Yes, I was thinking what Schop said. I don't think ownership of guns is a vaccination against fascism. — Tom Storm

Willingness to use them against the government may be, though. I'm not saying this wont lead to disaster - I just cannot see how its possible fascism rears its head, unless seriously re-defined from its European origin. I don't think Rorty's conception is great, but even using that, I can't see it happening.

That doesn't mean anything. Most of the people who have the huge stockpiles are probably Trump supporters. — schopenhauer1

This certainly appears to me like you're not thinking very hard.

Remember, this theory strips out normativity from the good and bad; and groups the good and bad based off of similarities between actions, just like how we determine other naturalistic conceptions—so this only needs empirical inquiry. — Bob Ross

I cannot see how this is sensible. Good and Bad can only be deduced from empirical data. But the concepts themselves have ipso facto moral valence. They necessarily lead to moral implications, although, i agree, there's no moral command as a result of acknowledging good and bad. but as soon as you start having 'the moral conversation' reliance on the Good and Bad is unavoidable. I think its a bit of a slick move to claim there's no normative implications for an (what appears to attempt at..) objective categorisation of acts into the same. It sounds more like a statistical analysis that would result in a really, really clear idea of where your morals lie. It's extremely hard to see how the move is open to you to act other than in accordance with the categories and not make an immoral move.

Same with the good and bad: the good includes being kind, as well as other altuistic acts and what not, and the bad includes depravity, disrespect, meanness, etc. The serial killer can likewise acknowledge that what they are doing is bad, while maintaining they should keep doing it. — Bob Ross

I don't think this is correct, per se. The psychopath can acknowledge that the act would fit this category, for someone else thus defeating the applicability of the categories beyond those who assent to them. And, in fairness, this is a very sound way to arrive at a social good but i don't think it's right to say that it would be acknowledge as-is rather than with that qualifier.

While i suffered DiD, I underwent several prolonged periods of sociopathy. I can tell you, in that state, I would have just told you you are wrong. There is no moral valence to my strangling a cat (i never did that, btw lol). It is not good or bad. It simply doesn't matter. I would only have been able to recognise your categories - not that I was violating a category

The only way to synthesize the moral facts, being non-normative, with normative judgments is to subjectively affirm a normative moral judgment that implicates them in doing good; such “one ought to be good” — Bob Ross

I don't understand how 'moral facts' don't have pretty direct normative implications. If we have a moral fact "x is wrong" then to act against that, would be immoral. I have no idea how you find daylight between the two.

Not if we are just abstracting categories of actions, and labelling them ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ in a sense that ties well into how we typically use the terms. — Bob Ross

But this betrays those being facts?

The good is not a platonic form nor a priori under my view. — Bob Ross

Similar to above. Happy to acknowledge i've misinterpreted you, but then I fall back into - then these aren't facts. They're just socially-common concepts.

Morality, under this view, is not solely about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory; it is also about what is good and what is bad. — Bob Ross

Are you able to explain what you're seeing stands between a moral fact, and it's normative implication? Im having a really hard time not thinking this is an attempt to do something that can't be done.

I don’t think you are completely appreciating the severed connection between the good/bad and normativity in this theory yet. — Bob Ross

I don't see it - as will be obvious now :razz:

It was an analogy, and the point had nothing to do with how many colors there actually are. — Bob Ross

My point is still live, though. If that's the case, the system is entirely inadequate to talk about human behaviour (which is so variably 'coloured' as to require about 2350824690438 categories.

I am open to there being multiple categories; e.g., a neutral category whereof an action does not promote harmony nor disharmony. — Bob Ross

Ok, nice.

The term traditionally is both of these, I have severed them from each other. — Bob Ross

If the only reply you make is to describe how this can be the case (i.e avoiding the implication from moral fact to normative 'fact') that would probbaly be the most important for me to understand the theory :)

I agree with MU here. If it were not for Minkowski spacetime allowing rest frames and thus the "passage" of time with no physical changes I would think time required change — jgill

Is there's a boil-down source to understand the concept? Im not seeing any necessity beyond trying to support the idea that time doesn't require change, which im not on board with quite yet. Would love to see something about that concept of whcih i have no knowledge :)

I don’t deny that Kant believed there were objects outside us. Only that we don’t know what they really are. — Wayfarer

If it wasn't clear (because I'm shit at philosophical exposition) this was what I was trying to point out.

