Isn't the common thread of those cases where it is impossible is where the distinctions have been clearly defined and are in opposition (law of the excluded middle)? Atheism is the antithesis of theism. There is no middle ground, but there could be an absence of both (agnosticism). The cases where it is possible are cases where there isn't a clear distinction and\or the ideas are not contradictory - meaning that opposite sides can actually be integrated into a consistent middle ground. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I think that's a good way of putting it. You wanted real-world application, so let's come back to the thread now, using your tool of the LEM. This is the central counter-claim of the thread:

Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note the form: <Either all narratives are [X], or else some narratives are not [X]>. "Which do you believe it is?"

@Banno, @J, and @Srap Tasmaner have no ability to answer that question, and they failed to answer it for 20 pages, making all sorts of weird excuses.

@J and @Srap Tasmaner in particular tried to say, "Let's take a step back into a neutral frame, so that we can examine this more carefully. Now everyone lives in their own framework..." Their "step back" was always a form of question-begging, given that it presupposed the non-overarching, framework-view. That's what happens when someone falsely claims to be taking a neutral stance on some matter on which they are not neutral* (and, in this case, on a matter in which neutrality is not possible). In general and especially in this case, the better thing to do is simply to give arguments for one's position instead of trying to claim the high ground of "objectivity" or "neutrality."

Note that if one holds that all narratives or frames are equal, then they should just say that. They should be honest about it. The problem here is that it is evident to everyone that not all narratives are equal, and this is why such people refuse to answer the question in that way. We could sum up this part of the thread as, "There is an obvious truth that some people refused to admit, and their avoidance of dialogue was part and parcel of that refusal."


* And this is related to the deceptive genus I am discussing with @Joshs

So Haidt compared video games to marbles and says that the video game is inferior to marbles because Piaget would play marbles with children and intentionally break the rules to see what the children did, which was to somehow negotiate the rules of the game in order to keep playing. — Moliere

Right, good.

There is a video game called MineCraft which doesn't exactly have rules to play by. There are rules in the sense that it is a physics engine where different simulations of objects interact within some set of rules which are apparently deterministic. But there's no reason to do one thing over the other. I've watched children play video games in the exact manner that Haidt praises the negotiation of rules for marbles -- the children are in fact still children even with different technology, and they negotiate all kinds of rules all the time. — Moliere

Are you truly unable to see Haidt's point? Have you ever watched children at recess, playing a game and disputing the rules? Minecraft is not a counterexample. It's just a game with loose rules. The only time Haidt's point comes up in video games is when there is a bug, and then some people exploit the bug, and then there is an argument over whether the bug ought to be exploited. But it is almost always fair game to exploit a bug in a video game, and that's no coincidence.

When I worked at a school there was one game in particular that the children played, which I believe they called "wall ball." But the rules were extremely complicated, and despite this the children understood them remarkably well (although I don't think they would have been able to articulate them clearly). I had a co-worker who I would sometimes lunch with, and she was never able to discern the rules of the game in the years she worked there.* That sort of phenomenon would never occur with video games. The rules of a video game are defined by the code, and they cannot be bent or broken.

Indeed, when adults play children's games with children, they are often convicted of transgressing the rules, and there will be a large number of infractions before they begin to understand how to play. That's normal, and also funny. Contrariwise, when an adult plays a video game with children, they get their ass beat, but they are never accused of breaking rules. They are just laughed at because they are so bad.


* One of the rules of this game was that, if you tried and failed to catch the ball after it bounced off the brick wall, then you were inactivated. You were unable to play again until the ball hit the wall. Even if every player missed the ball, there was no exception (and this fascinated me). At that point the whole game went into stasis, and could not be continued until an outside party joined the game, picked up the ball, and threw it against the wall. If no one came to renew the game, it would end and the children would veer off into other games, like basketball or kickball. That combination of competition, cooperation, fault/blame, and consequences—both individual and communal—has everything that a good game needs, for it mimics the complexities of reality and life.

Not being either would qualify one as agnostic - which I think is a cop-out. — Harry Hindu

If you think that's a cop-out then we are on the same page. I am saying that there are some cases where it is impossible to say, "I am neither black nor white. I am perfectly neutral." If you think the theist/atheist case is one of those cases, then that is the sort of thing I am talking about.

"I am neither a framework-relativist nor a realist. I am perfectly neutral between the two."

I am thinking of situations where, as you say, two gensuses ( genera) differ subtly enough that the second can be reasonably mistaken for the first. — Joshs

Right, and that is what I was talking about in the quote. I think you actually mean "innocuously" rather than "reasonably."

Your characterization of such situations seems to assume that nothing stands in the way of our recognizing and properly interpreting the meaning of the second genus, save for circumstances where the other intends to mislead. — Joshs

That post I quoted is literally identifying "being at cross-purposes" as one central cause of dismissal, and then going on to claim that dismissals of that kind can be either correct or incorrect. An example of an incorrect case would be the false attribution of blame, which is what you are thinking of.

