Wittgenstein already won this particular game by pointing out that it is not so much what we say as what we do that is of import. — Banno

I guess I never understood why this was supposed to be obvious, or even true. Why is doing more important than saying? Certainly we want to know what we're doing with words, but what we're trying to express with them has usually been taken as extending well beyond what we may do. Is there a way of expanding the above maxim with some argument or demonstration, rather than claiming it's something we can simply "point out" as a game-winning move?

I'm not seeing a difference. Won't you also have to explain what a side and an angle are? How would you do that? Is your point that red is a simple and square, a construction? Is "angle" a simple or a construct? What about "side"? — Banno

I think you're pointing to the fact that any definition will ultimately have to consist of simples. But why would that mean it wasn't a definition, or meaning? My suggestion is modest: anything which can be defined in terms of simples is therefore different from a simple itself. Thus, this may lead to an explanation of why we have a pretty good idea what "square" means, much less so for "red."

It's important that we don't get this mixed up with using these terms. Here, of course, we do fine with both "square" and "red," but to say that this settles the issue of meaning is to beg the question, surely; the question at hand is whether meaning is use.

BTW, if either one of us resolves this satisfactorily, I will write it up and send it to a major journal -- Breaking news! 20th century conflict settled! Wittgenstein proved right (or wrong, as the case may be)! :wink:

Considering this . . . I think you can make Aristotle’s argument go through if you drop the premise “The skeptic has presented a piece of discursive knowledge” (or “Points 1-6 are a discursive demonstration”):

1. The skeptic, in discussing this matter, claims to have produced a piece of discursive knowledge.

2. That piece of allegedly discursive knowledge purports to show that discursive knowledge is impossible.

3. Therefore the skeptic has said something incoherent or self-contradictory.

In other words, make it about what the skeptic says, not what they’ve actually done. In fact, I think you have to deny that the skeptic has done what they claim, i.e., present a piece of discursive knowledge. The whole question of discursive knowledge itself becomes weirdly beside the point; the skeptic is wrong because the form of the argument is wrong, not because there is or isn’t such a thing as discursive knowledge.

So this would not be a powerful enough conclusion to show that discursive knowledge is possible (one of the original premises of the argument as you gave it). In this version there is no longer a piece of discursive knowledge to point to. So perhaps this doesn’t get you (or Aristotle) where you’d like to go.

I'm not sure how to get to that generalization. Can you work it out using the example in question?

Forgot to say, I think the rest of your post, about noesis and misologism, is excellent. These are interests of mine as well, and I agree that noesis is often badly and tendentiously misunderstood.

Ummm . . . but you don't think this works, do you? How does it not simply beg the question?

Points 1-6 are a discursive demonstration. The skeptic is claiming to have demonstrated that discursive knowledge through demonstration is impossible through the use of discursive demonstration. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, Aristotle has to say that 1-6 purport to be, but are not, a discursive demonstration. Which upsets the whole apple-cart.

You're reading Aristotle's reasoning as follows:

If the skeptic is right, discursive knowledge is impossible.
But discursive knowledge is possible, because the skeptic has just engaged in it.
Therefore the skeptic [is wrong] has said something incoherent.

I'd respectfully suggest, then, that the argument needs to be expanded with an additional step:

If the skeptic is right, discursive knowledge is impossible.
The skeptic, in discussing this matter, has presented us with a piece of discursive knowledge.
So we see before us an example of discursive knowledge.
Therefore the skeptic has said something incoherent.

And this, I'm afraid, changes a lot. You or Aristotle can no longer avail yourselves of premise 2. You can't simultaneously say that what the skeptic has given us is discursive knowledge, while also denying the truth of what the skeptic says. All you can do is point to the incoherence of the entire chain of thought -- the usual liar's-paradox problems -- but we already knew this, that's precisely what we're trying to find a way out of.

Now if Aristotle could point to some other piece of discursive knowledge that was somehow self-credentialing, that would be different. But of course "self-credentialing" is so close to "question-begging" that I don't know if even that would advance us.

I suppose there's a couple of types of content involved. If you established that X causes Y through an experiment, then that's an excellent justification for believing it. But that's far for explaining why X causes Y. So if someone were to say "X happened, that's why Y happened", and someone challenged it: "Why?", you could point to the experiment. But that doesn't tell you the mechanism, it doesn't explicate the why. It demonstrates it. The first type of content would be what suffices to demonstrate truth, the second type of content would be what serves as an explication. They both might work as reasons, but they don't both work as stories or explications, and only attempting to specify a mechanism would tell you why.

So I suppose what I'm saying is that the content of the claim doesn't need to make any kind of sense to serve as an excellent justification, it just needs to be established as true. And in context noting causes, without any further commitment to mechanism or generality, might serve as a terminus of giving reasons. Putting it in -isms, a kind of foundationalism which uses every passing contingency. — fdrake

The distinction between a justification and an explanation is excellent. I agree with everything you're saying here except whether justification alone can serve as a terminus of giving reasons. Or let me rephrase that: Certainly it does serve; long before humans knew anything about planetary motion, they were absolutely justified in believed that the "sun will rise" tomorrow; they just didn't know why. But . . . is that the same thing as "established as true"? Comes down to usage now, I suppose. We're used to thinking of establishing the truth of something as being able to explain not just our belief in the phenomenon, but how the phenomenon comes to be so constituted as to produce the regularities that result in our true belief. But, as you point out, is that really required? If we say "No," then we also seem impelled to say that scientists have no reason other than curiosity to motivate them to discover explanations for otherwise obviously true phenomena. That feels wrong, but I'll have to think more about it.

