Oh, I don’t know. If you read on to the section about Pinter’s book Mind and the Cosmic Order, he says there are quite valid scientific grounds for his proposals, which I hope my arguments conform with.

I’m not saying that everything is a matter of perspective, but that no judgement about what exists can be made outside a perspective. If you try and imagine what exists outside perspective, then you’re already positing an intentional object. — Wayfarer

Right, but it seems that you would then go on to draw a further conclusion, "...and therefore there are no mind-independent objects," and that is where things get tricky.

For example, I agree with Locke that shape is a "primary quality," and disagree with Pinter. Yet Locke and Pinter are in agreement that color is a "secondary quality." The first point is that there really is a distinction to be had between primary and secondary qualities.

The second point, regarding shape, is that if a boulder rolls over a small crack it will continue rolling, but if it rolls into a "large crack" (a canyon) then it will fall, decreasing in altitude. This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, and this is because shape is a "primary quality." A boulder and a crack need not be perceived by a mind to possess shape.

At the tail-end of this is the idea that intentional objects can represent real properties, and this is called Realism. It's also the thing that scientists take for granted. So if one extreme says that only the spatio-temporal exists, and another extreme says that there are no mind-independent objects (or that the mind is not capable of knowing mind-independent realities), then I want to navigate the middle path and avoid both extremes.

Maybe your position is not as clear as you suppose. — Banno

For what it's worth, Banno's position is much more clear to me than creativesoul's. Creativesoul's posts aren't providing me with a great deal of insight into the position or the arguments. In fact I really don't understand what creativesoul is saying or getting at.

But someone who believed the clock was working would say that it was working. Not following you at all. — Banno

Right. I wonder if it would be easier to sort out past beliefs about working clocks before bringing in broken clocks, or at least to place the differences side by side. I mostly don't think false beliefs are a great starting point for these discussions (nor a great re-starting point).

:sweat:

- Oh, okay. Teleology is not purpose-driven in the sense that the entity necessarily devises its own purpose and its own means to that purpose. For example, teleology is present in the plant's being ordered to reproduction, even though there is no instrumentality of means. Thus a teleological entity need not possess intention.

I'd say that reason is ultimately instrumental. Basically, consciousness is teleology. — Pantagruel

Reason is surely teleological. It is ordered towards truth. It is not ordered to falsity in the same way it is ordered to truth.

This is one place where Hume's is-ought theory seems to break down. Reasoning implies 'oughts' because we are ordered towards truth. If I present you with a sound argument, then you ought to assent to the conclusion. Thus when Hume was giving his no-ought-from-is argument, he was ironically deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. "This is a sound argument, therefore you ought to believe it." Or, "This is true, therefore you ought to believe it."

That said, I don't quite see how teleology and instrumentality are the same thing. Perhaps you can elaborate?

I think you've largely just used the word "transparency" to refer to having an argument. — Judaka

No, I don't think that's right at all.

An assertion with no argument = there was no argument, surely. — Judaka

That claim was that to move from asserting to arguing involves an increase in transparency.

It would be just semantics, but it's the entire premise of your OP. That transparency, which seems to be nothing more than sharing/giving your argument, is a prerequisite for a good argument, and by your own logic, it isn't. — Judaka

I don't think you will find anything in the OP to support these ideas of yours.

If I argue that "This is the best way of doing X", — Judaka

You're conflating practical knowledge with truth. Not all propositions are about how to get something done.

To change what someone else thinks is true requires one to be compelling, intellectually and emotionally, to help someone see the merits of a different approach or flaws in theirs. — Judaka

Yes, and that requires transparency.

This is such a drastic oversimplification that it's misrepresentative and incorrect. — Judaka

Then name the third way instead of being opaque and contentious.

To sum up, truth without an argument is useless and irrelevant. If one doesn't know why something is true, and they don't feel those reasons are compelling, then they won't care. A truth's value is dependent upon the quality of the argument, and what the argument succeeds in doing. — Judaka

I could grant this naive epistemology for the sake of argument. So what? What does it have to do with the OP? You are trying to oppose my claim that argument helps us arrive at truth, but your arguments are invalid. Your claim that <only argument is able to arrive at truth> is not at odds with my claim that argument helps us arrive at truth. You're engaging in eristic, and you're not even addressing the OP. Bad day?

Edit: If you want a real-time example of what I am talking about, look at my post <here>. What I am proposing in that post is a means to transparency, a transparency that I propose is severely lacking in the previous two pages. If you read those two pages and agree that my suggestion would aid the dialogue by introducing more transparency, then you should have a key to the meaning of the OP, which you seem to have misunderstood.

To put it in blunt vernacular terms, it is the assessment of life in general, and human life in particular, as being basically the product of mindless laws and forces. — Wayfarer

So this is where the axiom of 'the reality of mind-independent objects' has its origin, and it is precisely that which has been called into doubt by the 'observer problem' in quantum physics, — Wayfarer

Okay, thanks for that explanation! I missed a few days and this thread seems to have gotten away from me, so maybe what I am saying has already been covered. In any case...

