talk of propositions and propositional signs.)[26]

    The use of the term occur in Frege’s observation is ambiguous between occurrence understood as the actual concrete occurrence of a propositional sign and a symbolic occurrence of a propositional sign within a larger propositional or logical context.
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 38

    . . .Understood as a point concerning a proposition’s concrete occurrences it is the straightforward insight that having the character of an actual assertion, by contrast to having a semantical or logical identity, is characteristic of particular occurrences of a proposition that cannot be associated with the repeatable symbol. In other words, a propositional sign manifests, through its symbolic composition, the semantical character of each actual occurrence of the proposition, but not the force character of any those occurrences.

    However, for Frege and Geach the observation amounts to something different. They want to say that anything within the composition of a propositional sign which is associated with assertoric force must be dissociated from that which carries semantic significance—that is, from everything directly relevant to its truth-value. In particular, they want to dissociate assertoric force from anything in the composition or form of that which is primarily true or false in a propositional sign.[27]

    In what follows, I shall call the correct understanding of Frege’s observation Wittgenstein’s point, and I shall call the conclusion Geach and Frege draw from it—that assertoric force must be dissociated from a proposition’s semantical significance— Frege’s point. We shall see that Frege’s point is mistaken. It only seems necessary if we accept certain functionalist (and more generally, compositionalist) assumptions about logical complexity. Correctly understood as Wittgenstein’s point, Frege’s observation concerns actual occurrences of a proposition and amounts to the full context principle; misunderstood as Frege’s point it runs together the symbolic and actual occurrences of a proposition and limits the context principle to atomic propositions.
    — Kimhi, Thinking and Being, 38-9

    (See here for footnote 27)
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Minor point, but yeah I should have been saying "declarative" all along!Srap Tasmaner

    Useful. :up:

    I think we can say this: a world with declarative sentences in it, or a world in which they can be produced, is a world that also includes assertion.Srap Tasmaner

    Yes, that is a good way to put the point I was trying to make. Note also how philosophical anthropology is implicated, namely the question of whether the human being is capable of truth, where 'truth' means something high or Platonic.

    What that gets us, I'm not sure. If you say, for instance, that assertion "aims at truth" (which, perhaps mistakenly, I suppose is the sort of thing Kimhi will want to say), then a declarative sentence must be the sort of thing that can be aimed at truth, whatever that means. One adjustment to this I would probably make...Srap Tasmaner

    And now we are on the edge of the deep waters again, but this is all on point. I am going to try to address some of the points I missed before diving into this headlong.

    ---

    So there's no sense talking about storage and retrieval in the first place.Srap Tasmaner

    No, I agree with this. I was not trying to say that we store and retrieve declarative sentences. The point is that declarative sentences have a unique and inalienable nature. Your later considerations about our capacity for truth also point to their unique importance. The relation between a screwdriver and the act of driving screws is loose. The relation between a declarative sentence and a statement is not loose in that way, and I would go on to say that the relation between these two things and our capacity for truth is also not loose in that way. But again, I don't want to move too fast into this newer and deeper topic.

    And I'm just not sure what you're reaching for here with "handle", or "independent of", for that matter. Now and then I think you're making a sort of psychological or cognitive point: Hume noted that to conceive of an object is to conceive of it as existing; you almost seem sometimes to be saying that to conceive of a statement is to conceive of it as being asserted. Which might be true, but I don't believe this is what you're saying, or what the point of saying it would be. So what kind of "handling" of statements are you talking about, and how are possible assertions implicated?Srap Tasmaner

    I don't see any problem agreeing with Hume in that even if I would probably go a bit further. But I worry that this tangential "hair-splitting" may have no force against Frege, and so I don't want to develop it too far. It's more that, "Here's something I hold, which sounds a lot like what Kimhi is saying. Maybe Kimhi could be interpreted this way? But I don't see how it intersects with Frege."

    We've sort of begun talking about the assertibility of a statement as an affordance, in direct analogy to screwdrivers. But we could instead think of the way simple objects in the Tractatus are said to sort of carry with them the possible states of affairs they could enter into. Just so, a sentence in a given language has what we might think of as chemical properties: there are other sentences it will have an affinity for, and bond with readily to create a narrative or an argument; there are sentences it will repel, sentences that if they bond it will reconfigure both into new configurations with new possibilities, and so on. Philosophers tend to treat statements as having built-in "affirm" and "deny" buttons, but that's surely a somewhat impoverished view, once you consider the wealth of ways sentences relate to each other.Srap Tasmaner

    Yes, I like these ideas. I think this relates to what I have referred to as intentional force, and perhaps what @J has referred to as force. But again, I have no clear sense of how this will intersect with Frege, except for the basic point that Frege simplifies what is not simple.

