Plants are "Sentient", in that they can sense the environment. — Alkis Piskas

I do not believe this to be a very widely view of what sentience consists in. My understanding is there must be feeling in the sense of "what it is like to be.." involved for sentience to be observed. So, @RogueAI has a very apt question for you there..

the bodily sensations (pain, pleasure, heat, thirst, etc) — hypericin

Are these not just modes of touch? The sensations are all physically derived. If not, how do you separate 'touch' from these?

How can the soul be beyond the scope of human comprehension as millions of words have been written about it? — RussellA

If you've experienced an altered state of consciousness, that conclusion (that a 'soul' is beyond comprehension) is perhaps best thought off as an approximation. IN altered states, things become comprehensible which are not in normal waking consciousness. The reality of those things (as with a soul) are up in the air, or perhaps leaned-against. But there are concepts such as the 'soul' or a clear conception (at a very base level) of something 'unimaginable' that don't inspire typical incredulity or awe in those mind states. Being and not being do not always appear contradictory in those states.

We know very little about them and their function. My policy has been, and remains to wait until far more work has been done into the nature of the mind and its, hitherto almost ignored functionality, before making any sweeping statements of the kind made in the 18th and 19th (or even 20th) centuries about them. Without a systematic consideration of that which we know apply, but don't yet understand it seems a bit premature to posit absolutes about the ability to perceive/conceive certain things.

Moral claims absolutely do not escape this.... The larger philosophical question is, what claims do escape this? — hypericin

:up: Yessir.

They comport with all I’ve read about deontological principles from Bentham on? Idk man.

Because it posits a system in which lying is violating a duty. Which supports my contention.

That said; I don’t care. I’ve never seen any deontological writing invite dishonesty for any reason than paradox.

Disagree.

Supports my contentions

But true or false? I don't think so. I just can't see how they are the sort of things that might be true or false. — hypericin

I agree with this - and it seems to me that this exact thinking applies to moral statements. But I consider truth dependent on an object. If your object is “the world at large” I simply don’t understand what you think you’re saying wrt to a moral “fact” of the world.

But again; I may be (and this is active work(including this comment)) changing that conception as we exchange.

Fair, in general. But, not quite my understanding based on multiple academic sources. One below, directly dealing with the issue:

https://www.merton.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/inline-files/Roman-Evans.pdf

From the above:

"From a deontological point of view lying is always wrong (as is deceit for that matter), on the basis that communication is a process needed for prosperity and that truth communicates but a lie does not. Therefore, on this basis lying is always wrong. In the case that there is a clear and moral alternative to a lie then of course anyone would agree that this point of view stands true. But one might ask ‘What if a lie prevented an action worse than a lie from occurring?’ And this essay would answer that from a deontological perspective the lie must still be wrong as a lie is always wrong."

(I understand the Isenberg definition to in fact be Kantian from Arnold Isenberg's essay Deontology and the Ethics of Lying - https://www.jstor.org/stable/2104756 - but i don't have access)

Another, though, i've just pulled this one out for mentioning Kantian ethics specifically:

https://books.openedition.org/obp/4433?lang=en#:~:text=That%20is%2C%20if%20the%20consequences,be%20morally%20acceptable%20to%20lie.

"That is, if the consequences of lying are better than telling the truth then we are morally required to lie. The deontologist — the Kantian or Divine Command Theorist for example — thinks that lying is always wrong. There are no situations at all when it would be morally acceptable to lie."

Someone who values their own self-perceived "respect" so much that would condemn an innocent to a terrible death for its sake, operates under a deeply flawed moral system, I think most would agree. — hypericin

I am not a deontologist. So am free to agree with you. My understanding is that as lying perverts communication, a deontologist cannot, ever, lie, to be consistent. But i agree with you at least intuitively.

Yes. To lie would be to disrespect yourself to a degree that is unacceptable to a deontologist (is my understanding)

Totally missed this thread!

A lot of you already know me and my ankle-biting ways because of that, so apologies.

My name is Amadeus Diamond
I'm Irish; living in New Zealand
33; married; 2 kids (blended family)
Legal professional full time; back in school (conjoint LLB (law) and BA in Philosophy undergrad).

Most intensely interested in the question of personal identity over time both "whether" and "if it matters".
More minor (but still, very much preoccupying) interest in both trying to justify my feeling that morals can be objective, while conceding i have never seen a good argument for it; and understanding why so many philosophers appear totally detached from the real world, while trying to avoid that myself.

Outside of philosophy and law i practice brazillian jiu jitsu competitively and play many instruments.

