Morphic fields, and morphic resonance, even though generally (and angrily) rejected by mainstream science...
— Wayfarer

You are projecting again. Scientists are pretty used to many people preferring woo. — wonderer1

The irony physically hurts.

I know you're thinking only of the gametes. That's okay, outdated, but I understand where you're coming from. There's a reason why many "sexual aberrations" as you like to call them are referred to as "INTERSEX" conditions. And I take that as a valid view, just a very "stiff" view is all. — Vaskane

Haha. Errm... In reverse, I don't, because it isn't a view, it's a word which is used to refer to aberrations in sexual development (more commonly referred to now as differences of sex development, not intersex conditions as a catch-all). No one is "inter" sex. You're obviously entitled to your view, but using these words has become quite important, and being wrong about htem common.

intersex conditions say absolutely nothing about the sex binary.

It is, though, and you've accepted as much with the statement:

not different sexes persay — Vaskane

Variance within the two sexes doesn't constitute a third, or non- sex.

Sex has two extremes that it aims towards sure, but on occasion the spectrum is blurred between the two extremes. Even when the 23pair is XX or XY a male, for example could be born with fallopian tubes for example. And even still there are more karyotypes than just XY and XX although not different sexes persay, just not falling within the Binary extreme of XX and XY. — Vaskane

Thank you for clarifying what you're trying to say, and in that sense, I agree, and think this is why Gender is actually apt at all - we need not invoke aberration to note the wild variance within sexes). However, none of these examples presents anything other than a male or female individual. That's the issue that I think the "sex is a construct" people don't get.

Mammalian sex is, in fact, 100% binary to our knowledge. Aberrations in sex development don't change, or 'partial alter' your sex. If you're saying they do, I'm open to the argument at least :)

Yes, and that's nonsense — 180 Proof

To a physicalist ;)

There are definite exceptions to the rule. — Philosophim

What are these exceptions?

What are you basing that on?

I think this is a good venue for it and philosophers need speak up. — Philosophim

I agree. But the reality is they do and get vilified. Holly Lawford-Smith is a great example, as is Kathleen Stock; Judith Butler. Plenty of examples of what you're suggesting being genuinely dangerous for philosophers. Even Rebecca Tuvel, who is pro-trans, got absolutely torn to shreds for suggesting that the same logic applies to race. Which it clearly does.

There are practical considerations that are going to be far more important that being 'right' for many philosophers and particularly women (who stand to have the most important views on this, imo).

Which is why using words that more clearly delineate between the two is important. — Philosophim

Yes.

Okay. It's good to know that all publications always abide by the law and that there is a law on the books to cover every situation in which publishing certain articles, images or commentary could cause someone an injury. — Vera Mont

I think you're either being incredibly disingenuous (my preference) or do not understand what journalism, common sense, and "society" are.

Transexualism seems the easiest word for this — Philosophim

I would agree, if it didn't leave open the doors I brushed past in the ending of my previous comment (which you quoted there, I see from the comment box hehe)..

I think trying to make a word better defined is a common pursuit in philosophy. If you wish to give up, that's fine. — Philosophim

Not at all. But when there are scores of philosophers who have literally nothing to do with their time, but use philosophy to support the supposition that their special identity relies on, it's really fucking hard.

Making the types of arguments we're making get people fired, in the real world. My University philosophy club has for three of its highest administrators trans people. This means certain views are off-limited because they don't want to hear it. They are happy to put the cart before the horse. Adn this is extremely disheartening to someone who feels teh way you do. I'm not suggesting we 'give up'. I am suggesting that it may be a matter of time.

I'm more interested in what you think about the underlying difference I've noted here. — Philosophim

I think Sex and Gender are patently, inarguably different sets of properties and are easily discernable from one another. It is totally bizarre to me that it's taken seriously that they are either the same thing, or somehow reliant on one another. Questioning your gender shouldn't ever invoke some kind of negative connotation, or indication of mental illness. Questioning your sex (if not intersex) would indicate one of those. Though, it is to be noted that intersex individuals are all, without exception either male or female. "intersex" is a confusing misnomer used by dumb people to support wild, unsupportable theories about how sex is a social construct.

