Very good discussion. Here's what I'm wondering:

What can exist without observers are physical processes and relations between states. — Wayfarer

This is quite a commitment. The idea, presumably, is that unlike time, physical processes do not require a "common measure" within the same "frame of reference". How would you argue for that?

My point is not to deny physical reality . . . — Wayfarer

Yes, you don't have to deny it in order to arrive at all your important conclusions, but could someone deny it, coherently? Using your starting points, I don't see why not. So why would you recommend assuming it?

the fact that the sentient/rational being's existence is contingent to me 'cries' for an explanation. — boundless

Indeed, and as I said, I wonder whether philosophy is the right mode to give that explanation. We can't know for sure, but it has the feel to me of a question that, several hundred years from now, people will be amused was considered philosophical and not scientific.

Also, as @Mww pointed out, idealist theories about time are compatible with any story about the specific genesis of human consciousness. The OP is primarily questioning the idea that the apparent linearity or successiveness of time would be evidence against mind as constitutive of reality, since mind appeared at some point in time. But as I wrote, I think "reality" is being used ambiguously here.

Very good. I'm reminded of the so-called "ripple effect" theory that Christian theologians have sometimes offered to explain how the incarnation worked. The idea is that Christ's incarnation did not merely affect temporal events following his life, but was like a stone thrown in a pond: the ripple went in all directions, backwards as well. The theological reasons why this would be important are probably obvious, and not of much interest to me, so enough said. But it does exemplify another way to break "time" free from "succession".

The OP and its arguments have nothing to do with the being or becoming of, hence attempts no explanation for the existence of, any kind of creature, individually or in general, — Mww

This is true. And while I agree with the OP, I think we need to do better at responding to the type of question that @boundless raises. If evolutionary theory is acknowledged to be true, then we know that consciousness can appear (using the most neutral word possible) as an item in biological history. Will it have causes? Presumably. Will there be counter-factuals we could state that would describe necessary conditions? Probably. So when we say that consciousness is "fundamental to reality", it's pretty clear what we don't mean: We don't mean that the history of Earth had to be what it was, or that, should it have been the case that at one point in the history of the universe, nothing was conscious, that therefore nothing was real. That's not the reality that Kant et al. are talking about. Rather, we're asking into what is fundamental to our reality, as subjects of experience.

We don't want an endless debate about how to use "reality", I trust. But there's a legitimate usage of the term that grounds what @boundless is asking, if I understand them. Within our story of reality as we experience it, what is the further story about how we, as conscious beings, came to be, came to exist as part of the universe's furniture? That does seem contingent. There may also be little philosophy can say about it.

Why not just say that the babe has not yet learned to see the ship, and doesn't do so until they do so under a description? — Banno

Yes, though maybe we should use scare-quotes: "The babe has not yet learned to see 'the ship' and doesn't do so until they do so under [that] description." This allows that the kid has some kind of visual experience before the learning.

What we call a "ship" just is the sort of thing that we see. — Banno

OK, again adding that on occasion we see things that we can't conceptualize without further instruction.

So the claim is: when I see a ship, I am directly in contact with the ship itself, not with a representation, sense datum, or mental model of it. — Banno

A lot of the foofaraw here seems to hinge on "in contact." One of those terms that can be used in many contexts to mean many things. Certainly there is no ship (not even a "ship") pressing against my eyeballs when I see one; it can't be that kind of contact we mean. But why should it be? The appropriate kind of contact is, precisely, perceptual contact, and I agree it doesn't help much to interpose "representation" or "datum".

But I have some sympathy with those who want to. I think they're trying to emphasize the fact that our contact with what we perceive doesn't provide us with certainty about the experience. There's the idea that, if I had the right kind of direct perception, I couldn't be wrong. Instead, I perceive a ship . . . but wait a minute, no I don't. Fair enough. But I don't think the language of "sense data" or "indirect perception" is the best way to keep this distinction in mind.

Do you understand my problem? Part of it may be that I'm unfamiliar with Sider. I'd like to know how the joints relate to the magnets (I really wish he'd found metaphors that work better together). — Dawnstorm

Totally agree about the metaphors! He inherited "reference magnetism" from David Lewis and others, and "carving at the joints" is Plato, but still . . . both are awkward and, together, comic.

I think I do understand your problem, and I'm not helping much because most of what you're saying about taxonomy is new to me, so I'm not really sure, on the fly, what to say. Probably I should shut up and think it over for a while. For what it's worth, I think the confusion has got something to do with whether there is a joint-carving taxonomy available. In ignorance of the issues you've raised, I assumed there was, more or less. But if there isn't, then perhaps we really can take our pick, depending on context and usefulness. Again, Sider is not suggesting that all problems of this variety will resolve themselves, because not every group of related concepts will contain ones that do carve at the joints. But he is suggesting that some of them will.

So "species" may just be poorly chosen as an example, whereas "provable in L" or "electron" may succeed.

Also, Sider means E and E* to be quite different kinds of terms. E is supposed to be a "common" term like "causation" or "leopard" that refers in a commonly accepted (or contested) way. E* is supposed to express whatever E actually refers to, if there is indeed a reference magnet that carves at the joints. (Sider doesn't think that there's a "causation*", interestingly enough. He doesn't believe the concept of causation is fundamental.). I imagined originally that "leopard" once referred to several big cats, whereas "leopard*" now refers to Panthera pardus. But you've helped me see that, if "species" is indeed non-joint-carving, as I now suspect, then there's no reason to expect "Panthera pardus" to be any more help with fundamentality than "leopard." For many or most purposes the binomial nomenclature does the job . . . but not always.

Kant’s concern was more structural and general: he focused on how the mind contributes to experience. — Tom Storm

And we know that perceptual content is structured, that we see a chair, not bare colours and textures. — Banno

Picking up on these observations: By starting with the idea of "looking at a ship", we can be misled into believing that to perceive a ship is always to do so under that description.. A child has to learn, quite literally, to look at a ship -- to learn what to look for, how to recognize one, what the fuzzy cases are. Direct perception would instead be something like "bare colors and textures" -- a very unnatural thing for the human species to experience, past infancy. I think that to defend direct realism, you have to argue that those unmediated (?) experiences are what we perceive, full stop.

This suggests a significant parallel between the evaluation of art and concepts. — hypericin

Yes, I like that. It shows that, if there is indeed something different about ontological structure, the difference must have a degree of non-subjectivity that we don't usually associate with artistic evaluations. We could let Sider off the hook by denying this, and just say that when he talks about "privileged structure" he means a structure that is not (for example) useless, meaningless, and arbitrary. But I think he means more than that. Sider is part of the "grounding revival" in metaphysics, and if I understand him, he's claiming that you need certain concepts in order to ground other concepts; those in turn will ground yet others; etc. A privileged ontological structure would be one that gets the grounding relations right -- crucially, these relations are not subjective or pragmatic in the way that useful, meaningful, or non-arbitrary relations in part are. ("Non-arbitrary" might be closest here.) Or if they are subjective, they are only so in the innocuous way that logical relations must be. That would be the claim, at any rate.

I'm perfectly free to call all European art bad art. What I cannot easily do is call it all non-art. — hypericin

I agree with you about the important difference between dubbing something art vs. going on to evaluate it as good or bad art. But I really did mean that a person who would make such an outlandish claim about European art does not even know what makes something "art". This person would, I suppose, have a different culture's or era's artworks in mind -- or maybe they believe there is no genuinely good art. But it's preposterous to suppose that the entirety of Western culture could be wrong about this. We could perhaps tease out this (I admit very unlikely) individual's views on what constitutes good art, and hopefully discover what it is they're misunderstanding about the nature of art.