So for Nagel the 17th century brought the idea, <That which is real is spatio-temporal; the human mind is not spatio-temporal; therefore the human mind is not real>.

Yet your 'perspectivalism' seems to be a quasi-rejection of mind-independent objects, and that strikes me as an overcorrection, like falling off the other side of the horse instead of regaining balance. It's a bit like moving from the extreme of nominalism to the extreme of Platonic idealism. Of course rejecting mind-independent objects will avoid Nagel's conclusion, but it will do more than that!

It seems to me that the 17th century spatio-temporal error is a variety of scientism, and in particular a reduction of external reality to that which is measurable (and able to be manipulated). Notably, though, it is not an error to accept the existence of mind-independent objects. That was being done long before the 17th century. So I'm wondering if we need a smaller scalpel to excise a smaller portion of the 17th century's presuppositions.

Surely that line wasn't meant in the context of a private (!) philosophy forum, was it? — baker

I would say that in Burr’s context and mine the proximate motivation is fear of criticism. Criticism is of course feared because of its connection with adverse consequences. That is itself a perfectly workable definition of fear: anticipation of future evil.

In any interaction, it is vital to discern what type of interaction it (potentially) is. — baker

The topic of this thread is argument, particularly in the context of a philosophy forum.

I think it's easy be ambivalent or hostile towards Dawkins and like many atheists, he is often a polemicist. — Tom Storm

Persona non grata, in the well-deserved sense. Even his scientific colleagues began speaking out against him and distancing themselves, wary that he was dragging the scientific community into ideological skirmishes. He is a kind of zealot who lost himself in battles with those he considered to be the foes of science. At each point the proper remonstrance from his colleagues could have been, “Richard, stop stooping down to their level! Your zeal for science is only harming it.”

Fine’s paper is an illustration of the divide between Analytic and contemporary Continental ways of thinking about metaphysics. — Joshs

I don’t think this is plausible, and largely because Fine’s construal of metaphysics is the classical construal, stretching back thousands of years. It predates the curious dichotomy between the analytic and continental schools.

By contrast, for contemporary Continentalists of various stripes, logic is not more general than metaphysics, it is the contingent product of a certain era of metaphysics. — Joshs

You seem to be defining logic differently than Fine does. You seem to have in mind particular logics or particular epochs in logic. Fine is thinking of logic as that which pertains to the structure of thought itself.

I should probably note that Heidegger is a fairly poor historian of philosophy, and a fairly poor exegete. His merit and his intention lies in creativity and originality, but to take his pronouncements on the history of philosophy at face value is to be led astray. Thus, when Heidegger talks about “metaphysics,” he is talking about something almost entirely different from what that word has historically been used to convey. Fine is at the very least being attentive to historical usage.

(I wanted to offer a response, even though I will probably be unable to sustain this conversation.)

But thanks for agreeing that Wayfarer was exaggerating the truth, if only by .1. Exaggeration is a misrepresentation. Why exaggerate and misrepresent if you have no agenda? — praxis

No, Wayfarer was not saying that Dawkins has a 7/7 certainty. That was your strained misinterpretation. You missed the point, just as you consistently missed Hanover's points. Do you have a desire to understand?

"Science disproves God"

A. True
B. More true than false
C. Neither true nor false
D. More false than true
E. False

For Dawkins & co. the answer is "B". If you want to understand why your posts are sophistic, then consider the fact that they have consistently obscured this fact with rhetoric and hair-splitting. A newcomer to Dawkins would come away with a more accurate understanding if they attended to Wayfarer's posts rather than your own.

Interesting essay. Thanks for sharing.

(Caveat - so far I have only read the portion of the essay contained in your OP.)

Physicalism and naturalism are the assumed consensus of modern culture, very much the product of the European Enlightenment with its emphasis on pragmatic science and instrumental reason. Accordingly this essay will go against the grain of the mainstream consensus and even against what many will presume to be common sense. — Wayfarer

I must confess that the way you are using 'Idealism' is somewhat foreign to me. I am trying to understand the general thrust of your position, and specifically the way in which it contradicts physicalism and naturalism.

Would I be correct if I said that the crux is the idea that <the objective domain has a mind-independent status>, and that you are rejecting this idea whereas physicalism and/or naturalism accept it? That this is your central claim over and against physicalism and naturalism?

On my view there is clearly a cleavage between the scientific paradigm and post-Kantian philosophy, and it does revolve around this question of realism, but I tend to see more problems with the post-Kantian approach than with the scientific approach. Granted, there are problems with both, as both seem to provide only a partial account. In any case, why think it is the scientific-physicalist-naturalist half that is especially problematic?

(It's curious and encouraging to me how strongly this forum focuses on metaphysics. I haven't seen that on other philosophy forums.)

Can you please define what you mean by ‘metaphysics’? — Bob Ross

Here is a paper by Kit Fine on the topic, "What is Metaphysics?"

Hope this gives you a sense of Bernstein’s interests in this area. — J

It does, thank you! That’s actually very interesting and it seems like I would have a lot of sympathies with Bernstein’s project. In fact at this point I doubt anyone could look around at the state of our culture and deny that his foretellings had come to pass.