Looking to make some type of philosophy friends too; hence extraneous information above.

Glad to be here!

I think this depends on your moral standpoint, but i would say deontolog-ism is a good start. I believe that strong deontology requires never, ever being dishonest in any scenario regardless of context.

So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies? Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day? This is what you are committing yourself to. — Leontiskos

I don't read Bob as even intimating that this might be the case. All he's positing is that some judgement could be independent of him and still be subjective. That seems obvious. There are opinions on pieces of art i'm not even aware of. That's an independent-of-me judgement that is still subjective. And an addendum of inter-subject agreement about that wouldn't make it objective.

I don't read more than this into what he's saying. Can you lay out where you're squeezing your reading from? (I use squeezing for fun.. Not in any way a comment on your methods). If you don't want to, that's fine; I'm just curious :)

For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably. — Leontiskos

In my case, I do think this, but i dont think it's a norm (beyond being 'the norm' for most people) or that it applies universally or unchangeably.
Can i be an anti-realist? :P

Thank you! Really appreciate the considered reply! Even a polite rejection is fine by my lights :nerd:

I am doing my best to try not to annoy people so, snippiness is a good indicator (as long it's not gratuitous!). I understand why, too. You'll have seen from several exchanges that I just do not see what moral realists see. I cannot make the connection they make either semantically or conceptually between an act and its rightness or wrongness per se, rather than apropos of a chosen framework. So it is very frustrating, I think, from any perspective to be discussing these things as though we could convince someone of the POV (see below for why your notion of persuasion isn't part of my moral framework, really, other than incidentally - although, i would just note for my own peace of mind here, there is no consensus).

Unfortunately, as I (currently) reject the notion of moral truth in the sense of objectivity, this extrapolation is fairly much unintelligible as a 'way forward' for me but I (think) I grok what's being said regardless, from the realist perspective and it's consistent and helpful.

I have, elsewhere, today, had to alter my formulation of truth, though, and so I could, imagine, with quite little force be convinced of moral 'truth' as long as it's a relative truth.

You are a legal professional. Law is the most practical form of morality, and it is a social reality. As a society we agree that certain actions are impermissible and we lock people up for decades in prisons for carrying out these actions (things like murder, rape, pedophilia, etc.). — Leontiskos

Tricky. Unless you're a legal positivist (Leiter, anyone?) this is not very clear. Things have evolved over time, but drug laws are a very front-and-center example of why your conception probably isn't actually the way things are. I don't really see the law as moral. It's pragmatic and usually, really bad.

I think there are some widely-held views that make their way into law, and that's fine. I don't really think much beyond that. This is why i think activism is great, but faulty. You probably should speak up if you think a law/regulation is wrong. But it's faulty because activism necessarily requires a moral certitude that i don't think is warranted (ever).

I think my same point applies to the question of truth, as judgments always relate to truth. But if you want to say that "true" means "true with a high degree of certitude," then you are of course able to say that one or more of your moral judgments are not "true" in that sense — Leontiskos

What would you think about a visceral uneasiness is calling it 'true'? I don't know whether my behaviour is correct. It's the best i can envisage. I feels awful to claim that as truth. Any comments there?

The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude. — Leontiskos

Hmm. I imagine i'm being linguistically imprecise then (or i've been unnecessarily reactionary to challenges), as this is not what i think. I'm happy to call it a judgement. I just think that entails that i believe the truth of the judgement. I do think a tentative judgement precludes me from assigning 'truth' to it, personally but again, I'm not at the stage that i could enunciate this well. I take an internal sense of 'true' to entail a certitude that I don't apply to my moral judgements.

You can't just run around encouraging/arguing/forcing others to act in certain ways and claim you are not a moral realist. — Leontiskos

(please keep in mind I am not defending, particularly, anything here - I am nutting out ideas and approaching tehse things as a pretty green amateur philosopher)

I just cannot see in your exchange where that's established but i run into the huge problem that i don't engage other people's morals for the (imo subjective) reason that i don't feel adequately omniscient to perceive my moral standards as applicable to others. So, i act-out exactly what you're saying in practice (i.e, i take morals to be subjective, and therefore do not attempt to enforce my morals on others), but I don't actually see why i couldn't without a contradiction getting in the middle (treatment of 'enforce' below - whcih i think is relevant).

Can it be the case that, at the apex of my considerations(judgement), a certain behaviour appears moral/immoral, and so I enforce that judgement to the degree that I am acting on it toward other people, and yet am open to their response motivating or informing an adjustment in my judgement?