I think privileged structure exists. But concepts don't perfectly capture it. — hypericin

Actually, that's pretty much what I think too. Well, to give Sider his due . . . perhaps there are some concepts, broadly logical, that do capture privileged structure. I leave that determination to those better versed in philosophy of logic than I am.

there is not necessarily one truth to converge upon. . . "Which truth?" can as much a cause for disagreement as "which is true?" — hypericin

Good. The question, for any given inquiry, of whether there is a single culminating truth (or, indeed, anything that would bring the inquiry to an end) will always be itself a question; not necessarily an unanswerable question, but the answer can never be assumed. Not sure about Peirce, but I think Habermas would agree.

If you had a shark, a trout, and a camel, what would you think are the joints to carve here? — Dawnstorm

I would say (and probably Sider too) that there are a number of reference magnets available for that group. Remember, we can make all sorts of classifications and groupings without also claiming that they're ontologically important. Colors, for instance, even when we "get them right", are hardly examples of privileged structure.

I see the problem about species that you and @hypericin have raised. But it still seems like the "fuzzy edges" to me, for this reason: In practice, a person who says that a beaver is a fish has made a mistake. Our concept of "species" may be unclear, but that judgment is not. The zoologists' joke shows why; if we really were in doubt, we couldn't say the most basic things about taxonomy.

When we have two terms, E and E*, if I understand this thread correctly, Sider would assume that we can tell what is E and what is E*, because of how the terms are restricted by what's "out there". But the biological classification of fish says: "It's not that easy." When we have the facts, our classifications might break down. We're juggling contexts. — Dawnstorm

Yes. I'm not saying that withholding natural-language terminology will allow all joint-carving candidates to appear crystal-clear for us. "Species" may not carve at the joints. Sider does think E* will carve better than E because E* quantifies more perspicuously, but that doesn't commit him to claiming we can never make a mistake. "We can tell" should be understood as provisional in the majority of cases, I would imagine. Sider merely wants to insist that pre-fab terms (or disputes about them) will only make it harder to identify and analyze the reference magnets that are actually "out there." Of course, if you don't think "out there" applies at all, that's a whole other discussion . . .

Your post focuses on some important stuff. I like the way a good conversation can do some chaff-separating, helping all parties see what's really worth thinking about.

forming concepts is as much art as it is science. . . .This is not to say that anything goes. There are better and worse concepts, — hypericin

If we knew how to give the details of this, we'd be far along. Can the comparison with art hold up? No doubt there is better and worse art, just as there are better and worse concepts. But we further say of a concept that it can be right or wrong, it can correctly or incorrectly align with the world. When we talk about bad or unsuccessful art, we're thinking about something else. One view is that bad art isn't internally consistent, its form doesn't work. Another is that bad art fails to mean. In contrast, when the bred and rue people draw their lines, aren't they consistent? (They always say true things about bred and rue.) Aren't they saying meaningful things? (We have no trouble understanding what they're getting at.) It seems there's a dimension missing from the art comparison, and it has something to do with "the right sort" of concepts.

Not only the creation, but the ranking of both, in part, is subjective. — hypericin

Here it might be useful to remember the two senses of "subjective". We agree they're subjective in that, without a subject to do the creating and ranking, there'd be nothing to talk about. But "subjective" can also mean "matter of personal opinion" or "relative to a particular viewpoint", and I don't think that sense applies here. An established scientific law is not subjective in that sense. You can't say to an exponent of the theory of entropy, "Well, that's just your opinion. I like my theory better." I'm not even sure you can do that with art, at least not completely. Someone who declared, for instance, that all European art (including music, literature, et al.) from 1700 to 2000 was bad art would be told something like, "You must not understand how 'art' is used."

I'm curious what Sider has in mind instead of the objective/subjective dichotomy. — hypericin

I'll write something about that in a subsequent post -- I want to reread his section on subjectivity.

The world isn't structured in concepts. Our minds structure the world as conceptual. This is perspective, a creative act. Because of the mismatch between world and concept, there is no perfect set of concepts. — hypericin

We can agree on all this, but remain troubled about where the idea of "mismatch" could even arise. This circles back once again to whether there's a "world" -- our world, not a perspectiveless world -- which exhibits privileged structure. If not, are we reduced to pragmatics? Is something a mismatch because it doesn't do what we want done?

The space of "good, aligned" concepts is endless, including the meta-concepts we are discussing now, and we will never stop arguing about them. :wink: — hypericin

Yet two of my favorite philosophers, Peirce and Habermas, insist we should regard communication as in principle converging on truth. This may be a statement of faith, in the same way that ethical statements can be, but I do think that every good book or interesting conversation moves us just a little bit toward that convergence. As you point out, philosophy opens the door to meta-conversations, which are endless! But not everything deserves iteration.

But, does he admit to a mere plurality of ways? If so, then he can still, in principle if not realistically, enumerate them in his hypothetical book. Or, a boundless number of ways? In which case, the project seems hopeless, even in principle. — hypericin

I think it depends on how comprehensive the "book" must be. I think you're right that the ways are boundless, since humans are but one type of consciousness. Writing that book is indeed hopeless. But (and we shouldn't stretch the titular metaphor too far) the book Sider wants to write is a book about our world, which he believes can permit of objectively better and worse ways of being described. How many are there? What are the degrees of betterness and worseness? I file those questions under the category of "What is 'the right sort' of alignment with the world?", which Sider sensibly concedes is very difficult to answer.

[Lived human reality] is a subjective perspective on something that is already intrinsically subjective. — hypericin

Would you be open to modifying that to say "already contains intrinsically subjective aspects"? I'd be fine with that, especially if we bear in mind Sider's idea that "objective/subjective" may not carve at the joints anyway.

Science is a description of the world that subtracts the human, subjective element. Scientific description is the kind of co creation you and perhaps Sider might actually have in mind. Whereas philosophy is perspectives on something that is already intrinsically perspectival. — hypericin

Yes, I see what you mean. Science is trying to eliminate one of the two subjective elements -- with what success, opinions would differ. And we could say that philosophy at any rate doesn't start with that goal or presupposition. To the extent that a philosopher wants to identify themselves with the scientific project -- and many do -- then they too will try to approach the "view from nowhere." But they needn't.

The project of finding the best, most ontologically aligned description of the world, is the scientific project, not philosophy. — hypericin

When you put it this way, though, I don't think I agree. That would only be true if your ontology was one that comprised exactly what science can study. See above -- that's a premise of some philosophers, but probably not all that many. Or perhaps you only mean that any philosophy, no matter what its ontology comprises, which thinks in terms of "best" and "correct alignment", is a scientific project in spirit. That would put the roots of science back with the Greeks, and perhaps we should.

This has been a very substantive discussion so far. I think the new approach we discussed in the previous thread gets the credit. — T Clark

That would be cool, but one way or the other, yes, good conversation.

But it makes a point about an inherent contradiction in physicalism.
— Wayfarer

It is, as you say, one of the main reasons to reject physicalism, at least as it's usually understood.
— J

I don't understand why this would be true. Maybe I misunderstood what Wayfarer meant when he wrote "are the mathematical laws themselves physical." — T Clark

And @Wayfarer can of course elucidate, but I took him to mean that a "law" isn't something made of physical items. You can adopt the thinnest ontology and still not find any numbers or laws among the sub-atomic particles. Or you can accept macro-items -- tables, groups, mereological items -- and still not find any laws. They're not "out there" in the way that the physical world is (or seems to be) out there. This is a challenge to physicalism about all non-physical items, but it's particularly stinging here because mathematical laws are supposed to be basic and explanatory. How does that square with a physicalist conception of what exists?

