If sex is biological there is no harm in attributing a new label to a different genetic structure. — Philosophim

This assumes genetic make up as-is, determines sex - where is does not. So, "harm" is probably not apt, but it is flatly incorrect to assign a status of 'sex' to a genetic variation within an established sex. This ruins your aim entirely.
The 'harm' comes from the fact that your usage is causing hte exact problem you're trying to solve.

So, call it direction of best fit - what you're doing is spoiling your chances of success, directly, by ignoring the problem you've identified and refusing to do what's necessary to clear up the confusion about hte terms. Again, sex is already established as somthing that genetic variation does not determine, so it is again, flatly wrong to attribute a 'sex' status to a genetic variation - this, aside from it being exactly against your purported aim for the thread.

Klinefelter syndrome — Philosophim

Is strictly a condition present in males.. It is determined firstly, by the subject being male. The highlighted section in your link (i assume you were pointing me to that?) indicates this clearly, without ambiguity. Phenotype has merely a correlative relation to sex (extremely closely correlated, it must be said). The case study presented is concerned solely with phenotype. The researches know this person is male, and that is the basis for this being a novel case (well, novel, after three examples? lol).

So we could label it as 'female Klinefelter or male Klinefelter', or we could call it a new sex "Klinefelter" for example. — Philosophim

We could, but we would be both wrong, and continuing the problem you are purporting to want to solve. I have to say, it's really strange to see you doing what yyou can to continue the language problem you seem tto want to avoid? It is the exact same here, as it is between Sex and Gender, per OP. Mixing up aberrations and actual states of sex (male/female) makes the endeavour worthless, on your aims.

Sex expression = phenotype expression related to sex. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right I see. As far as I can tell in the literature, and in my experience, this is just called 'phenotype' which varies as much within sex as without (barring specifics which are the arbiters of whether to question ones sex - external genitals, hair placement and thickness etc..). But, on that conception, yeah, sure. Just continues the confusing use of words, though.

male-female binary within the social and biological sciences, and the wider culture. — Joshs

Oof. Those are three very differeent things. I posit that the conflation of the three is why we're even having this discussion. Male/female are extremely important in biology and biologists, on the whole, reject entire the attempts to trivialise them.
But I would also add engineers to that list. They use the terms constantly to refer to something non-biological which is analogous.

The bigotry and hatred this community face is exceptional. — Tom Storm

As compared to? And in light of?
I also have many trans friends. I have worked with trans people. I simply do not care what the think and feel in their minds about their ownn identity. How could I? But even these, trans, people understand that your version of this story is inccomplete.
www.terfisaslur.com

I have not been insistent that there are only two sexes. For the general discussion, we are using two sexes. If you wish to discuss exceptions by addressing XXY etc., I still do not see this in opposition to my points. — Philosophim

I am going to be insistent. There are two sexes. Genetics do not determine sex. Genetics are variable within sex. If your problem is the linguistic use of terms, you've been shown an absolute use which removes all doubt and confusion, allows for all cases, and is not offensive to anyone not looking for offense.

There is not anyone who isn't male or female, but current understanding. Why isn't that good enough?

(3) normativity that specifically concerns the species' defects (i.e. vulnerabilities to harm / suffering) of natural beings, however, is moral (i.e.obligates natural beings to care for one another) insofar as natural beings are cognizant (how can they not be?) of their species' defects as such; — 180 Proof

Fair enough! The thing that shook me off the track was that the underlined appears to be the unpinning of the system (otherwise, I see no connection with anything moral in the description - set me right if i'm wrong). If this is the case, this seems an arbitrary assertion for which nothing in the wider post acts as support. It seems, this is your emotivist crux, hiding under a cloak of objective reason.

ex as expression — Count Timothy von Icarus

Could you maybe outline what you mean by this? I don't think this is a coherent concept. The 'expression' of one's sex is the functional output of one's sexual role in the species, as best I can tell.

"sexual expression" in the way you describe is, surely, just Gender by another, more confusing name?

But identity comes as much, if not more, from expression than function. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Definitely agree, but further to the above, "expression" can be "masculine" or "feminine" with some association to function of sex... But are not at all analogous or tied to the sex/es. While i believe (not worth arguing here) that some behaviours are sexual determined, most behaviours are merely correlated and have no necessity to one or other sex. In another word: Gender.

