which is what I've done. — creativesoul

Interesting. As you'll have seen, It appears i must necessarily be heading toward that conclusion. But i will explore every alcove on the way down haha

If it is not objectively wrong for others to torture babies then you should not get angry at them when they do. — Leontiskos

I'm unsure this makes too much sense. If i'm happy with (in light of potential objections in practical day-to-day life) understanding my position is subjective, but that it is the 'best' position by my lights, given the information I believe I can rely on, how would that necessarily mean it was senseless to get angry about a behaviour that I have, by those previous subjective position/s, understood to be 'wrong'?

Making moral decisions, acting out their conclusions, and then adjusting for resulting data input seems to be a totally coherent and workable way to go about moral consideration. I suppose if you take morals to be objective (or that there are some objective morals) this might not work, but i'm more trying to make the 'other' position cohere in the face of this critique.

Can you explain your thinking? — Banno

HI mate, sorry for the delay here. Weekend with the kids :)

I came into this thread simply to point out that there are moral truths. — Banno

So, i'm taking this as an at-base position. One with which I disagree, in so far I consider truth to be corresponding to states of affairs, and I don't understand morals to be states of affairs. In that position in a baked-in need for individuals to understand their own moral compass as theirs and not aligning with some antecedent (though, i recognize that within this position is also a incredible wealth of guiding lights in previous writing and other people's conceptions of their own morals. They just are all relative to those individuals) theory that claims truth. Not an odd position, i don't think, but just laying some ground work for the response.

Indeed, in questions of ethics, you have no choice but to work it out for yourself. — Banno

This seems to suppose that ethics are the correct basis/es for considering morals. I reject that wholly as ethics basically assume either 1. A worthwhile external benchmark (you could think revelation or law here); or 2. Some way to ascertain certainty around a moral claim via some ethical consideration.

If you're concluding that for ethics, individuals must 'work it out for themselves' you're (to my mind) precluding an external mitigating authority (or force) which would be required as a source of 'ethical truth' which would be required to ground a moral truth.

I certainly think you can make claims like 'Generally, suffering is bad'. That could be an ethical consideration informing a moral position to not cause suffering. However, I just don't understand how that's an objective or 'true' statement. It is patently relative. So accepting that ethics must be relative, each individual who must necessarily (by this light) work out their own ethical code as such, are being informed by a identically relative moral code as informed by that antecedent ethical consideration (notwithstanding hypocrisy lol).

If you're decoupling ethics from morals and essentially considering ethics teleological and morals some how truth-apt, I'm not really understanding how that works

I did re-read it, and found the same conclusion; so perhaps it would be useful if you could elaborate on what I am misinterpreting? — Bob Ross

Fwiw, for both of you ( @180 Proof ) i read the same ideas into the post/s.

I'm still seeing the same as Bob Ross in those passages.

Yes, this is a very good point, and shows that the nuances of objective truth isn't quite captured by the "realism" in moral realism. — Michael

While there may be some daylight between us in terms of reflecting on our interactions; the point that you're responding to here is largely what I was trying to get across throughout our interactions around moral realism.

If the context is what gives a moral statement its validity, I have no issue with that (and, to be fair, i expounded on this much more clearly in the exchange with Banno) - but I see the requirement for context in actualizing the validity of statement to implicitly confirm its subjectivity. And this may be that the bullet it bite is an extremely Kantian one of idealism, in some form, to support the idea that if everything needs context, nothing is objective.

I have work to do :lol:

Indeed, in questions of ethics, you have no choice but to work it out for yourself. — Banno

This seems to be an implicit but quite strong admission of moral subjectivity

Mad, but that's just how it is. So I'm not going to try to convince you that kicking puppies for fun is wrong. I'll just call the RSPCA. — Banno

That seems like giving up the discussion because you hit the crux of the climb…

And even if it does, my next question would be how does it matter in terms of how we live? — Tom Storm

Parfit? Is that you? :nerd:

e are constantly changing, all the cells that constitute our bodies replaced every seven or so years according to some accounts. On the other hand, are we not distinguishable as the entities that undergo those changes? — Janus

I was making this point to my wife yesterday. Persistence overnight might be fairly easy to deal with but me now is my e when I was nine via persistence of self? Seems utterly absurd. But I am clearly the same person so wtf haha

Yeah, there's a way in which "one ought not do harm" is tautological if harm is just what we ought not do. There'd be work here in sorting out harm in a way that pays out — Banno

Ok, i think we've probably come to terms here then. Thank you :)

Gotcha. Thank you.

Part of the whole critical deal is to expose the errors in doing just that, — Mww

Do you mean by "just that" the act of trying to use terms in their incompatible context? Just for clarity - Can't be sure if you're decrying that, or my delineation between contexts lol

I think it's a good mental habit to be aware of it. — Mark Nyquist

Agreed

however the benefit is that by following an order of operations we might eliminate some physically unsupported mental content that we seem to be prone to. — Mark Nyquist

Could this be prone to just having various orders of operations being discussed with no real road to resolution?