I think this allows for "running around encouraging/arguing.." but not forcing. But then, do you consider my behaving in line with my (subjective) moral considerations, forcing them on those I interact with, or does 'enforcement' only apply to aattempt to change their behaviour?

Many people who favour artificial intelligence see the absence of emotions as an advantage, for making rational or clinical judgments. Nevertheless, the contrasting argument is how this may lead to an absence of empathy and the ability to feel compassion — Jack Cummins

I have a rather unique, and I imagine, quite pertinent perspective here.

For about seven years i suffered what was termed "Trauma-induced DiD(dissociative identity disorder (multiple personalities)). The over-all effect of this was that my personality became, on average, a sociopathic one. It took rather extreme experiences to alert me to the emotional reality I was inhabiting (i.e the emotions around me, informing those around me, and motivating their actions). I was, during this period, daily likened to Sherlock in the BBC series (in this aspect only).

During this time I found it extremely easy to do things like:

- Hold a conversation;
- Listen to a Podcast; and
- Overhear a conversation in the room

all at the same time, with coherence and attendance to all three activities, verified by the incredulity and accusations of being psychic from others. I can't do this now that I experience emotions the way I used to. I couldn't prior, either. I could, when i was younger, MAYBE grasp two conversations at once and stab at decent replies - but they would be muddled and i'd have to take moments to straighten myself out. The emotions get in the way of the smooth transition from one activity to another as I discern what i am 'to do' and try to justify my 'decision'. While sociopathic, it was already apparent what i was to do/reply/offer based on a sort of logical calculus, in any situation. Obviously, it's almost inevitable my calculus was at times way off, and at most times, a little off. However, my achievements in terms of productivity and expansion of my concepts at that time, i feel I will never come close to again. I prefer feeling - but I miss not wanting to care about things that came through my mind.

Incidentally, it was that period that initially sparked my interest in philosophy proper. I'd listen to someone like Daniel Dennett or Noam Chomsky and just think "What the absolute hell are you talking about?" and then realised what sophistry was LOL.

I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience".
What are your definitions of "Transcendental" and "Transcendental Idealism" in Kant? — Corvus

(well aware you did not ask me.. Just adding a perspective as I'm reading CPR right now for the first time so feel like i need this type of thing to nut out whether i understand.. any.. of it LOL)

My understanding of 'Transcendental' is that it denotes the concepts which transcend phenomena/experience. So these 'a priori' concepts are transcendental, as are the processes by which we make use of them but the concepts are how we experience sensory data. I don't think its strictly a placeholder for 'a priori' but it does encapsulate that there are concepts necessarily experienced in a representation-to-come, yet understood prior to experience of the representation, making the 'giving' of the object possible to our senses. I've not gotten far enough to tease out whether this could (as seems obvious to me) apply to things that don't actually exist (i.e, if: there is no object which could be 'given to' us, could we yet ascribe these transcendental concepts to figures of hte mind not ever present to our senses?). Issue is, it seems to me Kant denies the 'actual' existence of the object aside from the inner sense of it, so... I need to read more lol.

But there’s no object yo be referred to so maybe my formulation of “truth” needs to change — AmadeusD

Yes sir ^^ @Michael

Objects don't need to exist for statements to be true. — Michael

But they are not objectively true. I guess they must be relatively true in light of what does exist - exclusion. Hmm. Thanks for this,

I may be needing to adjust my view here because there is no object. There is no objective reality to non-existence, brute fact maybe? Unsure. But there’s no object yo be referred to so maybe my formulation of “truth” needs to change

onsciousness is not "hard" in a physical sense, but in the holistic philosophical sense of : not subject to simplistic reductionism. :smile: — Gnomon

Given he also identifies a few “easy” problems of consciousness I think you’re safe here :)

f you want to say that not existing isn't a state of affairs, and if it is objectively true that nothing else exists in scenario 1, then you must accept that objective truth does not always depend on there being some corresponding state of affairs. — Michael

While I think probably “yes” I don’t think its a lack of correlation with a state of affairs. It’s a state of affairs which lacks some “thing”.

I see an appreciable difference there. You may not and I’m unsure how to sort that out

You're saying that non-existence exists. That makes no sense. — Michael

Not really no. What I’m saying is that in scenario 1. the entire scenario is caught by your mind. There is no sense of “doesn’t exist” outside that so perhaps I mis-spoke there and used exist incorrectly. The state of affairs is that your mind exists. Nothing else.
The absence of say a cat isn’t a state of affairs. But within the actual state of affairs the fact of “no cat” is evident. Unsure what precise wording I need there I’m sorry. So the state of affairs “there is only your mind” includes there being no cat - so, to me, it can be referred to as “existing” that there is no cat but I concede it isn’t objective because there is no cat to refer to.