In the situation where someone tries to exterminate Jews and another tries to stop them, can we really say that they are engaged in a common pursuit of practical execution before we understand WHY they are doing what they are doing f from their own perspective? — Joshs

Maybe try reading the OP of that thread, especially where I talk about "material positions." That is what you are talking about here, and it is taken for granted given the OP.

Opponents in a football game can easily switch sides because the game is understood in the same way by all. But the rescuer and exterminator of jews are not on opposing sides of the same game. They are playing different games, and neither side’s position appears justifiable to the other. — Joshs

I would argue that in both cases each side knows what the other is attempting to do, and that each is trying to thwart the other. That's why they are not at cross-purposes in the relevant sense. If we think of "being at cross-purposes" differently, then even the footballers are at cross-purposes simply in virtue of the fact that they are on different sides.

The idea is that in order for cross-purposes to result in (moral) dismissal, there must be blame. And in order for there to be blame the other must be falsely representing his purpose.

These points are incredibly subtle, so you will have to try to understand the context. No one took me up on that point in the thread, probably because it is too much of a quagmire for most. For example, you might say, "Ah, but the rescuer of Jews morally dismisses the exterminator." The answer would be, "Not in the sense we are speaking about, given the fact that they continue to engage with them (militarily)." The exterminators are not being dismissed or written off militarily. They are both engaged in an activity which presupposes that the lives of Jews are important. Again, these are subtle puzzles. One can dismiss the exterminator's aim as hopelessly depraved without dismissing the exterminator's military efficacy. The exterminator is being depraved but he is not being deceitful with respect to his genus of activity (or, if he is, it is not a beyond-the-pale form of deceit given the expectations of war, spying, etc.).

It's just called On the Philosophy of History. Like a lot of his stuff, it's free online. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks. :up:

the internal contradiction between the idea of democracy and self-rule versus the tendency of capitalism to concentrate wealth such that elites become able to manipulate the system and lock out economic and political competition (which is essentially the system destroying itself, corrupting its own principles). — Count Timothy von Icarus

We're a little bit off topic, but this is obviously related to the Adorno thread. I am wondering what the contradiction here is said to be, in a precise way? Is it that democracies can turn into oligarchies, and once they do then they are no longer democracies? I think that's true, but it looks like a change rather than a contradiction.

Or perhaps we have here the idea that democracy is incompatible with liberalism, because liberalism is tied to capitalism and therefore tied to oligarchy? If so, then I would want to ask, "What is it about liberalism that is tied to capitalism"? I'm not disputing the thesis, but I want to see the reasoning.

That's how Solovyov resolved Hegel's oppressive focus on the universal and Providential. He sees a telos to history, an end, but not necessarily its attainment; just as an organisms has ends but might grow ill instead. History becomes the meeting ground of truth and falsity, the dramatic encounter in which the wheat is winnowed from the chaff, the blazing fire that reveals what man has built his work from (I Corinthians 3:15). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. :up:

The problem that comes up in logo-skepticism is that nominalism and the elevation of the individual/particular has made it so that the logos must be embodied in Rome as it is, because culture and institutions are considered to be prior to any determinant logoi, the ground of their being. And so you get bad takes like: Virgil must be simply "writing propaganda," but then "sticking it to Octavian with his subtle skepticism" rather than the idea that Virgil (being exposed to Stoicism, Platonism, and the Peripatetics) simply recognizes that unities struggle to fully attain their form, and often fail, but that this struggle is needed for them to be anything (and anything good). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, very good. :up:

Saint Isaac the Syrian is a good example: — Count Timothy von Icarus

Great quote!

During compline, when we ask for God to strengthen and correct us that we might awaken to "hymn [His] incomparable glory all night long" the goal is not to be free of affect (it is rather to be filled with it) but of inappropriate affect (and presumably for monks and nuns, to not accidently sleep through the midnight service :rofl: ). There is less separation between emotion and thought in general though. The "heart" as the "eye of the nous" has both, there being a sort of intellectual emotion too. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Great - I think we agree on this. :up:

So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to understand or subscribe to rational norms? — goremand

Oh no, not at all. That strikes me as saying, "Someone does not subscribe to breathing, therefore they do not breathe."

To be honest, I was just trying to be generous. Your understanding of that point in the thread does not seem overly strong. The point is that there is an equivocation on what "moral" means. The reason people act morally when they are not intending to act morally is because they have a strange understanding of "moral," which is what the thread was trying to address. But that point you singled out is admittedly tricky, and I would even say it was a relatively weak spot in the OP, which could not be ironed out without adding excessive length.

