The idea of sign to which I refer is that of "being in the place of something else ready to be interpreted by a context". So you can understand ideas as a kind of sign. For example when you think of rain there is a representation in which you can think of that object rain: you think of clouds, lightning, umbrellas and other things that are not directly present that nevertheless give meaning to that idea and not only that but constitute it.

Without this possibility of the sign (that of being in place of something else...) ideas could not be transmitted. But above all, it is thanks to this that it achieves the characteristic ideality of the idea: its repetition. Be it in someone else's head, in writing, in an archive, in a painting, in a paper, in our world, etc. For example if you think of an idea that another person gave you, that idea is present in your mind but it is no longer present in the mind of the other person.

When I say that ideas are material, I do not mean that they are physical, but a third option between the mental and the physical that respects the identity of each one. And this is provided by the idea of sign. An idea is a meaning that has a relation to other meanings, according to which it is itself a signifier. And this makes it possible to understand something as the language in which you transmit ideas to other people. If the idea did not exist as a sign within a system of signs we could not speak of transmission from one person to another (since in Communication you are being affected by the signs of another person). Moreover, the fact that an idea belongs to a system of signs ensures its ideality (that it is something that persists even beyond the subject who thinks it). In this sense ideas are as material as any sound within the transmission of ideas) but not in a physicalist sense, but in a very different sense.

Ideas unfold in the world. When we think of an idea transmitted by language for example. Since there is a relation to signifiers the idea itself becomes a signifier within a chain of referral. It is necessary to explain how the idea is related to sound, the extension of language and the relation of representation (for example the relation to pixels on a screen). This explanation can only be carried out if the idea and its representation are part of the same system of signs. This implies that the idea is not enclosed in the head but that literally the world is made of ideas unfolding, our world, but the idea is something necessarily material, if by material we understand the finiteness of the sign, its appearance, its action and reaction, its contact, its causality, its transformation, its difference, etc....

There is an interesting interpretation based on the temporality in which subjectivity unfolds. It refers to the absolute novelty of the future now that becomes the present. This absolute novelty makes the non-present now constitutive of subjectivity. Is this not what the other has always meant, another perception as another absolute now? This would restore the possibility of another subjectivity as equally originary.

“The now is not a point but a continuity that is always in transition.” (Lectures on Time-Consciousness)

The pure ego only shows itself to consciousness by reflection, — Joshs

But it has intentional sense. That's my point. And therefore it is related to the expressiveness of language. The pure self as an object for consciousness is intentional and therefore it is expressive. My emphasis is Husserl's need for pure language for a description of the phenomena in the epoche Including pure ego.

No. It is related to the sense of expression. "I am" has meaning beyond whether I am alive or not, but no longer because it is said in the epoche but because it is a function of language. Husserl needed language to found the expressivity of the epoche. He tried to make language something pure given in the epoche. But he did not succeed, since he needed to justify ideality as repetition in the sense in the epoche.

It is related to the sphere of expressivity of sense or meaning where the pure self of the transcendental reduction shows itself self-evident to consciousness. The sense of this pure I is self-evident. But as sense it has a linguistic value (see phenomenology of language in Husserl) , as "I am". "I am" is the sense of the self-evidence of the pure self.

You are forgetting that there is a passage from the naturalized ego to the transcendental ego. Therefore, the two cannot be confused. The transcendental ego is a sort of eidetic reduction of the ego that we begin with in the natural attitude and which is dealt with by psychology, for example. Thus this natural ego is also reduced, put in parentheses. I know that the reduction and epoche does not mean that literally the world of the natural attitude ceases to exist. But there is an ego of the natural attitude which is taken care of by psychology. Therefore, by rights, the self-evident and essential sense of "I am" would be worth and have all its transcendental eidetic value even if the natural ego disappears or is bracketed out of existence. It is a necessary possibility. But a possibility that is no longer safeguarded by the transcendental ego itself but by the language that allows signification beyond a living or dead subjectivity.