↪AmadeusD I think he more or less found something more interesting to look at. The journey was more important. The question was kind of futile in the same sense that asking ‘Does the world exist?’. — I like sushi

Sorry, perhaps i'm just frazzled but I can't quite grok what this is in response to?

They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so. — creativesoul

Can you elaborate on this a bit? I note a distinction in a way that one could be 'telling the truth' that they believe something which runs counter to a fact of the matter.

But I can't see how this removes the element of 'truth' in a given fact (if established as such)

That we ought not eat babies. It's true even if we all believe otherwise (and even if we never consider it at all). — Michael

No it's not.

How do you respond to that?

I think many moral truths are facts, but I'm skeptical (and nervous) about justifying them with these kinds of analogies — J

Do you have a suggestion of how to justify a moral 'fact'?

but i somehow don't think that's you — Banno

As I understand the position, I would agree that's not me. But i'm young in this - so that may change, or be revealed as I go.

that gravity accelerates objects at that rate is just a brute fact... — Banno

I note that verification is what gives this statement veracity. You could have noted a different rate, and been wrong, in the face of the verification of the rate you've noted. You're right in that there is a rate of gravitation acceleration, as a brute fact, and if we're wrong, that doesn't change the fact of it. But,. that we note it at THAT rate, is a custom. Our scale could just be something different. Borders of London could be different too. But hte difference is, the rate of acceleration remains what it is without that conventional rate-signifier. London does not exist at all without the convention.

are there some other statements that imply its truth — Banno

My immediate intuition is yes, but I'd need to do more work to identify what they are, and may end up conceding.

So, do you think it true? — Banno

I do not. I believe 'wrong' must be established as an actual criteria, rather than just a word to be referred to in relation to harm. Why is it wrong? Because it's harm? That's tautological.
That many people ascribe wrongness to harm doesn't do much for me. Still just extends convention. There is nothing in my experience of the world that indicates harm is wrong, ipso facto so I, at least, require some further grounding of it's wrongness with reference to the world.

For Kant, then, world and Universe are pretty much the same thing — Mww

To me, this is basically the key to understanding your point/Kant's point. As long as we're sure the term, in this context, isn't trying to do the work of it's every-day definition, there's no difficulty.

my position is is not a brute fact, though. What makes it a brute fact?

Do we have to just rely on “brute disagreement” to resolve, at least in terms, the conflict?

It's not. 4 is required to get from the facts of hte matter, to the judgement about htose facts.

And you've done nought to show otherwise. It's just your belief.

Santa doesn't exist even if nothing exists. — Michael

If nothing existed, that would be a state of affairs that included Santa not existing. Though, that would require 'soemthing' no notice that ffact, which is fairly much incoherent if nothing exists.

What? — Banno

I understood your response to be that, if i claim that using harm (level 2, lets say) to prevent harm level 6, this would support the brute fact of 'one ought not harm'.

I provided that the concept of justification can render that irrelevant. The brute facts remain:

1. We exist
2. We can be harmed
3. We can harm others.
4?????? (this is where i'm not seeing any work being done)
5. One ought not harm.

Which is extant in the state of the physical world - Santa isn't in it.

There are non-physical states of affairs; that Santa doesn't exist, — Michael

That is a physical state of affairs.

In any case, it's plain to see that your reliance on the brute fact isn't something i accept, and so we can't come to terms.

Obvious special pleading — Banno

Vehemently rejected. It was a direct response to your claim that proportionality has somethign to do with establishing the fact. It doesn't on my account, and i'm not ignoring, but rejecting the crux of your claim that proportionality matters.

Situations in which a greater harm is avoided? — Banno

That was not my contention. They could be equal, but considered less or more justified on either side.

They could also be inverse. Causing a greater harm, to prevent a lesser harm to a less deserving target (Israel/Hamas comes to mind.. )

Harm is not, in brute fact, amendable to judgement. It just is a fact that we experience harm. And can cause it.

That aside (i mean to say, please respond to this next question separately, rather then within your answer to the above):

How do you take claims of desiring harm? Either due to mental illness, or lets say some BDSM proclivity? Is that an except, or is there some reason this doesn't fit the definitions your using?

I do. I'm sorry, but i'll need to pull away if this gets adversarial.

It makes no appreciable difference unless you're quoting a particular instance of speech. The cat is on the mat refers to something outside of the utterance/quotation/sentence. It is referential. The quote marks literally make no different to the substance of the statement. Whether it's spoken, or thought, it is the same statement making the same reference.

That it has no quote marks around it, doesn't change it's actual content, and merely it's source. But even then, ultimately, the source is a thought about something.