My elaboration of W's point was to compare a statement of a mathematical law produced by, say, an AI program, with the same statement produced by a mathematician. For physicalism to be true, you would have to say that there is no difference between the two instances; they're both just bits of writing, physical marks on paper. They both exist in exactly the same way. To me, that seems very unlikely -- the idea that explanation can really be reduced to an arrangement of ink on paper. (It's the same proposal that thoughts can be reduced to neuronal activity.)

Interesting OP, thanks. Reading the presuppositions, the first thought I had was that most laymen, even quite educated ones, still make the same pre-1900 assumptions! But perhaps I'm being cynical.

do these patterns tell us about reality itself, or only about the ways humans organize and interpret our experiences?
— Tom Storm

This is a really good way of putting it. I think the two choices you’ve given us above are absolute presuppositions of two different metaphysical approaches which have different understandings of what “reality” means. — T Clark

Not to pull this back to reference magnetism, but . . . the two approaches could be contrasted and understood without necessarily needing to employ the term "real" or "reality." "What does the the word 'reality' refer to?" is non-substantive. "Can we know anything apart from our own interpreted experiences?" is substantive. Or at least as substantive as such a highly abstract inquiry can be.

The question that jumps out at me is: are the mathematical laws themselves physical, and, if so, how? I don’t expect an answer to that, as there isn’t one, so far as I know. But it makes a point about an inherent contradiction in physicalism. — Wayfarer

Excellent. It is, as you say, one of the main reasons to reject physicalism, at least as it's usually understood. I wonder -- if we changed the question to ask, "Can a mathematical law be expressed in purely physical terms?" would that be answerable? Your favorite AI can do this, in one sense: It can spit out whichever law you please. But has it expressed the law?

while there are infinite ways of seeing that are misaligned with the world, there are also infinite ways of seeing that are in fact aligned. "One true way" is just naive realism. Once naivhe realism is discarded, one realizes that the way we see the world is a construction, one that is aligned with the world in the relevant ways. — hypericin

This really gets to the tough problem. Let's agree that we'll use "naive realism" to mean the idea that 1) there is a description of the world that is not a construction, but instead mind-independent in a somewhat mysterious way we'll have to leave as a promissory note; and 2) there is only one of these. On that understanding, naive realism is a non-starter. Neither condition can be met. A description requires a describer, hence some relation to a mind. And even if we decide that we can construct a description that is "aligned in the relevant ways," there's no reason to believe that there could only be one of them -- maybe not even for humans, and certainly not for other consciousnesses. (And BTW, Sider never implies that his joint-carving candidates add up to a single true way of assessing ontology.)

So let's kick naive realism to the curb and consider our options. On the one hand, we want our descriptions and explanations to bear the imprint of a human mind -- to be, in some sense, co-creations between the world and us. On the other hand, we're hanging on to the concept of "being aligned with the world in the relevant ways," as I think we should. We want to be able say why the bred and rue people are getting something wrong -- it's not that they're saying false things, but that the things they're saying aren't aligned in the right ways. Less bizarrely, we want an account of error in general.

I think we can do this. Realism about structure, to use Sider's phrase, can be a realism about stuff that is both dependent on our interactions with the world and not the least bit arbitrary. The question to answer is: the structure of what? When we inquire into what grounds what, in logic or metaphysics, what's the object of our inquiry? Is it first-order ontology understood as naive realism? No, we've rejected that. Rather, we want to understand the structure of our world, the world we encounter as humans. With Kant, we hold out the possibility that the noumenal world also exists, but that's not what we're looking at when we look at structure.

This is just a sketch, but I hope it's pointing in the right direction. So . . .

Whereas, philosophy straddles first and second order ontologies. It is about the real world, but a world that includes subjectivity and perspectives, and itself constructs perspectives upon that subjective-inclusive world. As such, there can never be a single philosophical "book of the world".
— hypericin

:clap: — Wayfarer

. . . I'll add my applause to @Wayfarer's. :clap: "[Philosophy] is about the real world, but a world that includes subjectivity and perspectives, and itself constructs perspectives . . ." -- I think that puts it very well, as long as we add that these perspectives can be more or less aligned, can carve better or worse at the joints.

I'm beginning to suspect that "thin ontology" is just science. The examples you've shown conform to this. Could Sider be mistaking philosophy for science? — hypericin

I didn't want to ignore this, because it may be true. Not exactly that he mistakes philosophy for science, but that he over-values the parsimony and predictive value of current scientific concepts of the physical world.

The "book of the world" is science. There might be one grand unified theory, one way of describing the objective world that perfectly carves to the joints of the objective world. — hypericin

That would be a critical reading of Sider's project, possibly justified. For what it's worth, he spends most of his time in Writing the Book of the World talking about structures that are clearly philosophical rather than scientific in nature. And I put a lot of weight on his liberality with regard to first-order ontologies. I think he prefers a scientific "thin ontology" when it comes to physical stuff, but he's trying to construct a way of understanding the world that doesn't require us to agree.

If we asked him, "Can a first-order ontology, as you use the term, include a refusal to separate objective from subjective components?" I believe he'd say yes. I don't think he'd insist that the objective/subjective polarity can only emerge in second-order ontology. In fact, in his (brief) discussion of subjectivity, he makes it clear that it's not a good reference magnet -- it doesn't carve at the joints. So he might be happy with dropping that old dichotomy entirely, except for what he calls "value" terms in morality and aesthetics.

I actually think this is a horrible example, biology is so messy. — hypericin

Sounds like you know more about biology than I do, so I need a better example! I thought "species" was fairly clear-cut, though sometimes fuzzy at the edges.

Far more common are alterations in perception, and especially thinking. Not mere illusion. Leaving LSD aside (drugs and philosophy is a huge topic, very worthy of an op), it is clear that the way a bat sees the world is no illusion. It is a way of seeing, coequal with the way we see. — hypericin

I think we basically agree, and you're right to make the distinction (which I did not) between illusion and simple difference, perhaps due to one's species. The LSD example does point to a problem, though: You've chosen to describe the typical psychedelic experience (or at least it was typical for me) as an "alteration in perception" -- very neutral language. If, while tripping, I see the usual fanfare of squigglies and trails and pulses, these are not actually "aligned with the world." The bat is doing a far better job at that than a person with chemically altered consciousness. Surely we should be honest and call the LSD experience a distortion of perception, not a mere alteration? Which brings us back again to the question of whether there is a "right sort" of ontology. If there isn't, then we need another way to explain why the wall isn't really breathing.

But you're right that, even among the possible "right sorts," there are infinite variations, depending on all the factors you named.

I'll reply to some of your other thoughts . . . but gotta run now. Appreciate the conversation!

The last couple of weeks, I've noticed that I'm not being emailed about some of the references, replies, and quotes from my posts. I can't see any pattern about which ones are or aren't -- it doesn't seem to depend on a particular thread or poster.

Anyone have any experience with what might be going on here?

As I was rereading this I had an epiphany. The primary subject of the thread was not metaphysics, it was the enumeration of the underlying assumptions of pre-quantum mechanics physics. I could have raised that question without ever mentioning metaphysics at all. — T Clark

Great insight.

in a sense I've drawn the joints of the discussion in different places. — T Clark

And the acid test would be: By drawing the joints this way, can you increase the substantivity of the discussion? Can you head off disputes about terminology? Seems so to me. Of course you never know what someone will find terminologically debatable.

