First among them was Homer — Fooloso4

Homer was one in a long lineage of rhapsodes.

If you get too extreme then you will be shooting yourself in the foot — Agree-to-Disagree

They are already metaphorically shooting themselves in the head by overdosing on cortisol coming from their neurotic worldview and oestrogen-filled tap water:

Among the plethora of chemicals released into the environment, much attention is paid to endocrine disrupting compounds (EDCs). Natural estrogens, such as estrone (E1), 17β-estradiol (E2), estriol (E3) are excreted by humans as well as animals, and can enter the environment as a result of discharging domestic sewage and animal waste.

These compounds can cause deleterious effects such as feminization, infertility and hermaphroditism in organisms that inhabit water bodies. — https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0043135422013586

I don't think any of the people here implying terrorism have solved an equation in the past 5 years to be able to pretend to know what they are talking about, neither are they in shape to go jogging to the local government building. Since there is no general environment thread, I will post this here while people worry about the fact that the Netherlands should be underwater 20 years ago:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3281765#:~:text=First%2C%20AIs%20could%20display%20a,the%20doubt%E2%80%9D%20in%20uncertain%20situations.

[...]

https://theconversation.com/emotion-reading-tech-fails-the-racial-bias-test-108404

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html — Pantagruel

It does not seem like any of the links prove that programmers' beliefs are affecting the AI. The first one simply states correctly that the AI works in a racially biased way. While the other two just seem to me like the usual screeching of Anglosphere leftists whenever some fact of science or technology does not agree with their politically formed confusions about the world — all the time since 2015. What is apparent is the contrary, that these articles are calling for the direct injection of human aesthetic preferences into the code.

Ask ChatGPT if its answers could be subject to unknown selection biases its developers may have passed on to it accidentally through data-categorization. — Pantagruel

ChatGPT is programmed to give the most milquetoast, politically neutral, common sense answers to any given question. Whatever it is that you ask it, if there is a slight chance of controversy, it will start with a disclaimer. ChatGPT is also not rational
https://chat.openai.com/share/96378835-0a94-43ce-a25b-f05e5646ec40
https://chat.openai.com/share/b5241b53-e4d8-4cab-9a81-87fa73d740ad

In any case, I still have not seen any proof that programmers are categorising their own data by hand.

The only way a computer knows what is "happy" is if someone feeds it in say one-hundred pictures of "happy" faces and tags each one as "happy". Then you can feed it in millions more pictures, if you like, and refine it's capabilities. — Pantagruel

I just don't think that happened because programmers don't spend their time tagging millions of data-points, it is usually that the data-points are externally-sourced and the tags come with them. On this topic, the pictures would come from Google and the tag would be whatever emotion name was in the query. I will change my mind if you provide a source.

In the example I gave, the original dataset of training images had to be identified each as representing "joy", "surprise", "anger," etc. And the categorizations of interpretations of the images of black people were found to be reflective of the selection bias of the developers (who did the categorizing) — Pantagruel

Did they? AI models typically use thousands or millions of datapoints for their algorithm. Did the programmers categorise all of them?

I can also design trusses and figure pressure loss in pipelines. Doesn't that sound exciting. — Mark Nyquist

No, I hate trusses. But hey, more power to civil engineers, though I would rather let the computer handle all those forces in different joints. Don't ask me about hyperstatic structures — I don't know.

The first code example is the correct one for counting rocks. It initializes the variable "rocks" to 0 and then uses a while loop to increment the value of "rocks" until it reaches 2, printing the current value of "rocks" in each iteration. The output of this code is "1, 2." — punos

Sure. But the programming language does not "know" that counting start at 1 — for some languages the first element of a list has index 0, in other languages index 1. And the fact that one piece of code counts "correctly" and the other "incorrectly" (like ChatGPT says) begs the question as to why one is right and the other wrong, which is the thread's topic.

Most recently the example of the AI system designed to evaluate human emotion from faces that identified an inordinate number of black people as angry. — Pantagruel

I understand this is simply an illustrative example for your sensible point, but yet on this particular reason programmer bias is likely not the reason. If the AI detects them as angry, there must a reason why, surely the programmer did not hard code "if race == black{emotion=angry}". It could be that the black people from the sample indeed have angrier faces than other races for whatever reason, but it could also be that the data that was fed to the AI has angry people as mostly black — though a Google query "angry person" shows almost only whites.