I am fond of Joseph Ratzinger, who seems to come from a similar school, and who was in dialogue with Habermas on many of these issues. Actually Ratzinger seems to align very nearly with the position you’ve outlined. The difficulty for Ratzinger (and presumably also for Berstein) is that it is not clear whether one can complete the project without a “metaphysical foundationalism.” I don’t know that he ever moved beyond vacillation on this point.

What then is Berstein’s alternative to metaphysical foundationalism? Does he attempt to go the way of a coherentism that could resist the “will to self-assertion”? Does he attempt to avoid metaphysics altogether?

Except for the quote that addresses my complaint. — praxis

Okay, fair enough. I apologize for overlooking that quote.

Do you believe that Wayfarer was merely paraphrasing and it was a happy coincidence that the paraphrasing supported his assertion so well? — praxis

But what assertion are you talking about? You seem to have taken a fairly simple assertion and applied a great deal of pedantry in order to make a mountain out of a molehill. Here is what Wayfarer actually said:

There's a great deal of pseudo-scientific nonsense spouted by the 'new atheists' such as Dawkins, Dennett and Sam Harris who all mistakenly believe that 'science disproves God' or some such, leading none other than Peter Higgs (of Higgs Boson fame), no believer himself, to describe Richard Dawkins as a 'secular fundamentalist'. — Wayfarer

Now you apparently read the phrase, “that ’science disproves God’ or some such,” in a very strange way, especially given the context. You want to read it as if Wayfarer were talking about strict proof of God’s non-existence, and as if the new atheists were in violation of a tautology, but obviously that’s not what Wayfarer was saying. That your interpretation is strained could have been known by the immediate context, “...or some such.” It could also have been known by considering the concluding attribution of “secular fundamentalist.” No one was talking about strict or formal proof, and neither was there any equivocation on this point.*

Then cited a source to the effect that Dawkins possesses a certainty of 6.9/7 that God does not exist. Dawkins makes this point precisely in order to block the inference that a lack of proof implies a significant possibility of God’s existence. Dawkins thinks the people who harp on this point about “proof” and “complete certainty” are misguided (people such as yourself). He thinks there is excessive scientific justification for rejecting “the God hypothesis,” and that a lack of strict proof is neither here nor there.

So it seems to me that your quibble here amounts to, “No, Wayfarer, Dawkins does not believe that science provides a 7/7 certainty that God does not exist. He only believes that it provides a 6.9/7 certainty that God does not exist. How intellectually dishonest of you.” Both the quibbling and the interpretation of Wayfarer’s statement are silly.

* Note too that when one wishes to concisely convey the ancillary point that a group of people believe science provides excessive justification for rejecting God and religion, this phrase is perfectly adequate: “that ’science disproves God’ or some such.” That is a much smoother and easier way to convey the simple idea than anything else that comes readily to mind. It is not Wayfarer’s fault if someone manages to parse the words in a strained and implausible fashion. (An entire thread could be devoted to the general problem of uncharitable interpretation and the lack of effort to ascertain intended meaning.)

But I'm done debating Dawkins, I shouldn't have brought him up — Wayfarer

The manner in which you brought him up is pertinent. The "conflict hypothesis"—that religion and science exist in an inherent conflict—has now been dead in the water for quite some time. Yet, as you pointed out, folks like Dawkins, Dennett, and Harris cling to this outdated hypothesis with all of the emotion they can muster. I don't think this is controversial or even overly interesting, but it is true and pertinent to a thread on the topic.

You should be honest when bringing him up. It’s probably a good idea for the moderators of a philosophy forum to be intellectually honest. — praxis

The irony. :groan: You are the one misrepresenting Dawkins, and you are doing so with bald assertions, apart from sources or quotes. Everyone you are disagreeing with has provided sources, with quotes. You have provided neither. Your accusations of intellectual dishonesty are truly absurd at this point.

You're making a strained epistemological argument. — Hanover

If we suggest that Dawkins is an agnostic because he's left open the possibility that the earth might be flat, pigs might fly, and God may possibly exist, the only true atheist would be the dogmatic atheist, who rejects the existence of God regardless of the evidence, but that would reject the scientific epistemology most atheists rely upon. — Hanover

I think this is exactly right.

Am I the only one who finds this odd? — creativesoul

No:

This is a bit tricky. I would want to say that it is something I do not believe, but not something I do believe. Or rather, it was. Now that you have brought it to my attention I have assented to it and I believe it. That I believe you are sitting at a computer on Earth explains why I would assent to any entailed propositions that are brought to my attention, or which become generally relevant. — Leontiskos

Incidentally, I am presuming the reference to 'incontinence' is actually to celibacy or lack thereof. — Wayfarer

The incontinent man (the akratēs) is one who desires correctly but does not act correctly. For example, the alcoholic who wishes to be sober but, overcome by his bad habits, is unable to act thusly. Nowadays we think of akrasia as relating to psychology, but for Aristotle it was central to ethics.