"One ought not x" is only referential if you have a state of affairs to refer to. In this case, you haven't established it. You end up on 'brute fact' but i don't accept that position, so, as i actually began this part of the exchange - we have no further to go on this journey together.

Firstly, "one ought not x" is a sentence, not a thought. Specifically, in this case, it is a written sentence. — Michael

I covered this. It's the linguistic representation of a thought, not a state of affairs. If your position is that a sentence is necessarily representative of a state of affairs, i find that bizarre and hard to grasp.

No, i understand the distinction you're making. Perhaps you're not groking my objection - support that it is a state of affairs, rather than a falsity.

I think you're misunderstanding me.
Those sentences, as you posited, indicate a less-than-truth, to a realist. This is the case with that statement. Which is why it's qualified. I don't see the problem...
I do not understand realists to be unable to make equivocal or less-than-truth statements, but to delineate clearly between those whicih have truth-value and those which do not. Forgive me if im getting that wrong.

I think perhaps, I would say, the correct sentence structure (in this particular context) for a realist then, would be "I think xyz about, what I think, is London".

But i do think the force of habit is strong enough to explain why realists talk in those absolutes anyway.

Thank you mate :) I shall look into those sources.

"The cat is on the mat" is a sentence. That the cat is on the mat is a state-of-affairs.
"One ought not harm another" is a sentence. That one ought not harm another is a state-of-affairs. — Michael

How? You've not addressed my reason for it not being one. I also, again, do not think we can get any further if you see that as a state of affairs, rather than a thought with no external referent, which is necessarily true, whether it could be construed as a state of affairs as well or not - it certainly doesn't refer to anything external to the mind.

What I did, which has been a really helpful path (given i'm only a fledgling academic philosopher and am purposefully leapfrogging the academic pathway in terms purely of duration...) was to read A.C Grayling's "The History Of Philosophy" and then choose (at a time) six books to attack, going from earliest, to later philosophies/philosophers which his account/s made me want to follow up on.

Initially, I went with some bigger names (Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Parfit, Chalmers) and a then added a couple of lesser known (North-Whitehead, Benatar, etc..). Since then, I just pick up what takes my fancy when im at the book store or on Amazon haha.

Has been very helpful to figure out what i'm interested in, and what I might think about those things without being beholden to views of those presenting the sources to me. I assume, when i hit the relevant courses, this will allow me a bit more room than out-of-highschool students too.

There is some X such that "one ought not X" is objectively true because it is a brute fact that one ought not X. — Michael

I think i can lay out here (to the point that we need not actually go any further) why this makes no sense to me:

Facts are derived from states of affairs. We agree there.
"One ought not x" (or any other behavioural command) is a thought, not a state of affairs. It's literally just the language enunciating a thought.
I cannot take a thought to be a state of affairs, which are necessarily mind-independent (in my understanding).

So, if you're seeing that statement as a state of affairs, we're just not talking about hte same thing as so we couldn't be wrong or right by each others lights :)

It's pretty damn rough to read. It's one a the very few cases in which I recommend secondary literature before reading the book, there's plenty of it. — Manuel

Any specific recommendations? I'm finding it very dense, but going slowly is giving me some confidence im my interpretations. I'd like to know if i'm just not getting it LOL

The task Kant set himself was to ask ‘What can we know before experience? — I like sushi

Do you think he came to a reasonable conclusion on that? I'm not done with CPR - and it's so dense, i'm asking this question without a preconceived possible answer.

But fascinating notwithstanding the futility of such an exercise, it's an obsession. — Manuel

Where do you get off the train? (meaning, at what point do you hit the 'its now a futile endeavour' line in your enquiry?)

The sentence "angels do not live in Heaven" is true even though the words "angel" and "heaven" do not refer to anything. — Michael

I do not agree. It’s a fictional sentence referring to nothing and so does not carry truth (is my take).

That we ought not eat babies. It's true even if we all believe otherwise (and even if we never consider it at all). — Michael

What supports your contention that it's true?

I take your other response as a tautology and can’t say much about it ‍:halo:
Morality exists in the mind, only. It isn’t discovered (is my position). See Hume :nerd:

I’m kidding. Enjoying the exchange

No, that's normative ethics. — Michael

:up:

all “alien” refers to is non-human, non-Earthbound life forms. All of those elements have direct referents which we almalgamate.

But noting the issue you’re outlining my question is - what moral facts could exist a priori? That is, without human knowledge of them?

The concept around geometrical facts ar least is that they exist whether we know about them or not right? We discover aspects of the material world.

What are we discovering when we come across moral facts?

Edit: sorry for post-comment additions - that isn’t my assertion. My contention is it must refer to a state of affairs. “Ought not” isn’t a state of affairs and so I can’t see it to be either a fact or compelling morally to begin with. The states of affairs “of” that statement is that there are others and we can harm them.

You have to do more work to support the “ought not” and I’m not seeing that work