Regardless of why we believe them if they are believed because they're true. Or just because they're true, regardless of why we believe them. Like the break up because of the uncomfortable clothes. True, utterly useless as an explication, and no one would believe it because it's not a cromulent story. — fdrake

This makes me wonder whether the uncomfortable-clothes explanation could be true. I suppose it depends how you phrase it. "They broke up because they had an argument, largely caused by how each was feeling physically" seems believable enough. "She left him because of his itchy underwear" is surely inadequate . . . and is it even true? A bizarre version of the butterfly effect, which is also questionable as a good explanation of anything.

Sir Egg, I can't tell whether you really are curious. Your use of terms like "this kinda shit" and "plagiarism" leads me to believe that your mind is fairly made up. But I could be wrong.

@Banno, @sime

Quine rightly dismissed the analytic/synthetic distinction as too vague, — Banno

I know I've pointed this out before, but I think it's really important to keep in mind: Quine accepts the analytic/synthetic distinction when it comes to what he called "logical truths":

If we suppose a prior inventory of logical particles . . . then in general a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles. — Two Dogmas, section 1

It is the second kind of alleged analyticity, typified by "No bachelor is married", which requires synonymy, that is the focus of Quine's objections.

Perhaps bead eight is square. In that case, and given that our domain is just the beads, "...is square" and '...is eight" are extensionally equivalent, and whatever is extensional the case with square things will be extensively the case with bead eight.

So it does not look as if the choice of red is an issue. — Banno

Here is the difference I see between "red" and "square". If someone is in doubt about "red", they aren't going to say "But what does 'red' mean?" They're probably not even going to ask, "How do you define 'red'?", though if they did, a definition of sorts is available, involving wavelengths. But people used "red" correctly long before this definition was known, so it's not a helpful response. The point, then, is that "red" does seem to be the sort of thing that has to get pointed to; it can't otherwise be explained or defined (phenomenologically).

"Square" is different. The doubtful geometer can and does ask, "What does 'square' mean?" and receives a definition that is phenomenologically relevant and simple -- check the sides and angles. For me, the conclusion is irresistible that, in addition to various extended things that are square, there is also an intension for "square", a meaning or definition that can be appealed to in doubtful cases, and that we would certainly use in teaching a child about squares.

This doesn't yet constitute a full-fledged defense of "meaning," but are you with me so far?

This is really interesting. Does Franklin have to be a non-realist or a "non-theoretical-reasons" guy in order to hold out for agnosticism about a particular question in science? I think Pincock would be happy to say that scientific realists do this too -- indeed, they must, if the evidence isn't sufficient to justify an explanation. The question is whether the realist could extend this stance to include a case where a clear outcome is available, but without explanation. Is this necessarily (as you put it) "the anti-realist attitude that 'we can't really account for why we get this outcome'"? I'd like to know what Pincock would say. Perhaps it would be something like, "True, we don't at the moment know why. But if the result is indeed correct, then an explanation is knowable; we have to keep looking."

I agree with your overall point about the Franklin example being something of an outlier, but I believe a realist could acknowledge this without putting their stance into question. But of course Pincock has chosen the Franklin example with a purpose in mind, and could be accused of picking some low-hanging fruit, I suppose. Not every IBE works out so tidily.

By conflating pragmatic coherence with rational obligation, Pincock oversimplifies the range of legitimate epistemic responses. Instrumentalism, for instance, operates within a perfectly coherent rational framework yet explicitly avoids metaphysical commitments—a stance that clearly avoids the "pragmatic incoherence" Pincock accuses voluntarists of. — Wayfarer

I think so. Once again, he'd have to show that instrumentalism can't be understood as "avoiding metaphysical commitments," and that these commitments are at odds with theoretical reasons as he defines the term. As Chakravartty says, it's a tall order, but we haven't seen anything so far that indicates it's impossible. And Pincock does offer such an argument (not about instrumentalism specifically), which I'll discuss later.

1. Whatever is scientifically known [i.e., known as necessary, through its causes] must be demonstrated. . . . et al.

Yes, this "circle problem" is very much in the spirit of the voluntarism/obligation debate. One question: by "demonstration," do you take these thinkers to mean inferential or logical proof of validity? Presumably, at any given point we enter the circle, we're equipped with premises that don't (at that moment) require demonstration, so does "demonstration" describe a "downstream" process (to use the language we're developing on this thread)? Starting from premises and reasoning to conclusions?

But Aristotle reasons:

If the skeptic is right, discursive knowledge is impossible.
But discursive knowledge is possible.
Therefore the skeptic is wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ummm . . . but you don't think this works, do you? How does it not simply beg the question?

(Note, if the skeptic rebuts this claim, they cannot possibly claim to know their own rebuttal's truth without contradicting themselves). — Count Timothy von Icarus

That would depend on whether the skeptic believes that it's discursive knowledge itself which is leading them to conclude that discursive knowledge is impossible. I have little sympathy myself for radical skepticism, but in fairness I think the skeptic can rebut the claim without also needing to claim that the rebuttal is discursive knowledge. Or, if "rebut" is too strong, let's say "show the claim to be highly implausible."

I understand that noesis and intellectus are meant to come to the rescue here, as in so many other places where Greek thought is contrasted with 20th century emphases on strictly (and literally) "rational" thought. Making this rescue attempt attractive is hard, even though I suspect it's correct in some fundamental ways. I'm reminded of this, above:

something that is held on unconditional grounds that connect to a sense of being that is non-propositional. — Wayfarer

Would you agree this is similar to the desideratum you (and perhaps Aristotle) seek?