So... I guess you were right. — T Clark

Yeah, but . . . "going Siderian" is not a panacea, as you and others have shown. I'd settle for the modest goal outlined above: Keep it substantive.

And speaking of acid tests . . .

perceptually the man can see the rock one way sober, one way drunk, one way on LSD. . . . There is no limit to the number of ways all the different sentient species, past, present, future, from earth or other planets, might perceive the rock. — hypericin

This is true.

Crucially, each and every one of these perspectives is valid , none are garbage, none are privileged. — hypericin

Not quite sure what you mean here. If we stipulate that each one legitimately occurred to the person concerned, then I guess they're all valid in that sense: You can be mistaken about what an illusion represents, but not about the fact that you're experiencing something.

Concepts too are perspectives. They are the cognitive counterparts to perceptual perspectives. They are also limitless. There is no upper bound to the number of ways to think about, compare, categorize the rock. — hypericin

OK, interesting analogy.

Creating concepts is a creative endeavor. Part of the artistry of it is to create concepts that are somehow aligned with the world, that "carve the joints". "Cow plus electron" doesn't cut it. — hypericin

I agree with this, and here's where the analogy with perception is especially helpful. The myriad perceptions (or illusions of perception) that you mention may be valid in the sense I used, but not in the sense that they are "aligned with the world." A mirage is when you see something that isn't there. And Sider's "bred and rue" people are, according to him, thinking something that isn't there. More precisely, they can think an infinite number of true things about the concepts they've invoked but still be missing a crucial piece of ontological structure, a piece which -- and here it gets controversial -- is really there.

So back to the first-order ontology question:

"relationships, concepts, categories" et al. seems just as much a part of first-order ontology.
— J

I don't think so. These are observer dependent, and limitless, while I would take "first order ontology" to be observer independent and finite. It is clear to me they don't exist on the same order of being. — hypericin

concepts and perspectives are not ontologically primary, in the same way a heap of atoms is. — hypericin

I'll take a dose of my own medicine and withdraw the term "first-order ontology"! We're now hyper-alert to what could happen next, if I don't: We'd launch into a debate about how to use the term, or even worse, the term "ontology" itself.

Instead, I'll just say that you're right, concepts and perspectives look to be observer-dependent. In two senses: They differ depending on individual (or intersubjective) perspectives, and there wouldn't be any if there weren't any subjects to have them. Are there are also things that are observer-independent? You're using "a heap of atoms" in much the same way that Sider uses "sub-atomic particles" to represent a "thin ontology" of very basic physical items. I'm not sure what to say about that. Can we even have gluons without concepts, which we've agreed must be observer-dependent? Does "observer-dependent vs. independent" carve at the joints? That's a complicated issue, but at least we can try to keep it substantive by focusing on the different ways in which phenomena may or may not require constitutive construction by consciousness.

coming up with a fixed, finite set of these everyone agrees on is hopeless endeavor. — hypericin

Maybe so, in philosophy. But let's not forget the leopard I brought up a while back. Biological taxonomy is a good example of doing precisely this; we have a fixed set of concepts that everyone (who knows the science) agrees on. Where it's fuzzy at the edges, work needs to be done, but the overall shape of the project is accepted, I think.

Is this a fair criticism of Sider? How might he respond? — hypericin

He might say, "Well, if we can't enter the metaphysics room and find more precise terms that correspond to the right reference magnets . . . so much the worse for ordinary-language philosophy." But I think he'd be pleased that you see his point about "aligning with the world." This is where I have the most questions, but Sider has sharpened the issue in a very helpful way. And he too admits that "it's highly unclear what exactly the 'right sort' of basis is" for making decisions about what is explanatorily fundamental, i.e., ontologically primary.

As for first-order ontology, if we want to go back to that term, Sider says, "Ontological realism [is the view that] ontological questions are 'deep', 'about the world rather than language'." And he adds, "It is consistent with all positions on first-order ontology." This is a pretty broad understanding. I think he means to include the position that there are no fundamental structures that are observer-independent, though he doesn't agree with it. But it is, after all, a standard position on first-order ontology.

Sorry if this is muddy; it's hard to find the right way to express the problem.
— J

I think there’s an inherent contradiction in the question you’re wanting to pose. — Wayfarer

Could be. What do you think it is?

let me see if I understand what you mean by "ineliminable"
— J

it means, can't be eliminated from the reckoning. — Wayfarer

So it's just about human reckoning? I was wanting you to make a bigger claim: I asked, "If there could somehow be a view-from-nowhere perspective on what there is, that perspective would "discover" consciousness. And the question that must follow is, Would the discovery be first-personal, even from the viewpoint of the view from nowhere?" I thought you wanted to say "Yes, the discovery is, ineliminably, from a perspective." I was then going to ask, "Is this perspective identical with consciousness?" I think a lot of the thrust of a view-from-nowhere argument concerns whether perspective, viewpoint, stance, et al., are referring to exactly the same thing that "being conscious" or "being a subject" refers to. In the scenario you describe, where we try to imagine a perspectiveless description of the early universe, it seems true that there is nothing left to imagine. Does that mean that we cannot imagine it (referring to consciousness) or that there is nothing to be imagined (referring to the lack of perspective)? Or are they one and the same? Sorry if this is muddy; it's hard to find the right way to express the problem.

The question is: did this longing to ditch rationality turn into in-humanism that set the stage for the Holocaust? — frank

Well, no, I don't see the argument for it. But anyone attending the Lectures on Metaphysics, given in 1935, would have heard that "in speaking of greatness we are referring primarily to the works and destinies of nations" (11); and "The works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism but have nothing whatever to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between global technology and modern man) -- have all been written by men fishing in the troubled water of 'values' and 'totalities'" (199).

This sort of thing seems like it would have provided much more aid and comfort to Nazis than anything in Being and Time. The second quote in particular looks to be in line with your question about ditching rationality. I don't know nearly enough about Germany in 1935 to be able to guess how such talk of national greatness would have been received at a university. Nor is it clear to me that Heidegger's scorn for values, in this context, equates to an irrational endorsement of in-humanism. Yet Heidegger is clearly buying in to 1) the concept of national greatness, and 2) the belief that National Socialism offers "inner truth and greatness." If not irrational, then surely nuts.

Thanks for the excellent OP and thoughtful shepherding of the ensuing discussion.

You may not need another cook for this broth, but . . .

the reality of first-person consciousness is ineliminable, and any account of the world must ultimately be grounded in the structures of experience as they appear to the subject. — Wayfarer

This assertion is clearly key, so let me see if I understand what you mean by "ineliminable". I think you mean that, if there could somehow be a view-from-nowhere perspective on what there is, that perspective would "discover" consciousness. And the question that must follow is, Would the discovery be first-personal, even from the viewpoint of the view from nowhere?

(If talk of a God's-eye or view-from-nowhere perspective is troublesome to some on TPF, just think of it as a limit question: Is there any way to conceive how consciousness may be observed or discovered that is not itself an instance of consciousness?)

What I think you don't mean is that we can't imagine a world without consciousness. Sure we can. We can imagine a world without any living things too, even though only a living thing can do any imagining at all. Unless one is a panpsychist, there was no consciousness in the early universe.

Tell me if this is right, and I'll take it a bit further.