I think Sex really, really matters, and Gender far less so. I think Gender is merely a loose system of categorizing social roles and behaviours, and should be relegated to a nicety and nothing determinant of anything whatever in Law or elsewhere. However, I admit freely that I am slightly less open to some of the more 'progressive' arguments in this sphere due to having once bough them hook-line-and-sinker. I am somewhat afraid of succumbing to public/social pressure as I once did. There are facts that I will not ignore, despite vehement, and threatening protestations from angry journalists and whimpering children.

For example, if the "original" were duped into thinking it was just going to be a transportation — Dawnstorm

Agreed. That's very much an extra portion of the set-up though. If the person isn't aware of the nature of the teletransporter, the deliberation never occurs so it kind of defeats the point.
But yes, that's potentially an issue for them. But for our discussion, it's not. They are simply misinformed.

There's a difference in bodily continuity between the person not "transported" and the person on Mars, and that difference is susceptible to ordinal description: one body is more continuous than the other — Dawnstorm

I'm not quite sure I grok, but on the assumption I do, im not sure i entirely assent to this. based on what I think is important, it is the differing mental states that matter. You could actually remove the necessity for their bodies to be empirically difference after that infintessimal period after duplication. They could remain bodily identical (qualitatively) and still be numerically different. The actually 'continuity' aspect probably doesn't need addressing in that case.

So is the person who steps into the transporter the same person that steps out of the transporter, even though the body that stepped into the transporter has been taken apart and re-assembled? — Dawnstorm

On my account, they could be considered the same person. But that isn't necessary. They could take on their own novel place in the universe, and not merely slip into the same place the P1(as it were) occupied. But, they are not 'reassembled'. They are basically 3D-printed based on the data-set beamed from Earth to Mars (in Parfit's case). So, in the duplicative case, there literally is no P1 left to be dealt with. They didn't even exist AS P1. They were P. They they were nought. Then P2. And who is P2? Is where we're getting some juice.

I think every duplication event, in light of the Star Trek version, is simply a new person who's start point was the exact same as another person at a previous point in time. They are numerically, qualitatively and temporally different people. Confusing, sure. But no issues metaphysically/ontologically imo.

If I print the address of a material witness in a murder trial, will that person be in danger as a result? — Vera Mont

That's illegal. Not common sense-related.

If I print the salient details of the police investigation, will the integrity of the trial be compromised? — Vera Mont

Again, illegal. These are regulated standards. Common sense doesn't inform these decisions.

intelligent reasoning. — Vera Mont

is not common sense. You're really not engaging the issue here. Journalism is not something common people do. Common sense doesn't relate.

Funnily enough, I was going to post a couple of further readings, to ensure there's some rigour in the thread. One being this, as an example of feminist, political rhetoric on the topic:
https://philpapers.org/rec/DRARAL-4

And this, from a very much British Feminist perspective:

https://philpapers.org/rec/STONTS (she also has a great piece on sexual orientation, which is related, since people are claiming men can be lesbians now).

It really, really isn't. But it will get there very quickly, i'm sure.

I do not think transexual people are transgendered. A transgendered person exhibits cultural actions that defy their sex. A transexual person is trying to act in a gendered way that fits the sex they want to be. — Philosophim

I'm unsure whether you misspoke here, or are conflating the two ideas you're trying to prise apart.

If we are to understand that gender is, in fact, a bundle of loosely-collective behaviours and tendencies, there's no 'defy'ing going on at all. We're all simply people who behave in various ways, and some of us don't sit in the pregnant middle of the distribution. There is not a condition or 'social justice' issue to be discussed here. I would say, on your preceding account, this (above) statement is a little incoherent.

If someone is 'transgender' and regards that condition to relate to the opposite sex then the only reasonable determinant is that they believe gender and sex are correlated. Otherwise, to be 'trans gender' would mean to, as you say, defy one's sex. It seems these can't exist without contradiction.

In a similar vein, the concept of 'transexual' makes only logical sense, and not practical sense. Sex can't be traversed.

I think the biggest problem is that some trans people are claiming to literally be the opposite sex, and some are denying that that's possible. Some claim to have a mental illness, some claim you must have a mental illness etc...
It is ill-defined, badly researched and reported even worse. If it were possible to eek out an exact notion of transgenderism, we could move forward - but those who use the term seem terminally incapable of doing so. Sunk-cost, imo.

