Kathmandu will be the site of a giant mushroom festival in the year 2145. — Patterner
I guess not all thoughts are caused by thoughts. — Patterner
Ideas tend to spread continuously, and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. — Collected Papers, 6.202
[Peirce believed] we should take "thought" and "mind" to refer to both the particular minds of particular organisms, and to the intelligible patterns, the Platonic Ideas, found in the formation of crystals or the hexagonal cells of a honeycomb. — in Putting Philosophy to Work, 83
How's that? I'll look for a good analogue as well. — Banno
I don't think that's right. The propositional or meaning content of the thought can't lead to anything. — Patterner
We don't need to understand how thought can be brain activity, only that thought is brain activity. — hypericin
I agree that '12' would be the most common association, my point was only that it is not, by any means, the only possible association. If '7+5' can be said to cause '12' in those common cases where that association occurs, then it could be said to cause any other association that might occur it would seem. — Janus
Causation is often distinguished from correlation (association?) with the idea that to qualify as causal, when X occurs Y must occur. — Janus
Are the thoughts Keynes thinks in things, or rather complex dynamic sequences of events? — wonderer1
Thinking I had an understanding of something, I've often come to realize I didn't when I tried to put it into words. — Patterner
As maths, a world 3 object, entailment pertains even outside of any thought. — Dawnstorm
And then there's the problem that world 3 objects need to be maintained by world 2 process for them to exist. . . — Dawnstorm
However, in the case of a normally sighted person, how do you (or they) check that the purple cow that they are imagining is indeed imagined to be purple? — Pierre-Normand
Notice that nothing I've said about the public criteria the determination of the content of acts of imagination depend on impugns the notion that the person imagining them has first person authority. She's the one to be believed when she claims that the cow she imagines looks "like that" while pointing at the public sample. — Pierre-Normand
I'll come back to the issues of public criteria for intentions, as they may apply to LLMs, later. — Pierre-Normand
As to the "how" that you're asking? Good question. But we don't really have the answer to that for physical causation, when it comes right down to it. . . . I don't know that we can figure out more about thoughts causing thoughts than we currently know. — Patterner
I’m drawing on Rödl’s Kantian distinction between knowledge from receptivity and knowledge from spontaneity. Empirical knowledge is receptive: we find facts by observation. But avowals like "I believe…" or "I intend…" are paradigms of spontaneous knowledge. We settle what to believe or do, and in settling it we know it not by peeking at a private inner state but by making up our mind (with optional episodes of theoretical of practical deliberation). — Pierre-Normand
It's not causation. It's memory retrieval. — L'éléphant
Causation is physical. — L'éléphant
From a phenomenological perspective associations would not seem to be rigid or precise. — Janus
As to whether they are causal, if all our thoughts are preceded by neural activity, then the activation of one network which we might be conscious of as an association would presumably have a causal relationship with the neural network which it is experienced by us as being associated with. — Janus
I prefer: mental events supervene on physical events because they are two perspectives on the same thing. — hypericin
Both are equally causative because both refer to the same reality. — hypericin
How the very same thing can be framed as a brain event or a mental event is just the hard problem. — hypericin
there is a difference between the modal instance and the temporal instance. They are not the same. — Banno
Thinking of Ann -> World2 thought of how Ann is doing -> Production of World3 object "I wonder how Ann is doing" — Dawnstorm
there could be some causal connection ([but] how do we differentiate between cause, influence and trigger, for starters). — Dawnstorm
Is the thought "I wonder [how] Ann is doing" viewed as a type that anyone can have? Is it the thought that's in your brain? Is it the World 3 words and its associated proposition? — Dawnstorm
I suppose it can be argued that your initial thought about Ann did not cause your second thought about her. It can also be argued that it did, but I think there's a much stronger argument that the thought "7 + 5" caused the thought 12 — Patterner
If you later come across one of those details in other circumstances they will cause a connection to the other event. — Sir2u
Looking at it in terms of semantics, I'd say the connections between thoughts is associative. There are many common, that is communally shared, associations between ideas. — Janus
Looking at it from a physical perspective, the semantic relations could be physically instantiated as interconnections between neural networks. — Janus
So what made you think of Ann (W2) in the first place? — Sir2u
That is I was automatically seeing "thinking of Ann" as a background process that instatiates as both A and B. Wondering how Ann is doing and her birthday are two different elements you could connect with Ann. — Dawnstorm
I can't easily pin down a single thought. . . . So if you'd be excluding "unheard thoughts", I probably have little to contribute. — Dawnstorm
Do all thoughts have or need a cause? — Sir2u
But first of all exactly what is a thought? Is it that voice we hear in our head, or do we have unheard thoughts as well? — Sir2u
Thoughts are like actions. They're a continuous process. — Copernicus
Start by finding some question you really want answered. Then start reading around that. Make notes every time some fact or thought strikes you as somehow feeling key to the question you have in mind, you are just not quite sure how. Then as you start to accumulate a decent collection of these snippets – stumbled across all most randomly as you sample widely – begin to sort the collection into its emerging patterns. — apokrisis
. . . The second is monism, which holds that mind and matter are not two separate kinds of things at all, but rather that consciousness is a particular organization or pattern within the physical, not something over and above it. — tom111
JTB seems to be saying, "You can only know something if it's true." Or wait . . . maybe it's saying, "You can only know something if, right now, you are sure it's true." Which is it?