The program simply outputs what you told it to output. There is no right or wrong. If you program print('The dog is a cat') and it says 'The dog is a cat', the output is not wrong, you told it to do that. And some programming languages start counting from 0 (Java), others from 1 (MATLAB).

Pomo authors like Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida often get blamed for the excesses of wokism and cancel culture, when in fact the repressive moralism coming from these movements is attributable to such doctrines as Critical Race Theory, and figures like Franz Fanon and Antonio Gramsci. These approaches are heavily influenced by Marx and psychoanalysis, which are put into question by pomo writers like Foucault and Derrida. — Joshs

:ok: Very well put. Actors such as JBP and Shapiro are doing a disservice to their own cause when they bring up Derrida and Foucault, all the while the people they want to fight are seldom named — some might say they are poisoning the swamp, but realistically they are just ignorant. But then, what about Lacan?



I don't understand what you are getting at. I provided plain proof that there are indeed people who deny mathematics for political (leftist) reasons. Maybe they are not post-modernists, perhaps some are and others aren't, or maybe none of them are. What place is there for post-modernism to be productive in mathematics after all? As Count said:

There is already a lot of pluralism and "questioning all assumptions," in the foundations of mathematics/philosophy of mathematics, so it's hard to see what a post-modern critique of mathematics would find worth critiquing. I've never seen one, and I've certainly looked in places where they might show up.

She didn't say 2+2=5 — ssu

Maybe she (whoever) didn't, but many did.

As an afterthought, this argument here:

That is a possible argument against solipsism, that all the body of knowledge produced so far is generated/contained by/in my mind, and yet we struggled with Abstract Algebra 2. — Lionino

is just a case of (simplified):

A: My mind is the collection of things I am aware of.
B: There are things in the world I am not aware of.
C: Therefore there are things outside of my mind.

Which is that there is scientific knowledge to be learned, the fact I don't have this knowledge implies there are some things that I am not aware of, therefore there are things outside of my mind. There is some X I am unaware of, X is outside of my mind, there are things outside of my mind. But this only works because the implication {unaware of X} → {X outside of mind} is accepted, and it can be assumed only if we define my mind in such a way (A) to rule out the existence of some unknown-to-me part of my mind. A semantic argument therefore.

Which I said here:

but it works, in my view, because I redefine mind to exclude involuntary aspects. It works because it satisfactorily counters solipsism in its semantics. It does not defeat idealism or pan-psychism or open individualism or a blend of all those, because the world could still be fundamentally made of mind-stuff, or we and the world are the mind of god a la Spinoza — Lionino

This is not to say I do not have an ego, I certainly do, but I can cope with being wrong at times in a much better way than others it seems. — Zolenskify

The only person here who ever said anything about "ego" was you. People replied to your poorly-made OP and you went on a rant like you were deeply hurt. Did you take LSD and suddenly made up your mind that you are enlightened? Because you are not.

There is nothing correct or incorrect about the output, it is just the way you programmed it and how Python works.

I was talking about the fact that the first unit ever made in a mind, so the first number ever counted, was a "1", and all units since then (yes units), were multiples and divisions of when we first started counting units of one. So quantification started long ago with a 1. 'Numbers start at one' would be a weird way to say it, but it reflects this sense of "start" and "numbers" and "1" I meant. — Fire Ologist

That is somewhat productively discussed in the Postmodernism and Mathematics thread.

it's nonsense then to talk about 2 + 2 = 5, because any postmodernist that is against 'naive realism' isn't trying to debunk arithmetic with natural numbers — ssu

Maybe those people are not real post-modernists, but they do exist:

addressing students’ mistakes forthrightly is a form of white supremacy. It sets forth indicators of “white supremacy culture in the mathematics classroom,” including a focus on “getting the right answer,” — WSJ

We all remember the 2+2=5 nonsense of 2021-2022 (that a prized mathematician even went to Twitter to defend), whatever label we apply to the people that pushed it. It was brought up in this thread exactly because it is a deconstructing of mathematics as culturally relative.

Should we even platform — RogueAI

English-speaking country?

he was visited by three wise men from the East — Fire Ologist

On that, they might have been Zoroastrian. The translation to English "three wise men" does not tell the whole story.
Edit: the archived version presents an extremely poor text compared to what I remember, but I hope the idea is still understandable.

Well, whatever way it is that we know they exist. — Patterner

I tried looking up some educative articles on the matter but none of them were complete. If it is in your interest, you can try. In any case, the short answer is that you can have as many "particles" as you want, it is simply less likely the more particles you want to have.