:ok:

Interesting to see this taken up, without ridicule here. Particularly by yourself. Nice

Seems to me you may be losing grip on reality.

and dragging @Lionino with you.

I implore both of you to save time, blood pressure and reputation by ending this pissing match and walking away.

That is, I know the beer is in the fridge because I put it there. — Banno

I agree, Astrophel is being a bit obtuse in general, and I think they're going to have a field day with the above, because it satisfies their criteria for something you could 'know' to act upon under their account, being:

you already know about refrigerators and their capacity to contain beer — Astrophel

Hehehe.

compare our descriptions with available facts. — jkop

Which facts could you compare perceptions to? Other perceptions?

Everyone else experiences your death, so on this account yes. But it was a throwaway descriptive take on something that is clearly mind-dependent. Death is clearly not.

*moans in latin prog*

would that be sunk cost too? — Manuel

From experience: Moments where I have, apparently, seen or experienced something extravagant, anti-physics, telepathic etc.. it is very hard to drop the moment of intense speciality of being "the one" who experienced something extra-sensory, or special, or beyond normal experience. EVeryone wants to be special. Once your inner person has latched on to the experience, I think it's very hard to let go of it.

Francis Collins would be an example there. His experience was powerful, and I imagine, he has since been trying to support the initial emotional response with theology, rather than the opposite. It was 'spontaneous'.

the ghost still exists in my world and reality. — javi2541997

No, it doesn't. The experience exists, of a non-existent ghost. That is, if you accept that abstract objects don't obtain.
If you do, sure, I'll take it. But that's, imo, a very much massaged use of the word.

I don't think decisions about what articles to publish have anything to do with day-to-day practical sense and navigation. It seems specifically outside of the group of activities to which 'common sense' could apply.
I think you're lamenting something that both never existed, and isn't something particularly desirable. This, in light of what I think Lionino hit and is right about:

a call to submit to the rules of modern moralism — Lionino

Seems to be the 'common sense' you're driving at, and happen to align with. I would say, with most liberal thinkers, that stymying publication based on 'common sense' is a risible idea, and a tragedy in practice.

But what accounts for this? — Manuel

Sunk-cost fallacy.

Coming to terms with your entire milieu being wrong is painful, and avoiding it seems standard. This applies equally to thinking Horoscopes represent something not derived from your own mind, and being an asshole.

Contrary to popular opinion, I think science is very liberal with which hypotheses it entertains. — flannel jesus

Which science?
A lot of narrative sciences are completely incapable (probably, funding reasons) to entertain hypotheses not prima facie overwhelmingly likely to be true, in my experience.

Hard sciences, though, can at the very least in discussion be more liberal. Then again, Avi Loeb hasn't exactly been treated 'well'.

That was a standard claim I used to hear amongst New Age types. You don't see them because 'you're a crass materialist who lacks sensitivity' or 'you are a skeptic and so are nto receptive'. I think this romantic approach to occult matters is still popular. — Tom Storm

Very much is. The idea that you have to develop a 'sense' for extra-sensory phenomena is both preposterous, and the most common defense to being proven wrong when you claim special identity.

Me, I don't know if there were ghosts there, but it really wasn't hard to believe it in that environment. Partially because of the sense of the past and of premature and violent deaths. It was much easier to believe it there than in the brash newness of Australia where I come from. We're not old enough to be haunted. — Wayfarer

Similar stuff going on when I visited the East Coast of the USA.

A friend of mine, also from there but hasn't been in a long time said the same as I - we are sceptics and understand the basic 'facts' that pit against the possibility of these kind of phenomena.

But we both, and his father (who finds this type of thing fully risible, and not worth being polite about) were harshly emotionally stuck by something within the grounds of Plantations around Georgia/St Simons/Jekyll and then at Gettysburg. Something hangs in the air. And whether we bring it with us, it is shared, and explains a lot about hte conviction people walk away from those experiences with - particularly as they tend to group up (flat-earthers, is a great example).