Ah, you were speaking specifically about a certain condition I was speaking of conditions in general AIS was just an example. — Vaskane

For clarity, you brought up an example, and I used the example. When you brought up another example, both of our previous responses were no longer apt because they were very particular to that one condition. Just clarifying that I'm not trying to topic-hop. That seemed to be what was happening without my input...

But it's quite possible for men to have internal female sex organs. Like I said, you reduce it down to gametes. — Vaskane

You're now using the term "men". Which defeats the entire purpose of this discussion. Males cannot have functional internal ovaries. as a result of having active SRY. Other aberrations can result in the production of the tissues required for them (many conditions for males include streak ovaries, for instance) but there is not a single example of a male with functional female reproductive organs, to my knowledge. But then, you've used the term "men". Which, I take, requires merely identifying as a man. So, I have to concede your position - while pointing out that its a Mott and Bailey in terms of our discussion.

I take the state of the being's entire bodily make up. — Vaskane

Then you have literally infinite sexes to contend with. Everyone's body has a different total make-up. This is bizarre.

a more limited social construct over a more comprehensive social construct. — Vaskane

1. I am not using any social construction whatever;
2. I don't 'prefer' anything. I'm laying out the uses of these terms as employed for their meanings;
3. There is no reason whatever to prefer a 'more comprehensive' definition of anything complex. In fact, history shows this to be the most unhelpful use of language in definite fields (biology - there is only male and female - your apparent rejection of this is lacking in support or reality); and
4. It is obvious to me that you're playing word games now, and not dealing with the issue. You've made your case for your position - I reject it and use the words as they are actually apt to be used and Am not conflating 'men/women' with 'male/female'. It seems clear to me why you have trouble with my conception and that it lies in not delineating between three distinct concepts: Sex, gender and social identity.

But your way does boil it down to the two part formula I've accused you of being landlocked to in the past. — Vaskane

No, it doesn't. You've flat-out ignored my concept of sex, as it is used in biology and sex research, and pretended I am basing it on 'gametes'. Which, ironically, amounts to the exact same conception you initially tried to present: If one cannot produce gametes, they have no sex. As absurd as to say the ability to "fuse gametes" establishes sex. I have rejected this about four times, and yet you are here accusing me of it. Risible.

always boiling things down to their black and whites. — Vaskane

If that is what something boils down to, then that is what it boils down to. It seems to me you prefer imprecise, unehlpful and confusing definitions for things that have plain meanings. Far be it from me...

There is absolutely nothing wrong with defining this as a new sex. — Philosophim

Yes, there is. That person is male already. Either people can be multiple sexes, or not.

Would you agree that in humans and other mammals there are sex-correlated differences in brain function that lead to the differences in behavior between males and females that allow, for instance, dog owners and trainers to quickly recognize males and females on the basis of these inborn brain differences and they are manifested in behavior? would you further allow that if there are such inborn sexual-related differences in psychological-behavioral gender , that there are likelyintermediates between male and female inborn brain organization. In other words, an inborn basis for a spectrum of psychological genders? — Joshs

Underlined: That is exactly my view.

The rest:
Hmm. I'm, nearly there. To me, though, the spectrum of 'psychological genders' is an actual spectrum and that there are not 'multiple discernable genders' related to the person's sex. Being one or other sex predisposes one to certain sets of behavioural properties. These are not necessary. They are at least tertiary to the sex "at hand".

In this way, the bolded part doesn't make a lot of sense to me. I don't know what you are considering 'male and female inborn brain organisation.'? If this is just to say that brains aren't exactly correlated with one's sex, then yeah - I don't think one's sex gives them omre than a propensity (though, it is clearly an extremely strong propensity) for any behaviour that isn't driven by sexual function. But these aren't rules, they are propensities. So, i reject that there are ny 'intermediates'. There are brains.

Sexed bodies are processes of interactive behaving, not simply collections of dna, so gender isnt something to be tacked onto a scientized specimen after the fact. — Joshs

Many within the transgender community no longer accept this binary, even if we treat it as two opposite poles of a spectrum. — Joshs

Because it isn't valid and it is not encumbent upon others to validate the incorrect assertions of special interest groups. There are two sexes.