Some of the other proximate categories are helpful in situating the idea. The depraved man (akolastos) desires incorrectly and acts in accord with his desires. Then comes the akratēs, described above. Then comes the continent man (enkratēs), who desires correctly and acts correctly, but only with difficulty or effort. Then comes the temperate man (sophron), who desires correctly and acts correctly (primarily in relation to pleasures), and without difficulty or effort. At the further extremes, even apart from considerations of pleasure, stand the bad man (kakos) and the man of practical wisdom (phronimos). The commonality between the akratēs and the enkratēs is that they are both divided internally, at odds with themselves. Contrariwise, the akolastos and the sophron are both internally unified, acting as they see fit without internal contradiction.

:up:

From Wikipedia:

In The God Delusion, Dawkins contends that a supernatural creator, God, almost certainly does not exist, and that belief in a personal god qualifies as a delusion, which he defines as a persistent false belief held in the face of strong contradictory evidence. He is sympathetic to Robert Pirsig's statement in Lila (1991) that "when one person suffers from a delusion it is called insanity. When many people suffer from a delusion it is called religion." — The God Delusion | Wikipedia

It's simply not tenable to hold that Dawkins does not see science as undermining religion and the belief in God. Hell, just read the title of his book, "The God Delusion."


You almost made it to October. :razz:

But then he goes on to say (around 8:00) that Harman doesn't see it this way -- that he regards it as basic ontology, something that could be shown to be right or wrong, not just a useful idea. So I'm still unsure how Harman would argue for this. — J

Yes, quite right. :up: The same thing occurs towards the end of the video, in the wrapup. Maybe it's better to say that Hohipuha sees a fundamental contradiction in the work, and attempts to reconcile it by recourse to a kind of pragmatism.

A look and poem, I suppose so, yes.

An action? Unless it is an act of communication, it wouldn't seem so. The same for a life, I don't see how a human life can be treated as a sign. — hypericin

If an arbitrary phoneme can be a sign, then why can't an action or a life? Photographers capture actions and use them as signs or even symbols. Biographers capture lives and help people see these lives as signs of one thing or another. But people always do this same thing even without photographs or biographies. For example, the life of Martin Luther King Jr. is a sign of hope and progress in the realm of racial discrimination, and it had already taken on this signification long before a biography was written.

Now I wonder if in fact there are two distinct meanings of meaning: sense, and significance. Or, is significance conveyed with "meaningful", a distinct word from "meaning"? — hypericin

I think they shade into one another. For example, a distinction that is not meaningful for Sue will, at least at some point, not have sense for Sue. For most people the arcane distinctions that analytic philosophers make are not perceptible precisely because they are not meaningful, and it is only by helping the person understand the significance of the distinction that one can get them to see what the distinction even means. Usually this is done by illustrating the historical disputes that gave rise to the distinction.

There surely is a distinction to be had, but the word "meaning" is clearly used for both of them.

Take the question (apparently key to Harman), “What is an object?” Exactly what sort of question is this? Is it akin to a scientific or experimental question, which could be explored and perhaps answered by an investigation of the world? Is it more like a traditional metaphysical question, which might be answered a priori using some kind of transcendental argument a la Kant, or an appeal to logical principles? Or is the question really a pragmatic one – perhaps when we ask “What is an object?” we’re really asking what, out of the many possible uses of the word “object,” is the most useful or helpful one in philosophy – and of course we’d have to specify the uses we have in mind. — J

There is a place in the video series where this is addressed, and it seems that it is a pragmatic matter (link).

In general there seems to be a lot of vacillation between whether an object is real or whether an object is representational, and this relates to the "anti-correlationism." It seems like Harman wants to reject Kant's "Copernican" move but does not have the resources to do so. A bit like the child who wants to use a different color, but whose crayons are all shades of grey.

- You are begging the Kantian question. You are not allowing yourself to see past Kant's axiom.

I agree, a look, and action, a poem, a life may contain meaning, not just signs. I am arguing that meaning is to that which conveys it as the signified is to signs. Sign-signified is one form of the meaning relationship. — hypericin

But aren't looks, actions, poems, and lives all signs? I think they are all signs conveying meaning. I think meaning is conveyed by signs, and the "meaning relationship" is the triadic relationship between sign, signified, and interpreter.

The point I was making is that conveyance or "meaning relationships" does not exhaust the meaning of meaning, and we know this because some signs convey more meaningful things than other signs. For example, a wedding ring is much more meaningful than a crumb on the floor, even though they are both signs which signify a reality.

We could simplify by thinking about meaning in a univocal way, and say that each meaning-transaction utilizes signs, just as each bank-transaction utilizes cash or a check. But this fact does not tell us about the level (or quality) of meaning present, just as the fact about banks does not tell us about the quantity of money being transferred. Then going further, money is meant for more than bank transactions, just as meaning is meant for more than signification.

Then how did we learn it? — hypericin

The same way we learn most things: through experience.