I think the primary takeaway I've gathered from this thread is simply that there need not be "correct" words to identify concepts. That is, when I say "existence" is this way, and you have a different way of using "existence", it's perhaps not that one of us has a better understanding of "existence", but that we are simply talking about different concepts and we need to think in terms of their implications. — QuixoticAgnostic

Yes. I would add that the "different concepts" may be seen as more or less perspicacious, more or less adequate in capturing ontological structure. This is Sider's view, at least. Hence the notion of reference magnets.

This seems kind of naive, as if words really just picked out subsets of ontological reality. When in fact, words are as often dealing with relationships, concepts, relationships and categories of concepts, subjective relationships... — hypericin

I think it would be naive, if ontology was conceived as a 1-to-1 matching of terms with "objects" or items we metaphorically imagine as existing in a visual space. But your list of "relationships, concepts, categories" et al. seems just as much a part of first-order ontology. Also, nothing here is meant to limit what a word can do. We use words in so many different ways; Sider is focusing on a particular philosophical use, and how it can get murky and non-substantive.

It seems impossible to find indisputable, singular 'ontological' versions of such words. — hypericin

But leave aside the words. Is it possible to find indisputable, singular, ontological versions (or concepts) of the references of the words? Sider would call that a substantive question, as opposed to the one about words, which is not about metaphysics but about a particular language.

That said, I'm much less confident than he is that anything "indisputable" would come out of this.

This exercise can be repeated for every of the variations of "existence" above. So ultimately, we wind up with 100s of "ontologese" terms just covering the natural language "existence". Is this progress? — hypericin

It's a good question. Even if "100s" is a exaggeration, there's still a problem with the limits of what natural language can do. I tend to think that logical languages often can better handle longstanding philosophical problems, precisely because terms are removed from their ordinary-language polysemy as much as possible. But, as you helpfully show, carrying out such a program with even a single "big" term is a headache.

One clarification, which relates to my first response. You ask:

Take mind-dependent existence. Does this require for the mental object to be thought, right now, for it to exist? — hypericin

A "Siderian" rephrasing might look like this. We are aware of some reference magnets "in the vicinity" of: what our minds do when we think. Quite often, a mental image appears. And if we stop thinking about that idea, the image will disappear. Now we can be fairly comfortable that this really does describe something in "conceptual space." We know the difference between having the mental image, and no longer having it. (Or maybe not, if you're a hardcore Wittgensteinian . . .) We also know that some of the things we think about are in physical space, and some are not. So . . . rather than talk about what any of this has to do with existence, let's talk about the joint-carving concepts themselves. Maybe, if we get a good grasp on them, we'll go back and decide that "existence" is a good word to use for a present thought, but not for an absent one. Or the opposite. But starting now with a debate about what "existence" means is like looking through the wrong end of the telescope.

I really can't disagree with this. An actual adoption of Ontologese is utopian, or possibly dystopian, as you point out. But if, having taking Sider's ideas on board, we can do a better job of keeping debates substantive, that would be significant. The question of substantivity is what motivated Sider in the first place, and it certainly drives us nuts when we get pulled away into terminological wrangles.

I think there are interesting questions remaining about reference magnetism. @T Clark has articulated the issue with fundamentality very well. I find myself pulled both ways on it. I don't want reference magnetism (or joint-carving) to depend on a perception of ontological structure that is completely independent of human conceptualization. Rather, I want it to do what Sider (mainly) asks of it: to help us separate terms from what they refer to. Is there more? It's worth quoting Sider again:

Epistemic value: joint-carving languages and beliefs are better. If structure is subjective, so is this betterness. This would be a disaster. . . If there is no sense in which the physical truths are objectively better than the scrambled ["bizarre"] truths, beyond the fact that they are [true] propositions that we have happened to have expressed, then the postmodernist forces of darkness have won. — Sider, 65.

That last phrase is silly rhetoric, but the rest is provocative. Sider brings in the idea that some languages and beliefs are epistemically better. He doesn't elaborate on what "betterness" is, but we could probably fill in the story using the successes of science, at the very least.

So maybe we should concentrate on epistemology rather than ontology. There is no knowing without a knower. If joint-carving terms are better for us in knowing the world, isn't that consistent with agnosticism about Fundamental-with-a-capital-F ontology? Turning the question around: Is "knowing better" a fundamental ontological category? I don't see how, and that's good.

The other question that Sider's thought highlights is the role of truth in epistemology. He's not the first to have noticed that "truth is not enough" -- that we don't want just any truths, but truths that carry a certain perspective or depth. Giving content to that additional "oomph" isn't easy. For Sider, it has to do with the references of the true statements -- whether they're reference magnets and carve at the joints. I think this is a promising line of inquiry. It's always going to be helpful to remind ourselves that what is true and what matters are different issues.

This is the most fun I've had with a discussion in a long time. — T Clark

Very good discussion!

we just differ on the solution. We don't even disagree much on that. — T Clark

Especially because I see a lot of latitude in interpreting what Sider recommends. To say it again -- his main concern is to draw some kind of distinction (that matters) between a term and its reference. One way of doing that is to use some version of Ontologese, but a curious, flexible willingness to "try on" another's terminology might accomplish much the same thing.

how can we interact with, experience, the Tao without being able to consciously, i.e. verbally, think about it? What is non-verbal consciousness? What is awareness without consciousness? — T Clark

Yes, these are aspects of the consciousness question that are often ignored when Western philosophers talk. You'd think, reading the literature on consciousness, that no one had ever tried to meditate -- much less entire centuries-long traditions of it!

"Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking" by Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander. — T Clark

Thanks, I'll check it out. I've read a bunch of Hofstadter with pleasure.

Yes, but there is a distinction between technical language and jargon. — T Clark

My concern is what is advocating for is a massive jargonization of philosophy. — hypericin

You're both pointing to the problem -- what's the difference between defining operators and domains in logic, versus a similar operation in ordinary language? Sider is a good writer, but his background is what I'd call technical. I agree, we don't want jargon, and we don't know how far we can push this idea before Ontologese becomes unintentionally comic. Heidegger is an interesting example. I think he was absolutely right to invent some new coinages to talk about his idea of Being, and amazingly enough, at least one (Dasein) has actually stuck. But his way of using those new terms . . . not easy, and often not clear, which was supposed to be the whole point. Sartre too, with pour-soi and en-soi.

it seems a fantasy that a singular set of terms, with universally agreed definitions, could ever be achieved. — hypericin

Yes, but . . . isn't that what happened, more or less, with several logical languages? So it can be done, and done usefully. The problem, once again, is whether ordinary language is flexible enough, and its users willing enough.

I don't really see an alternative to what is sometimes done already: for individual philosophers to rigorously define their terms from the outset, as best they are able. — hypericin

I think that's fine, as long as everyone steers clear of arguing whether they're the right definitions. Maybe that could come later, after the participants have gotten a better look at what sort of structure you can build using those definitions. This presupposes that structure is to a significant degree independent of language, so I'm with Sider there.

OK, I understand. You value the "leap of faith" whether it's religious or merely toward an ethical ideal. I agree that "faith" or "belief" (in this sense) are different from picking the most likely explanation, or going with the best evidence.

They [ontological questions] are about us and the world as a single entity. And yes, they are also about language." - T Clark

This leaves open the possibility that "the world" doesn't have to be construed as something apart from how we experience it.
— J — T Clark

I'm happy with this way of putting it, as long as we remember that being "about language" is in a sense peripheral. I'm just highlighting Sider's point -- and I think yours too -- that when a philosophical debate switches from what a term refers to, to whether it is the correct term to use, we are likely moving to something non-substantive. Though see below, about "metaphysics" . . .