I dont get why people even argue about this kinda shit.. — DifferentiatingEgg

Sure, different philosophers have different interests, and worry about different things. I understand this isn't the thread for you.

It's difficult to make something a story beat if it resists any sense of narrative. — fdrake

It would probably matter whether either partner was aware of the irrelevant distal cause. Matter in terms of how to handle it as a story, that is. If you're within either or both points of view, and if your PoV doesn't include the requisite awareness, then yes, it's a narrative challenge. You'd have to find a way to show the reader what's really going on, while keeping the characters unaware of it. But this can be done. It's a twist on the "unreliable narrator/protagonist" idea. Or of course you could allow yourself an omniscient authorial viewpoint and simply inform the reader what's going on.

In any case, I completely agree that, in our non-philosophical lives, we accept stories as reasons, when they have the appropriate narrative explanatory form. We accept physical causes too, and unconscious motives as well. The peculiarly "rational" reason (a reason for everybody?) seems to come into play when we try to justify beliefs, rather than explain actions. And there's the middle ground of explaining beliefs: Your (narrative) reason for believing in ghosts gives an explanation for the belief, in one sense, but not in the sense of "justifying a true belief." That would require the other kind of reason, which is public and meant to be persuasive.

So terminating at causes is fine, as long as we're not pointing to a cause as the source of a JTB. Problem is, that seems to be what Pincock (and perhaps any rationalist) demands. The inferential loop seems to go on and on, as long as we insist on that special variety of "true reason." And we can't simply say, "Well, then stop at cause here as well," because we can see why it won't explain a JTB, except perhaps coincidentally.

Even if people agreed that, like in the second story, the man's feeling made him stand up, it serves as a reason for him standing up only by narrative juxtaposition/co-contextualising the feeling and standing up. And that's something I did in writing the sentences, not the hypothetical man standing up. — fdrake

I'm stuck a bit on this. Are you saying that the man, if we asked him why he stood up, would deny the feeling as a cause, or say he wasn't aware of it? Yes, you wrote it that way, but he could agree, couldn't he? Or perhaps this goes back to the "unreliable narrator" question. Let's change the example back to "loses his temper at his partner." And let's say his therapist, who knows him well, realizes that this occurred because the guy got triggered by a certain phrase that connected to a childhood trauma. But the man himself might not know this, and might give a completely different reason. So the therapist is somewhat in the role of you, the author: They know something about this character that the character does not. Is it, then, a reason? Different intuitions are possible here. I'd say it is a reason, and point to the many different ways we use that term. But for the man, as I think you're saying, it can't be a reason unless he goes beyond "narrative juxtaposition" and actually accepts the account.

You don't need the content of a cause to be reasonable, or even explicable, just to notice that it really is a cause. — fdrake

OK, but as above: You do need the content to be reasonable if we're working toward warranted belief.

a meta-methodological commitment to believing things that seem to be true regardless of why — fdrake

Sorry -- regardless of why we believe them, or regardless of why they're true?

In one sense it tells us that there is nothing more to say about red; given the domain is only the beads, red just is {1,2,3}.

I agree that there is something annoying here, but I suspect that it cannot be well articulated. — Banno

I wonder if part of the problem lies in the choice of "red". I thought that picking an irreducible quale would help us see what's going on with "meaning," but maybe not. In a certain sense, "red" is like a proper name, in that it's "just there," and can't be defined further, at least not in a way that's relevant to the phenomenology.

So what if we pick "square" instead? This term has a simple definition, and doubts about possible squares are easily and publicly resolvable. Would you want to say that the extension of Square X simply is what we mean by (or define as) a square?

Part Two

In his paper, Christopher Pincock gives two arguments that he says demonstrate that someone who adopts a realist epistemic stance must do so, on pain of incoherence.

The realist should reject voluntarism about stances, and so insist that their stance is tied to theoretical reasons. . . . My suggestion is that the realist should maintain that their realist stance is rationally obligatory. How might this defense go? — Pincock, 7

I’ll try to lay out the first argument in this Part Two, while pointing out that Pincock himself does a very good job, and it’s worth reading this in its entirety rather than my paraphrase.

First, a preliminary point which I’ve raised before. We can say that, for Pincock, the term “theoretical reasons” is essentially equivalent to “reasons that are rationally obligatory.” And we know that Chakravartty objects to this characterization, claiming that it begs the question against the very idea of stance voluntarism: “On the voluntarist view, rational choice and rational obligation are distinct concepts and cannot be run together.”

So let’s keep this dispute in mind, in what follows.

Pincock’s first argument is a reductio designed to show that, if an epistemic realist takes the position that their stance is not obligatory, they will arrive at “pragmatic incoherence.” Therefore, they should claim that realism is obligatory.

To set this up, Pincock describes a typical instance of inference to the best explanation (IBE), which characterizes the kind of inference he believes realists can and should draw. This involves an account of Benjamin Franklin’s famous experiment with kite, key, and lightning. The realist will say that Franklin concluded that “lightning is an electrical discharge” (call this L) because he had a reason for so concluding. He needed to understand that his evidence is evidence for L. He needed to grasp a principle of inference that can link his evidence with L.