It is inductively true that there must be actual objects, but we are precluded from any knowledge of them. I'm unsure that your wording means anything different rather htan more precise, than mine. In any case, it strikes me as commensurate with what I was trying to get across, having finally worked out separating the thing-in-itself from the noumenon (lets say, of it).

1. The thing-in-itself is not that which appears. — Mww

Well, it doesn't appear in intuition, but for the system to make any sense it must appear to our sense organs to impart an impression outside of our ability to perceive that process. Otherwise, again, we're left with impressions from absolutely nothing, instead of something for which we have no concept or knowledge. I don't see any reason we can't grasp this idea.. The 'thing in itself' cannot be 'nothing'. Only nothing in intuition.
Beyond that, yes, i'm describing the same process so neat-o.

:ok:

I wasn't sure anyone would care about the reasoning, about US politics, from an irish expat in NZ :P

The USA has an armed populace.

I think anyone seriously entertaining Fascism as an incoming concern in the USA isn't up to having a conversation about it.

I watched a Sideprojects this morning where Simon Whistler went over the misunderstandings around Schroedinger's Cat.

The indeterminacy is affected as much by the geiger counter as a human (or cat) eye/brain complex and collapses the wave-function in the same way. So, there's not really anything mysterious in the box anyway

All we know is that it is something with sufficient affect on our senses, a mere appearance. — Mww

Nice. Despite probably unfortunately saying something else, this strikes me as the same my understanding but in clearer words.

I suppose the thing remaining is that thing between the two -

1. Thing-in-itself appears to us as an unknowable entity;
2. ????;
3. Something is presented to our sensuous organs;
4. We receive that something, undetermined as sensory perceptions;
5. Off to the races with understanding/reason/judgement.

Sigh. Goddamn Kant.

:ok:

Then you have a burden to explain why that's the case. Insisting on your own definitions isn't reason-giving. — Hallucinogen

I don't think so. I'm attending the actually, etymologically sound usage of the words. Why would you accept randomly-ascribed meanings that don't fit the etymology. More on that below...

I did -- I gave the Oxford definition in the OP. — Hallucinogen

That isn't looking at the words - that's taking a definition that fits your point. The one provided by an institutional atheist organisation has much more authority, imo. And i did give that reason - apologies if it wasn't clearer. It should also be extremely clear by now that, three things are going on in my position:

1. I am trying to solve the problem.
2. I have identified robust meanings for these words which avoid double-counts, inaccuracies and inconsistencies, on my view.
3. I have provided a potential actual solution, rather than merely asserted "i am right'. I am asserting that my suggestion solves the problem of inter-subjective meaning making conversation either near-impossible, or totally unimportant.

It is either luck, or my erudite treatment of the words that results in that solution aligning with the etymologically-sound use of hte words.

All of this is making me think that you didn't read the OP. — Hallucinogen

Do feel free. I'm not being shirty there - please, feel free.

No, anti-theism is moral opposition to God on the basis that belief in God is harmful to people. — Hallucinogen

I've never seen this position ascribed to the word from any other source including a brief click-about just now to ensure i'm not totally off-mark - unless you're misreading 'theism should be opposed' as a moral, rather than logical claim (here, they can co-exist - It can be immoral for society to accept patently illogical and false cosmologies - but that's not a moral opposition to God. Was Hitch's position best i can tell). If i'm wrong there, conceded, and I return to my 'solution-oriented' approach to it, using the actual structure of the words to deduce their meaning to avoid this pulling of teeth.

This reasoning doesn't follow, because if theism is the opposite of belief in God, rather than lack of theism, then it's the positive claim that belief in God is false — Hallucinogen

I assume you mean atheism there. And if so, I reject that oppositional framing. They are related, but not opposites. One is a positive claim, one is rejection of that positive claim with no claim of it's own. Clearly, 'anti-theism' is the literal opposite of theism. A-theism is patently, inarguably non-theism with no positive claim. I simply will not accept claims other than this, looking at the words themselves and their structure. Otherwise,. I'm choosing to roll around in a shit-heap of talking over and past one another at every turn. Call me dogmatic, or egoic - I'm just not willing to wade into a clearly dumb framing of words that matter to the conversation. I'm more than happy to be inflexible about nutting out useful strategies for discussing things when it is obvious we don't have one.