I think it is complicated. — hypericin

It is well-accepted in the field of semiotics that some signs have no inherent connection to their object, while others do. An acorn signifies an oak tree, and this is not arbitrary or human-imposed.

---

Yes. I think that sensemaking is key. — Amity

:up:

Signs convey meaning, but not all meaning is conveyed by signs. We can say that a sign is meaningful insofar as it signifies some reality, but at a deeper level some signs are more meaningful than other signs, because the realities they signify are more meaningful. Meaning is more than being signified.

What is the meaning of the usages of "meaning" that unites them? Is there a unitary concept they share? — hypericin

Perhaps something like significance, resolution, comprehension, making-sense-of? "Meaning" seems to be a rather root or simple concept, not easily explicable in terms of other concepts.

What is it about the partial knowledge that

"catalytic converters in cars can break"
"my car has a catalytic converter"

Which goes into

"I think it's the catalytic converter"

which distinguishes it from the website example? — fdrake

I would say that in the website example knowledge is present, and this knowledge also involves knowledge of the referent. If I have a partial description of a website and I want to learn the exact URL, then I can provide my friend with the partial description in order to learn the exact URL. Metaphorically, my partial description is a sufficient key to unlock the door to my desire. In this case my knowledge of the referent is sufficient in order to use the term well and achieve my goal.

In the car example knowledge is not present, and this lack of knowledge also involves a lack of knowledge of the referent. One does not possess knowledge that "There's a problem with the catalytic converter" once they know both that "catalytic converters can break" and "my car has a catalytic converter." The partial description possessed is not sufficient to use the term well and achieve the goal, and this is because there is no knowledge. Or rather, the knowledge present is not sufficient; the description of the referent is not sufficient for the problem at hand. The partial description is not a sufficient key to unlock the door to the desire. One will be wasting the mechanic's time.

(So the difference lies in sufficient knowledge for successful use.)

Now this isn't a complete answer, because it does not spell out the way in which knowledge relates to reference. The rough idea is that some cases require more knowledge of the referent than other cases, and the one who knows the referent perfectly is licensed to use the term in any case whatsoever. The one who has no knowledge of the referent at all will likely not even possess the term.

I don't know what the essence of reference is, so to speak, I broached it the way I did to try to find a speech act containing a successful reference which "piggybacked" on another's successful reference. Can you give me one instead? — fdrake

That's fair. I now understand what you were doing. So is it sort of like the case I set aside above? Where they "have it on someone's authority that the catalytic converter is malfunctioning," even though they do not know what a catalytic converter is?

(I will leave this case aside for the sake of length.)

Aye I agree with you that it's obfuscatory. Where I'm coming from is that I'd have difficulty being able to imagine it as an obfuscation if we didn't recognise that "my car's catalytic converter" indeed did refer to my car's catalytic converter, and that I was bullshitting in ignorance of this fact. If we assumed that "my car's catalytic converter", in this instance, did not refer to my car's catalytic converter, on what basis would we be able to say that the mechanic - when grabbing the converter to check - displays an understanding of the car's catalytic converter which we lack? — fdrake

I think the obfuscation will come home to roost when the mechanic checks it, finds that it's fine, and then asks why we think the problem lies in the catalytic converter. Embarrassed, we might then admit, "Actually I don't even know what a catalytic converter is, or what it does." At that point the mechanic will realize that what I meant by "catalytic converter" is a great deal different than the thing he checked.

And there seems to be a nested obfuscation here. The first obfuscation/ignorance lies in "the problem," which we are ignorant of but pretend to know. Yet in order to feign competence we are required to obfuscate more concretely, by proposing a concrete solution to the problem that we do not understand.

I'm trying to say that how reference works is in some sense orthogonal to communication. Because communicative speech acts, and non-communicative speech acts, both can contain successful references. — fdrake

But what is an example of a non-communicative act that contains successful references? Perhaps we are disagreeing about what constitutes a "successful reference" of the catalytic converter. Would we at least agree that the mechanic would not count it as a successful reference? And that the mechanic is the one who most knows the referent?

I suppose you can successfully refer to the blegbleg in certain ways despite not knowing the referent. But is it a full absence of knowledge, or simply a dearth of knowledge? For instance, I can successfully ask what a blegbleg is with limited knowledge, but I cannot discourse on blegblegs with limited knowledge. That requires a better understanding of the referent, much like my point about Thales ("Suppose, ex hypothesi..." ). The idea is that there is a correlation between one's knowledge of a referent and one's ability to communicate regarding it.

"Speculative Realism" is related to the anti-correlationism I noted (). Here is how Graham Harman describes it:

“Speculative realism” is an extremely broad term. All it takes to be a speculative realist is to be opposed to “correlationism,” Meillassoux’s term for the sort of philosophy (still dominant today) that bases all philosophy on the mutual interplay of human and world. — Brief SR/OOO Tutorial, by Graham Harman

After watching the first video I opined that it was related to the ancient speculative/practical distinction. This seems vaguely true, but it is more about the way that modern philosophy sees the subject as conditioning all forms of knowing, even non-practical knowledge.