Do you not see that you're conflating sex and gender? And that this is teh entire problem with the discussion?

Sex is a biological fact. It is not a spectrum, or a 'set of behaviours' or a "standard" or any other nonsense. "sex" doesn't arise once one becomes sexually active, or when one starts to question their own species factual expression as sexually dimorphic. These are delusional thoughts, and while they require care and support, they do not need assent.

I've been arguing that the perception is the smell, not its causes. — Luke

I have felt that was the case - but then, I don't quite understand the resistance to settling the question on one side or the other. It seems clear that you would hold a view, given you consider perception "the smell" which is an experience - and not, from what I gather, how most people consider those two things in tandem (i.e, in causal relation rather than identical relation).

Suffice to say, no, and i direct you to my previous post. The question contain therein is crucial to my understanding how you could possible think that was the question.

Thanks very much, that's very helpful - It seems to be counter to a general conception of moral naturalism, so that's really cool to me.

Not at all compelling, though, for various reasons.

Not so, to my mind. Perceptions need not be accompanied by conscious experience of them, in emotional terms. This seems patent, as we talk about sentient and non-sentient conscious beings. The feeling is the difference. Subjective judgement of something perceived.

The experience is the smelling of something particular given an emotional valence. Is the implication in your position that there is no difference between the experience of say "sweet smell" and the data which produces that smell? Seems well-off-the-mark to me.

Almost certainly; I've not read much Witty, but my understanding is that his 'objects' covers all objects that other theories, respectively, exclude - i.e abstract, physical, mental ... all objects.

"Morality" is certainly not "innate" or "furniture if the world" any more than ecology or medicine are, and yet the latter are bound (i.e. enabled-constrained) by the laws of nature. — 180 Proof

Ah, ok, interesting. And is it hte case that you apply that similar boundedness to Morality, but perhaps with different parameters?
Again, I don't really know any moral naturalists so my understanding is purely academic. Just enquiring, mind to mind :)

Seriously, though, it is a question of whether our perceptions of objects are direct or not — Luke

But a perception is nothing to a human, unless we have an experience. So, the question actually probably isn't apt to that delineation. Whether a chimp 'directly' perceives something is a non-question to us, because we have no access to their experience of anything.

Similarly, it may well be the case that I can experience touching of an object, but that "touching of an object" is an experience conjured by my mind. That doesn't mean the object isn't there, but it does mean my perception is indirect. Again, if the idea here is that you're taking about the perception, and not the experience, I don't think there's anything to even be discussed. We have no experience of perceptions, per se.

Hehehe. Equally, "hehehe" at @Count Timothy von Icarus Toad Venom comment.

But I can see arguments for how defining sex at the individual level might be different. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Could you throw any out?
I'm only pushing, as it seems that your initial outline there ("in the aggregate") is aptly applied to individuals too. But, i do agree, at least intuitively, its easier to parse in teh aggregate.

That's a different condition... We can talk about that if you like?

morality. I'm not a dentist...

The perception is the final product; the smell. All you smell is the cake. You don’t smell the causes of the perception.

I don’t know how you could smell the cake more directly. Would it be without the causes? — Luke

Yes, this is the clarity that Indirect Realists seem to see, that Direct Realists don't. It's not that it puts paid to either position, but an Indirect Realist needs some wholesale importation of object into experience, for it to be direct. Which is, obviously, incoherent. Hence, rejection Realism. Direct-ers don't seem to require - directness - for their position.

But, taking your enumeration of perception at face value, I'm unsure how a direct realist can maintain a straight face. If we're only directly in touch with our perceptions, we're not directly in touch with objects. I presume that a DR would come up with some Banno-esque " But how do you perceive your perceptions?" (the seeing seeings problem, from a few pages back) which is not the relevant question. Perceptions are experienced. They are direct to experience, qua perception. They are not direct to experience, qua object. As you've noted.

Hmm, Ok I see the problem you're trying to solve now. I don't find it a problem though, as will become clear.