    I'm sure I'm leaving some out. I'm not sure which of these we've been talking about, which Frege has, which points made depend on whether you're talking about one or the other and which don't. We may have no choice but to wade into some of this -- though I'll note again that this is the sort of crap you don't have to worry about in mathematics, where Frege's machine is both happy and indispensable.Srap Tasmaner

    Yes and yes. :up:

    For example, I'll go ahead and note (not assert) that in a mathematical or logical proof, you will often have occasion to rely on statements, derived or not, that it would be odd to call assertions. When you say "And since 2 is less than 3, ..." you're not asserting that 2 is less than 3, you're not claiming that it is, you're reminding the audience that it is, and pointing out to them that you are relying upon this as fact.Srap Tasmaner

    Yes, this looks like a kind of presupposition or premise in the way it functions logically. Our context and aim will determine whether such distinctions are necessary, but in a way you have already pulled the curtain on the obvious and difficult debate—and that visitor was at the door from page 1. It is something like the realism debate, colored by your pragmatist approach.

    There is something faintly Fregean about this, because of B. Frege's arguments for the "third realm" were often intersubjective: there is not "my pythagorean theorem" and "your pythagorean theorem" but "the pythagorean theorem";Srap Tasmaner

    Yes, but Frege and Kimhi do not seem to be at odds on this point. That's not to say it's not worth talking about. My next post will hopefully be on Frege's judgment stroke, and whether that idea had any lasting effect.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    Impossible to address all the interesting points and questions, but I’ll do my best to respond to folks one by one.J

    Yes, I feel this as well.

    The difference is that (1) is an assertion, couched of course in language, about something in the world, e.g. the green grass. (2) is an assertion, couched as affirmation or denial (which could be in symbolic language rather than words) of the sentence used in (1) about the grass.

    The irony is that Kimhi claims there is no difference – this is his monism. He says there’s no “logical gap” between (1) and (2). But in order to appreciate how he could say such a thing, we first have to get clear on what appears to be the difference. Hope this helps.
    J

    Well yes, but it is many more than the 'monists' like Kimhi who do not see a difference here. The difference presupposes a certain kind of sentence reification, and this is related to my complaint about thinking about sentences divorced from intentional sense and implicit speakers.

    I know, this is really hard to be clear about. When I suggested “adding a nuance to the vocabulary” that would separate force from assertion, I was suggesting a possible way to clarify. My idea was that we could then talk about “displaying force” without “asserting.” So, to respond to your paraphrase: No, not exactly. I‛m suggesting that we should stop thinking of “force” as something that only an assertion can create. The term “assertoric force” kind of twists our arm into thinking that there’s no force without assertion. So instead, “This statement has force [positive or negative predication] even before you pick it up and assert it.”J

    My impression is that you have spoken about assertoric force independent of assertions, and not just force, but I could be wrong about that. For example, if Kimhi questions the distinction between assertoric force and predicate, then the prima facie reading is that there is some kind of assertoric force associated with the predicate. The difficulty about simple force, or illocutionary force, or intentional force, is that it is very vague and seems to take us far beyond the realm of logic. A number of times throughout the thread this idea has been reigned in lest we move into the open sea of super-logical (linguistic) concerns.

    Right, but it’s the introduction of the argument into the function that allows us to claim it exists. I see how you could have read my “before we can say whether it exists or not” to mean that there would be a further decision process. But no, all I’m positing is that, for Frege, ontological commitment can only be shown through his predicate logic.J

    Well, "before we can say whether it exists or not," seems to be simply anti-Fregian, given that we can never say that that an "argument" (in Frege's language) does not exist. As Frege said, to say that 'A is B' means that there are B's. We can never say 'A is B' and then go on to decide whether B's exist.

    Hmmm. Well, ‛Fido exists’ isn’t a proposition, if I understand Frege. So for that very reason, we don’t have to do anything with Fido other than use him in a function in order to claim he exists. We do have to do that much, though.