I think that's an opinion written from ignorance, honestly. — Moliere

Maybe check out the video and try to understand what is being said.

I don't complain about it -- I understand that guessing is a feature, and not a bug. — Moliere

The idea is not that guessing is a feature, but rather that a game which involves rule-negotiation is superior to a game which does not. Hence Haidt's claim that, "A video game is really like the junk food of games..."

Coward.

:lol:

Only a fool such as yourself would think that I was serious. (Don't imagine for a moment that I am being serious here or that I imagined you were being serious either, or your foolishness will be exponentially increased). — Janus

Then drink if you dare! And we will see who's who!

Knowledge held by a third party. So, the subject isn't involved in that knowledge-having. — AmadeusD

Even in my original scenario the knowledge that the video is a deepfake is shared by both parties. That was the whole premise of the multiple-question format:

We could think of a very simple example.

"Trump dyed his hair brown!"
"Why do you say that?"
"Because I saw it on the news, from *this video*."
"That video is a deepfake."
"Oh, okay. I guess _____"

Here are two options for the blank ("_____"):

A. Trump did not dye his hair brown
B. I have no good reason to believe that Trump dyed his hair brown — Leontiskos

I also said it explicitly:

The idea is that you convince the person who had held to R that R is false. — Leontiskos

-

Maybe you don't, and that's the issue. If something crucial has been missed by me, I would assume it was something around this. That the subject has had this evidence given to falsify the state of affairs. And that's fine, it's not likely they would continue to believe the falsified state of affairs. This does not entail that they had a false belief (to me). They had a true belief, in a false state of affairs — AmadeusD

You are saying, "They had a true belief, in a false state of affairs." Can you give me the example where this claim would hold? Presumably you are not just saying, "They truly/really believed something false."

If you falsify the state of affairs, but hte person remains steadfast in a belief due to reasonable standards of evidence then the belief is 'true' and the state of affairs false. — AmadeusD

If I understand this, then I think we should say that the belief is justified but false.

Hence "Gettierrrrr (with bells and whistles)". — AmadeusD

The Gettier case is one where the conditions for justified true belief (JTB) are satisfied and yet knowledge does not obtain. What we are talking about here is a case where one sees that the reasons for their belief are false, and nevertheless the belief itself (and the proposition, if you like), remains undecided.

---

OK then, I agree that you respectfully disagree. :wink: — Janus

Only a moron such as yourself would agree with such nonsense. :rage:

but I don't see how this distinction is made strictly speaking — goremand

That's understandable. But I've not used the word "obligation." That's your word. I'm happy to stick with the words I've used, such as "non-hypothetical ought-judgment."

I have read the OP, but I can't promise I've absorbed it completely. — goremand

That's fair. It's dense.

What stood out to me is that you allow for acts to be judged as moral (or as you say now, rational) even if moral judgement doesn't feature in the decision of the act, which I think is true. The way I see it, we can judge whether an act is moral/rational/whatever simply by checking it against the appropriate framework, but strictly speaking there is no need for the agent of the act to be aware of that framework. — goremand

Yeah, I think that's basically right. That is one of the points I was trying to convey. :up:

The relationship between the persons. — Moliere

So an OP which says, "I might also invite PM contributions," is saying, "I might invite some of you to contribute to our personal relationship"? That is a very curious reading. Usually when an OP talks about "contributions" it is talking about contributions to the thread. Surely you see this?

I have no qualms with that. — Moliere

You've switched the topic. You said, "it would defeat the point of the website to exclusively do philosophy by PM, perhaps." I can see that you would have no qualms with someone who only PM'ed, but it does seem to me that the purpose of the website has to do with a forum.

I think the invitation is for people to PM if they want to, not that the PM is a contribution to a public thread. So it would work by someone PMing him. — Moliere

Okay, but what is the person who sends the PM contributing to? What does it mean to "Invite PM contributions"?

it would defeat the point of the website to exclusively do philosophy by PM, perhaps. — Moliere

Not 'perhaps', but 'certainly'. No?

I don't mind putting my ideas out there for all the reasons thus far stated. But I can see an occasional use for philosophy by PM. One of them being asking someone you know who you share some perspective with to ask them to review their argument and make sure they aren't missing something that they are. — Moliere

Although I am having trouble following your pronouns here, I would say that that sort of clarification is much more helpful within the public forum (assuming you are speaking about a point of clarification on something that was said publicly). That is precisely what is needed on the public forum: earnest requests for clarification, and earnest answers.

And sometimes I really only want to hear one person's take on a particular subject because of some past interaction. — Moliere

I agree.

I don't think it's so nefarious as you're imputing. — Moliere

Catharsis is not nefarious, no. That would be a very poor word to describe what I illustrated.