So it's the idea that knowledge of the world is possible, and this knowledge is not automatically contaminated, distorted, or even conditioned by the human subject. This draws near to classical realism.

Nope. Further work though - truthmaker semantics. I don't know owt about it and would need to do homework. — fdrake

I tend to understand what Fine is arguing for better than what he is arguing against, and that's where my homework would lie. Ideally if I am going to discuss Fine I would need to interact with someone who is committed to what he is arguing against.

I suppose what I'm saying there is that a sufficient condition for a speech act to contain a successful reference is that the referent of the referring token can be acted upon. And if that suffices for a successful reference, it would thus suffice for a reference (simpliciter).

And where I'm going with that is that because that sufficient condition can be satisfied without an understanding of the catalytic converter, or the website's, essence, a speech act can contain a reference without requiring its doer understand the referent at all, never mind its essence. — fdrake

Whereas I claimed that language is for communication, you seem to be claiming that language (or at least reference) is tied to action ("the referring token can be acted upon"). That's a fairly significant difference.

Let's say you said "There's a problem with the catalytic converter", and you didn't know what the catalytic converter was, the mechanic could go and look for the car's catalytic converter. — fdrake

So in this case I want to say that miscommunication is taking place, not communication. The action is based on that miscommunication, and will therefore be futile (or accidentally lucky). This is because the purpose of the customer's assertion is not being realized, given that they do not know what a catalytic converter is and therefore have no basis for their assertion. It seems to be a kind of lie. The lack of communication would seem to undermine the action. (Unless you are thinking of a case where they have a rational basis for their claim and are not merely feigning competence. For example, perhaps they have it on someone's authority that the catalytic converter is malfunctioning and they are simply conveying this opinion to the mechanic.)

More concisely, in order for someone to respond to a piece of information with action (such as 'checking the catalytic converter'), there must first be reliable information. Yet if your source is not actually communicating, then they cannot be providing reliable information; and if they do not understand what they are saying then they cannot communicate. But I'll leave it there for now. Perhaps you had the rational-basis case in mind, rather than the feigned competence case.

An example I was thinking of is "Can you send me a link to that website you mentioned last night?" — fdrake

I see this as a quite different case than the case of feigned competence, because real communication is occurring. In this case the speaker has real knowledge of the referent, even though that knowledge is incomplete. "That website you mentioned last night" is an adequate description with an adequate referent. The partial knowledge is necessary in order that the friend can supply the remainder of the knowledge, by sending the URL. This gets into Aristotle's theory of knowledge, where new knowledge is always something like a furtherance of knowledge, and that in order to learn some additional thing we must already know some previous thing (i.e. knowledge cannot be grounded in mere tautologies).

The Wikipedia article was helpful in clarifying some things for me, especially this part:

Critique of correlationism
Related to 'anthropocentrism', object-oriented thinkers reject speculative idealist correlationism, which the French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux defines as "the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other". Because object-oriented ontology is a realist philosophy, it stands in contradistinction to the anti-realist trajectory of correlationism, which restricts philosophical understanding to the correlation of being with thought by disavowing any reality external to this correlation as inaccessible, and, in this way, fails to escape the ontological reification of human experience. — Object Oriented Ontology | Critique of Correlationism

(This maps onto what I was claiming about realism in the other thread - .)

---

- I think your question is important and foundational. Understanding the starting point and the justification for the account of "objects" that Harman gives will be essential in understanding the theory.

Welcome to the forum, !

Good points. I am not familiar with Bernstein, but I can definitely see what you are saying with regard to Habermas and Peirce, and I admire their dialogical approach.

a self-corrective critical community of inquirers — J

I think this is an important point: that the inquiry is in some way attached to the community itself and not only to the individual, and this fact leads the members of the community to relate to one another in a different way, as partners in a common purpose.

Bernstein has a lot more that’s interesting to say about the connection of rational inquiry with democratic values. — J

I hadn't actually considered that idea, but it does make sense. In a democracy one probably has more modest expectations for their ideas and arguments, and surely dialogue is opened up when the participants are considered equals. What are some of Bernstein's thoughts on the topic?

I've listened to some of his lectures and generally like his survey of the philosophers, though I thought he was a bit too dismissive of Schopenhauer due to his pessimism. But fairly enough, I think he does that to all the philosophers giving his critiques as he goes. — schopenhauer1

I agree. Sugrue is good although overly critical at times, but his criticism is usually evenly distributed.

But anyways, to the broader point, much of philosophy revolves around how it is that the world exists without an observer, or sometimes formulated as a human observer. — schopenhauer1

Yes - much of modern philosophy. :smile:

This video might help as a good jumping off point for a Harman's view of objects. Perhaps we can have a discussion on it? — schopenhauer1

I found this to be good and interesting. I welcome this sort of approach in our day, these realist attempts to overcome the divide that Sugrue talks about. In fact I find myself on the same page as this reviewer, both in his commendations and his criticisms.