I make no comment on what that something actually is. I just find this a very interesting phenomena that doesn't seem tied to one's pre-existing state of mind.

Well, that explains you, I guess.

Do indirect realists only hold the negative view that this concept is incoherent? Or do they also hold the positive belief in their position that we cannot directly perceive ordinary objects? — Luke

For clarity: there is no difference here, except that you're ascribing one version of it as a defined philosophical position, and the other as a descriptor of it.

The concept is incoherent, and gives rise to the view to which one is then committed - we cannot directly perceive ordinary objects (as a particular commitment of understanding that "unmediated awareness of ordinary objects" is impossible). This is what the Indirect Realists are just incredulous about. Seemingly, other positions take the former as given, and the latter as somehow impossible. But, they are the same claim in different clothes.

Then my original comment stands.
Absolutely nothing to think there's anything reasonable about that claim.

"common sense" has nothing to do with publishing articles.

Nice, thank you.

The Morality as Cooperation hypothesis is a candidate for scientific truth based mostly on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms and everything we know about our moral sense. — Mark S

Unfortunately, nothing here (or behind it in the comment) responds to my position. I understand your position. I'm wanting to explanation as to how it affects the world in the ways claimed. It seems it doesn't? I can't see its explanatory power prima facie. I can see it's claim to it, but not any reason to take it seriously. More further on..

If a simple hypothesis can explain that superficially chaotic data set, then we have a robust hypothesis that is strong candidate for scientific truth. — Mark S

But the claim isn't of that kind. THe claim is one where its apex would be an efficient and predicatable statistical analysis of moral norms over time, in various cultures based on lets say 1000 variables "number crunched" for "intimative" power to ascertain the most likely moral position of future states/generations/peoples. That seems to just be a really focussed sociology. So, I'm wondering whence comes some kind of verifiability in the present? Maybe interesting as to how we 'got to" any particular moral situation (but again, so various even across the present moment that I think attending to the "chaos" would presuppose something you've not shown - coherence).

The insight that the chaos in this data set is only superficial is critical to the great simplification of cultural moral norms into a few categories and high confidence in the hypothesis. — Mark S

But this assumes the success of hte claim, without even beginning the project of showing that success. I'm unsure this has gotten off the ground. The underpinnings still seem fairly wide of a workable hypothesis beyond internal monologues.

The cooperation strategies found to date make the simple categories that cultural moral norms and our moral senses' judgments belong to self-evident. — Mark S

They certainly don't appear that way to most people, from what I can tell. I'm failing to see anything in your defenses that would establish this claim. And if this claim were established, I'd think you're well on your way to a workable hypothesis. But as above, without showing some coherence across those disparate data points I think its very hard to get interested in the hypothesis.

So what? — Mark S

A purely observational, statistically analytical historical "hypothesis" is not one which has the power to explain anything more than what "was" (and, maybe, under certain constraints, what is... but we already have various disciplines making sense of that data, to the degree it can be made sense of)

Ah, yeah, I was talking Star Trek transporter as per the OP. I missed the two-line post about Parfit. I've never heard of that case, and am unfamiliar of the specifics. I'm not sure I'd change my mind, but I might. What's "TE"? — Dawnstorm

Totally fair enoguh - I may have missed that that was the case, and if so, apologies. I could've done much better to have a constructive exchange.

TE=thought experiment.

At the very least the original and copy would know who is who. — Dawnstorm

I think that's true, yes. There memories would differ in "cogito"-type ways that ensure knowledge of which they are.

Under the Star Trek teleporter model, there's nothing meaningful to distinguish the resulting individuals, since the original (who committed the killing) got taken apart, and both versions were assembled using the same information. — Dawnstorm

I agree, but only to a point. The exact point of duplication. After that, they are numerical and qualitatively different people. Otherwise, there would be nothing to tease apart any sufficiently similar people (in terms of trying to figure out a 'rule') without even trying to invoke identity.