I don’t have any disagreement with this. What I have in mind are situations where the other is ‘not even wrong’, where the opponents are talking past one another, where it appears as though the other has ‘changed the subject’. This may seem like an inconsequential circumstance, easily remedied by a careful clarification of the substance of the topic. — Joshs

Well let's clarify the substance of the topic. :razz: I have been explicitly talking about what is needed in order to agree to disagree. Do you want to talk about a different topic?

But I suggest that such gaps between parties in construal of the nature of the topic are responsible for the lions share of social conflict, because they are difficult to detect. Before we can separate the reasoning process from the beliefs that are held, we first have to be able to recognize the underlying perspective on the basis of which those beliefs get their sense. If we mistakenly assume we both are interpreting the meaning of the concepts seeding the reasoning process the same way, we will pre-emptively move to looking for faulty reasoning in the other rather than making sure we are actually talking about the same thing. — Joshs

I think we have to be careful that equivocation is not occurring between two people, that's true. The deeper problem is something I pointed to here:

Another observation is that “being at cross purposes” seems to play a fairly significant role in dismissal. Some kind of communal short-circuit occurs. For example, if someone tries to exterminate Jews and another tries to stop them, they are not at cross-purposes in the deeper sense, because they are engaged in a common pursuit of practical execution. Similarly, when two football teams face off, they are not at cross-purposes given that they are both engaged in the same genus of activity, even though they are opposed within that genus.

“Writing off” or dismissal seems to occur when the actual genus of activity differs between two people. For example, if someone comes to TPF to advertise their newest invention, they will literally be dismissed by the moderators because they are not engaged in the requisite kind of activity. Or if a musician aims only to make money rather than art, then her fellow musicians will dismiss and ostracize her in a way that they wouldn’t dismiss or ostracize a technically inferior musician who possessed the proper aim. Or if one person is engaged in a practical activity such as anti-racism, and another is engaged in a speculative activity such as studying racial characteristics, they will tend to dismiss and oppose one another. Other examples include the philosopher and the sophist, or the pious and the charlatan. It would seem that in order for moral indignation to fully flower the genus of activity must differ subtly, and in such a way that the second genus could be reasonably mistaken for the first. It may be that moral outrage occurs because someone is seen as an impostor, pretending to be what they are not and in danger of fooling and misleading onlookers. The more intentional, subversive, and potent the imitation or likeness, the stronger the moral outrage. — Leontiskos

The trouble with being at cross purposes is that it can be very hard to sort out that sort of equivocation, and self-knowledge plays a much larger role given that people can deceive themselves about what they are doing.

I wrote about topic-equivocation, for example <here> and especially <here>.

- Just tell him that one of those damn kids knocked out your mailbox and the mailman was unable to deliver due to the damage. I'm guessing that will still be happening long into the future. :smile:

- Clicking on the message should take you to the conversation...? The links should be in your inbox.

But it is unfortunate if it gets to the point where people want to retreat into private messages. — SophistiCat

I think it's a lot more complicated than that. Consider this from Banno's most recent thread, which I also responded to there:

But I might also invite PM contributions — Banno

Banno is inviting private contributions to a public thread. How would that work? In fact what I would say is happening is that Banno is conflating himself with the public thread, and slipping into a form of solipsism. He mistakenly believes that any contribution to himself—even privately—is a contribution to the thread.

This is why we have seen Banno confusedly reprimand posters within a thread for failing to understand what is being discussed privately, by Banno's cohort, about the thread. Banno's PMs are a very strange attempt to proxy-lecture the people in public threads who are not invited to the PM. It is a cathartic way for him to "conquer" privately those who he cannot "conquer" publicly, much like someone who fantasizes about conquering an enemy and is then confused to find that their fantasy had no effect on the real state of their enemy.

This is also why this thread is filled with eye-rolling towards Banno. Posters are used to Banno gesturing towards the way he has conquered them behind closed doors, and they are sick of it. "You're ignorant. The Brights have already discussed and settled this in a private court."

Thus it is not a retreat; it is inevitably a means that is leveraged within the public forum, precisely because the public forum is the place from whence the dispute emerged, and to which it must therefore return if any resolution is to be had. In this case it is a very strange form of resolution.

(Note too how quickly these sorts of private cliques will lead to factionalism within the forum, or else exacerbate that problem.)

That seems unnecessary to me. All I have to do is explain have math involved, and the child will understand if able. What essential role does the obligation to believe a particular claim play for either the teacher or the student? — goremand

To believe that someone ought to do something is not the same as believing that someone has an obligation to do something. This equivocation between "ought" and "obligation" is extremely common on TPF.

But note that our touchstone for this conversation is the notion of "non-hypothetical ought-judgments," that this is taken from the thread, "The Breadth of the Moral Sphere," and that that thread is extremely clear about what such a thing is. The only difference is that we are focusing on intellectual matters rather than moral matters. So if you mistakenly believe me to be talking about obligations, then I would suggest revisiting that thread.