Your objection is roughly that we need a great number of particles before making a brain, that is something that was discussed starting here.

but a 0th rock does not exist — Zolenskify

Saying someone has 0 rocks is not the same as "there is a 0th rock" — one is a nonsensical statement, the other is not. There is a difference between cardinal and ordinal numbers — I learned that in my first year of school.

"if I am a sea turtle, then I am Bill Gates (or [insert favorite billionaire])."

We certainly could make this argument, it's not wrong, but anyone who wishes to entertain this would be wasting time — Zolenskify

No we couldn't, it is wrong. Bill Gates and a sea turtle are mutually exclusive.

really take some time and educate yourself on the various domains, genus', orders, etc, of the species before jumping to any sort of conclusions here — Zolenskify

I don't think I need to educate myself on grade school biology, thanks.

At any rate, I think it agreeable to say that we should come prepared for any sort of discussion, as to not waste time on preliminary information. Just a thought, it may serve you in the future. — Zolenskify

There is no discussion, you started a thread with a claim that no mathematician will entertain — because first of all, what does the phrase "numbers start" even mean? You used an analogy which relies on the semantics of the English language to prove your claim and I showed another analogy using English that makes the contrary claim. Your OP does not even fulfill criterion B on how to make a new thread.

You are conflating counting (which assumes some existential statement) and mathematics, those two are not the same¹. Overall, another horrible thread by someone who did not research the topic they are starting. Here, have fun: https://web.math.ucsb.edu/~padraic/ucsb_2014_15/ccs_proofs_f2014/ccs_proofs_f2014_lecture4.pdf

1: Don't reply to this with a cut-off quotation that says "Mathematics is the study of counting", read the rest of the quote.

But if I steal your rock then we introduce a negative 1 to the equation... — Vaskane

Subtraction is derived from addition. So numbers would not "start" with a negative number.

I pick up a rock, I have one rock. Pick up another, have two. Drop them, have none. Only started counting rocks when I picked up the first one. So, numbers start at one. — Zolenskify

Before you picked up a rock, you had 0 rocks. So, numbers start at 0. :roll:

How many virtual particles have been observed in the same place at the same time? — Patterner

The thing is that virtual particles are not observed.

What do you make of dialetheias then?

There's no good evidence of this but I think it is safe to say the myth came to us via one or two messianic preachers of the time. There were many doing the rounds. — Tom Storm

For sure, check this.

A bitterly ironic area to consider considering that most POMO thinkers tended to be far to the left side of the political spectrum. For decades they sharpened and refined their critiques of the sciences, and no one really paid attention to them. Then, finally, a huge swath of the public did start taking their critiques seriously, but it tended to largely be the far-right of the political spectrum who did this. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Horseshoe theory in full display. Not that it is impressive, being extreme is a big thing to have in common.

"Who funds this research? Who stands to gain financially? What are the power relations in the field? What are the socio-historical factors influencing theory?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

You really can't expect that to be in the modern far-left's script because the people who write the script are exactly the people who funded that research.

Which is why I keep saying: either we are most likely Boltzmann brains or our scientific theories are incorrect. — Michael

That is a true dichotomy. My point was that, as by Carroll's argument and your subsequent argument, the dichotomy dissolves as we have to believe that our scientific theories are incorrect — which sounds fishy to me as I said because of the "most likely", and there seems to be some sort of self-reference involved in the argument too, as I will think more deeply about later, rejecting empirical theories a priori is always iffy.

Even though we can say that if the universe will last forever then the number of Boltzmann brains will increase to infinity, it must be the case that the time from the Big Bang to now is finite, and so that as of now there have been a finite number of brains — Michael

Surely that is true. So your argument seems to be, there has been finite time T between now and the beginning of the universe, there has been finite Boltzmann brains, therefore we are likely to be a brain with incorrect scientific theories.
I don't know what to make of this, but it seems that you are restricting the pool of possible Boltzmann brains we could be by establishing the upper time limit as the time where the entity we are now lives in. I don't know how to feel about that, it seems circular.

but there's something less-than-rational about the suggestion that we can dismiss such a possibility a priori, especially given that "we are quantum fluctuations" isn't a contradiction — Michael

This is what I mean about the whole thing being iffy.

Perhaps the simplest solution is to reject scientific realism in favour of instrumentalism. — Michael

How would that come into play with Boltzmann, especifically?