Pincock distinguishes Franklin’s epistemic stance from another one that Franklin might have taken. He might have said, “I’m disposed to claim to know L when I have this kind of evidence. It’s just what I do, or what seems best to me; others may do differently.” For Pincock, this wouldn’t give Franklin reasons for his claim that L. Pincock asks us to imagine how this “non-theoretical” Franklin would respond to a challenge to his claim about L: He has nothing at his disposal that would count as a reason for others to adopt, so he would have to be silent in the face of his challengers. The actual Franklin, though, scientific realist that he was, can reply with an account that involves how evidence is connected to knowledge claims. This account will not necessarily carry the day, nor will it have to result in an indisputable knowledge claim, but it does consist of alleged reasons for beliefs that are meant to be convincing for anyone, not just statements about “how I proceed when I see X and Y.”

Now, here is the core of Pincock’s incoherence argument, in which he asks us to imagine a realist who does not believe that their epistemic stance is obligatory:

A realist who is also a voluntarist about stances will admit to their own realist stance, but also allow that there is no reason that obliges them to adopt that realist stance. Consider a claim to knowledge that the realist advances on the basis of their evidence and their realist stance, such as Franklin’s L. A realist who is also a voluntarist about stances and who reflects on this situation is immediately landed in a pragmatically incoherent situation. . . . First, they put forward the claim L as something they believe to be true. Second, they are aware that this belief is due in part to their realist stance. Third, as a voluntarist about stances, they admit that they have not adopted their realist stance on the basis of any reasons that reflect the truth.

As we have seen, the voluntarist explains the adoption of a stance by appeal to the person’s desires and values. If these desires and values have no connection to the truth, then the realist must admit that their resulting beliefs are not appropriately connected to the truth, and so not known. . . . The realist must admit to themselves that they know they could acquire this belief whether it was true or not. This is the pragmatic incoherence: by the realist’s own lights, one of their beliefs, which they take to be true, is also something that they admit to themselves that they would have whether it was true or not. The only way to restore coherence and to maintain one’s voluntarism about one’s stance is to withdraw any claim to know that is based on one’s stance. For the realist, this means abandoning their realism. — Pincock, 5-6

There are a number of issues raised by this argument, which Pincock discusses carefully. One, inspired by Bernard Williams, concerns whether one can actually “acquire a belief” without believing it to be true. Another concerns whether such a question applies only at the level of doxastic belief, not the choice of epistemic stance.

But I’ll cut to the chase and say that I think the argument as a whole can be defeated simply by denying the characterization of what a stance voluntarist does. Pincock’s language includes phrases such as “no reason that obliges them,” “not adopt[ing] their realist stance on the basis of any reasons that reflect the truth,” “no connection to the truth,” and “not appropriately connected to the truth.” These all-or-nothing characterizations can only hold water if we accept Pincock’s idea that a theoretical reason must result in rational obligation. (I should point out that the first phrase, “no reason that obliges them,” would be conceded by Chakravartty. But he would not concede that there are no theoretical reasons that could have a bearing, or influence the decision – merely that they don’t result in rational obligation, and that others could have different reasons for their stances, or weight them differently.)

As we know, Pincock maintains that the stance voluntarist has no theoretical reasons of any sort for their adoption of a stance. For Pincock, only “desires and values” can form the basis for (voluntarily) adopting a stance. Once again, if we look back at Chakravartty’s description of how he understands an epistemic stance, this seems to be a misreading:

An epistemic stance is an orientation, a collection of attitudes, values, aims, and other commitments relevant to thinking about scientific ontology, including policies or guidelines for the production of putatively factual beliefs . . . — Chakravartty, 1308

Or perhaps it’s not so much a misreading as an interpretation which claims that, if all theoretical reasons create obligations, then everything on Chakravartty’s list has to be something else, since Chakravartty is claiming to be a stance voluntarist. It may also be a sort of challenge: If this list is not merely disguised “desires and values,” then tell us directly what the theoretical element is. What “other commitments” do you have in mind?

In any case, Chakravartty’s response to the incoherence argument is straightforward:

Let me generalize this contention [that stance voluntarism is inconsistent with realism] in a way that I believe Pincock would accept, by parity of reasoning: in this case (ex hypothesi) no one would have a reason to adopt their own or any other rational stance – the concern presumably applies across the board – because there is no rational obligation to go one way or another. Lacking rational obligations and recognizing the rationality of those with conflicting stances, it would be indefensible, incoherent even, to adopt any such option. — Chakravartty, 1311-12

The epistemic realist, of course, wants to say that this argument applies only against other stances; there is something unique about the stance supported by strictly “theoretical” reasons. Chakravartty says that the only way this could be made compelling is by accepting the conflation of rational choice with rational obligation, which, as we’ve noted, seems to beg the question against the voluntarist:

The very idea that a given stance must be rationally obligatory to be rationally chosen is precisely what stance voluntarism denies. . . . On the voluntarist view, rational choice and rational obligation are distinct concepts and cannot be run together. — Chakravartty, 1312

And Chakravartty points out what we’ve alluded to several times now: a non-question-begging argument would have to start with an understanding of rationality that precludes alternative rational standards completely:

But this would require something more than what has been provided [by Pincock]: a compelling argument for . . . a theory of rationality in light of which such a demonstration could be given. This, however, is a tall order. — Chakravartty, 1312

In fact, Pincock does offer such an argument, which I’ll look at in Part Three. But for now, do you agree that the pragmatic-incoherence argument requires this “tall order” if it’s going to go through in a non-question-begging way? I believe Chakravartty is right about this.

beholden to the aims of instrumental reason — Wayfarer

the subject of merely propositional knowledge — Wayfarer

Weirdly, this is what I was writing about to @fdrake when your post appeared. In that context, we looked at the idea of "cause" as a way out of strategic (instrumental) reason's circles. What you're talking about, if I understand you, is yet a different form of escape, if it can be found.