Context — 180 Proof

Errr. Okay lol.

Is this so? Any thoughts? — dani

Speaking only to the earlier portion, as i'm actually not too up the relationship between Libertarianism and other identitarian pursuits:|

Huh. My experience of basically the entirety of deconstructionist thought has been that it replaces the individual per se with the individual qua group /membership/s and in varying proportions.

This seems to actually be borne out in the what they 'think is right'. Broadly speaking, it tends to be large-scale either action or reaction in the spirit of some or other group usually with legislative change in mind - I recognize that there's obviously an individual effort involved for each person pertaining to the group to which they belong and are, at any time, acting in light of, but the defining feature of that action or decision's significance in terms of its socio-political nature seems the motivating factor. There's no motivation for an individual to become 'liberated'.

What's the weird slogan being thrown around? No freedom til were all free or something or other.

s Please be more precise: what is (your) philosophical question – perplexity – about "emotions"? — 180 Proof

Why is “your” in parentheses?

I wonder if what we call 'emotion' is in some way equivalent to what was meant by 'the passions' in those sources. — Wayfarer

I doubt this will come as novel but that’s exactly how I read Hume.

usD Are we now playing posts-last-wins? — Banno

I’m just trying to get back to a place of good faith, whether we think the other has missed a specific point in a specific thread being irrelevant :) that’s all.

So it seems. :wink: — Banno

Hehe.
“We ought to get on well”.

I simply repeated what you had already said, adding an observation about forum etiquette. — Banno

Listen mate, I understand that obtuseness comes natural; but I’m here to have fun.

Far be it from me ;)

s just...I can't stop thinking about how the process of law was so rapidly abandoned as the fundamental liberties of citizens in "so-called" free societies were blatantly trampled upon. — Merkwurdichliebe

As a legal professional, yep. Fully agreed. Regardless of the possibility that it was, in hindsight, right, there’s always a niggling Kantian asking whether that matters

If that's what you need to think, far be it from me.

are any judicial gag orders constitutional? — Relativist

(am not trained in constitutional law, but law in general).

Yes. It has to meet the benchmark for 'fair trial rights' being preserved, though. That can be pretty vague and requires serious scrutiny of the order in question.

They apparently lament Trump's being restricted from hurling ad hominem attacks, and feel this unfairly hurts his election chances. — Relativist

That is a curtailment of free speech, as i understand it. Unfortunately, it's actually the legal proceeding protocol that matters, so your conclusion is still correct (particularly with the second post immediately above this one)

That nothing else exists in scenario 1 is a state-of-affairs, but not something that "exists". Therefore it is false to say that something is a state-of-affairs only if it exists. — Michael

that doesn't exist in scenario 2. — Michael

the absence of anything but that one mind exists in scenario 1.

In scenario two, this extends to "but those two minds".

While your example here is infinitely clearer than other attempts you've made, which i commend, I still end up with the answer "Not existing isn't a state of affairs". It's talking about a non-state-of-affairs. I would posit that in either case, it wouldn't even be possible to posit anything not existing or existing, beyond the items noted. That seems baked into the scenarios to me.

That may seem semantic to you, but doesn't to me, and that may be the difference.

If you act as if one ought not keep slaves, then you act as if it is true that "One ought not keep slaves"
Your point is pointless. — Banno

HI Banno... Hmm..This is likely to be my last reply in this exchange and so f'ing help me i will stick to that, unless something fruitful comes of it.

I act in accordance with my thought. My thought is not that it's true, but that its best practice. It is a sentiment i hold. Not a claim i make about hte world. I don't make that claim. I just behave in accordance with the claim, accepting it could never be 'true'. Reject that? I don't care. That's how it is.
You've elsewhere admitted that these claims can only rise to the level of heuristics anyway, so i literally don't understand what's going on.. Can't for the life of me figure out how your mind works mate, but its fascinating.

If you believe that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you believe that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you doubt that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you doubt that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you understand that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you understand that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you suspect that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you suspect that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you are 98% certain that the tree is a Eucalypt, then you are 98% certain that it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If you act as if the tree is a Eucalypt, then you act as if it is true that "The tree is a Eucalypt"
If the one ought not keep slaves, then it is true that "One ought not keep slaves" — Banno

That/if you do not see a significant linguistic and philosophically important difference between statement 1. about "It is " or not and 2. about "One ought..." or not, I'm unsure this can be helped. I anticipate "It is the case that it is a Eucalypt" vs "It is the case that one ought..." as an objection. It isn't one. That sentence is the same with extra words. They contain the exact same distinction between them. Is/ought.

