Really enjoying this.
I don’t see why this would be the case. We can induce what ‘the good’ is from its instances, just like how we induce what a triangle is from its instances; and we can use our current knowledge of ‘the good’ to make informed decisions about what can be classified as such. — Bob Ross
Doesn't this pre-supposes knowledge of the Good? As best i can tell, unless you're going to employ Platonic Forms, you can't induce what the Good is from instances. There is no concept for it to match to; just other like-instances based on your presupposition - which makes that induction false.
Triangles, on the other hand, can be understood a priori and an instance matches the concept.
The analogy i would use here (while trying not to ruffle feathers - its just extremely apt) is the definition of 'woman'. It has become popular for this exchange to take place:
A: What is a woman? (What is the Good?)
B: Anyone who identifies as a woman (Whatever you identify as The Good)
A: What are they identifying as? (What are you identifying 'it' as?)
B: A woman. (The Good)
Round, and round we go.
Non-moral intuitions are used to determine the category of ‘the good’, no different than how we non-morally intuit the concept or category of triangularity. — Bob Ross
I see these as very much different. The concept of a triangle is prior to intuition, allowing us to perceive a triangle. Morality has no such basis.
Think of it this way, — Bob Ross
Thank you; that made it very clear what you're saying. All of those attributes have moral valence to them. So, I'm finding it hard to understand how rejecting 'good' behaviour while acknowledging it is 'good' is not a moral choice. I realise you're trying to say 'Good' is not a moral category, but using your analogous example, it seems to be so.
acts which care about life to the maximal extent possible; and 'the bad' as the negation of it. However, I freely admit that inductions are not necessarily true and that this method of inquiry is sort of scientific. — Bob Ross
There we gooooo. Wasn't so hard, was it? ( i kid). Though, in light of the objections i've laid out, I can't see any reason to suspect the induction to Good and Bad is even serviceable. As you say, its grey, and there's no one-size-fits-all. So, in this sense, where's the fact? "X is good" wont be true for everyone - or even most people - I realize you've acknowledge the lack of normativity, but I can't even see how this gets us to moral facts per se. A fact is stance-independent right, but noting something is 'good' IS a stance. I think you're shoehorning a definition in(that of 'good' without moral valence) where it can't fit.
This means, that this view affirms #2 only technically insofar as we are talking about non-normative moral judgments; which means that this view is a sort of hybrid between realism and anti-realism, whereof it does affirm that there are moral facts, but none of them are normative. I am not sure what to make of it yet: it definitely exposes my deep anti-realist sympathies. — Bob Ross
As above, I am unsure that this is the case, as the theory is written. Also, as above, I note the non-normative nature of the theory - which certainly helps. You're not trying to establish oughts. Just good and bad, as moral facts.
However, the idea that someone can reasonably say "I will actively avoid doing good* things" and on your account, that would be A-moral - seems a bit incongruous. If something is objectively Good, how could we avoid the normative command to behave in line with the Good? I guess i'm finding it really hard to take that 'Good' is devoid of a moral stance - particularly if it means maximizing care about life (as murky as that concept is, i grok what you mean). It does not seem as if you could possibly have an a-moral stance on something objectively good or bad.
*I import your usage of 'Good' as someone objectively discernable.