And that sounds rather like a belief, doesn't it? — Wayfarer

Just to clarify -- "belief" in this discussion has been used to refer to something like JTB, that is, a warranted belief that would result from propositional knowledge. I think you're using "belief" to mean the opposite, or near-opposite -- something that is held on unconditional grounds that connect to a sense of being that is non-propositional. Neither is right or wrong, of course, I just want to avoid talking at cross-purposes.

I find the peremptory description of 'anti-realist' unsatisfactory. — Wayfarer

I think your refinement of it is fine, and we should ask ourselves: Using this understanding of antirealism, would Pincock still be a realist? I believe so. Even a generous and sensible view of how antirealism works in practice (or a commitment to an inevitable Rodelian subjectivity) is probably not going to sway a non-voluntarist about stances.

OK. And how do we want to fill in "good"?
— J

I have no idea. If you're just estimating the mean of a data set, sample size 19 and 20 are basically the same thing. It would be really hard to justify one or the other on any purely statistical basis. — fdrake

Or, I'm guessing, a purely "rational/theoretical" basis à la Pincock. This is where the specter of strategic rationality becomes a bit frightening. I'm certainly not saying Pincock believes this, but you can't help being concerned if your conception of rationality turns out to be so rigid, so precise, that it could engender an epistemic stance capable of mediating between sample size 19 and 20, and labeling one as obligatory and the other as incorrect. Another way of putting the concern would be: Could there be an epistemic stance so powerfully grounded in rationality that we could predict everything it would and wouldn't countenance "downstream," no matter the feedback? Kinda like the One True Dialectic -- it's obligatory to adopt it, and all subsequent beliefs are also obligatory.

By hierarchy I meant that there would be direction of influence between things that constitute the stance and things that constitute putatively factual level claims. By denying its existence I meant that a change in the putatively factual level claims may engender a change in what constitutes the stance. I was treating a discovery as a change in putatively factual level claims, specifically the discovery that 2 new data points had the majority of the benefit of 3. And I claim that this triggered evaluating the allocation of resources on that basis, whereas before it was largely a question of scientific accuracy. — fdrake

OK, good. I just didn't read/think about this carefully enough, sorry.

...a stance toward a stance? A meta-stance? Who knows. Notably all of these answers would be inferential, they involve giving reasons. — fdrake

That's right. This is what happens when reason-giving is understood as rigidly inferential. So, part of what we want from a rationalist account is a way to either get out of this nightmare, or show why it doesn't matter. To what else must we appeal besides inference?

Whereas, and this is a big complication I think, people may be caused to adopt stances, paradigms of interpretations and so on — fdrake

And here's an answer to my anguished cry :smile:: EDIT: [Should we] talk about causes rather than reasons?

The "true reason" that someone values what they value might terminate in describing a cause or telling a story, rather than giving a reason. — fdrake

Your use of scare-quotes around "true reason" says it all: Are we willing to accept a cause or a narrative as a reason? It would not be a theoretical reason, as Pincock understands one. And here the question of level is really critical. If you tell me your belief in ghosts is caused by growing up around people who believed in ghosts, I'll say "Thanks much" and completely ignore this as a reason for me to believe in ghosts. From a rationalist perspective, a reason is supposed to be "for everybody." Chakravartty and Pincock both discuss this, and as you'd imagine, Chakravartty believes some reasons can be valid for you but not for me, while Pincock thinks this is loose talk, and that a "true reason" asks for universal consent.

But suppose the explanandum is "Why I have adopted epistemic stance X." Can we opt out at the very beginning of the endless-justification-by-inference loop, by replying with a cause? That would be, in Pincock's terms, a "practical reason." He doesn't think it's enough, because it's not "appropriately connected to the truth." We'll see more of this in Part Two. For now, I think this point you raise about what counts as a "true reason" lies at the heart of the debate. The answer will affect everything, from judgments about upstream-downstream relations, to issues about obligation or voluntarism.

Aristotle himself is replying to going concerns about "where justification terminates" and "syllogism skepticism" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Interesting. Can you give us a reference in the Analytics?

This might be a position that could be added to ↪J's initial list of stances. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quite possibly, and it raises a subtle question about whether there is a thing called a "realist epistemic stance," or rather whether it's the case that a certain epistemic stance will lead to realism (or the opposite). For instance, the second stance that Chakravartty offers, and I cited, was: "Empiricist stances, which question whether theorizing beyond the observable phenomena should be a basis for warranted belief." Arguably, such a stance could also be framed in @Joshs's terms: We have no basis for believing that an alleged debate between realism and antirealism is even coherent. This reading places realism and antirealism "downstream" from the epistemic stance itself.

I think it's upstreams all the way down. — fdrake

Maybe I'm taking this too far, but is this another way of saying "We are blank slates, and can only learn from experience" i.e. empiricism? Are there some faculties of mind which start "upstream", and are not created by input from downstream? Huge question, of course, but a serious explanation for how an epistemic stance is chosen must have a tentative answer, I think.

A dispute between Alice and Bob regarding sample size 19 vs 20 wouldn't just be about whether sample size 19 or 20 was good, it would be about whether it is reasonable to believe 19 or 20 is the minimum one to allow study results to update your beliefs. — fdrake

OK. And how do we want to fill in "good"? Presumably with something stronger than "reasonable to believe for purposes of updating beliefs through study results." What might that be? This is a good (sorry!) question to ask a realist.