As such, and in any case, even assuming i'm mistaken in all these term's meanings and therefore all of my suggestions and positions are 'false': That's a stupid, unhelpful framing of these words that causes the utterly ridiculous conversations we're having now. Hence, actual solution being suggested (IFF i am entirely wrong and can't argue from the words themselves) Why not just accept that a better system of terms would be better instead of going "this is what we have, we'll make do" That doesn't seem to fly anywhere else...

Well, i guess this is what im trying to sort out for myself.

'time', best i can tell, is a mere relation in perception. So, without perceiving beings, time does not obtain.

Changes, however, do, in the absence of mind, but there's no perceptual relation that requires cause-before-effect in extended space, for an eg. Bear in mind, I may be contradicting myself due to not developing these ideas anywhere else.

time could not have been passing before there was minds? — Metaphysician Undercover

If time consists in either the changes described, or the relation between them, I don't see how that couldn't be happening prior to humans conceiving time in a particular order, to unify perceptions. Though, maybe i'm missing a trick but it seems to be that your suggestion presupposes an 'actual' time, independent of objects passing, rather than time being a description, or set of relations between objects.

I tend to think i'm missing a trick, but i conceive that the universe, as a whole, does not undergo 'time'. Sentient beings do, as a facility of relation between objects of change, to ensure a logical causal relationship in extended space to avoid the delusional mess we noted earlier.
So, prior to sentient minds, there would be the continually changing material of the universe, but no perspective to relate those changes to any prior or future state - just the entirety of hte universe changing in 'one place' as it were. I tend to think that without a mind to relate these changes to one another, 'time' does not obtain. Just changes, with no necessary relation to each other. Very counter-intuitive, and probably wrong.

Thank you mate. I'm having a bit of a build up here at work, so will need to get to this when i get a quiet spell :) Shouldn't be a long reply though, as you;'ve covered most of what was in teh air for me.

I was suggesting that if they are saying things that are understood locally as racist, and they are locals, then they probably are racist. — Hanover

Oh, no, I understood what you were getting at. I think it's an... objectionable... conclusion. But there we go.

Thank you very much for the tip on Cumberland!

It is a Kantian conception of time, and i do not believe it results in any of these logical issues. Do absolutely feel free to set me right, if that Kantian thought has been dealt with over the centuries. It almost certainly has, and I am, as I try to make clear, very naive :)

That you might mean something different when you say it will likely be realized with your Aussie accent, but, I assure you, the harder the Southern twang used when it is said, the less likely you're going to convince someone your questions about the presence of black people was just an innocuous curiosity. — Hanover

Fair enough. I still see that as utterly ridiculous - impugning someone's motives based on their accent or locale. Wild.

I have a british accent, ftr :)

Jekyll and St Simon's were the better examples i could think of. Big, oak-lined properties with Master homes, somewhat preserved.

Apparently, around fourteen were established on St Simons. I can only recall three different memories of different plantations on St Simons, though. As to Jekyll, i may be recalling PLantation Oak and then conflating.

"something of substance". — LuckyR

Yes, i think that's probably true for most :)

This is significant because the comment by the driver was in fact a faux pas where I am from. — Hanover

I find this utterly preposterous, and a symptom of looking for enemies, unfortunately. Thems might be the rules, but they're ridiculous, if so.

My main point is that it's more impartial that a bunch of Senators — Relativist

Thats definitely true - they're allowed to do it in the open!

As a lionizer of Dylan, I do think that was his take outside of true civil reform (MLK for instance).

But those representations in us must have a cause. That which makes an impression on the senses, an appearance, from which follows a sensation, is sufficient cause. But, as already proved, it cannot be the thing-in-itself that causes the impression on the senses, which leaves only the thing of the thing-in-itself. — Mww

I'm not sure i understand this (or, possibly, just understand it to be the case). The impressions must be caused - and things-in-themselves are said to be at the bottom of that causal chain, so to speak. Obvious our impressions are not of the thing, for the reason you state, but cause by our interacting with it, via sense organs, doesn't seem to create any issues and seems to comport with the admittedly insanely hard-to-parse passages about it in CPR. Even if we can never have an impression proper of the thing, we must be actually engaging it somehow to get the impression we do get.