I said "you," not "I." I am thinking of non-hypothetical ought-judgments with respect to others. So if you are tutoring struggling first graders, and you inevitably base the various lessons and interventions on the belief that the child ought to believe that 2+2=4, then you are thereby a member of the rational community. Note well, for example, that every teacher and tutor is thereby a part of the "rational community."*

* Everyone is, but teachers are even in virtue of their teaching.

Isnt there a danger of relying too heavily on the validity of the other’s reasoning and too little on the possibility that the other is making use of conceptual senses of meaning you are u familiar with? Don’t many situations of breakdown in communication result from a confusion between reasoning that lacks validity, coherence, and rationale, and valid reasoning anchored to unfamiliar concepts? — Joshs

The thing is, my point holds in an even broader sense than you are interpreting it. As long as one separates the reasoning process from the conclusions/beliefs that are held, and also recognizes correctness and incorrectness with respect to reasoning processes, then what I say holds. Thus to, "Understand the other's reasons," is to understand the reasoning process being used, and to deem it at least partially correct. Whether or not we define validity as, "a quasi-correct reasoning process," or as something more strict, makes no difference to this broader point.

(Note too that one could understand another's reasons in a way that involves no judgment of correctness, but that this will not lead to an agreement to disagree, which is our topic.)

Wouldn’t it be predicable that if each fails to be persuaded to cross over to the other’s stance, they will also have a great deal of difficulty in accepting the logic behind the opposing view? — Joshs

Your posit here is, "If your conclusion is false, then your reasoning is invalid." Or, "If your belief is false, then the reasoning process which led to this belief lacks all forms of correctness."

None of that follows, and I think the whole idea is bound up with a preference for post hoc rationalization, or in this case a non-discrimination between the process of reasoning and the beliefs that are thereby generated.

Long ago, Srap Tasmaner threatening me with this essay. — Banno

This is a more promising thread. I appreciate the paper to ground the discussion. :up:

But I might also invite PM contributions — Banno

So long as you remember that PMs do not contribute to public threads any more than a "private language" is generally accessible. What is done invisibly cannot be appealed to to justify a visible thesis. There is no general continuity between any PM and a public thread. They are two different things.

- Thanks for the information.

This sub-topic is also related to Mikie's thread/request, and also my <post> which is admittedly wacky and entirely unrealistic given the forum features of all currently extant forum software. I think the principle is interesting, even though many of the objections given were also quite reasonable.

Let’s say that two parties who embrace sharply opposing philosophical, political or religious positions are bought together to engage in earnest dialogue. Wouldn’t it be predicable that if each fails to be persuaded to cross over to the other’s stance, they will also have a great deal of difficulty in accepting the logic behind the opposing view? If I tell you that I understand the reasons for your disagreement with me, but in the same breath I find those reasons to be irrational and logically faulty, am I really understanding those reasons? — Joshs

When I say, "each party must understand at least in part the reasons which prevent the other from agreeing," I am not saying that they are able to mouth back the words the other person is using. I am saying that must be able to understand, at least in part, the reasons.

Wouldn’t it be predicable that if each fails to be persuaded to cross over to the other’s stance, they will also have a great deal of difficulty in accepting the logic behind the opposing view? — Joshs

Only if they cannot rise above post hoc rationalization, where reasoning is irrelevant and it's only assertions that matter. Anyone who understands what valid reasoning is should be able to see how a position possesses validity, coherence, and rationale, even if they do not agree with the conclusions. Anyone who cannot do that is more interested in ideology and "material positions," rather than true reasoning.

When I try to enforce the terms of the OP on other posters, they are often incensed. — T Clark

Yes. I wrote an OP where I wanted to work through a paper, chapter by chapter. I made it abundantly clear. This is what happened:

↪Banno - It is not a "kindness" to hijack the thread and skip to section 4...

Part of this thread is experimental: are we allowed to have focused reading groups that move at a consistent and controlled pace? Will moderators honor an OP that wishes to do this? If not, then obviously a thread like this is not worthwhile to conduct, and this sort of endeavor is not possible on TPF. — Leontiskos

@Banno, who did his darndest to undermine the thread from the first page, literally flouted the terms of the OP and moved to unread sections, all in order to try to make those sections look stupid.

I think it would be great if the mods enforced intuitive OP-terms, but that thread showed me that they are not willing, or else are not able due to time constraints. I was even PMing one, asking for help.

's thread on Adorno is presumably one place where such terms would be enforced, and that is great. I think it would be enormously helpful if users could create reading groups where such simple and commonsensical terms were enforced, and trolls like @Banno were not allowed to sabotage the threads and contravene the terms of the OP. Again, Banno is himself the biggest culprit of the things he complains about.

