It's questionable whether pain is properly a sensation rather than a sort of idea. This is because pain crosses all the sense types. Generally we think of pain as a type of touch, but sharp sounds can be painful, bright lights can be painful, even the tastes and smells which we judge as very bad can be painful. — Metaphysician Undercover
I understand it being questionable, but I do not understand actually thinking this. Pain is a sensation of touch with varying degrees to it - high-enough, and you experience a sensation. The
aversion response is certainly an emotional/psychological aspect of pain, but that aspect is not necessary to describe pain. It is the ideal response
to pain (well, pain accurately alerting one to an injury anyhow).
Loud-enough noises vibrate elements of the ear
in "painful" ways such that the physical vibrations send the signal to "stop/avoid this noise" to the brain to avoid damage but often, these go either unheeded emotionally, or are overwhelmed by more, or higher-degree sensations (think about wtf someone needs to turn the music down to read road signs correctly).
Similarly with other senses - smells - some chilis are physically dangerous to smell due to the chemical composition of the air which carries the aroma in question - they can destroy cells in the nose/sinuses. These are, in the cases you've pointed out, anyway, the same thing(i.e a sensation) under different levels of description - but they are not 'different' ways of accessing the same mental phenomenon. For completeness, you mention taste - but 'painful' taste is that which is actually harming the tastebuds (bloody chilis do not like humans!!) Though, i take pain to be
just that, anyway so perhaps 'idea' is actually correct anyway? Sensation, as best I can tell, is the mental percept resulting from a sensory stimulus. They can, in that way, simply be wrong if our machinery isn't calibrated to accurately convey the local issue (injury) to the brain for review.
Notice the use of "or" which allows ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover
If 'pain' can be characterised as a mental phenomenon, the 'or' is only indicating the cause (i.e what triggered the c/a-fibers). I'm unsure this allows for any per se ambiguity in the concept. The one exception here would be "emotional pain" which I think is
incorrectly labelled pain rather than discomfort - which can, acceptably, be left very vague and subjective. "sensation" per se is not-well defined, i'll grant you - but it seems pretty obvious that a "bodily" sensation must be a the result of
the senses. This then gets into how mental phenomena such as pain are
merely triggered by the senses and so pain, within a dream, could not properly be described as sensation, but an idea. One which is triggered by the senses in some way, would be a sensation. Does that at least track with the delineation you're outlining?
The second definition — Metaphysician Undercover
I would say this is a good example where a word is referring to two obviously different things and we can jettison that second def. for the purpose of this discussion. I take it to be a metaphorical extension of the first, in any case, to apply to 'the body of persons' involved in the 'sensation' caused. As if humans were atomic parts of a whole. So, it seems irrelevant to discussing 'bodily sensation', as we
seem to be doing.
what happens with the conscious awareness of pain. and consequently the use of the word "pain", is that it becomes a concept which we use to refer to a type of "sensation" which is emotionally based, rather than being based in sense perception — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think this is right, but I do think that
this does happen, wrongly. The above responses go some way as to why. Emotions often conflict with the sensation of pain. I believe pain is, like vision, a result of sense perception but is simply open to the all the aberrations vision is open to, being that we never "view" the actual object in the visual field on this account. Pain is rightly not conceptualised as something 'taken in' from without, via the senses, but something
produced by the sense-data of touch interacting with the sense organ (in this case, pain receptors/skin variously described as such under particular conditions of intensity, locality etc.. receiving pressure, angle, surface coverage, angle-of-motion etc.. to inform the signal to be sent). All senses are indirect in this way as I understand them both on the empirical, process related information, and the conceptual coherence (or, incoherence, really) involved. And they are all open to being wrong. I think holding a 1:1 concept of the internal representation of sensory data is probably wrong.
Pain is commonly contrasted with pleasure — Metaphysician Undercover
Which is, at best, misleading. The opposite to pain
or pleasure is a lack of touch sensation. Nothing to trigger a percept of either. They aren't entirely dispositional states - 'pleasure' can be characterized as uncomfortable, and pain as satisfying.
In this way, the emotionally based feeling, or sensation, has a causal object, but the object is a good, as a goal or objective, rather than a sense percept. — Metaphysician Undercover
This, to me, went completely off the rails right before this conclusion. Introducing 'the Good' made this almost impossible for me to wade into, and I apologise as it seems to just not make much sense as a result. I realise that's as likely to be me missing something!