An IRL example of a thresholding dispute . . . — fdrake

Very helpful.

there was no way to organise the putatively factual, the methodological concerns, and our values in a hierarchical fashion. There was no upstream or downstream. — fdrake

Are you sure? Didn't you end up doing precisely that? Or maybe I'm reading "hierarchical" differently from you. I'm thinking you could have (and probably had to) give reasons for what you decided to do, and in explaining them, you'd implicitly be indicating the hierarchy that wound up prevailing. But I could be way off.

So embarrassing. Maybe I'll sleep for 20 years.

:smile: Isn't it your bed time...? — Banno

Ha! Argumentum ad tempus requiescendi.

I will try to articulate the annoyance better, but probably not tonight, as the moon rises slowly over the Gulf of America . . .

can you give a reason for saying that {1,2,3} are red, that does not involve showing us or at least looking at the beads? — Banno

No. So take me to the next step -- what does that tell us about "red"?

It's not that use reduces to extension, but that the use of a (proper) name is it's extension - what it refers to. — Banno

I agree, because what else could a proper name refer to? Some "essence of Banno"? But I'm suggesting that a color name is different, because in addition to referring to the various extensions of "is red," it also (appears to) refer to something intensional, namely the quale we can each call to mind. I know how much you value ordinary usage, and I would maintain that this is a clearcut case: No one scratches their head and says, "Yes, but what is Banno? What does 'Banno' mean? How can I use 'Banno' intensionally?" whereas we surely do talk this way about most terms that have definitions in addition to an extension. A proper name merely signifies without defining. So I still think the burden of argument is on you to explain why this way of talking has to be mistaken.

We want to say that there is more to being red than being {1,2,3}; but note that that "more" is intensional rather than extensional — Banno

Yes. Does this mean you countenance an intensional use that is not extensional -- or by "we want to say," did you mean that we'd like to but we can't justify doing so?

I am drawn to the critters of no try realism and anti-realism — Joshs

I'm dying to know what your software misunderstood here! :grin:

The passage you offer is very on-point. In the OP, I only devoted a single sentence to Chakravartty's idea that stance voluntarism would explain why the realism-antirealism debate can never be resolved. But this is an important claim he wants to make -- one that Pincock would certainly have to deny.

The reasons offered by Fine et al. are in a similar vein, but not identical. What I think they have in common with Chakravartty's viewpoint is the idea that the desideratum of "resolving a disagreement" between two epistemic stances is, on analysis, incoherent.

For realists, it is a significant achievement to determine, for some scientific theory or hypothesis, that this claim, with its semantic content independently fixed, is true. If the determination of the truth or falsity of a claim were entangled with the interpretation of its content, however, such that what the claim says was not determinable apart from those interactions with the world through which we assess its truth, then realists would be unable to specify the claims (i.e., the contents of those claims) about which they want to be realists.

This passage in particular fits with what @fdrake and I were discussing. I bolded the phrase about semantic content as independently fixed because it's a version of the question, Can we really separate "upstream" from "downstream" input in a neat way that maintains a distinction between epistemic and doxastic stances? The rest of the passage plays this out: If "what the claim says was not determinable apart from those interactions with the world through which we assess its truth," then interpretation and truth-value are viciously circular. It's a bit like the creationist/evolutionist example. Once the interpretation of terms like "fact" or "evidence" become dependent on an epistemic stance, we have to look for an interpretative truth that is outside the stance itself. How do we find it? Oddly, this could be considered an argument in favor of either the realist or the pragmatist position!

That is, and here I'm grossly overgeneralising, the extension. — Banno

I think you are. I was "seeing the picture" up to this point, but you'll have to work harder to explain how use reduces to extension. I believe you still need to respond to the bead question: How do we make coherent a situation where the extension remains the same but the color changes?

I don't really know what to do with this, and I might be missing a lot of subtleties, but my suspicion is that the distinctions between stance and doxastic attitudes, and stance and object level claims, aren't as clear as the argument needs to go through. — fdrake

Starting with your final thought . . . I agree. The more I reflect on both papers, the more I wonder whether Chakravartty and Pincock really have the same conception of what an epistemic stance is. Chakravartty gives a clear enough description, which I quoted, but we can see that, because he wants to present stance selection as a broad process involving many factors, he can't be precise about what is and isn't a stance, compared to a doxastic process within a stance. As we've noticed, merely using the "upstream/downstream" idea doesn't settle all the important questions about how that works. And it matters whether a stance is immune from "downstream" input.

Pincock, in contrast, needs a stance to be largely independent of its subject matter, and determinable by rational ("theoretical") criteria alone. Is this even the same thing that Chakravartty describes? A stance, described thusly, results in a huge meta-commitment such as "realism." Whereas Alice and Bob don't seem to have such a disagreement. Their differing stances look much less philosophically weighty -- and that may be Chakravartty's point, in part.

I think the following is an option - upstream, downstream and alongside relations are allowed between stances and evidence, it just so happens that there is One True Dialectic that correctly links them. The One True Dialectic would have to fully understand how it related to all of its own principles, and conditions of revising them. I don't believe such a thing exists, but I would want an argument to rule it out. — fdrake

Great. Such a dialectic would presumably be capable of resolving -- or explaining away -- that nasty circle I described, in which a defeater changes a stance, in turn putting into question whether the defeater was legitimate evidence. I'd be very interested in Pincock's take on this: Does non-voluntarism about epistemic stances mean that there must be such a dialectic?