From this idea the the thing-in-itself isnt causal in this chain, I can only be left with things that have no effect on sense, and impressions that come from nowhere/nothing. But i suppose, that is transcendental idealism in some regard.

whereas noumena are nothing but conceptions, having no phenomenal representations at all, hence cannot even be known to exist. — Mww

My understanding is that Noumena are perceptions not found in sensory intuition, so yes, entirely unavailable to us - but not conceptions as such. I suppose though, you might be referring to our ability to conceive them in the understanding, as totally unrelated to what they actually are - which, yes. Fair enough. We can always imagine, as you note.

So if phenomena are the representations given from human sensibility, noumena cannot be either the representations, or the means for the possibility of them. — Mww

Agreed. But, I did admit I was entirely misunderstanding Noumena, and this comports with my updated understanding, in terms of relation to 'us'. They're just not there, even if they 'exist' some'where'

they are very unhelpful. — Mww

They seem to be entirely irrelevant to the system, other than to posit something medial.

And, thank you, so much, for continuing to engage. I did my best to go away for a while before responding so i really hope its not tedious and you turn into 180 Proof on me :P

The point being that some word usage doesn't leave much doubt as to where people stand, and you have to realize that the words you hear are probably modified to your sensibilities until the day you stumble into somewhere you've been misread. — Hanover

I agree with this, and refer to Bill Burr's old bit about the N word, and using it out of earshot of those whom you assume would take umbrage. He's not wrong - but that would be the substantive :)

We told him we were from Atlanta, and he told us he had been there and that it had so many black people he couldn't believe it. — Hanover

he already committed a faux pas — Hanover

I don't see a faux pas in pointing out a demographic unfamilar to you. Doesn't seem to contain any opinion on it - just that it was unusual for that guy. I think in this case, your friend/her husband aren't being reasonable - but this, I think goes to my point. Id want to hear more, in any situation.

P.S have spent some time in Georgia, near the coast. Lovely, flat, welcoming place but its super-creepy to drive past plantation after plantation

Yep, I understand that. But lawyers gonna lawyer, and they are extremely tricky. You're right that the system shouldn't be open to this type of crap, but it seems it is.

This process of competing interests leads to a set of jurors less likely to favor either side. — Relativist

I would refer (though, this is extremely low-brow stuff in terms of the convo we're having) the opening scenes of The Devil's Advocate for a fictional take on how lawyers tend to voir dire. It is a scurrilous process at worst, and cynical at best. Maybe i'm the cynical one :rofl: I deal with these things almost daily and am somewhat disillusioned by the idea that lawyers can't fuck with the process. They are, after all, all humans.

This seems a contradiction from the above. We now know two things about the thing in itself: (1) it is unknowable and (2) it causes intuitions. #1 appears definitionally true, but #2 an empirical statement. If X (the thing in itself) causes me to see a flower, I can say something pretty substantive of X, specifically that it elicits a particular intuition, but I don't think I can say that because it's noumenal. I can only say there are Xs out there and intuituions in here, but I can't say any particular X is consistently responsible for any particular intuition. — Hanover

Having not yet replied to Mww, maybe he's said something relevant, so apologies if i've not seen that yet..

I do not see the issue. We can understand (in Kant, anyway) that intuitions arise from things-in-themselves, of which we know nothing as an empirical deduction. We know for certain that our perceptions are necessarily askance from whatever causes them. So, the need to say 'it's unknowable' arises - but this isn't the noumenal. The noumenal is that which arises in a perception other than sensory perception and so is theoretically knowable, but unattainable for humans. The 'thing-in-itself' as for itself is not available to any intuition, is how i read this. Therefore, we can infer its existence, despite knowing nothing of it, other than it may be hte basis for our intuitions.

I am also shit at Kant, so this is probably way off.

I can abstract out that this is what is ‘good — Bob Ross

I deny this entirely. Without something to ground your conception of hte good outside of empirical sense perception, I cannot see how anything but bias or assumption could lead to judging acts as good or bad. This is kind of my point - what criteria do these acts meet? It seems to be an internal criteria based on intuition(in the colloquial sense) or an arbitrary adherence to some conception of 'flourishing' as commonly posited. I'm not seeing where the induction is validated...