One is about a state of affairs that actually exists (As you point out, if it's a Eucalypt, then its true to claim it is) and one is your claim about what want to exist (the state of it being wrong to own slaves) and does not reference anything in the world (it references something in your head) - coupled with your claim that is is a state of affairs, rather than your belief in one. It is a claim. Not a fact. This is the exact is/ought distinction.

You've nothing to add to your claim, but to further claim that it's also true, rather than a mere claim.
Have you just plum forgotten to provide anything more than the claim? Or are you saying that acting in accordance with it rises it to the level of truth? So far, no mechanism between the claim and it's truth have come forward (see below for the 'brute fact' issue).

The bold is the exact non sequitur I've been trying to tease out of you. Thank you. What in the world does it refer to?? What would confirm or defeat this claim?? IF it were true, then that would make the claim true. But, you've not established that it's true. Your opinion is the single piece of data in support of the claim (or, perhaps an aggregate of other opinions appended) couple with a claim that its a brute fact. Except that amounts only to the claim it could be a brute fact, if ever shown to be true. If you concede, without qualification that it's a 'brute fact' that you can't prove, then what the heck has this exchange even been (refer also here to your concession that its heuristics all the way down).

So, "Your claim is true for you" (my position) cannot be addressed by your use of 'truth' here. Its entirely self-referential and is patently, inarguably and inescapably merely your subjective assessment of hte world. Which is fine. We don't even need to deal with what would make it objective here.

If you reject that, please stop wasting my time as i've respectfully noted we have nothing more to discuss. This is literally an is/ought distinction and that you're not getting it is just tedious to me. I would posit if you're going to repeat yourself in more words, this is a waste of both our times and i request you not bother.

That's ok. My question was directed Gnomon. — wonderer1

That's nice dear.

And this is the kind of attitude that gets trumpism elected. Ser. — baker

It is EXACTLY 180proof's attitude that resulted in the first T election.

I see, clearly, from outside the US, this happening again. Biden has been such an absolute disaster in so many ways that It's really, REALLY hard to believe that he, or another Dem, could be re-elected. It's obviously in the realm of genuinely possibility, and almost rises to likelihood - but given that:

Biden:
Approve: 37.9%
Disapprove: 55.4%
78% of D approve.

vs

Trump:
Approve: 42.2%
Disapprove: 53.1%
85% of R approve.

https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/favorability/donald-trump/

It's hard to understand an attitude that writes off a reelection, given the absolute paucity of candidates with anything coming close to acumen or persuasive media presence. Seems like wishful thinking on the part of someone who can't understand T's election at all.

We were able to see just how many people (the vast overwhelming majority of people) are willing to throw away their basic rights simply because they are told to. We also saw how they will defend their choice to abandon their basic rights with the weakest, flimsiest bullshit, and then go on to indiscriminately impose the same upon everyone else.

It is pathetic that these sheep continue to double down on it all, despite the fact Coronavirus-2020-hindsight has proven lockdown and vaccine policy to be an absolute disaster. It is a case of too much pride and zero dignity. — Merkwurdichliebe

I can't help but laugh at the lack of self-awareness here. The exact same attitude present in those who went gung-ho and demonized those resistant to public health protocol is present in this dismissive, inhumane reading of the other side. You also can't (No, you can't) be sure that those public health protocols didn't ensure a far-less intense negative outcome from the pandemic than without.

That said, I think your screed DOES apply to those who are, since let's say last August, still making the claims made two years ago, and still expecting people to behave in what are (regardless of the previous ssituation) definitely absurd and pointless ways now.

wreak of coordinated corruption more and more as time passes. — Merkwurdichliebe

maybe this is true if you've been predisposed from the jump to leap to this conclusion. In actual fact, all it reeks of in hindsight is more-than-initially-assumed incompetence. Which is, let's face it, the norm. There is no such thing as a competent government, and least of all when it comes to public health. We don't need to invoke any intent to get the results we got.

Do you understand that "materialist" is not a distinct category from "philosopher"? — wonderer1

I dont understand the problem.

A plumber can have opinions about other plumbers that don't comport with those plumber's attitudes.

A materialist philosopher can have opinions/views on philosophers in general. Am i missing something here? I mean, analytic/continental philosophers are at loggerheads often in this way..