I think people are making too much of this. — Srap Tasmaner

I think you're missing what is plain to see:

I fear your OP could be read not just as a suggestion that sometimes direct communication with a poster is helpful for clearing up issues, particularly if the matter is so esoteric that it might not be of interest or ability to others, but as a suggestion that one is better served if they remove themselves from the common man so they can discuss their thoughts among their elite equals. — Hanover

Banno comments (brags), quite often, about how he has to take things to PM since the forum is too dumb. What others are pointing out is much more in line with the reality of the situation. You are again missing the contextual situation of the thing you read.

I don't know. Would this mean that it would be impossible for a person to convert from one position to another? When I was a Christian I had one framework but began to notice things like how what you believed often depended on where you were born and raised, which made me start questioning my beliefs. I eventually became an atheist. I had overcome my upbringing. What you seem to be saying that what happened to me is impossible. Or are you saying I'm not really an atheist because my original framework prevented me from understanding what it actually means to be an atheist? — Harry Hindu

I'm saying that no one is both a Christian and an atheist, straddling that line neutrally. A Christian can become an atheist, but if they do so then they are no longer a Christian. No one truly says, "I am both Christian and atheist in a neutral sense."

We could perhaps imagine someone who is neither and views both objectively and neutrally. I'd be fine with that, especially for the sake of argument.

(But note that @Srap Tasmaner was not "neither" when he appealed to the very same framework petitio principii that @J was appealing to less eloquently. In fact Srap is very deeply committed to that framework sort of relativism. Nevertheless, the difference is that Srap is much more capable of questioning his own presuppositions by engaging in dialogue and answering questions.)

No, not necessarily. But most of all, I don't think it is a requirement for joining the rational community. — goremand

I disagree on both scores. I have a whole thread disagreeing with the first claim. I would argue against the second claim on similar grounds insofar as we concern ourselves with intellectual ought-judgments, i.e., "You ought to believe that 2+2=4." But no one "joins" the rational community. They are already rational, and they are already bound by the truth that 2+2=4. Even and especially as they ignore such truths will they feel their binding force. We can't opt in or out of the fact that 2+2=4 will have an effect on us and on our lives, as for example is seen when consulting one's financial transactions.

Yes, absolutely. — goremand

Okay, good.

- I'm afraid I'm doing to have to respectfully disagree. :razz:

The way I read many of these exchanges between those I will call the Wittgensteinians and the Atistotlians (although that is just to avoid naming people here, but you know who you are!), is the Aristotelians openly seek to understand the other position (or any position), so they can accurately analyze it; they ask specific questions about it, to both better understand it and to reveal the limits of their own understanding, and they provide restatements, to better ensure everyone is on the same page; they craft critiques, and offer positive alternate views. Whereas the Wittgensteinians may do these same things, but only when talking with each other - when someone disagrees with them who is perceived to be an Aristotelian, they act indignant and paranoid (emotional) and tired (as if dealing with their lessers), and argue about hidden meanings and bad-faith and psychopathy (authoritarian intent, myth-making, delusional), some of them making ad hominem comments, and position themselves as too smart to dignify such people. — Fire Ologist

(@Count Timothy von Icarus)


I ran across an idea that I found quite fascinating, both with respect to this thread and with respect to the Wittgenstein/Analytic Philosophy question. It was from the recent discussion between Jordan Peterson and Jonathan Haidt, from 44:11-46:53. Go ahead and listen to those few minutes, but what Haidt eventually says, drawing on Piaget, is, “A video game is really like the junk food of games, in that it doesn’t have the nutritious part which is the disagreements, the arguments.” Peterson interjects, “Right, so there’s no meta-negotiation about the rules themselves. So one of the things Piaget pointed out […] And that’s also why Piaget wasn’t a moral relativist – he thought there was a hierarchy of morality. And that’s also why he thought Thomas Kuhn was wrong…”

They don’t talk about Wittgenstein, but I have never heard anything which hit the nail so perfectly on the head with respect to axiomatic thinking, such as Wittgenstein’s or Analytic Philosophy’s! It is the idea that if there is no ability to see the rules, jostle against them, and engage in meta-negotiation (with respect to, say, so-called hinge propositions), then there is a deficiency and a lack of robustness in the activity. complains that Aristotle’s “induction” is not (deductively) valid, but according to Piaget this is a feature, not a bug. I think this is why Aristotle is so much more robust than Wittgenstein: because he doesn’t set those a priori limits on what can be done, and also because he does not have a set color palette before he begins his painting. This is what makes him so much less contrived and artificial (and here others would argue that Plato is better yet). Note too how it is Piaget—in his observation of children, progress, and development—who sees what Wittgenstein is so blind to – the Wittgenstein who literally physically abused children because they weren’t “doing it right”!