There was <a thread> that ended up getting into Lloyd Gerson's work a bit, particularly his paper, "Platonism vs Naturalism." Anti-physicalism reminds me of Gerson's anti-materialism, and anti-smallism reminds me of Gerson's anti-mechanism. The opposition to "anti-fictionalism" and "literalism" don't have parallels in Gerson's article, but I also sympathize with these tenets.

I also think that his idea of "undermining" and "overmining" an object is useful here. Undermining would be reducing to separate constituents. Overmining would be how it is related to every other thing, more-or-less. — schopenhauer1

Right, these were interesting ideas as well, and I think "overmining" relates to Fine's article to some extent. A lot of this resonates with Aristotle.

It is speculative because it obviously can never prove that reality, but it is believed one has the ability to speculate from the perspective of the human. They are not allowing this to hamper their ability to speculate. — schopenhauer1

I wonder if it comes from the idea of speculative knowledge (as contrasted with practical knowledge). His argument against scientism is basically the idea that science is only concerned with practical knowledge, and the obvious alternative here is speculative knowledge. In that sense "speculative realism" could be something like "realism as an attempt to understand reality, with no ulterior motive."

Along these lines, I agree with the author in his wariness of Harman's attempt to see nothing unique in human thought:

Realists are willing to speculate about the world, not caring how representation formulates the empirical evidence, per se. — schopenhauer1

For a classical realist like Aristotle or Aquinas, "realism" means realism with respect to universals (this is Gerson's anti-nominalism and anti-skepticism). The crucial idea here is that the human mind is capable of knowing reality as it is, and this is precisely where modern philosophy in all its forms departs. This inevitably leads to positing certain things about the human intellect, such as that it is immaterial due to its ability to comprehend material realities. (Interestingly, the one point in the video where Aristotle is brought up is with respect to knowledge of singulars, and on my view this is crucially related to this thread. It's a rather complicated topic, though. (link to Aquinas' view).)

Now the Speculative Realist seems to be committed to the view that the human mind can know reality as it is, and therefore I don't see how they can remain neutral on the question of the nature of the human mind (and the uniqueness of the human mind as an object).

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More generally, a problem I see with so many modern philosophies is that they are largely reactionary, reacting to other philosophers' views on very limited and discrete issues. "A related problem is that such individuals basically started with a critique, and then interpolated their more systematic views on that basis of that critique" (). I hope Harman is careful about this, because there is a danger of reacting to current problems in philosophy rather than setting out an ontology that can stand on its own.

The other broad problem in modern philosophy seems to be a simplistic subordinationism. The approach is often mathematical, where one seeks a perfectly stable starting point and then attempts to derive all of the rest from that point. Once the starting point fails the philosophy is thrown into abeyance, and remains in abeyance. Aristotle really doesn't do philosophy this way, and it is a deep merit of his work. I wouldn't call his approach coherentism, but there are all sorts of different footholds, accessible from different directions and different realms of inquiry, and the system is not reliant on a single point or first principle. Neither is there an overemphasis on epistemology.

Anyway, sorry for the choppy and meandering response. The posts deserved more time than I had. Thanks for sharing the video. :up:

Yeah that makes sense. I think we'd proceed better by going into tangential discussions at this point. But I'd not be interested in pursuing them without a detour, onto the original path, through more of Fine's work. — fdrake

Sounds Fine to me. Is there a particular part or aspect of Fine's article that you are interested in discussing?

It seems like I can refer to my friend's blegbleg successfully even though I have no interpretation of its nature... — fdrake

I am inclined to doubt this, although it depends on what we mean by 'refer'. On my view not knowing something prevents you from referring to it. Suppose I get into a conversation with my mechanic and starting using the word "catalytic converter," despite having no idea what it means (I am feigning competence). In this case we are both using the token 'catalytic converter', but in entirely different ways. Now if language is for communication then this is a failure of language. Even if I manage to fool the mechanic for a few minutes, no substantive communication is taking place.

I recognize that Anglo-American philosophy is keen to promote the idea of objective meaning, apart from the mere intention of the speaker. That's fine, but I would say that we can only prescind so far from intention and private knowledge. In my conversation with the mechanic intention and private knowledge come to the fore, and it seems that the term 'catalytic converter' when found on my tongue cannot be referring to a real catalytic converter, because I have no idea what a real catalytic converter is.

At best the ignorant person's working definition of 'blegbleg' or 'catalytic converter' seems to be, "That thing that my interlocutor knows about." It is the same in the earlier example about the novice who inquires about Thales.

I can just tell you. The only philosophy background I have is in scientific inference - so logic and statistical theory + methodology work. The research I've done has been fundamental in that intersection. Not fundamental in terms of importance, of course, but in terms of abstraction. So learning "conceptual analysis" has been useful. — fdrake

Okay, interesting. But you've obviously delved into philosophy given that you are able to discourse on a number of different philosophical topics with relative ease. For example, your interpretation of Fine seems quite apt, and your analysis of the debate between Banno and creativesoul was very cogent. Are there other philosophers or traditions that you have picked up along the way?