The paper advances the idea that a selection mechanism might work on stances, and render some of them rationally impermissible and some rationally permissible. Above and beyond that, there is the possibility of there being a single stance which is obligate to hold {about some domain}. — fdrake

Yes. It's important to remember that Chakravartty is not an "anything goes" guy. He certainly believes that some epistemic stances would be ill-chosen, on grounds of irrationality.

. . . the core of the article's imaginative background on the matter. It cleaves the enactment of an epistemic stance from what it concerns, which could be read as cleaving how things are done from what's done, even though what's done influences how things are done through learning, and how things are done influences what's done through norms. — fdrake

To use some old language, an epistemic stance is imagined as -- conceivably, if not in practice -- an a priori commitment, an armchair commitment that could be determined without recourse to any questions about "what it concerns." The appeal would be strictly to the "how," the process, rather than what that process is working with. We could even go so far as to call it an analytic understanding of epistemology. (Or is this way too strong for Chakravartty, who is very concerned with contexts?) For a non-voluntarist like Pincock, this becomes an appeal to rationality itself, which on this understanding will dictate our epistemic stance.

But, as you point out, this immediately seems to lead to some inconsistencies about what's a factual claim and what's a criterion for a factual claim. Granting that creationism is incorrect, is this because it is a false factual claim, or is it better characterized as a false conclusion based on an epistemic stance that is much too liberal in what counts as evidence? In other words, do the creationist and the evolutionist even agree on what counts as a factual claim -- do they share the same epistemic stance about this? I would say they do not, meaning that their disagreement is in part about stances, not just the facts on the ground. They will have different understandings of how to determine what a "fact" is. And this is where Pincock's realism comes in. He would of course claim that their understandings are not merely different; one is correct, the other ludicrously wrong.

It would then seem that the stance is secretly a list of propositions and attitudes toward them, rather than a means of assigning propositions to attitudes given a context — fdrake

I know what you mean. If a non-voluntarist is going to claim that they have a rationally/theoretically mandatory epistemic stance, they will be asked their reasons for believing this. Will the reasons they give be the same kind of reasons that two people would give who share an epistemic stance but disagree on a particular scientific interpretation? This is hard to understand. And it tempts us to say that all this talk of stances is really a way of justifying some core propositions about method or process which are believed/disbelieved/held as uncertain, not merely "adopted." We want to link propositions with these same attitudes within an epistemic stance -- that's the whole point of having one -- but where are we standing before the stance? What's the further argument that there are worse and better (maybe even obligatory) reasons for enacting the stance?

There's a lot more in what you wrote that is interesting and worth pursuing, but I'll stop here. Since this question of what might make an epistemic stance attractive or even obligatory keeps showing up as central, I really should write Part Two, which concerns Pincock's incoherence argument. So I'll try to do that fairly soon.

So now you are making use of a private rule... this (indicating the qual) is red...

And how can we say that what you pick out by "this" is the same as what I pick out?

I don't see that question as having any significance. — Banno

This seems to conflate several issues. Why is my description of my red quale a private rule? What would be the (correct, presumably) use of a public rule to describe the quale? I'm not seeing the alternative.

As for whether you and I are naming the same quale, wouldn't the answer be: Conceivably we aren't, but it's unlikely, given how color names are learned. And again, even if our meanings turned out to be different, it would have no bearing on whether we intended rather than extended (so to speak). When I point to the red beads and call them "red", this has nothing to do with their extension. Because, as above, the same beads might be green, with no difference in extension. If the extension were all that mattered, how would I know if they were red or green? So what then is the difference?

What I'd really like -- what I think would help most for me to see this picture -- would be to hear your alternative account of how, for instance, we can label "red" without allowing that "red" means that color (or quale). And, anticipating you, if that account involves learning how a word is used, what is the "extensional version" of that? What do we teach a child when we teach them color names? "When you point to that, say 'red'?" And if the child replies, "Why?" what do we say?

(It is like a chess problem, isn't it? :wink: ). So, turning to the colored beads:

{1,2,3} may be extensionally equivalent to "is red", but would you really want to say that "{1,2,3}" means the same thing as "red"? — J

We agree that we know what "is red" and "is green" mean, sufficiently well to imagine them ourselves, and to pick them out in the visual field. (And I'm not trying to beg the question by employing "mean" as if we both understand it the same way. Please feel free to translate as you see fit.). If I understand you, you're saying that extensional equivalence explains this. Or at least that's how I interpret your:

If everything that applies to {1,2,3} applies to "...is red", then what more is there to "meaning"? — Banno

The "more" would be the quale "red." In pointing to the beads, I happen also to be pointing to beads 1,2,3, but if you and I are discussing redness, that would be beside the point.

Perhaps another good place to pause -- do you see something awry yet?

Is there more here than the collapse of "meaning" that occurs as one attempts to say what meaning is? — Banno

I think so . . . Let me try it from the idea of qualia. I suppose you agree that, if I ask you to close your eyes and imagine "red," and then "green," the two color patches or whatever you come up with will look different in your imagination. That is because (I would say) "red" and "green" have different meanings, at least as far as "meaning" is commonly understood. Are we on the same page so far?

Great OP and interesting paper. — fdrake

I'm glad it engaged you.