“The ego as the subject of psychological experiences is not the pure ego of transcendental phenomenology. The latter is not an object in the world but the source of all world-constitution.”
— Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book (1913)

My point stands because there is in fact a reduction of one's own psychological ego or empirical self. Otherwise all transcendentality would be ruined.

I can't see that at all. The paragraphs that I've just been studying are those concerning his critique of naturalism — Wayfarer

I am speaking "in fact". By bracketing the world I include my worldly self. That is why in the epoche it is said that the "I am" has full evidence. Which means that I can be dead (the worldly self) and the "I am" is still originally self-evident. But in fact the epoche is made from a singularity that gives the specific sense to the "I am", with which the "I am" remains anchored to worldliness if it is not for the language that here saves ideality.

The article barely discusses eidetic intuition and original evidence (in the epoche) and Husserl's intuitionism in general. What I am referring to is what links intuitionism in Husserl with his claim of objectivity and ideality of phenomenology as a science of essences (unconventional Platonism as Husserl himself would say).

An example is given by Derrida: when I say "I am" in the epoche. Husserl would tell us that it has a full evidence or that we have an intuition of full and ideal essence (which can be understood universally) , however for being in the epoche the "I am" has a possible meaning without object in the world (since the world is put in parenthesis). So the "I am" has full meaning and evidence even if in fact I am dead. How is this possible? Well, it is not simply because of the epoche because the epoche is still made by me being alive. It is language that makes such a thing possible, that "I am" means even if I am in fact dead. Language here gives ideality to expression because language is transmitted and repeated.

For me, Husserl's Cartesian enclosure limits his philosophy. His aspiration was to objectivity and ideality, but then why shut himself up in subjectivity? Husserl himself in "The Origin of Geometry" gives us the tools to get out of the enclosure when he speaks of ideality as something constituted by repetition and reactivation through tradition. This repetition, however, cannot occur by means of an epoché. We interact with things in a theoretical way but without the need to leave the natural attitude. Moreover, the only possibility of achieving true ideality and objectivity is to go against Cartesian enclosure. Proof of this is Husserl's own need to introduce apperception and intersubjectivity into the bosom of this transcendental dimension. But the question is how can another subjectivity settle in this dimension of the solitary life of the ego? Is it not necessary, for example, language and writing to make what we call objective truths settle? And ultimately to make their ideality be given as such? Husserl in this sense remained a prisoner of the egological dimension. And therefore it is necessary to find another way out of the confinement of founding the constitution of truth and objectivity.

Thanks all for the very constructive feedback, I’m away from desk for today look forward to further remarks and criticisms. — Wayfarer

No problema.

Further to the distinction between the structures of subjectivity and the merely personal, a snippet from the IEP article on Phenomenological Reduction (a very detailed and deep article, I will add, and one I’m still absorbing)

Thus, it is by means of the epochē and reduction proper that the human ‘I’ becomes distinguished from the constituting ‘I’; it is by abandoning our acceptance of the world that we are enabled to see it as captivating and hold it as a theme. It is from this perspective that the phenomenologist is able to see the world without the framework of science or the psychological assumptions of the individual.
— IEP

The same distinction I made between the subjective and the merely personal. — Wayfarer

For Husserl the objectivity of science is ensured by ideality as a repetition that transcends singular experience and can be repeated in different subjectivities (Ideas concerning a pure phenomenology and a phenomenological philosophy, Book I, § 18). The question is always how in an increasingly Cartesian enclosure there can be a communication and transmission for the ideality of meaning and truth to occur. According to this, the ideality of meaning must betray the principle of the principles of phenomenology, which is the pure evidence of meaning as something given as ideal once and for all immediately for consciousness.

The same distinction I made between the subjective and the merely personal. — Wayfarer

I have always wondered why Husserl still maintains the idea of a self, ego, (in your case subjectivity) in this domain of the transcendental. Especially when he relates it to intersubjectivity. Husserl would say that every man can have access to this domain of the transcendental, so what is true for one is true for the rest. Is there, again, the hope in a repetition? Something that repeats itself from man to man in which a particularity is neutralized, in this case the monadic ego. Just wonder...