Also studied philosophy a bit as a student. Yours? — fdrake

I took an undergraduate degree in computer science, and then later took an undergraduate degree in philosophy along with some graduate work in theology. But the only field I have formally worked in is computer science. The philosophy was in large part a kind of analytic Thomism (Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle often in the sphere of analytic philosophy). But this was years ago and much of it feels rusty.

Observation proves that is the case... — Mww

Whereas I would say that observation proves that we do not do things that we are not inclined to do (things for which we have no inclination). Moral acts are just like other acts in this respect. If moral acts are not caught up in our inclinations, then moral acts do not exist.

So, if one is doubting whether they're acting, then the doubting itself is an act that they're not sure of. This has a funny consequence -- I'm not sure I'm walking, but I'm also not sure that I'm not sure I'm walking, and I really can't be sure at all of anything, which means there is one thing I know non-mediately: that I don't know anything. So, there IS ONE THING I know for sure!!
:sweat: — L'éléphant

Quite right. :lol:

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Sure, when we are aware we feel our body acting, moving and we feel the ease or the effort. — Janus

When we are riding an ass we feel the ass acting, moving, and we feel the ease or the effort. But to act is not to be carried around by an ass. ...Not even St. Francis' "brother ass"!

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Yes, I’m sure I’m acting, iff I’m in the act of doing something and aware of it. — Mww

Okay.

Why, the knowledge that I have walked to the kitchen, is mediated by my understanding of what a kitchen is. — Mww

Of course to have knowledge of a proposition involves having knowledge of the terms of the proposition, but the knowledge of the proposition is not mediated by the terms. The proposition presupposes and is constituted by the terms, just as the knowledge that you are walking into a kitchen presupposes knowledge of the kitchen. I think it would be quite odd to call this mediation, particularly in the sense of the "appearances" of the OP.

And yes, you actually do need a kitchen-type object to hit your eyes, or, possibly but not as definitively, some particular kitchen-like perception, in order to KNOW you’ve arrived in the kitchen. — Mww

But you've confused the topic. We are not talking about knowledge of arrival, we are talking about knowledge of acting. Transeunt acts will be easier (acts that have no exterior term). Kant thinks we should legislate for ourselves the categorical imperative, and it turns out that this legislating is an act. Well how do we know that we have so legislated? That we have so acted?

For the sake of argument, if you know you are acting iff you are "in the act of doing something and aware of it," then when you are consciously walking you have knowledge that you are walking. And if you are consciously thinking then you have knowledge that you are thinking. This knowledge is immediate.

What would you say is the main reason you’ve read Groundwork a few times, but you’re not a Kantian? Would it be that you weren’t persuaded by it enough to investigate other works, or you weren’t impressed with it at all? — Mww

Off the top of my head, I think Kant takes some starting points that are not tenable. For example, that self-legislation is possible and that there is morality apart from inclinations (or that moral behavior and inclination-behavior are conceptually separable).

I think the project is interesting, and when reading Kant in general I can see where he is coming from. It's a fairly tight system, and that's always a nice thing to have. In truth I take an Aristotelian-Thomistic approach and I haven't seen a need to leave it behind (except perhaps in a few recondite areas).

I would be somewhat curious to get my hands on The Metaphysics of Morals and skim through it to see what Kant's moral reasoning looks like at a more concrete level.

- Well, that might be slightly different than what I want to posit. It seems that if Ernie sees Bert flip a coin, then he has knowledge of Bert's action through observation. If Ernie flips a coin himself, then he has knowledge of his own act through observation, but he also has knowledge of his own act qua actor.

So through observation Ernie has knowledge, but he also has a different kind of knowledge when he is the one doing the acting. When Ernie flips a coin he does not need to observe the coin flip—like when he is watching Bert—in order to know that he is flipping a coin. As an actor he is able to act, and when he puts this ability into play and acts he knows he is acting. This is a sort of knowledge that we only have of our own acts.

This is what I mean by the difference between acting and observing. Are we agreed on that difference?

This video might help as a good jumping off point for a Harman's view of objects. Perhaps we can have a discussion on it? — schopenhauer1

If you start a discussion I will watch the video and contribute a bit, but my time is running short at the moment so I can't commit to too much.

I have been pondering Michael Sugrue's claim that Anglo-American philosophy starts from the external world and can never manage to bridge the gap to the mind, whereas continental philosophy starts from the subject/mind and can never manage to bridge the gap to the external world. He makes it, for instance, in this video on Husserl at 44:59. It seems like this discussion is somewhat related.

Okay, thanks. I think that is a common approach to the matter. Wood's thesis (in the preface of his translation of the Groundwork) caught me off guard a bit. He posits that the 13 years between the two works brings with it significant development, and a working out of the problems of the Groundwork.

Sound about right to you? You see it differently? — Mww

I own and have read the Groundwork a few times, but I do not own and have not read The Metaphysics of Morals. I have never heard of "The Metaphysics of Ethics" construed as a separate work.

I am not a Kantian. I was mostly curious whether I would be talking past you if we ever get into a discussion where I have the Groundwork in mind but you have the latter work in mind. It sounds like we wouldn't be.