As far as there being something "prior to thought" here we part ways. This can only be speculation, IMO — Pantagruel

Actually nothing can be said of being, so that's fine isn't it? Nevertheless something gives rise to thought, and since it is prior it is without telos — no purpose. You can create your own.

"The nothing is the "not" of beings, and is thus being, experienced from the perspective of beings. The ontological difference is the "not" between beings and being." (Pathmarks, p. 97)

"Beyng is nothing "in itself" and nothing "for" a "subject."" (Contributions, p.381)

Even if it is figuratively nothing it makes a placeholder for something prior, thus escaping teleology and logos. A rare freedom in a logocentric world.

But I don't see the "null-state" as being meaningful, except as an exercise perhaps. — Pantagruel

I think it has utility as an aspiration, as in calling thought into action when required and resting it when not required; calming the chattering monkey-mind. Nevertheless, just quietly observing uses reason and teleology to render the world intelligible, so thought is not really fully rested.

Another reason to contemplate the "null-state, or gedankenlose Anschauung [thoughtless intuition] is that it is the origin of thought, phenomenologically. 'Being' facilitates conscious thought which discriminates the beings, the things. Because it is prior to thought it has no telos or logos. So there is existential significance to the distinction in our generally logocentric world.

Various philosophers also consider the faculty of "intellectual intuition" — Pantagruel

I am sure that is not what I am driving at. I am distinguishing that telos pertains to rationalisation and consciousness, but one's being, or (unconscious) self has a mysterious ineffable existence that can spin-up consciousness. When it is giving consciousness a rest then telos takes a holiday.

"there is a perception of a refined truth of the dimension of nothingness" — Chris Degnen

I mistakenly foreshortened the quote; the subsequent paragraph hits it:

". . . If I were to think and will, this perception of mine would cease, and a grosser perception would appear. What if I were neither to think nor to will?' [3] So he neither thinks nor wills, and as he is neither thinking nor willing, that perception ceases [4] and another, grosser perception does not appear. He touches cessation. This, Potthapada, is how there is the alert [5] step-by step attainment of the ultimate cessation of perception."

I'm not sure how thoroughly that can be done. A clonk on the head might be more effective. Then you can exist without thinking and all logos, telos and instrumentality is dropped.

"Passive volition" is an example of a paradoxical concept found in Tibetan yoga and zen buddhism. But this is not being without mind so much as it is being of two minds. — Pantagruel

I think it can be more direct than passive volition, e.g. Potthapada Sutta

"with the complete transcending of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, [thinking,] 'There is nothing,' enters & remains in the dimension of nothingness. His earlier perception of a refined truth of the dimension of the infinitude of consciousness ceases, and on that occasion there is a perception of a refined truth of the dimension of nothingness."

In other regards I guess you have to suppose 'If I stop thinking is there a world?'. So if I'm unconscious I am still alive and my being is in the world, even though I am having no thoughts.

I would say that whether there is or is not such a world is precisely what is in question. And the essential fact of telos suggests to me that there is not such an unconditioned world. — Pantagruel

In Dennis Schulting's Kant, Non-Conceptual Content, p. 85, he write about Kant's gedankenlose Anschauung: intuition without thought:

"From the immediately preceding passage (A110), where he argues that ‘[t]here is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection’ (emphasis added), it appears that Kant excludes the possibility that one could have an epistemically relevant perception or intuition that does not belong to unitary experience grounded in ‘a transcendental ground of unity’ (A111), but this does not imply that he excludes the real possibility of ‘intuition without thought [ gedankenlose Anschauung ]’."

A translation of A111 from the Critique of Pure Reason is:

"The thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accor­dance with concepts.
[A111] "Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and, were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us."

As good as nothing. Perfect meditation material for the upstream float.

I'm seeing telos as instrumental purposeness and teleology as the examination of purposes and reasons. That is fine in a world of thought and things, but in an unconditioned world without (or before) thought there is no telos.

Re: "Thomas Nagel has some really good descriptions of the ways in which reality seems to have fundamentally teleological aspects. For me, this hinges on the idea of instrumentality. /
Instrumentality is the translation of an abstract into a concrete idea, I think."

Telos seems to have more to do with the idea itself than the concrete result. For example, from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"Consider a knife. If you wanted to describe a knife, you would talk about its size, and its shape, and what it is made out of, among other things. But Aristotle believes that you would also, as part of your description, have to say that it is made to cut things. And when you did, you would be describing its telos."

Heidegger goes into more depth in On The Essence and Concept of ΦΥΣΙΣ in Aristotle's Physics, p. 26 & 27:

"In Greek thought ένεργεία [energeia] means "standing in the work," where "work" means that which stands fully in its "end." But in turn the "fully-ended or fulfilled" [ das "Vollendete" ] does not mean "the concluded," any more than τέλος [telos] means "conclusion." Rather, in Greek thought τέλος and έργον [ergon] are defined by εΐδος [eidos: form, essence]; they name the manner and mode in which something stands "finally and finitely" [ "endlich" ] in its appearance. ...

"Aristotle says this in his own way in a sentence we take from the treatise that deals explicitly with έντελέχεια [entelecheia] (Meta. , Θ 8, 1049 b 5): φανερόν ότι πρότερον ένέργεια δυνάμεώς έστιν [phanerón oti proteron energeia dynameis estis]: "Manifestly standing-in-the-work is prior to appropriateness for...." In this sentence Aristotle’s thinking and pari passu Greek thinking, reaches its peak. But if we translate it in the usual way, it reads: "Clearly actuality is prior to potentiality." Ενέργεια [energeia], standing-in-the-work in the sense of presencing into the appearance, was translated by the Romans as actus, and so with one blow the Greek world was toppled. From actus, agere (to effect) came actualitas, "actuality." Δύναμις [dynamis] became potentia, the ability and potential that something has. Thus the assertion, "Clearly actuality is prior to potentiality" seems to be evidently in error, for the contrary is more plausible. Surely in order for something to be "actual" and to be able to be "actual," it must first be possible. Thus, potentiality is prior to actuality. But if we reason this way, we are not thinking either with Aristotle or with the Greeks in general. Certainly δύναμις [dynamis] also means "ability" and it can be used as the word for "power," but when Aristotle employs δύναμις as the opposite concept to έντελέχεια [entelecheia] and ένεργεία [energeia], he uses the word (as he did analogously with κατηγορία [katēgoria: predication, categorisation] and ούσία [ousia]) as a thoughtful name for an essential basic concept in which beingness, ούσία, is thought."

So telos is to do with the 'standing' of the essence, the instrumental idea, but not so much the actualised concretion. In general we can take a break from the instrumental reification of reality, as Derrida notes of 'teleology' in A Taste for the Secret, p. 20:

"It is perhaps necessary to free the value of the future from the value of the [eschatological, teleological] 'horizon' that traditionally has been attached to it — a horizon being, as the Greek word indicates, a limit from which I pre-comprehend the future. I wait for it, I predetermine it, and thus I annul it. Teleology is, at bottom, the negation of the future, a way of knowing beforehand the form that will have to be taken by what is still to come."

So we can actually chill-out and float upstream in a reality free of instrumentality, from time to time.