I was wondering if Chakravartty or Pincock have any writings about how one might adapt one's values, or change stance, given evidence? — fdrake

I don't know; I only know of these two philosophers from reading the cited papers. An important question, though. I would imagine that a stance voluntarist could give a convincing account of how they switched from one stance to another, given evidence. Someone like Pincock will have a much harder time, as they may have to actually deny that cogent evidence could arise. But notice what Pincock says toward the end of his paper: "A realist should not endorse . . . dogmatic loyalty to IBE [inference to the best explanation]. . . The only viable form of scientific realism is a cautious realism that responds appropriately to the historical record of success and failure for various modes of inference." We're left with wondering exactly how to interpret "appropriately", but the overall tone is not inflexible.

The construal of an epistemic stance, and indeed of epistemic values, seems to be {in the paper's words} "upstream" of matters of fact and questions of ontology, rather than "alongside" or possibly "downstream" of matters of fact and question of ontology — fdrake

Yes.

A stance doesn't judge matters of fact, it is a means by which matters of fact are judged - much like an assembly line for bikes can't be ridden as a bike. In that regard a commitment to a stance is an enactment of it. — fdrake

Yes. Moving on to "defeaters":

But that would render discoveries, facts, results - methodology - as potential changes for the admissibility of methodologies, and thus undermine a stance's construal as "upstream" from facts and matters of ontology. — fdrake

Your entire discussion of defeaters is very good, and I think puts the "upstream" problem in the right context, but let me zero in on the conclusion here. If an epistemic stance is supposed to tell us what we ought to believe, does that mean it has to be a one-way street? Or to stay with the river metaphor, does the justificatory stream flow in a single direction?

Well, how do we cobble together our epistemic stance in the first place? If Chakravartty's characterization is largely correct, it's a combination (hodge-podge?!) of factors, many of which are undoubtedly traveling "upstream" from the downstream events and evidence of our lives. At a certain point, we find we have a stance, however tentative. So the question is, does this stance now put up a kind of dam against any pesky evidentiary salmon that wants to swim upstream with new information that could put the stance itself into question?

I think this depends on how deep the epistemic commitments go. Someone like Pincock probably wants to say that some elements that comprise the commitments are irreversible, on pain of irrationality or incoherence. Your example of conservative Alice and cowboy Bob, however, doesn't seem nearly that bedrock. Couldn't a scientific realist make room for both Alice and Bob in the Temple of Reason? After all, neither one is questioning realism per se. They just have different risk tolerances when it comes to beliefs. The stance voluntarist will say that such tolerances are (largely) unresolvable by rational argument, which is not to say they aren't motivated by theoretical reasons. The stance-obligatorist (if that's a word) will deny this, and perhaps argue that even the difference between 19 and 20 represents the difference between what is rationally obligatory, given a realist stance, and what is incorrect.

This of course relates to your question about how a stance might change. My stance provides certain criteria for what counts as evidence tout court. Does that include evidence for the stance itself? Can the very stance that certifies item D as evidence in good standing be changed as a result of D, when what D defeats is some element of stance E? But then, that might mean D wasn't evidence in good standing after all, if the new stance no longer recognizes D as valid. This is a truly headache-producing circle, and I don't know the answer, other than to say that it motivates my question in the OP, "Is the argument for something being true, and worthy of belief, within a given epistemic stance the same kind of argument we’d give for the stance itself being rationally obligatory?"

construing fact, method, methodology and meta-methodology as inferentially related. — fdrake

Yeah, that's what it would be if there's no "rigid rational" epistemic stance that can trump all others, and travel both upstream and downstream is permitted.

The flexibility that goes into defining what allows one to adopt or enact a stance seems to give such wiggle room. — fdrake

I'm leaning that way too but let me give Pincock his say in Part Two.

Focusing on metaphysics rather than epistemology is taking us farther and farther from the OP. — T Clark

I don't agree. What you say here is critical to the issues the OP raises. After all, Chakravartty himself refers to a realist commitment to scientific method as a "metaphysical stance." When you write, "It's not our only choice of the way to see things, even for science," you're coming to grips with the key point that separates Chakravartty and Pincock. So please stay on the thread if you're interested!

But doubt this will convince you — Banno

It's not so much a matter of being convinced. I feel as you did, in an earlier thread, where you said something to the effect of, I'm frustrated because I can't see a point that is so obvious to others. (This might have been in regard to Rodl's concerns about Frege.).

If everything that applies to {1,2,3} applies to "...is red", then what more is there to "meaning"? — Banno

This would be the source of my frustration, here. No matter what angle I squint at it from, I keep seeing a need for "meaning" in order to give a convincing account of how intension works. But . . . better philosophers than I have contested this, so I'm going to keep pondering it.

I understand. But of course you know that many religious people maintain that complete faith in God erases these fears and doubts. The Abraham story pushes this to the limit. Could a father feel any faith in God under such circumstances?

Sorry, sometimes my sense of humor is obscure. Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling is famous, and kind of required reading if you're interested in the Abraham story, so I thought you were kidding about "obvious." He examines the agony of faith vs. ethics from many perspectives, imagining Abraham's reactions in several versions of how the story might have played out.

OK. Since this thread focuses on comparing and contrasting two philosophers, I can see why it wouldn't interest you.

It depends on what you are trying to achieve. If you're trying to achieve the most logical outcome, then you should. — Philosophim

This, I think, is close to Chakravartty's sense. He specifies "minimal constraints of internal consistency and coherence” -- so, broadly speaking, logical. In that sense, then, you're saying that such a stance is not voluntary or optional; we should choose it. How would you argue for that? Or do you think Pincock's position basically sets out that argument?

Oh, you never know. Might not be so obvious after all . . .

OK. And would you say that's a voluntary epistemic stance, in Chakravartty's sense?