But, since there is infinite space for these infinite particles to be spread throughout, we can't know that that number of particles will ever touch even a single other particle. — Patterner

Pretty sure that the size of space does not factor in it. If you take one m³ of space it will have the same density of particles popping in and out of existence as one cm³ — assuming same conditions. So having more space increases the likelihood of a Boltzmann brain forming if anything.

How do your views square with indispensability? — TonesInDeepFreeze

Wouldn't his views triangle with indispensability even? Corvus seems to be arguing for some kind of anti-realism about at least some mathematical entities, it seems.

Since we are discussing values, not physical objects as in the case of your example, there is no such thing as an extensional reading of "1+1 = 3-1" — Metaphysician Undercover

When you say "values" it seems you refer exactly to what is supposed to be the extensional reading of 1+1 or 3-1. So, if we are discussing values, saying that 1+1 is the same as 3-1 is correct, as both represent the same value, even if not the same operation.

Thanks and Christ! It’s a can of worms… — Tom Storm

And if you are interested, fictionalism is just one of the schools of thought surrounding the foundations of mathematics within nominalism, there are many more. And you should also read up on the Grundlagenkrise (which I plan on making a thread on). This article is also a good cursory view on the ontological view of platonism. But I think that this article is even more general and talks not only about numbers but also about universals in general.

Speaking of Fictionalism, it battles with Quine-Putnam's indispensability argument, which was mentioned on the "Infinity" thread (a mess of a thread admittedly)

Good points on the grounds of mathematics. Now perhaps we could have a thread on postmodernism and science, differently from postmodernism and mathematics, there is looots of content around that :razz:

It may even be that 'Jesus' became the name for a composite from the stories of different individuals claiming or believed to be the messiah. — Fooloso4

In light of Yeshu ben Ananias, it is likely the case. It is said around that Jesus is a mix of Ananias, Mithras, and others. I think the article's comparison with Romulo is very apt. Thanks for the link.

Gospel of Mark. Gospel of Mark chapter 14 second verse.

Jesus of Nazareth did exist. — javi2541997

I have convinced myself this is not the case. See here, here, and here.

I don't really think there are religious people active on this forum, besides some two or three members.

I was raised Catholic, and sometimes I tag along with relatives to go to Church if it is a special occasion. Catholic and Orthodox Churches are my favourite places to visit. I do not believe any of it is true however — I don't even believe Jesus was a real person.

But proving for sure that something doesn't exist? — Fire Ologist

If you can prove that a concept entails a contradiction, that would be a proof of its non-existance. Here is an argument against the concept of the Christian God by Alex Malpass.

1. Assume that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
2. Most Boltzmann brains do not have accurate scientific knowledge
3. Therefore, we most likely do not have accurate scientific knowledge
4. Our scientific knowledge entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
5. Therefore, our scientific knowledge that entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains is most likely inaccurate
6. Therefore, we are most likely not Boltzmann brains

He then uses this to reject (1).

I then simply offered an inverse of the argument:

1. Assume that we are most likely ordinary humans
2. Assume that we have accurate scientific knowledge
3. Our scientific knowledge entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains
4. Therefore, our scientific knowledge that entails that we are most likely Boltzmann brains is most likely accurate
5. Therefore, we are most likely not ordinary humans

I then use this to reject either (1) or (2). — Michael

In Carroll's argument, all the statements ultimately follow from 1, but 1 ultimately leads to a contradiction. In your argument, there are two assumptions, and the statements all follow from 1 and 2, 1&2 leads to a contradiction. You say you use that to reject 1 or 2, but if you reject 1, you go back to Carroll's argument. The only choice is then to reject 2.

Still, I feel there is something fishy with Carroll's argument or perhaps with the dichotomy of these arguments and I think it is in the phrase "most likely". I will try to put it rigorously some time later.

With Boltzmann brains there are a finite number of brains — Michael

There is an infinite amount of Boltzmann brains though. And if your argument for the multiverse follows, the same can be applied for the Boltzmann brains. So Carroll is wrong and we are as likely to be Boltzmann brains with accurate as with inaccurate scientific knowledge. Thoughts?

All nonsense. But a very fun idea. — Patterner

Unfortunately it is not nonsense but follows from our scientific theories.