— J
Why not both at the same time? — javra
As I and others have pointed out in previous posts, ontological truths occur, i.e, ontological correspondence/conformity to that which is, was, or will be actual do occur. Implicit in every belief is an assent to that which is true. — javra
If one assumes that JTB must be absolutely devoid of any possibility of being wrong, then we all communicate all the time via beliefs which we don’t know to be true.
How would this not then result in a societal chaos of sorts wherein most all trust goes down the drain? — javra
For example, it would be odd for a typical westerner to say "though I believe it, I don't know whether I will eat anything tomorrow". — javra
But of course, we could reply here that you "know it to be true" just in case you have a justified belief that it is true, and it is true. I don't think that answers J's question though, because we still have to assume the "it is true" part. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Well, no. If S is some sentence that satisfies the criteria JTB, then by that very fact it is true — Banno
The circularity, so far as there is one, is in your then asking "But is it true?" — Banno
we can deduce, from the fact that we have JTB of X, that X is true.
— J
That's circular. You can only satisfy the JTB if you know that X is true. — Ludwig V
Again, there is a difference between P being true and it being established that P is true. J still hasn't taken this to heart. — Banno
Truth is a logical device, setting out the move between a sentence and what it says.
The "T" in JTB is that move. — Banno
For the purpose of defining knowledge, we can assume that we have a concept of truth and worry about what it is on another occasion. — Ludwig V
So you accept knowledge based on authority. I'm a bit surprised - it is quite unusual for philosophers to accept that. They usually, if only by implication, seem to believe that only first-person verification is satisfactory. That's a very strict criterion and cuts out most of what we (think we) know. — Ludwig V
My concerns with JTB are all about how the truth of P is supposed to be established
— J
I would think it isn't. We just act like it is true until we are prompted to reconsider. — Count Timothy von Icarus
To go toward the mirage is Justified True Belief (if one is not familiar with modern day science). And who knows, it might lead to water. Eventually. — Outlander
But we don't know that X is true via JTB, but via whatever the truth conditions are for X. — Ludwig V
If say I am certain that something is the case, then I mean that there cannot be any doubt about it. Then I would say I know it to be the case. If I think something is the case but there is any possible doubt it, then I would say that I believe it to be the case, but do not know it to be. — Janus
it's on us to show why we think there needs to be something of the sort where "P is *really* true," and that we must be able to assert that this is so, or even "know" it, and how exactly that is supposed to work, since it seems one could function "pragmatically" whilst only speaking to one's own beliefs without "knowing" that any other beliefs exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus
In the Matrix scenario there is no skepticism about the real world—in fact that is what those who see through the virtual illusion are trying to get back to. If Descartes considered this he would still be faced with the question of being able to doubt the purported real world just as much as he can doubt the virtual world of the Matrix. — Janus
But I think you may be getting into an unnecessary tangle because you (seem to be) focused on the special case of "I know that I know.." — Ludwig V
That is very helpful - it helps me understand much better Kant's connection of time with number and space with geometry. — Wayfarer