I don’t see why this is the case: I don’t need to posit a platonic form of a triangle to induce a concept of a triangle. — Bob Ross

Because a triangle is analytical. It is a shape with three (tri) angles (angle). "the good" has no such grounding. X is good because of something further(its meeting a criteria/on for instance, held in the subject's mind), which makes it synthetic. In this case, I can't see how an a priori concept can be appealed to unless is some kind of Platonic Form-type thing assumed to be 'correct', as it were. We'd need an innate, defined concept of Good and Bad to accurately judge any act - and this would mean we can be wrong about it, empirically.

Sure it does, something like ‘any act which promotes harmony of alive beings with each other’. — Bob Ross

Sure, this is a concept you, as a subject, can match it to, if you want to use that a criterion. But from whence comes a reason to use that criterion? Given the criterion, I think you're off to the races - but I can't understand why I should accept it without an a priori concept for me to heed.

The good is a category of acts which is equivalent to something like ‘any act which promotes ...’. — Bob Ross

Promotes what, though? I agree, an act must, in some sense, promote something to have a moral valence, but what you choose to append to the quote within your quote is, not arbitrary, but only sensible and analytical. So, using your car example, yes that's true - But it makes the concept of the car directly relate to a subjective definition of the usage of 'car' to refer to what it is in perception (not, as-it-actually-is). It is derived from intuition - and if, as i read it, your theory has our moral 'rules' lets say deriving from intuition, my previous objections seem to comport with that. Somewhat arbitrary to note a conjunction, and just call it 'good' without noting that perhaps this is a result of you realising this particular rule ameliorates some discomfort you have with its opposite, as an eg.

I don’t think the concept of a triangle is a priori itself — Bob Ross

I tend to think if we have these a priori concepts of extension, logic and space in general, we can get a triangle without intuition. But then, im young at that particular mode of thinking so I'll leave that one to be possibly entirely wrong.

That’s the interesting thing with this theory: the good is non-normative. I can tell you what is good, but not what you should do about it. — Bob Ross

This seems to betray to concept of morality, and doesn't really answer my issue. If something (an act) must be objectively noted as good, rejecting it is immoral. Whats the catch? Im unsure how you're going about decoupling 'good' with a moral valence in any act. Though, i very much appreciate that you're avoiding the 'ought' and think this is commendable and honest.

(1) there are blue and red categories of piles and (2) the red belong in the red and the blue in the blue. — Bob Ross

Then I see that these are made up and you're putting things in two bins based on a black/white fallacy instead of extending your system to accomodate things that patently don't fit in them. What if one of the blocks is purple??. It's just not tenable. If I only have two categories, I will put things in the best-suited category. But that might be entirely unable to service what the things I'm categorising actually are/represent. In this case, I think that's true for 'good' and 'bad'. Its a subjective categorisation which allows for no third or fourth or fifth category of moral valence (given that morality is 'the right/wrong' and 'good/bad' judgements humans make).

we have to live, learn, experiment, fail, and keep trying. — Bob Ross

Agree. And this precludes me from ever knowing whether something is Good or Bad, other than according to my own, internal, empirical-derived sense of them. There couldn't be a rule, other than one i make up. If what you mean here, is that everyone, individually, can find these categories and work from there - yes, i guess so. But that's plain and simple subjectivity. All of our biases will play into what falls into which category. Thought, again, I recognize this falls well short of imputing an 'ought'.

Since the good is non-normative, it is not a (normative) stance — Bob Ross

I suppose this goes to my incredulity (my own, not at you) about how you're decoupling the Good from the Moral. If we knew Good and Bad outright, every act could be judged upon those categories as objectively one or the other. If you KNOW the good, and reject it, how is that not Immoral? I'm just not seeing where that one goes...

I would start off with the subjective moral judgment that “one ought to be good” and then the normative judgments will be synthesized with the moral facts (except for that one normative judgment). — Bob Ross

Ok, this is certainly sensible. But i reject any way to factually deduce the Good, so there's that :lol:

But, we don't know much more about time than that, — Metaphysician Undercover

This is what i was looking for. Not as a gotcha, but I now understand I'm looking for answer that isn't there. Currently, I take the 'it only exists in the mind' line anyway, so i was just probing for curiosity/philosophy sake.