MALE and FEMALE can FUSE their gametes. — Vaskane

Not quite.

have the potential to fuse their gametes

They have the potential to. They need not, currently, be able to do so. At what point that potential is read, as far as makes any sense to me, is the moment of the hormonal cascade beginning (either triggered by SRY activation, or not). Ignoring that, though, because fair - it's probably not the strongest argument on its face - on your account, someone who has had an horrific injury after siring 20 children is no longer male, either, as he is incapable of even producing sperm, let alone fusing any of them with ova. But I'm sure you'll agree that seems very wrong.

However, playing to my perspective, a "male" with female sex organs — Vaskane

I'm not sure how you are understanding this concept. so forgive if the following misses it... "female sex organs" is a little misleading here too - the external genitalia present as female, but there are no internal sex organs aligned with the female phenotype.
A 'male' as per either the above quote, or my construction, cannot have female organs because female sex organs do not produce male gametes, irrespective of whether the individual has a vagina or penis. However, I understand that this position (CAIS is a bit more accurate, as far as I know - otherwise, we're not looking at something problematic) results in a human who is biologically male (required for the condition) but has female presentation, and is infertile. An infertile male with a typically female phenotype doesn't seem very hard to categorise to me - unless we're strictly using your conception on whicih any child, post-menopausal woman or infertile adult of any kind, has no sex.

I also understand, though, that suffers of CAIS does have male streak gonads, providing enough evidence for the 'potential' if but for the aberration, required to satisfy this category. That said, I have never seen a person with any DSD for whom it was not obvious what their biological sex was. Caster Semenya is the prime example of this problem in action. She is a male. It was obvious to many of us.

Perhaps, but I'm also joking.

In anycase, I understand moral naturalism to entail that it is empirically discoverable, as an aspect of the universe. I can't understand how that wouldn't entail an 'innate to the universe' conception of morality. If that is the case, even if your view is sui generis, would be very much interested to know what the source is, if it's not innate. I don't realy know any naturalists

dilemmas of transgender individuals — Jack Cummins

What do you conceive these dilemmas consisting in?

Hmmm. Does the acknowledgement of variance within sexes not do that job a bit better? Male and female are, in fact, absolute categories in humans. There isn't a grey area to be covered with terms, if you see what I mean. You either are male, or are female.

Where we find grey is in phenotype - but this is the case with those who suffer no aberration whatever in their development. A fully in-tact and healthy hormonal cascade can result in Eddie Hall or Mike Tyson as much as it can result in Maynard Keenan or Chris Colfer. Thought, it also worth noting that humans are incredibly accurate in determining sex from facial features alone: the pop-sci take and less pop and again

even the grey area isn't all that grey.

but his notion of facts as states of affairs existing in reality and quite separate from propositions — Sam26

Ignores relational facts, as best I can tell. A fact can obtain between objects, but not be either. A distance is a fact, but is not an object. It's not anything except a brain delineating a straight line through space between two objects. But that distance obtains.

Morality — AmadeusD

is not

innate to the universe" — 180 Proof

Yet here you are, a moral Naturalist. And apparently a grumpy one. :)

The above few comments in turn are about sex?

However, I'm nearly with you on this. I don't entirely agree that its a 'mental status' but it certainly appears to be a result of mentation largely.
I think its totally reasonable to posit that a lot of that mentation is influenced by the facts of biology though. Cluckiness does not ever occur in males, because we don't have the hormones for it as an example. So while Gender can be conceptualised as bundles of loosely-associated behaviours, they are loosely associated to a sex. Which is probably hte source if the totally confusing statements in Philosophim's posts.

"Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe" — 180 Proof

Neither is Morality, but here you are - a moral Naturalist ;)

You would both immensely enjoy Supernatural by Graham Hancock.

Ignore his conclusions - his work is astoundingly good in terms of synthesising the histories of the exact ideas you're putting forth.

A nice, short overview is the Youtube video here

Again, if you ignore his conclusions, which are decidedly getting into truly super-natural territory, the connections he's drawing are compelling, as a theory as to why these things continue to crop up, time and time again.