Not even the people themselves would have a clue. — Dawnstorm

This is absolutely the weirdness of that case. Metaphysically, I don't think we have any issue. But they would both, until the critical moment after duplication (say five seconds) have absolutely no way to tell each other apart. But after about five seconds, in practical terms, it could be done. They have either seen each other, or are aware another of 'them' exists - ensuring it is not 'them' from each other's perspective. I think you're inadvertently invoking a situation in which they couldn't tell which person they were. I think that's not really ever going to happen, sans serious mentall aberration of schizo-affective type. They would know they weren't the other person, for sure.

but the simple existence of such a duplication technology might have effects that need to be dealt with one way or another. — Dawnstorm

100%.

For example, consider a religious fanatic who thinks he must kill unbelievers but since killing is a crime, he must also atone for it. He could use this technology to first kill someone, then duplicate himself, then turn himself in, expecting his duplicate to do the same (which he probably will if it is possible, since he is an identical copy of the original). — Dawnstorm

This appears to me to be praying with your finger's crossed and isn't a move open to a religious fanatic. But, you're right that the general problem obtains. Typically, a religious fanatic would run into the immaterial identity concept, anyway, making this a moot point for them.

I think such technology might have rather radical effect on what ideas we can even think about. — Dawnstorm

I am not convinced, But i look forward to finding out i'm wrong :)

I think that’s likely true as regards their stance on the potential legal ramifications - but it seems less relevant to the claim Vera made which was that these outlets “know it when they see it” sort of thing.
I disagree and think that it’s merely a game of massaging the arbitrary rules. The actual concepts don’t hold water though

I think Vaskane is in a trough at the moment. Regularly devolving into a pissing match with himself. Last time he did this he apologised directly to me.

Might be worth allowing it to pass.

Me: Two copies of the original (which is destroyed). — Dawnstorm

This is not the case in the TE. The branch line case results in the original and one duplicate; not two duplicates. Perhaps that’s the issue? If it were the case that P in the machine is also duplicated and die, leaving P1 to walk out of the machine and P2 to pop up on Mars, I can start from your premise - and it gets murky. That would be difficult intuitively, but I think my account applies there too. They are two different duplicates immediately qualitatively discernible from one another (and obviously numerically so).

However, that’s not the case we’re discussing and not the start point I’ve used.

In Parfit’s branchline, there is either P at t1 who dies, then P(2) wt t2 who do not exist simultaneously OR P and P(2) existing simultaneously at t3 (as in my previous comment) They don’t require a discussion of whether they are the same person. One is X years old (I assume 18 or more) and one is seconds old - there is no comparison.

Nice, good, thank you for the thorough response.

They share a history. — Dawnstorm

This is not a meaningful thing, unless you're restricting the discussion to the exact moment of duplication - at which time its extremely important. But, in the TE, the destruction of P1 happens before P2 comes into existence. So, it's even less of a problem than I had put forward. If you want to plum say "Ok, well then P2 clearly takes on P1s past and constitutes P1s future", fine that's a very practical and likely the most workable version, wihch (in reference to your closing portion) would influence policy and law I'd think.

But in the branchline case, that's not possible. There are two people. Two different people. The one which came into existence five seconds ago(P2) did not do and is not responsible for anything at all that P1 did and as soon as the exact moment of their creation passes, they are no longer analogous, identical to, or able to be understood as P1. So, the fact they share a hsitory is not meaningful. It is not, as far as I can tell, even true viz. they share memory, not history. The body of P2 simply did not do anything the body of P1 did. Nor did their brain. Or their intention. Or anything else. They didn't exist at the relevant time. You can here think about false memories, influenced memories, implanted memories etc.. etc... We cannot use memory as an accountant, in this discussion. The biggest problem is how its possible that P2 (in the original case) can be conferred the rights and responsibilities of P1, which they are not constitutive of. Is this just basically a rights transference by Deed? Could be. But nothing logical allows it.

P(t1) --Duplication event--> P1(t2) and P2(t2). There is no P1(t1)/P2(t1). There's only P(t1). — Dawnstorm

Sort of, and would agree on that arrangement but I would arrange it this way

P(t1) ->Duplication event is t2 and here we have P1 and P2 at t2-> any infintesimal period of time later is t3 and then we have P1(t3) and P2(t3):

separated, not even confusable as identical due to the sheer difference in body, mentality and situation (again, rejecting an immaterial soul concept) and anything but superficial appearance (as their actual bodily make up will be difference after any infintesimal amount of time.
There is absolutely a single moment of convergence where there is no notable (in this sense, I mean, it wouldn't be detectable by any means even if its logically there) difference between the two Ps. However, this moment is so faint and insignificant I can't rightly give it much at all.