However, the explanations I have given show why it is logically necessary to premise that the passage of time is a type of change other than physical change, as the answer to "how can there be physical change". — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is where I just scratch me head. What other change? And I'm intuitively connecting hte first quote to this one. We just dont know :)

Thank you mate.

Out of all the things that could possibly exist, very few actually exist. So something that is merely possible, has a low probability of existing. That's sufficient reason to conclude that a mere possibility doesn't exist: you'll rarely be wrong. — Relativist

Hmm. I do see the point you're getting at, but I just think your conclusion is a leap too far. It's not really the case - though it is practically necessary to deal with life, as it is.

My point is simply that my belief that aliens have not come here is warranted by my belief that it's extremely improbable - so improbable that it's not worth considering. — Relativist

I'm sorry, I'm not seeing how you can get from 'improbably' to 'impossible', which is what a belief would seem to imply your thought is? If not, that's fine and it may just be the same as the previous quote/response.

It's zero. There are no rocks on the moon with the molecular structure of a cabbage. If there were, it would be a cabbage, not a rock. You could loosen the exactness of the required likeness and match any probability you like. So instead, let's consider Russell's teapot: we're warranted in believing there is no teapot orbiting the sun between earth and Mars, even though it's logically possible, but grossly improbable. — Relativist

Yeah. It's not zero. I mentioned shape only. There need not be an exact molecular match (because that would be, as you say, a Cabbage LOL defeating hte point of hte example). But I think you're again, leapfrogging there. It is logically possible the a rock, the surface of which, is an exactly surface-dimensional match is possible. In fact, if we extend this to the universe, it's almost certain it exists somewhere. I don't want to go down this path though - it's logically possible, on my account, because I don't posit what you did here. I think we'd agree - and it would again, come back to practicality as the two above have (as i see them). But it's a fair point you're making in all three instances. Again - i may be mentally unstable for my selective skepticism lol

I simply suggest that if you have no reason to doubt she's human, then you actually DON'T doubt she's human and ergo you believe she's not an alien. We all believe lots of things, even though it's logically possible we're wrong. Believing x does not entail believing ~x is logically impossible. It just means we feel we have sufficient justification. — Relativist

And i do not see sufficient justification without investigation, if we have two logically possible outcomes. Obviously, by inference, I can support a belief that my wife is not an alien - she meets all criteria, prima facie, to be a human. So, in that sense, I don't deny what you're saying - I'm making the point that with no reason one way or the other, belief is unwarranted. That fact is here, i have many, many vicariously-substantiated reasons. But none personal, other than my trust that those reasons are sound. And again, perhaps my doubt here (for both propositions) is a bit schizophrenic. I mind not :)

No. I don't believe God is discoverable. — Relativist

Then you're not a deist. It is defined as a God which is discoverable in empirical observations of nature. I think you're just ignoring the fact that misusing words is a problem. And, i, personally, while understanding your view will no longer even attempt to say you're a deist, because the statement here precludes it. Your take on that is immaterial to me looking at the definition - looking at your positiion - and deducing hte daylight between them.

And yet, you apply that label to me. — Relativist

Im done. I've been over this three times now and you've outright ignored it to ascribe to me a claim which i have not made and the clearly sufficient solution i've posited. If you're willing to ignore specific, direct treatment of a false claim about my view here, im unsure what to do about it. You are wrong. I don't do what you're claiming and have outright, directly rebutted it three times.

I'm giving advice based on MY experience, but I acknowledge that your experience may be that your overwrought assumptions outweigh what others bring to the table. — LuckyR

When i said 'you', read it as the abstract use of 'one'. It was not aimed at you personally - And i do not carry assumptions of this kind (or, more accurate, i immediately, by way of years of habit-forming, jettison my assumptions upon meeting/interacting with someone). I wait until someone actually tells me something of substance, instead of reading into things.

Sort of like Marty (or his picture of his older siblings) beginning to fade as he slowly destroys any possibility of his parents hooking up. Hollywood loves this idea despite the paradox it creates. — noAxioms

Agreed, more or less.

That may be, but it is harder to convince people to worship the god of baffling with bullshit. — wonderer1

This may be the greatest feat Logic has ever achieved :)

Then again, if you had no other frame of reference, its a bit incoherent to think it would be baffling. It just is

Christians typically think that God, being good, wouldn't mislead us. — wonderer1

Although, in this case it wouldn't be Odd. It would be the case, and nothing more. — AmadeusD

:) :) "God works in mysterious ways" and all that... No misleading to be had here, though. Otherwise, we're assuming that 1+1 IS 2, and God is contravening...something. But if God is the almighty Creator of all, that's not what's happening there. It just is the case that 1+1=3.