Yes.

Subjectivity — or perhaps we could coin the term ‘subject-hood’ — encompasses the shared and foundational aspects of perception and understanding, as explored by phenomenology. The personal, by contrast, pertains to the idiosyncratic desires, biases, and attachments of a specific individual.

It is difficult for me to understand this. Isn't it some kind of a big mind or trascendental ego? By the way, The essential structures of a transcendental ego are essential because they are discovered in an eidetic reduction of psychology. In such a case we are talking about an essence that belongs to every human being. But there is a continuity with what I am saying: the reduction is the product of an imaginary variation (method of phenomenology). It is a process that leads us to a repetition, finding this structure in all people, don't you think? It is something that we discover as repetition through a neutralization (imaginary variation).

This is too deep in fenomenology, you can ignore me.

That's an interesting analysis, although I don't think that 'subjectivity is neutralised by repetition' really holds water — Wayfarer

How does it not? When two persons perform the same proof of the theorem both are neutralized and it can no longer be said that they are the raison d'être of the theorem. Subjectivity no longer justifies the nature of what has been proved although it has participated in its genesis. In this sense the theorem has been invented but has reached a degree of objectivity. In general we consider that something invented is not objective; my point is to show that something can be objective even if it is invented.

So I suppose what you're saying is that when only a single subject has such an insight, then it's subjective, but that as it becomes more and more widely known and accepted, then it is seen as objective — Wayfarer

Kinda. But not only because it is known but because in the construction of the theorem there are different realities involved in the matter. But what is important is repetition as a means of a virtually infinite induction that transcends, transcends subjectivity, transcends cultures, transcends subject, trasciende experiments and so on ad infinitum.

The theorem transcends and become "objective" by repetition and neutralization of particular genesis.

Subjectivity is never outside science. It is always in its genesis. What happens is that subjectivity is neutralized by phenomena such as repetition. That is, someone once invented the Pythagorean theorem, but through different mechanisms: language, writing, and repetitive processes that lead to its fulfillment, the theorem went from being the subjective invention of a person to a broader field of existence. It is a process of objectification. The same happens with sciences such as physics where experimentation becomes repetitive and theories are confirmed over and over again transcending the subjectivities always necessary to make the experiments.

In this sense objectivity is not simply the theory that corresponds to reality, but the theory that reaches an ontological degree in which reality and subjectivity are immersed. So we must even say that the theory of relativity transcends laboratories and experiments and reaches an ontological degree of its own. But of course nothing without these moments of neutrality of the particularities and thus to transit on the way of infinite universality and objectification.

Or there always was. Either way, uncaused existence. — Philosophim

I think we agree on this, given the structural closure of causality. That is what I have referred to with these two restrictions:

1. Ex nihilo nihil fit
2. Causality implies only relations between two or more things.

There has always been causality.

Why not one thing, then another thing 1 second later? What if there are still uncaused things happening throughout the universe as we speak? My point in all of this is that the argument does not conclude it has to be only one thing. — Philosophim

I claim there cannot be only one thing, in a causal context. Ex nihilo nihil fit. Causality presuposses relations n+1, If we want to maintain a principle of reason we cannot appeal to things created out of nothing.

From my point of view the causality of the universe is closed in its structure, since we cannot think of one thing in the absence of any causal relation with another thing, nor of things created out of nothing. Therefore causality has no end or start.

For all we know its possible that there is something that formed that then formed something else. — Philosophim

To me that is irrational. How is it possible for one thing to completely form another thing out of nothing?

If you have no present, then nothing would be possible — Corvus

Why not say the same about the past? Something proper to the past is that it was once present. In that sense there is a need for the past in order to understand and explain the possibility of the present. That the present passes but does not disappear completely (becomes past) is necessary for the existence of the present as something caused.