    Can you say more about this point? It’s possible I’m not following you.
    J

    That's right - I agree with your claims here entirely, although I think Frege would go even further and say that there is no reason or sense in "claiming that Fido exists" via predication. Existence in that basic sense seems to be superfluous for Frege.

    Good questions. If you accept my proposal to disambiguate “force” from “assertion,” then we need to clarify the relations among all these terms, which is a headache, not just for Kimhi -- much less so than for Frege, as you point out. Just to repeat the point from above, though: I think Kimhi believes that something can have force (not assertoric force) without being asserted.J

    Okay, but do you see how this reading of Kimhi fails to contradict Frege?

    Frege: "Assertoric force is dissociated from the predicate."
    Kimhi: "I disagree, because the predicate has force."
    Frege: "Unless you say that the predicate has assertoric force, you have not disagreed with me."

    I agree with this, and it seems to support your understanding as well. Notice, though, that Roberts puts “explained” in scare-quotes. Fair enough: Is this really an explanation or just an “ontological move”?J

    I read it as neither, but rather as merely "saying" or stipulating. If Roberts is right then it is an unargued premise. I find this whole line of Psychologism interesting, and Roberts' theories interesting and at least somewhat plausible.

    I read the passage from Roberts as suggesting that Frege’s “ontological move” is a somewhat ad hoc or tendentious solution to a potential problem about psychologism.J

    Right.

    So if we purport to describe thinking [that is, predicate something about it], or to explain it in terms of empirical categories, then whatever we purport to describe is by that very token not the formalism of pure thought. Ultimately, as Wittgenstein emphasized, thought in this sense can only be shown, or demonstrated in practice; it can never have things said about it. — Roberts

    This is where I see a large and sometimes unnoticed gap between analytic philosophy and scholasticism. The scholastics are quite happy to think about thinking, and are apt to switch into that mode at a moment's notice. If Frege really thinks logic is "a description of the objective structure of thought," then he will have to provide arguments for this thesis, and if he cannot argue about the psychological act of thinking, then he cannot do this.

    I’m not sure it’s enough simply to point out how tidy this makes everything, and how effective a weapon it is against psychologism. Frege was smarter than that.J

    I tend to agree. I think there is more here.

    I would also love to return, maybe in a fresh OP, to the wider implications of whether “carving the world at its joints” (Plato and Sider) is more than an ontological “move,” understood as something you just declare as useful methodology.J

    There are topics at hand that could easily resurrect your thread on Sider, and that might be the easier thing than drawing up a whole new OP. Especially because we don't want too many new OP's on the same constellation of topics.
  • A challenge to Frege on assertion
    I'm not much concerned about this, but the single most interesting point, and relevant to this thread, is that the assertion stroke disappeared. Frege thought it was necessary and later logicians universally (?) don't. I'm no historian, so I'm not quite sure how this happened.Srap Tasmaner

    I have been meaning to look into this same thing. I plan to look through this Master's thesis, "Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke."
  • What is the most uninteresting philosopher/philosophy?
    Yeah, when everything serves a religious end-goal, that does make debate sort of uninteresting.schopenhauer1

    I don't think so, as that wouldn't fit Aristotle, but I suppose antinatalism could be said to be the most uninteresting philosophy along these sorts of lines. :wink:
  • What is the most uninteresting philosopher/philosophy?
    stultifyingJoshs

    Russell is stultifying. But is he uninteresting?

    Like It's not just that I don't like Wittgenstein because I disagree with him. I actually think what is considered profound is actually not that interesting an insight.schopenhauer1

    I agree with that, but I don't find him uninteresting in an absolute sense.

    I can't think of philosophers who are uninteresting in an absolute sense, but perhaps Russell comes closest in that his goal seems misguided and naive. Of course, before the demise of Logical Positivism he would not have been so commonly seen to be misguided and naive.

    The scholastics can be quite boring and uninteresting at times, given that they were not motivated as much by their own idiosyncratic and subjective interests. Aristotle, too. [Their interest in the totality of all things leaves many complaints for those with idiosyncratic interests.]

    Maybe the philosopher is characteristically interested in things that most people find uninteresting or not worth attending to. But are there any who constantly fixed their attention on what is truly uninteresting and not worth attending to?