Hit me with your precise definition of Sex. (hehe I sense you know I'll find plenty to undermine your outdated position on only including gametes [it's why I say Sex is to State because it looks at the whole of the individual in question])
------------------------------------------------------ — Vaskane

As usual, your pretensions fail you. You are describing gender and then attributing your description to the word sex. Nothing to do with me that you're using words incorrectly to suit your emotional position on them.

It is the activation (or not) of the SRY gene in utero which determines which (male or female) developmental cascade one undergoes (very basically, Mullerian or Wolffian). From that point, aberrations occur in about 0.018% of people qualifying them for the "DSD" label because their aberration returns a non-ideal (in the strict sense) phenotype with reference to the sex present in that individual. You will note, though, that DSDs are sex-specific in almost all cases and this is not an issue for the binary. The one's which can occur in both, occur differently in each sex (per SRY/not SRY).

Many professionals actually take this to be something 'determined' at conception, and merely expressed at a certain point during early gestation.
And, I have to say, it's bizarre that people get emotionally attached to these things when it doesn't actively affect them (i.e they are trans)... The lady doth protest too much, me thinks. Or, in your case, the weirdo answers his own questions and thinks he can read minds :broken:

hehe... and in the face of such a response, I must say - likewise :)

Morphic fields, and morphic resonance, even though generally (and angrily) rejected by mainstream science...
— Wayfarer

You are projecting again. Scientists are pretty used to many people preferring woo. — wonderer1

The irony physically hurts.

I know you're thinking only of the gametes. That's okay, outdated, but I understand where you're coming from. There's a reason why many "sexual aberrations" as you like to call them are referred to as "INTERSEX" conditions. And I take that as a valid view, just a very "stiff" view is all. — Vaskane

Haha. Errm... In reverse, I don't, because it isn't a view, it's a word which is used to refer to aberrations in sexual development (more commonly referred to now as differences of sex development, not intersex conditions as a catch-all). No one is "inter" sex. You're obviously entitled to your view, but using these words has become quite important, and being wrong about htem common.

intersex conditions say absolutely nothing about the sex binary.

It is, though, and you've accepted as much with the statement:

not different sexes persay — Vaskane

Variance within the two sexes doesn't constitute a third, or non- sex.

Sex has two extremes that it aims towards sure, but on occasion the spectrum is blurred between the two extremes. Even when the 23pair is XX or XY a male, for example could be born with fallopian tubes for example. And even still there are more karyotypes than just XY and XX although not different sexes persay, just not falling within the Binary extreme of XX and XY. — Vaskane

Thank you for clarifying what you're trying to say, and in that sense, I agree, and think this is why Gender is actually apt at all - we need not invoke aberration to note the wild variance within sexes). However, none of these examples presents anything other than a male or female individual. That's the issue that I think the "sex is a construct" people don't get.

Mammalian sex is, in fact, 100% binary to our knowledge. Aberrations in sex development don't change, or 'partial alter' your sex. If you're saying they do, I'm open to the argument at least :)

Yes, and that's nonsense — 180 Proof

To a physicalist ;)

There are definite exceptions to the rule. — Philosophim

What are these exceptions?

What are you basing that on?

I think this is a good venue for it and philosophers need speak up. — Philosophim

I agree. But the reality is they do and get vilified. Holly Lawford-Smith is a great example, as is Kathleen Stock; Judith Butler. Plenty of examples of what you're suggesting being genuinely dangerous for philosophers. Even Rebecca Tuvel, who is pro-trans, got absolutely torn to shreds for suggesting that the same logic applies to race. Which it clearly does.

There are practical considerations that are going to be far more important that being 'right' for many philosophers and particularly women (who stand to have the most important views on this, imo).

Which is why using words that more clearly delineate between the two is important. — Philosophim

Yes.

Okay. It's good to know that all publications always abide by the law and that there is a law on the books to cover every situation in which publishing certain articles, images or commentary could cause someone an injury. — Vera Mont

I think you're either being incredibly disingenuous (my preference) or do not understand what journalism, common sense, and "society" are.

Transexualism seems the easiest word for this — Philosophim

I would agree, if it didn't leave open the doors I brushed past in the ending of my previous comment (which you quoted there, I see from the comment box hehe)..