I don't know how open you are to Taoist thought. Lao Tzu wrote "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." We might say "The world as expressed in words is not the same as your experience of the world.” I think that's a good response to Sider, although I'm not sure he would disagree with me. — T Clark

I'm very comfortable with Taoist thought, and appreciate your bringing it in here. I've sometimes wondered whether the Tao is the same idea as a perfectly noumenal world, a world that by definition is beyond human experience, just as Kant said. But we'd have to add a layer to Kant's thought and say that nonetheless we have a kind of intuition, or constant awareness, of the noumenal -- that we can know it in a way that is not rational. Kant would hate that, I suppose. Maybe Sider too, though I take him seriously when he says he's open to any first-order ontology.

I guess two examples of a particular subatomic particle really are identical, but few other pairs in the world are. Two apples from the same tree are not identical physically, only conceptually. — T Clark

Good point. The particles are peculiar, in that they aren't numerically identical -- they reside at two different points in space-time -- yet, as best we know, they are physically exactly the same. How about two triangles of the same dimensions? Are they identical in the way the particles are? Maybe "identicalness" is best considered from a mathematical perspective, which is not my specialty.

My point about grounding was definitely a conceptual one. We have a variety of terms we can use to describe the similarities and differences we observe in the world (and in our own conceptions). I think all of them may require the concept of "identity" in order to make sense. I'm not sure about this, but let's say it's true. That would mean that in an important sense "identity" is structurally more fundamental that, say "being green". This may be partly what Sider has in mind when he talks about "deep" structure. And, as discussed, one could make this case without requiring the deep structure to exist apart from our conscious experience of it.

I need bricks shaped like "metaphysics" to help build the wall. If I use another shape, the wall will be less stable. I guess I can call the bricks something else, but 1) there are already smart, qualified, experienced people out there using the word the same way I do and 2) making up new words almost never makes things better. — T Clark

Yes, and this is why I don't really think philosophy will ever be reformed along Siderian lines, even if we all agreed it ought to be. In fact, I could challenge (2) and point to many cases where making up new words (and logical relations) has been extremely helpful, and I still don't think most philosophers are willing to burn down the house and erect a more precise terminology. It is, in a way, unreasonable for me to say to you, "Stop talking about metaphysics and talk about metaphysics*!" It may be more trouble than it's worth, to you and to the people you talk to. But at least we can take Sider to heart and remember that we have a diagnosis available, when a conversation becomes terminological rather than substantive.

("A brick shaped like metaphysics" is another good image for a reference magnet. It "pulls" us, in this metaphor, because we need it as a conceptual cornerstone.)

Yes, we shouldn't get too lost in abstractions here. The problem with racism and homophobia is that it insists on telling people they are defective when in fact they are not. I don't much care what grounds the bigot uses to try to justify this; it's the attempt to harm and denigrate that is repulsive.

Question for anyone - Isn't belief in a God literally a choice to believe when no proof is possible? — Jeremy Murray

Could you clarify this a little? What would constitute proof that a given entity exists? I assume you're not using "proof" in the logical sense of being entailed by premises.

If this list doesn't constitute homophobia, what does? Do you have to advocate imprisonment or violence?

Should TPF tolerate homophobia? No.

A "thick" term can also pack an emotional or spiritual punch. This is a type of connotation, but worth calling out on its own. We're reluctant -- I think rightly so -- to treat "love" or "evil" or "enlightenment" as mere pieces to move around on the conceptual board. They matter to us, or at least to many of us.

I think (J will correct me if I'm wrong) one of the motivations for this post was a discussion whether 'reality' and 'existence' can be differentiated, citing C S Peirce, who makes that distinction. Whereas in common discourse, they are naturally regarded as synonyms - that what is real is what exists and vice versa. — Wayfarer

The question that interests me is whether "reality" and "existence" refer, perspicuously, and if they do, whether it's possible to focus on what they refer to, rather than the intellectual (and ordinary-language) history of how the terms have been used. Peirce's distinction is an excellent one -- wouldn't it remain just as excellent if it used different terms? In Sider's language, Peirce identifies important reference magnets, and helps us understand how they relate. But if we start talking about whether he's using "reality" and "existence" correctly, the discussion immediately turns non-substantive.

I have made the case that it only really makes sense to talk about real or reality in the context of, or at least with a connection to, everyday human life. That's probably a good example of a "non-bizarre interpretation," or "right sort of basis." — T Clark

This is a good target statement for the viewpoint that "fundamental structure" can only be fundamental to a certain perspective. Your use of "everyday human life" is interesting. Is that what Sider has in mind when he counterposes it to a bizarre interpretation? Another possibility is that human life can extend beyond the everyday, into some highly abstruse areas such as logic and semantical analysis, and still be the touchstone for what we can say about fundamentality or "reality."

The pivotal question, as so often, is whether this extension beyond the everyday can ever take us completely out of ourselves, into some sort of "view from nowhere" that is deeply fundamental, so to speak. If we want Sider's opinion on this, we may have to settle for: "Ontological realism [is the view that] ontological questions are 'deep', 'about the world rather than language'." And he adds, "It is consistent with all positions on first-order ontology." So he's not saying that being "about the world" is necessarily being about something perspectiveless. The contrast he wants to highlight is with being about language, about terms. This leave open the possibility that "the world" doesn't have to be construed as something apart from how we experience it. I think his comment about first-order ontology lends support to this interpretation too. What Sider cares about is that metaphysics be substantive, in whatever way our ontology may allow it to be, and not merely a wrangle about language.

That said, I'm not sure we've really done justice to the electrons and the cow. I need to think more about it, but just to indicate where I'm going with it: The two electrons exhibit the property of "sameness" or "identicalness in every way but numerically". As you point out, the cow certainly shares properties with the electrons -- but not that property. So we have to ask, Is identicalness a property for us because it is a fundamental property of ontology? Does being identical ground the other ways we can understand similarity or communality of properties?

I think this is a good example of a situation where our argument becomes pointless unless you are willing to accept my ideas about metaphysics or I am willing to abandon them. — T Clark

But suppose we both agreed that there is a reference magnet in the vicinity which is joint-carving. You want to say that "metaphysics" is the best word to apply to one division of the resulting conceptual carving -- the division which includes Collingwood's "absolute presuppositions [that] have been made by this or that person or group of persons." Other divisions might, on your terms, be "derivative assumptions" and "meaningless non-human-world statements about an inaccessible 'fundamentality'," or words to that effect, yes? For my part, I'm not as clear about the right terms, but let's say I held a different set of labels, but was willing to bracket them while acknowledging that what you mean by "metaphysics" is indeed a reference magnet, and an important one. Might we not be able to continue the discussion on that basis?

I think "happiness" is a different, simpler, case than the other concepts we've been discussing. It's a human emotion, a psychological entity, not abstract at all. Not interesting ontologically any more than an apple is. — T Clark

I understand what you mean, but happiness is such a crucial term in ethical theory that I would argue it's elevated itself out of the merely psychological and become one of those "big" theoretical terms. No matter.

Maybe I'll start a thread with lists of statements I consider metaphysical by my standard and ask people to describe how they fit into their own understanding of the term. — T Clark

I'd like to see that, but be prepared not only for descriptions but for arguments about why their understandings are correct! :wink:

There's a fascinating book called Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a Social Mind, by Cheney and Seyfarth, that makes a strong case that baboons have a more-than-rudimentary "theory of mind" which allows them to make predictions based on what they believe other baboons are thinking.