I don't think any of our current intuitions can prepare us for this type of technology. — Dawnstorm

Definitely agree, and have fun with these things rather than 'care' to much of a degree. We're no where near this type of tech, if it's even possible.

What any one person believes is besides the point. — Dawnstorm

This (and the rest of the para) isn't quite groking what I"m saying. You're making an argument based on legal positivism. It's a practical argument, based on the fact you believe the law is a legitimate system for regulating technology. If you didn't believe this, your arguments would be different (this is an assumption, i'm just aclarifying my point because it's been missed). It's not a philosophical argument.

They were the same person before the splitting event, which is when the certificate was issued. — Dawnstorm

I'm sorry, because I don't want to sound so incredulous given how reasonable you are - but what the heck? There s no P2 to be discussed before the event. This is a complete nonsense. There was only P1 before the splitting even - regardless of Classic or Branchline version. There simply is nothing to be discussed, unless the split has taken place. You cannot read from P2 backwards to before the splitting event. They did not exist at that time. They share absolutely nothing but memory. And even this is divergent, immediately P2 gains awareness. P1 doesn't ahve that memory, and P2 doesn't have the memory of hte machine(and anything after that) post-button-pressing.

c) The certificate is valid for one of them, and invalid for the other (no idea how to argue for this; my least favourite) — Dawnstorm

This is the only reasonable item from your list to me, and i've made the argument. Hopefully it hits. The other two are clearly not true, in any sense of that word, in the TE.

My immediate intuition went to "contract", but that wouldn't work, since the potentially disagreeing parties are at that time still one person. A type of "will"? I will let this to P1 and this to P2? — Dawnstorm

I would (as a legal professional) posit that you would need two things:

A deed conferring your rights on P2 assuming the machine works; and
A clause within the Deed that allows you to retain all rights and responsibilities in the event you do not predecease P2 (which is the expected outcome). All that needs to happen is that 'ideally' when a person is created on Mars (and the branch occurs) they receive a (futuristic) birth certificate (or creation certificate). In the Classic case, no one would care. Its just impractical to care, unless there's a significant amount of time that they both exist.

I would imagine this would go hand-in-hand with a (futuristic) Will in the sense that, what if both die? Or the split doesn't happen, yet you're destroyed. In this way, the problem is entirely avoided. P2 needs to come up with his/her own life after the Branching, if it happens. It's not P1s fault, and P2 is an accident, essentially. Though, in the original Branchline P1 dies three days later, so by the time P1 dies, P2 is an entirely different person with nothing shared between them except superficial appearance. I see no issue. The problem here, would be that all P1s significant relations knows someone who looks exactly like the deceased is out there, not being the deceased. And that would hurt.

I have digressed way too far from my points of interest here though - The legal ramifications appear extremely easy to deal with for me. It does assume a certain level of understanding in any P1 going into the machine, but we can't assume the worst if we want the future to rise above it. My points of interest are in establishing Identity, or why/why not.

I don't think identity can be established. And I don't think it matters. It's very uncomfortable, and I'd like to be wrong.

Now the OP certainly needs to give us more information about what he is asking about, but we can be sure it isn't what you make it out to be. — Leontiskos

This is an exact ignoratio elenchus. You have literally made my argument, despite pretending to be an objector to it. "I'll leave you to it".

How anyone can either reject this or think it anything other than indirect realism is what puzzles me. — Michael

Just to give you a little more bang for buck, no one seems to think that the chemicals that 'cause a lemon to smell like a lemon" aren't the lemon(they aren't), or the light particles reflecting off of an antelope are not an antelope(they aren't). Not even the object stimulates the senses. Far be it from me...

Oh good lord; i've never heard of another citing the 'good' Talk Talk albums.

I prefer Colour of Spring, myself, but the three - Colour, Spirit and Laughing Stock are all absolutely phenomenal.

O-Rang was good too.

Totally fair enough my friend. Sleep well :)

(also, I've set up the Zoom meeting. Check the thread :) )