I could get someone saying it's not always sucessful, but there's no question that the effort is made and the result is better than seating a jury that is knowingly biased. — Relativist

In a criminal case, both sides will actively attempt to choose jurors they deem favourable, or exclude jurors the deem unfavourable during voir dire.

I think, if you're under the impression that council representing a side in a case want impartial jury members, you've not considered the job they are being paid to do.. Win.

Thank you - clear enough for my crude understanding :)

I've read more, thought more, and tried to beat myself up a bit about this.

This is correct. IFF one accepts that the thing that appears to our senses, is the thing of the thing-in-itself. — Mww

I am unsure this is true, or makes sense given immediately prior you quoted the same thing and then just it was wrong, in Kant.
Kant tells us that there are real, material objects 'out there' of which we can know nothing things in themselves. But that these objects cause our intuitions... which are not, as far as we care capable of knowing, anything like hte thing-in-itself..

"On the contrary, the transcendental conception of phenomena in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made."
---
"They do not, however, reflect that both, without question of their reality as representations, belong only to the genus phenomenon, which has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it, and the nature of which remains for this very reason problematical, the other, the form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears—which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and necessarily to the phenomenal object."
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"On the other hand, the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the phenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are affected by that appearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of cognition is called sensibility, and remains toto caelo different from the cognition of an object in itself, even though we should examine the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom."
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"And for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may be said à priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to say anything."
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"..this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things as phenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe to them, are looked upon as really given; only that, in so far as this or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-consciousness, although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance."

These seem cautious admissions that the only inference is that things-in-themselves cause us to receive empirical intuitions of them, which are unable to be classed as anything about the thing-in-itself because of hte removal that occurs between the TII causing representation to our cognition.

"I find that the house is not a thing in itself, but only a phenomenon, that is, a representation, the transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown."

The transcendental object, i cannot find as distinguished from the thing-in-itself. If that's the case, then Kant seems to be fairly obviously connecting the two in a causal relationship - albeit, one with entirely unknowable properties.

And yet, there remains some idiotic insistence that noumena and thing-in-themselves are the same thing. Or the same kind of thing. Or can be treated as being the same kind of thing. — Mww

I was absolutely wrong on this, and misunderstood Noumena entirely.

And we can say there are none, even if it is only because we wouldn’t know of it as one if it reached out an bitch-slapped us. — Mww

My current understanding is that this is an incomprehensible hypothetical :P
Noumena cannot appear to us, as we have no non-sensuous intuition. But this just goes to how wrong i wass earlier... So thank you for that.

Going to leave this here, though, as it directly contradicts what I've come to think is what Kant meant:

"The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena"

and then this, which just seems a cop out

"If, therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a negative sense."

This seems to restrict noumena to merely things-in-themselves, as perceived by something other than sensuous intuition. Curious, and unhelpful lol

He just vanishes into thin air? — Luke

This would be the only realistic result, but then it would follow that this means he was never able to come back to kill Young Bob.

So we're still stuck with the 'copy' idea.

This is related to what I pointed out Kastrup showing ignorance about with his claim that the relationship between fluid flowrate and pressure is the same as the relationship between voltage and current expressed by Ohms law. — wonderer1

What's the catch there? I don't really understand the correlation, so I can't pick out the problem.

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say memories of the past exist in minds? — RogueAI

Hmm, a good point prima facie. I'm not sure what a memory is, exactly, so I'm unsure how to couch this, but... It seems it's a representation of something (the past state of affairs being recalled) received as empirical data, in the past, so I can't see the 'real' difference between the past, as experienced, and the memory.

If we're saying the past is mind-independent and that 'the present moment' is what constitutes the physical, in totality, it's a serious issue.

Maybe 'time travel' is confined to an approximation around memory though viz. you could have a 'conscious experience' of the past, such that it is the same, phenomenologically, as the present moment, but is in fact, a pale shadow.

Might it be a bit more palatable to say that the past exists in past minds..? Or does the mind endure?