Point well-made and taken. That should have been further qualified as all spherical lines of circumference. That's what I meant. That's what I was thinking. Evidently a few synapses misfired. — creativesoul
Just wondering if I've understood something. — creativesoul
My interest was piqued by the claim that a line of circumference around a sphere was a circle. — creativesoul
My position was that there are circumstances in which it makes sense to say there are square circles, perhaps even that there are circumstances in which one can correctly assert that there are square circles, not "there are square circles" with an unrestricted quantification in "there are". — fdrake
I'm not really sure what you are arguing, fdrake. It doesn't sound like you hold to logical nihilism or logical pluralism in any strong or interesting sense. Am I wrong in that? — Leontiskos
Is that wrong somehow? — creativesoul
All lines of circumference encircle space. — creativesoul
Because I'd say that just from a plain language sense "This sentence is false" is clear to a point that it can't be clarified further. — Moliere
What does it mean to "say something"? — Moliere
I suppose the flip-side would be that there is no relationship between concepts of truth. I can't help but think this would make truth arbitrary, or at least have major philosophical ramifications, maybe not. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Pick your poison. Your thesis is that there are true/correct logics with nothing in common, such that we cannot call their similarity logic in a singular sense, and we cannot apply a rational aspect under which they are the same. But the natural language itself betrays this, for simply calling them logics indicates that they belong to a singular genus. — Leontiskos
Now in a given philosophy we'll want a particular logic, or particular logics for particular ends, but the logician need not adhere to one philosophy. — Moliere
The idea that different formal logics can each yield sound arguments without contradicting one another is not in any way controversial, and I would not call it logical pluralism. — Leontiskos
It's the name for a sentence.
A name denotes an individual.
The individual is an English sentence.
The sentence is "This sentence is false"
(1) is a shorthand to make it clear what "This sentence" denotes. — Moliere
What do you mean by (1)? What are the conditions of its truth or falsity? What does it mean to say that it is true or false? All you've done is said, "This is false," without telling us what "this" refers to. If you don't know what it refers to, then you obviously can't say that it is false. You've strung a few words together, but you haven't yet said anything that makes sense. — Leontiskos
One answer, which you've provided, is that the sentence means nothing.
It's not the only one though. — Moliere
And yet Dialetheism. You at least need to make a case, rather than an assertion. — Banno
It might not be a confusion, it could be an insistence on a unified metalanguage having a single truth concept in it which sublanguages, formal or informal, necessarily ape. — fdrake
Historically logic is the thing by which (discursive) knowledge is produced. When I combine two or more pieces of knowledge to arrive at new knowledge I am by definition utilizing logic. — Leontiskos
Russell's approach is largely telling logical nihilists not to throw the baby out with the bathwater — fdrake
the great circle might be taken as a countermodel for Euclid's definition of a circle — fdrake
Our dispute was similar to the former - we both have the same pretheoretical intuitions about what a circle is. Agreeing on Euclid's and on the great circle's satisfaction of it. And we'd probably agree on the weird examples containing deleted points too, they would not be circles even though if you drew them they'd look exactly like circles. — fdrake
and I kept asking you to repair it. — fdrake
Whereas your examples do not insist on taking the conceptual content of what's said for granted, indeed they're attempting to distort it. Allegorically, the logic of shit testing is that of a particularly sadistic genie - taking someone at their word but exactly at their word, using whatever pretheoretical concepts they have. The logic of your sophist is closer to doubting the presuppositions which are necessary for the original problem to be stated to begin with. — fdrake
Where's the issue? — fdrake
To be clear you would have been compelled to deny the great circle was a circle by only using Euclid's definition of it verbatim, I would not have! — fdrake
In effect the nihilist doubt machine gets going by noticing that there's arbitrary degrees of contextual variation — fdrake
1) Gillian is in Banf.