And we would still ask, "What caused that to exist?" The answer is always the same in the end of the causal chain. — Philosophim

If it is a causal chain we cannot assume that it is one thing that existed alone and suddenly gave birth to a second thing. The causal relation as a relation requires at least two or more. Causality does not consist in creating things out of nothing (one thing creating a second thing out of nothing) but in creating things out of other various things (plural). That is why the idea of a first cause is so problematic.

Perhaps the problem is to understand causality in a linear and horizontal way and not in a vertical way in the order of coexistence.

An interesting point. But we can imagine a universe consisting of one simple thing. That would exist correct? — Philosophim

Yes, it can be said that it is possible that only one thing exists. But then we could no longer speak of causal relationships, don't you think?

About the scope of composition I have always wondered if when we reach the limit of composition we come to find something very different from composite things: A simple thing, without parts. I wonder likewise whether this simple thing is in a higher order of existence with respect to composite things.

But I immediately realize that the whole (or the relational property of the whole) has a retroactive effect on all parts, including the simple parts of a whole. The relational whole acts as the context of the simple thing making the simple thing something that is not known from itself but from its context, that is, from its relation to the other things.

Then it would not be a problem to reach the limit of the composition, we do not reach something divine or of a superior order of existence (the bricks of god). We arrive at one more part of the whole, since these last parts of the composition are only possible to know and understand them by putting them in relation to other things.

This said in causal terms seems to indicate that there are always at least two and never a first cause. First there is relation in terms of ratio essendi. The relational aspect of things seems to be primary and determinative of the identity of things themselves.

I used to interpret Kant's experience as "perception — Corvus

OK. But then you agree as would Kant that perception is given in the present. And we agree that you have to explain the prensent rationally in some way.

Let me ask you, do any of those worlds you invented have that function of explaining the present?

Already did it:

Don't you think that if we had this faculty it would not be necessary to make theories about reality? I mean, any theory would be true insofar as reality is given to us in its truth and we simply have to intuit it. — JuanZu

I want you to tell me the Absolute Truth about Reality Itself. — Arcane Sandwich

But what if I am wrong? I can at least give it a try.

Well, tell me if you want or don't want to have a debate with me.

You should if you want to have a debate with me according to your conditions.

OK. Could you help me to correct it and make it grammatical.

So it does not refute it. Right?

Then here's a counter-point to it. I declare that I am the creator of the Philosophy to be called "Argentine Realism — Arcane Sandwich

How that refutes what I just argued?

Don't you think that if we had this faculty it would not be necessary to make theories about reality? I mean, any theory would be true insofar as reality is given to us in its truth and we simply have to intuit it.

But what about the theory? Isn't it the theory which is true?

OK but what is truth?

I am not talking about perception, I am talking about experience. That is to say, when you and I experience something we do not see a perception without content and without conceptualization. Rather, the experience is already given with a conceptualization (a la Kant), but I wonder if this is given in the present, or rather it is the present itself or the present of the consciousness to the extent that the conceptualization is given simultaneously with the experience.

So you agree that there is a present of experience where conceptualization occurs simultaneously with perception?

Are you aware that the experience is given in the present?

In order for you to be able to experience different time dimension, first you need to start from present. You will need some special mental capability to be able to experience that suppose. It is not for the ordinary folks. But I was only giving you a hypothetical example scenario since you asked for it.
I would imagine extra multidimensional time experience would only be useful and possible for the only the few folks who are esoteric magicians or abstract artists. — Corvus

Let me get this straight: you're saying that people with special abilities can experience something like this?

If you read it again, it happens at present — Corvus

I think you are confused. You say that the events of these worlds happen in the present and then you say that they don't happen in the present.

I'm really not understanding you.

All of them must happen at present — Corvus

So we are still in the three dimensions of time. You haven't actually added any. You have added worlds but not dimensions of time, right?

For example, we could add super or subconscious and imaginative time time — Corvus

OK. But do any of those times have a direct relation to the present that you and I live in? I mean, of the explanatory kind and with truths that actually can be discovered?