Now some have been claiming that they want the ability to negotiate the rules, and I have been at pains to point out their performative self-contradiction. They say they want to negotiate the rules, but they don’t negotiate, they don’t engage in dialogue, they don’t answer questions forthrightly, and they in fact “take their marbles and go home.” On the other hand, the people they dub “authoritarians” are precisely the people who are doing all of those things: negotiating the rules, offering arguments, presenting objections, etc.

Note too how well this reflects Aristotle’s discussion of the PNC in Metaphysics IV. He in no way attempts to prove it. He allows his opponents to try to argue, but he also shows why their arguments are doomed to fail. This leaves it open for his opponents to try to argue and see for themselves how Aristotle’s prediction comes to pass. Anyone who has read the text seriously has probably done this for themselves. This closely parallels @Count Timothy von Icarus’ discussion with @Banno over the principle concerning the falsification of data, where Banno's rejection of the word "principle" eventually turned out to be ad hoc.

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what sort of explanation is left in order to account for profound disagreements? — Joshs

The better question to ask is, “How do we come to agree to disagree?” I want to say that if two people are to agree to disagree, then there must first be earnest dialogue, there must be honest irreconcilability, and each party must understand at least in part the reasons which prevent the other from agreeing. It is easy enough to see why such a thing is not possible where dialogue at all, much less earnest dialogue, is refused.

- That is how I see the matter as well. What we could say is that if Trump had dyed his hair unbeknownst to the two persons having the dialogue, then the first person's belief would have been true. We don't have enough information to claim that the belief is false.

(Good post)

Your syllogism above does not work for me, and I've said why. — AmadeusD

Here is my argument:

The fellow believes Trump dyed his hair. Is his belief false?

In a logical sense what we say is that his argument for the conclusion that Trump dyed his hair is unsound, but that this does not entail that the conclusion is false. I don't think it is correct to distinguish belief from proposition in that way and say that the belief is false but the proposition is not.

There are three propositions and three beliefs:

1. If *this video* is reliable then Trump dyed his hair
2. *This video* is reliable
3. Therefore, Trump dyed his hair

Belief/proposition (1) is true; belief/proposition (2) is false, and belief/proposition (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) because (2) is false. The belief/proposition, "Trump dyed his hair," is therefore neither known to be true nor known to be false. I don't see what grounds we have to say that the belief in question ("Trump dyed his hair") is false. — Leontiskos

You responded by saying, "Yes. I have explained this explicitly above, to the degree that this feels like outright trolling..." But my argument was precisely against your assertion that beliefs and propositions, "are not falsified the same way," so it doesn't help to point back to the assertion I was arguing against.

As to this:

Any belief can be falsified without looking at the state of affairs, as I see it. — AmadeusD

Another assertion, which my argument addresses. Replace "Any belief," with, "Some beliefs," and I would agree with you. But the case from my argument cannot be "falsified" without knowledge of the state of affairs, namely without knowledge that the video is a deepfake.

There is a sense in which the passions are something we do, as one of our powers/facilities, and yet another sense in which they happen to us, in that they are often involuntary, and indeed often run counter to the will. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. :up:

The passions and appetites aren't like a heart attack though. They can be commanded by the will, even if they are often recalcitrant. And our ability to command them can be improved with training; that's one of the ideas of asceticism. So, the other writer I was thinking of is Saint John Climacus, who I have been reading at night, and this is precisely what the monk aims at with "blessed dispassion," not the elimination of the appetites and passions per se, but their right orientation and ordering (granted, it sometimes seems like the latter in some passages). This is why, if you pray the Horologian, you end up reciting Psalm 50 many times a day. It's the "cultivation of blessed tears" and repetence, as Climacus would put it, a right emotional state that is willed. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would argue that the Orthodox use of "passions" is at least somewhat different than Plato or Aristotle or colloquial usage. I would say that Orthodox "dispassion," very crudely, has to do with a state of self-possession and self-command. It is the idea that "thoughts" (again in a wide, Orthodox Christian sense) do not move you. So there is that connection of being unmoved by passions, and a desire to achieve a state of dispassion, but I don't see the Orthodox view contradicting the idea that passions are primarily things that happen to us in the postlapsarian state. That's why Orthodox on the whole view passions as bad and desire a state of dispassion (although I realize there are a few exceptions, who you have read). So my hunch is that the Orthodox might admit that the deified individual has motive powers similar to the passions, but that they would not generally call those things "passions."

The trick is that everyone agrees that unwanted passions happen to us in a way that desirable and cooperating passions do not, as Aquinas sets out in the text I gave. From this is eventually follows that the well-ordered individual's passions are part of him in a way that a disordered individual's passions are not. But these are all very fine and subtle distinctions.

The analogy of the wind may be helpful here. When the wind is with us, it flows into us and we become one with it. It facilitates our movement and combines with our will. When the wind is against us, it opposes us and pushes us in a direction we do not wish to go. Note too the Spirit/wind parallel.