2) Therefore, I am in Banf.
to
1) Gillian is in Banf
2) I am Gillian
3) Therefore, I am in Banf — fdrake
you can tell it to sod off by specifying the exact mess you're in — fdrake
The problem is that we never know for sure whether or not something other than A might bring about the occurrence of B. — Metaphysician Undercover
There are all sorts of hypothetical entities that could answer prayers; devils, angels, fairies, wizards, extremely advanced aliens, the universe branching into a new timeline in accordance to one's will, etc. There's no reason to believe that it can only be the working of some sort of monotheistic creator deity (and certainly no reason to believe that it can only be the working of a specific religion's deity). — Michael
When you choose to enguage with the articles cited, I'll be happy to join in. — Banno
We say that prayers being answered is the effect, and God's existence is the cause of this effect. God's existence causes prayers to be answered. However, it's an inverse fallacy to say that if prayers are answered then God exists. — Metaphysician Undercover
Implied by stating it's violation is a destruction. — Cheshire
I disagree with the first premise. They could have systematic disagree and remain consistent in there conclusions. Somehow, presumably. — Cheshire
But how we might deal with a case where, say, two logics over the same domain reach opposite conclusions remains an interesting question. — Banno
Have you stopped beating your wife yet? — Banno
it would turn this thread away form the mere bitch session it is becoming — Banno
They aren't logical without total adherence seems strong — Cheshire
The "true/correct logics" either contradict one another or they don't.
If they do, then the PNC has been destroyed.
If they don't, then we are no longer talking about logical pluralism. — Leontiskos
No, Leon. If you are going to use the claim to reject there being contradictory logics — Banno
The inference depends on accepting PNC. — Banno
I'm curious, if you support that position, in virtue of what would true/correct logics be true/correct and false/incorrect ones not be? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Where you used it to adjudicate over logics — Banno
You are not here to addressing the topic of this thread, by your own account. You do not have to be here, and I am not under any obligation to address your posts. — Banno
I will often answer that there is indeed a kind of peer-review and 'quality control' method, if you like, in spiritual cultures, such as Zen Buddhism... — Wayfarer
The real problem with the idea of higher knowledge is the lack of a vertical axis against which the term 'higher' is meaningful. But that is the very thing that physicalism has undermined. Physicalism has a 'flat ontology', with matter (or nowadays, matter-energy-space-time) being the sole constituent of existence. — Wayfarer
That'd be logical nihilism. — Banno
Therefore, there are true/correct logics. — Banno
I guess a "strong" pluralism would declare that there are multiple equally valid/applicable logics but no morphisms between them? I just find it hard to imagine how this could be the case, since it seems that, by definition, they must have similarities in virtue of the fact that they are equally applicable to the same things. — Count Timothy von Icarus
For example, someone who believes in deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning is not a logical pluralist. It is in no way controversial that there are different ways of reasoning.*
* Similarly, someone who utilizes different logical languages or formalisms for different arguments is also not a logical pluralist. — Leontiskos
Glad we are on a philosophy forum and can adjust to the big picture and zoom in where necessary — schopenhauer1
Nice idea. So for your understanding here you are saying that mathematics are basically "arbitrary" forms of logic (that sometimes map to reality)? — schopenhauer1
Historically logic is the thing by which (discursive) knowledge is produced. When I combine two or more pieces of knowledge to arrive at new knowledge I am by definition utilizing logic. — Leontiskos
As I was saying to Leon, the "foundation" to logic would be a meta-logical theory, not the axioms/logical systems themselves. — schopenhauer1
Pick up a length of pipe. Look at it from the side and it's rectangular. Look at it straight on, it's circular. Done. "But I didn't mean that." — Srap Tasmaner
The "parlor trick" is just that the antecedent contains the contradiction "¬(P → A) ∧ ¬P". — Michael
I was trying to clear away the enticing parlor trick that made the OP appear plausible so that the error could be revealed. If it can be shown that the use of the logic within the OP will lead to absurd results in other instances, then that is a valid disproof of the logic within the OP. Such is a reductio ad absurdem. — Hanover
The way you are all using it is basically "axiomatic". I take "axiomatic" to mean "don't ask me anything further, this is as far as I'm going", or simply "duh!". It really doesn't mean much except that we need to start "somewhere" and "this seems like a good place to start". — schopenhauer1
(There's a direction-of-fit thing here: in one case, the center determines the circle; in the other, the circle determines the center.) — Srap Tasmaner
The two arguments (mine and the OP) are logically equivalent under deductive logic. — Hanover
Except they're not, because your "So..." is entirely different than the OP's "So..." I explained this <here>. — Leontiskos
Earlier logicians had drawn up a number of rules of inference, rules for passing from one proposition to another. One of the best known was called modus ponens: ‘From ‘‘p’’ and ‘‘If p then q’’ infer ‘‘q’’ ’. In his system Frege claims to prove all the laws of logic using this as a single rule of inference. The other rules are either axioms of his system or theorems proved from them. — A New History of Western Philosophy, by Anthony Kenney, 155