If we can dismiss the claim that we are most likely Boltzmann brains a priori then we can dismiss the possibility of heat death a priori, or we can dismiss the possibility of quantum fluctuations a priori, even though we have a posteriori evidence in favour of them. — Michael

Or perhaps we don't need to reject either heat death or quantum fluctuations, but just the possibility of quantum fluctuations generating a macroscopic object — which is against our scientific theories but not as harshly so. And even if we don't want to do so, by your footnote here, it can be that the time after the heat death is neither infinite or sufficiently large to make it so that there are more Boltzmann brains than ordinary brains.

I don't mean chess in its embryonic stages or whatnot. I mean chess today as you can play it in any website.

What defines modern chess is its rules. What defines mathematics is also its rules. You can make up any sort of game, but not all games will be chess. You can make up all sorts of mathematical systems, each with its own rules. A different culture may come up with a different kind of mathematics, but its usefulness and applicability will be different from our mathematics — and if it wants the same applications as our mathematics, it must be our mathematics.

including whether it is a basis for all other numbers or whether it is derived — Joshs

I am not aware of any mathematical system in which 0 is derived from other numbers instead of other way around. ChatGPT told me "Another example is in certain number systems, such as the surreal numbers or the hyperreal numbers. In these systems, 0 may be defined in terms of certain sequences or sets of other numbers, providing an alternative perspective on its construction.", but I don't think that is true.

You may as well say that perfection is an erect penis flawlessly being used for hanging up a dressing gown. — Tom Storm

:fire:

Asking whether math is different in other cultures is like asking whether chess is different in other cultures.

That's not how it works. — Michael

It is how powers of 2 work at the very least. But my point was not that there is a 6% chance, but that, differently from Boltzmann brains, there is no theory, understanding, or reasoning that tells us that we are most likely in such a multiverse. Surely, it is a possibility that we live in such a multiverse, but

is it more rational to believe that an infinite multiverse in which every metaphysical possibility is realized is less probable? — Michael

how likely is it?

—
What I really want to ask is: what are the rules of the multiverse? Is it a multiverse where every possibility is realised in some universe? But when does it stop, or rather, what institutes every possibility? If we are admitting of a multiverse that is beyond things such as non-contradiction and excluded-middle, we have universes where the LNC applies, one where it doesn't apply, and infinite others for each one of the infinite truth-values. And how big is the infinity of truth-values? Is it as big as the set of natural numbers or the set of real numbers? There must be something that institutes that. It is just a very troublesome thought experiment, especially since we are wrestling with things that enable rational thoughts and pondering about scenarios where they would not apply.

So you mean Platonic love?
Valentine's day is specifically about couples. Some countries however have friends' day.

In any case, lots of cynicism in this thread. Why not just thrash Christmas and Easter as well? Thrash birthdays too. We need holidays and special occasions, the choice to make it about consumerism is yours.

You are equivocating between the sense of an objective perspective and an objective thing. — Pantagruel

I don't know what you mean by "objective perspective", perspective is something subjective.

All you are doing is declaring that realism (or maybe Platonism) is true, nominalism false. — Pantagruel

I am saying, as before, that if platonism is true, we automatically have objective perfection by definition. But even within nominalism you can simply "summon" objective perfection by manipulating semantics:

Perfect red is λ=650nm.
Imperfect red is everything between λ=600nm and 700nm besides 650nm.
Hydrogen emits light at λ=650nm.
Hydrogen is perfectly red.

If you don't admit degrees and only accept black-and-white scenarios, "perfection" in an objective sense becomes a non-point as something either is or is not and there is no need for adverbs.

(assuming that it is rational to believe in an infinite multiverse in which every logical or metaphysical possibility is realized). — Michael

And even, would there not be laws that rule this multiverse? It is pushing the issue one step back.

If the latter then it is rational to believe in an infinite multiverse in which every metaphysical possibility is realized. — Michael

There are four ifs there, so, giving equal likelihood to each, we end up with a 6,25% chance of being in an infinite multiverse in which every possibility is realized.
We are likely not in one, but if we are, then the same thing that applies to Boltzmann brains applies here: we have no reason to believe in any reasoning we do — which bears no weight on whether it is true or not, but still.

You cannot say that something is objective because it "refers to a body." — Pantagruel

Well, that is quite literally the meaning of objective.

Unicorn refers to a body in that sense too, but it is not objective, it is a construct of the imagination — Pantagruel

If you mean that 'unicorn' is subjective insofar as it only exists as a thought inside the mind, yes.

Moreover, the perfection of what you are describing explicitly precludes its material instantiation. — Pantagruel

Not always.