It could only mean that God's idea of the best doesn't remotely resemble what a human would mean - J

This is partially true, I think: for example, we tend to think suffering is intrinsically bad; but I don’t think this is true. — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that helps. We can think of far too many cases -- the majority, probably -- in which suffering is bad for specific reasons. Let me really load the dice: The suffering and slow death of children who are trapped beneath a cliff after an earthquake is "bad," for reasons we can both give, though that word is much too weak. Preserving our ordinary meanings of goodness and badness, we could, perhaps, just about make a plausible case for why such suffering "had to happen" in this best of all possible worlds. The problem is that you have to multiply your plausible case by a million million, to equivalently explain all the other instances of "bad suffering." This is where the "likely-ometer" starts to go off, especially if you don't have a previous belief in a loving God.

The other alternative is, as you say, to just acknowledge that we don't have a clue. We lack the knowledge God has about outcomes, possibilities, etc. But, to be consistent, that would mean we could no longer speak about God as "good" or "loving", since we no longer know what those words mean from the cosmic viewpoint. They can't mean "sparing suffering whenever possible," unless our understanding of "possible" also is immeasurably out of whack. And if it is, we're back to wondering why it wasn't possible for God to do something that any child can do for its pet, namely create a "world" that is on the whole kind and nurturing.

This sense of what is loving and possible is not something most believers are willing to give up, and I don't think we should.

The electrons go together, and neither goes with the cow.” -- Sider — J

The only reason electron-plus-cow seems like a bad way of carving reality is context--not any absolute ontological structure. — T Clark

Now I want to depart from Sider on one point. (And I should emphasize that much of the above is my own interpretation of Sider.) I’m not convinced that “reality’s fundamental structure” is the best way to talk about what Sider wants to talk about. I don’t know how fundamental the various reference magnets may be, or whether it’s necessary to drag in “reality” (one of those very terms whose ambiguity causes so much trouble). — J

I think there are natural kinds, but they are natural human kinds. They are manifestations of our human nature and, beyond that of our own specific personal natures. — T Clark

With all of these quotes, we're focusing on a key point for Sider and the idea of reference magnetism. I believe it's a somewhat open question. If we could adopt the ultra-objective "view from nowhere/anywhere," would the same reference magnets exert their influence? Is that what we require in order to talk about "reality's fundamental structure"? Sider declares himself to be an ontological realist; he thinks the answer is Yes. Yet, in his discussion of the electrons and the cow, he never claims that a cow-plus-electron grouping is impossible, or incoherent, or even wrong according to some principle. He calls it "bizarre," and says that "the three objects should be [my itals] divided into two groups" as custom would dictate.

When I ended the OP by saying that we needed to do a lot more work on concepts like "right sort of basis," this is the kind of situation I had in mind. In Sider's favor: There is surely such a thing as a non-bizarre interpretation, in which the two electrons do "go together"; he isn't making that up. Your suggestion is that bizarre vs. ordinary is a referendum on human uses and contexts. And that too seems plausible. The question, I think, is whether we can argue that our human uses are themselves not arbitrary, but reflect actual ontological structure of some kind. I was jibbing at "fundamental," but there may be other kinds of structure which are to some extent invariant, though depending upon the life-world of humans for their perceptibility. Arguably, that's enough to satisfy Sider; he could reply that these kinds of structure are all that logic and metaphysics means to deal with. Quantification isn't a statement about ultimate reality, or even an endorsement that there must be such a thing.

in Ontologese, quantifiers are stipulated to carve at the joints. In other words, they are attracted by the correct, eligible reference magnets.
— J

Can you give an example of this? — T Clark

First, a little more elaboration. This gives us the context:

Suppose . . . that there exist, in the fundamental sense, nothing but sub-atomic particles. Given such a sparse ontology, the most plausible view about natural language quantifiers might be that they do not carve at the joints. The best metaphysical semantics of an ordinary sentence like 'There is a table' might be . . . a tolerant semantics, which interprets it as making the true claim that there exist sub-atomic particles appropriately arranged. The English 'there is', according to such a semantics, would not express fundamental quantification. . . So even if there is a joint-carving sort of quantification, the quantifiers of ordinary language might not carve at the joints. — Sider, 171-72.

Thus, Sider's E* is introduced as the quantifier that does carve at the joints -- on this example, it would refer to sub-atomic particles.

We're talking here about the "big" term "exist". Let's move to a less austere term: "happiness". Philosopher A maintains that happiness refers to a state that's measured in terms of pleasures and pains. Thus, it's possible, though unusual, for a person to fail to seek their own happiness, due to some defect of the psyche. Philosopher B maintains that happiness is best understood as that state which all people do in fact seek, since we are egoistic hedonists, and cannot fail to act in our own behalf.

This is a classic dispute about terms. A and B can go on (and on) to argue out their respective uses of "happiness" (perhaps joined by Philosopher C, who will maintain that happiness has nothing to do with pleasures and pains). Or . . . they can pose the Siderian question, "Is there something here that carves at the joints, ethically or psychologically? Is there a way of putting aside the divergent use of terms and discovering some actual structural item to which we can agree to refer?" With a term like "happiness," there are those who would claim that there is no such item. But I think there is. We can point out that there is such a thing as experiencing pleasure. Likewise, we might agree that there is such a thing as attempting to act in one's own best interests. These are reference magnets; they are "in the vicinity" of the term "happiness," and exert pressure on different philosophers to make the identification with "happiness." But we can resist that pressure, and instead decide to talk about the references, not the terms. Sider suggests this is best done not by stipulating one use of "happiness" for purposes of the discussion, but by coining or adapting a new term that is stipulated to carve at whatever joint may be available to be carved at.

Sider warns us, "Whether the introduction of Ontologese succeeds depends on the facts, on whether there is a joint-carving sort of quantification." He compares this with a proposal to introduce the term "dirt" as meaning "that element of the periodic table that allows trees to grow, etc." This isn't going to work, because there is no such element, and presumably no other reference magnet in the vicinity that is joint-carving.

The problem with that for me is, again sticking with metaphysics as the example, I need the idea as formulated in my understanding of philosophy. The way I’ve dealt with that in discussions that I started is to specify in the OP exactly the definition of metaphysics I want to use for the purposes of that particular thread. As I noted, it’s often a struggle to keep other posters on that path. — T Clark

I sympathize, and I think Sider has this sort of thing in mind. Is there a way to bracket your use of "metaphysics," so to speak, and instead specify the (joint-carving) way in which you use that term? It could be set out not as a definition of 'metaphysics', but as an interesting conceptual or structural category you've noticed. I dunno . . . people might still want to argue terms.

Thanks for your appreciation, and I'm really glad the concepts made sense, and spoke to experiences you've previously had doing philosophy. It was much the same way for me, reading and thinking about Sider's ideas. They rang so many bells, and seemed to put questions very clearly that I'd been inchoately trying to formulate.

To respond to a couple of things:

For the record, I love the term "joint-carving." — T Clark

(My vegan sensibilities squirm. :wink: Leave those joints alone!)

How is [Sider's plan B] different from just agreeing on the definition of the word in question at the beginning of the discussion? — T Clark

I think it both is and isn't the same. Sider is urging us to give up, or at least view with suspicion, the idea that we can agree on how to use "exist", for instance, for purposes of discussion, and then retreat back into our usual practices. Let's say you and I had quite different construals of how "exist" ought to be used. I'm sure that, being reasonable people, we could stipulate a meaning to employ in examining some given question. And we might learn quite a bit about this term -- call it E^. But neither of us really believes it means "exist"! We're clinging to the idea that there is some right way to use "exist", even as we agree to stipulate E^ for this discussion.