- Okay. I just wanted to point back to that, since @Srap Tasmaner already did all my work for me, and I thought you might have read it.

- Coming back to the question of whether there is a common thread between history and, say, physics. Here is why Srap thinks so:

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. — Srap Tasmaner

History would fulfill that criterion, so the question is whether Srap is mistaken about his criterion for what makes a science.

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I'll just add that the classical formulation of the difference is that science deals with the universal and the necessary. History is always particular though. Indeed, it's the particular in which all universals are instantiated. This doesn't preclude a philosophy of history, but it does preclude a science of history. Jaques Maratain has a very short lecture/book on philosophy of history that makes this case quite compactly, and he's drawing on the "traditional" distinction (in the West) that was assumed for many centuries. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is an interesting and useful point. :up:

Perhaps when we now talk about "history" we are talking about "knowing what happened in the past." Is that the thing that Maritain is considering, or is he considering history in some other manner? And do you happen to know the text where he talks about this?

In terms of a logos at work in history, I certainly think we can find one, just not a science. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I agree with this.

But you cannot predict this sort of thing in any strict sense — Count Timothy von Icarus

So the issue here is apparently prediction of future events, or a determination of the principles that led from one point to another?

However, although his gods (themselves a mix of personified man-like deity and more transcendent Logos) set the limit of logos in human history, and characters only ever recognize them when they leave. I've been rereading the Aeneid and this seems true in almost every case; only when they turn to go, when we are "past them" in the narrative, are they recognized as gods by man. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, that is a beautiful idea.

Right. To say "both" is saying that the framework more accurately reflects the state-of-affairs than other frameworks do and is what makes you a solipsist or a realist. — Harry Hindu

Yes, that seems correct.

So is the question, "How can we know when a framework more accurately represents the state-of-affairs?" or "How can we distinguish between the framework and the state-of-affairs?", or something else? — Harry Hindu

I added this in an edit:

To say "both" would require the adherent to claim that their own framework (e.g. realism or solipsism) is superior to other frameworks. I suppose they could do that, but it seems like the very idea of a "framework" would impede them. — Leontiskos

I think what is happening is that you have two incommensurable ways of viewing something, and it is likely impossible to try to strike some neutral ground. This is almost certainly why @Srap Tasmaner's "St. Louis to Kansas City" idea failed.

So surely ampliation is required to understand the opposing view, and a rather abrupt and extreme form of it. This issue is explored a lot in the field of interreligious studies, where there can be significant limitations on one's ability to understand another view (and the same thing could be said to hold between secular and religious thinking). Religion and culture are the two biggies, where a form of conversion and life is required in order to truly understand.

Yes I remember reading your suggestions back then. I doubt the software allows such limits though. — unenlightened

I think you're probably right. But some forum software does, so it is possible.

You don’t always get to answer questions with a better question like “maybe you are actually an authoritarian because of your God delusion?” — Fire Ologist

Good post. :up:

I think what you say about Wittgenstenians is natural to that worldview, which is more enclosed. But it's also worth noting that @Banno was the primary Wittgenstenian in this thread. @J and @Srap Tasmaner are not as exclusively interested in Wittgenstein.

Regarding the Analytic question, I think part of the difficulty is that cutting with a knife is most easy and most precise. Doing other things is truly much harder. In that way Analytic philosophy can generate agreement regarding its dissections. That can be helpful, but unfortunately it is a very limited agreement due to the fact that it lacks all manner of comprehensiveness, as the OP itself admits.

Just so you know, there was a new rule added which says, "AI LLMs are not to be used to write posts either in full or in part." In any case, I don't respond to purely AI posts.

resident sophists — Janus

Yes. Imagine what you did <here>, but multiplied over twenty pages and then combined with hypocrisy. It was a truly impressive display of sophistry. :wink:

The continue from those who have consistently failed to engage in dialogue throughout the whole thread. "If you can't beat them..." then I guess you do whatever the heck you can to calumniate them, all the while refusing to dialogue with them.

As Srap Tasmaner said "you ought to be ashamed of yourselves". — Janus

@Srap Tasmaner's outburst was <bizarre>, to say the least, utterly lacking in context. It's usually a bad idea to fall into that form of judgmentalism when you're such a newcomer to the thread.

quality — unenlightened

If one wants to improve the quality of thought on the forum, I think the easiest way is to impose posting limits (see for example, 6). This is arguably what generated the quality submissions (i.e. the time allotted to composition). Quality diminishes when TPF is treated like Twitter and people post without first giving thought to the topic. But of course this would not satisfy @Banno, who is one of the worst culprits with over 27,000 posts and a tendency towards quippy, dismissive posts. So I'm not sure it's just a matter of his "style."