Absolutely fantastic post; and I thank you immensely for hte tone and nature of it.
To this point, I'm with you. I am about 99.5% sure that actual objects are presented, in some way, to our actual sense organs. I would need to ask though, is that enough for you to say we 'see' those objects? If so, alrighty. It doesn't do that for me.
Perception does not occur in the mind; it occurs in the senses. — Mww
I can't make sense of this. Where are 'the senses'? Are they in the sense organs? Or in the mind? I can't see that could be anywhere else. Additionally, perception seems to be defined in various ways. Most seem to begin post-sense - meaning, perception is what
is done with the sensory information to create the experience it either constitutes, or initiates. Can you let me know where you see that as incorrect?
What is done with what the senses inform you of, is in the mind. — Mww
See above. This appears to be what perception is, on most accounts. But, aside from that, I suppose I do not see the mechanics the same as you do. I also then bring in to the discussion, the problem of inaccurate sensory perception. Meaning, there's weak reason to think that what you're "informed of" is necessarily information about any actual objects, as it were. It could be informing you that your eyes are fucked
Kinda silly to trip over the dog, but only credit the dog’s existence to the inference there was something there to trip over. — Mww
I really don't see a problem with doing so. I mean, adding that correlation with vision helps doesn't alter my argument, but would help on your end
:) My problem with that restriction is that we don't have any other experience of the dog. Inference is the only available avenue to infer (in the "posit" sense) that it is an external, real, mind-independent object: That we have an experience of it.
If you tripped over the dog it means you didn’t know it was there — Mww
Not so. I could have run too fast, I could have slipped on something, I could have forgotten in preconsciousness, I could have been mistaken about where I was stepping or where the dog was etc... But more importantly, I find you to be describing experiences. Experiences occur in the mind.
Where is the mechanism by which we 'directly' access these objects? You nearly touched on it with the basketball quip - but, in actuality, it would need to impress on the visual experience itself, for the claim to hold. And that seems plainly impossible, as it's not physical.
inference is a logical maneuver, and there is no logic whatsoever in perception. — Mww
I do not think I agree here. I think, ala Kant, this is
how we perceive. Using a priori concepts, logically consistent as to allow for possible experience, to organise sensory information into an experience.
wasn’t it more fun to read that what’s passed as philosophical discourse here recently? — Mww
105.33%