Sider's E* is different. With E*, we stipulate that it does refer to whatever joint-carving meaning is in the vicinity. Each of us gives up the idea that our respective "exist" terms do that. Another way of putting this: The move from E to E^ would be regarded by both disputants as a move away from metaphysical accuracy, again for the purposes of securing agreement on a given discussion. Whereas the move from E to E* is, as Sider says, to frame a superior question, not a less accurate one. The disputants agree that E* is what they really want to talk about, and drop their insistence that their respective Es are helpful in doing so.

Rather than trying to convince me, perhaps it makes more sense for you to say "You and I just see things too differently for this to be a fruitful discussion." Then you go find someone else to talk with. — T Clark

Yes, I'd far rather do that than keep wrangling. But as we know, a lot of philosophy consists of people insisting that Great Philosopher X was right about Big Term A, and they're sure they can come up with the persuasive argument somehow. That said, I enjoy talking with people who tone this down a bit, and want to show me how a particular philosopher's construal can be helpful, insightful, creative, et al., without necessarily settling the question for all time.

I also want to respond to your thoughts about fundamental ontological structure; whether it really must be context-dependent. But I've run out of time. I'll return to it.

This assumes that it would have been better for their to be less suffering at the cost of the natural world in which we live now; and I am not sure why that would be the case. — Bob Ross

But not to assume it is to assume something much harder to swallow -- that this is indeed the best of all possible worlds, so good that not even God could make it any better. You acknowledge this, on behalf of classical theism. How would one go on to argue which of the two assumptions is more likely? I don't know if there's a "likely-ometer" we can employ! But in favor of the first assumption, it's hard to disagree with the idea that a world without the suffering of my neighbor's child wouldn't be a better world; or, if that would upset some cosmic balance, then the next suffering child, or the next, or the next . . . etc. Surely just one could have been spared? There are so many to choose among! And while we're at it, maybe the Holocaust? And the Rwandan genocide? And . . .etc. Again, we're spoiled for choice. So much horror and suffering is all necessary?

Against the second assumption, we'd have to recalibrate all our moral and imaginative language in order to consider our current world "the best". It could only mean that God's idea of the best doesn't remotely resemble what a human would mean. And if that's the case, there's not much point in even talking about God using human attributes like goodness.

we have this intuition that suffering is bad and that we can conceive of a world without it — Bob Ross

No, that's too broad-brush. We have the intuition that a great deal of suffering is bad and that we can conceive of a world without at least some of it. If that intuition's incorrect, then see above: We are so in the dark about matters of good and bad, and of what is possible, that we might as well stop trying to talk about it.

There are, by the way, other defenses of the ways of God that don't back us into this corner, as you of course know.

Sider is doing something different - he is trying to come up with a kind of meta-philosophical framework against which the incommensurability of divergent explanatory paradigms can be interpreted. . . Do you think that’s what it is about? — Wayfarer

This is an interesting context to put it in. First off, I agree there's some similarity with what Williams is doing with "thick terms," in that Williams is pointing out the difficulty of using them merely descriptively, as if their meanings could be read off from some common lexicon. The difference I see is that the unclarity around what I'm calling "big terms" has to do with conflicting usages on the same linguistic level, so to speak. It's not that "real" is ontological in one construal and aesthetic in another (though I suppose that could happen), but rather that different philosophers, or philosophic traditions, will tend to reserve "real" to demarcate different conceptual territories.

So, is Sider offering a meta-philosophical replacement for the Tower of Babel? Yes, in part. As I read him, he's suggesting that it's often possible to sharpen up a contested term in a way that all the parties can agree to. But he's not saying we should do this by dubbing one use of "real", for example, to be the correct one, even for purposes of argument. He recognizes, I think wisely, that even if this could be made to stick, in the course of a single discussion, its usefulness would rapidly fall away as others join in, bringing their own preferred meanings, and the terminological clarification would have to begin all over again.

Instead, he thinks we can be upfront about needing a new (but related) term that "carves better at the joints." Whether one thinks there are metaphysical joints to carved, and whether one thinks those joints are perceptible apart from the language used to describe them, will greatly influence whether one thinks Sider's proposal has merit. But assuming one does, then we can look at possible uses of "Ontologese," as Sider calls it. I don't want to get too off-topic, but I'll just say that Sider approaches this in terms of quantification; the idea is that, in Ontologese, quantifiers are stipulated to carve at the joints. In other words, they are attracted by the correct, eligible reference magnets.

You ask whether this is also about "the incommensurability of divergent explanatory paradigms." I'm not sure about this. If the example of two such paradigms is analytic philosophy and existentialism, then it seems broader than what Sider intends. I haven't read everything he's written, by any means, but as best I can tell he's only interested in sorting out problems within analytic phil, especially as derived from logic and semantics. I don't know if he'd be happy with describing two uses of "real" or "good" as two explanatory paradigms. But that may not matter, since he'd agree they're incommensurate at whatever level you want to take them.

Leaving Sider aside, it does seem as if joint-carving terms for non-asterisked words like "real" or "good" could be part of an explanatory framework that potentially reaches across philosophical schools. An obvious obstacle would be to get some agreement about whether there are such things as joint-carving or ontologically privileged concepts. Some versions of post-modernism, for instance, would stop right here and ask for an account of this that makes sense in their tradition. Can we give one? Food for thought.

omnipotence, "all-powerfulness", and "maximally powerful" refer to the same thing in this view; that is, that a being has intrinsic power unrestrained by anything else. — Bob Ross

God is maximally powerful, as innate power itself, which is constrained by metaphysical possibility. — Bob Ross

'omnipotence' . . . it is to have innate power. — Bob Ross

OK. I thought you were drawing a distinction between the two terms, in terms of metaphysical possibility, but no matter. I now see you mean them both to refer to the characteristic of having innate or intrinsic power.

But how would a classical theist -- who I guess you're defining as pre-Christian? -- apply this concept of omnipotence to the usual set-up requiring a theodicy? When the questioner asks why God did not create a world without (or merely with less) suffering, this request doesn't seem to have anything to do with what is metaphysically possible, or what would be beyond "innate" power.

Hey J! Long time no see, my friend. — Bob Ross

I'm glad to be considered your friend :smile: but . . . have you mistaken me for another TPFer? I don't think we've conversed before. If I've forgotten, my apologies.

Trying to grasp this . . . Are you saying that "omnipotent" and "maximally powerful" don't mean the same thing, in what you're calling classical theism?

Modern analysis of trauma often assert that 'trauma is written on the body', or similar propositions. In this conception, 'forgetting' is not even possible? — Jeremy Murray

Probably true. The "amnesia theodicy" would require that God eliminate even such unconscious bodily traumas.

The classical problem of evil remains intact. — Truth Seeker

That's probably true, but these discussions do show that the classical problem isn't necessarily the only way to frame our understanding of God and evil. What I'm going to take away from the discussion is the thought that, when it comes to human suffering, subjective experience and judgment may carry a lot more ethical weight than it would first appear, from a strictly rationalist perspective. See: justice vs. mercy.

Appreciate your work on this.

Glad it makes some sense. This is a nice coincidence, because I'm trying to finish up an OP about this very thing. "What X means" is not a straightforward matter in philosophy, and it's so easy for any of us to get pulled into a dispute about terms when we'd rather talk about something more substantive. As you just pointed out, it's a disappointing result when the argument then seems to hinge on "how I use X" vs. "how you use X." Theodore Sider has some excellent things to say about this, which I'll try to lay out.