I think trying to make a word better defined is a common pursuit in philosophy. If you wish to give up, that's fine. — Philosophim

Not at all. But when there are scores of philosophers who have literally nothing to do with their time, but use philosophy to support the supposition that their special identity relies on, it's really fucking hard.

Making the types of arguments we're making get people fired, in the real world. My University philosophy club has for three of its highest administrators trans people. This means certain views are off-limited because they don't want to hear it. They are happy to put the cart before the horse. Adn this is extremely disheartening to someone who feels teh way you do. I'm not suggesting we 'give up'. I am suggesting that it may be a matter of time.

I'm more interested in what you think about the underlying difference I've noted here. — Philosophim

I think Sex and Gender are patently, inarguably different sets of properties and are easily discernable from one another. It is totally bizarre to me that it's taken seriously that they are either the same thing, or somehow reliant on one another. Questioning your gender shouldn't ever invoke some kind of negative connotation, or indication of mental illness. Questioning your sex (if not intersex) would indicate one of those. Though, it is to be noted that intersex individuals are all, without exception either male or female. "intersex" is a confusing misnomer used by dumb people to support wild, unsupportable theories about how sex is a social construct.

I think Sex really, really matters, and Gender far less so. I think Gender is merely a loose system of categorizing social roles and behaviours, and should be relegated to a nicety and nothing determinant of anything whatever in Law or elsewhere. However, I admit freely that I am slightly less open to some of the more 'progressive' arguments in this sphere due to having once bough them hook-line-and-sinker. I am somewhat afraid of succumbing to public/social pressure as I once did. There are facts that I will not ignore, despite vehement, and threatening protestations from angry journalists and whimpering children.

For example, if the "original" were duped into thinking it was just going to be a transportation — Dawnstorm

Agreed. That's very much an extra portion of the set-up though. If the person isn't aware of the nature of the teletransporter, the deliberation never occurs so it kind of defeats the point.
But yes, that's potentially an issue for them. But for our discussion, it's not. They are simply misinformed.

There's a difference in bodily continuity between the person not "transported" and the person on Mars, and that difference is susceptible to ordinal description: one body is more continuous than the other — Dawnstorm

I'm not quite sure I grok, but on the assumption I do, im not sure i entirely assent to this. based on what I think is important, it is the differing mental states that matter. You could actually remove the necessity for their bodies to be empirically difference after that infintessimal period after duplication. They could remain bodily identical (qualitatively) and still be numerically different. The actually 'continuity' aspect probably doesn't need addressing in that case.

So is the person who steps into the transporter the same person that steps out of the transporter, even though the body that stepped into the transporter has been taken apart and re-assembled? — Dawnstorm

On my account, they could be considered the same person. But that isn't necessary. They could take on their own novel place in the universe, and not merely slip into the same place the P1(as it were) occupied. But, they are not 'reassembled'. They are basically 3D-printed based on the data-set beamed from Earth to Mars (in Parfit's case). So, in the duplicative case, there literally is no P1 left to be dealt with. They didn't even exist AS P1. They were P. They they were nought. Then P2. And who is P2? Is where we're getting some juice.

I think every duplication event, in light of the Star Trek version, is simply a new person who's start point was the exact same as another person at a previous point in time. They are numerically, qualitatively and temporally different people. Confusing, sure. But no issues metaphysically/ontologically imo.

If I print the address of a material witness in a murder trial, will that person be in danger as a result? — Vera Mont

That's illegal. Not common sense-related.

If I print the salient details of the police investigation, will the integrity of the trial be compromised? — Vera Mont

Again, illegal. These are regulated standards. Common sense doesn't inform these decisions.

intelligent reasoning. — Vera Mont

is not common sense. You're really not engaging the issue here. Journalism is not something common people do. Common sense doesn't relate.

Funnily enough, I was going to post a couple of further readings, to ensure there's some rigour in the thread. One being this, as an example of feminist, political rhetoric on the topic:
https://philpapers.org/rec/DRARAL-4

And this, from a very much British Feminist perspective:

https://philpapers.org/rec/STONTS (she also has a great piece on sexual orientation, which is related, since people are claiming men can be lesbians now).

It really, really isn't. But it will get there very quickly, i'm sure.