Veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei



This seems to me a definition of essence but not truth

Now here's the potential circularity: we understand the geometry of space because we recognise the patterns. Our understanding of geometry is derived from our recognition of those patterns. We would have geometry explaining the patterns only because those patterns justify geometry. — Banno

But wouldn't that be an anthropocentric position? Hume tells us that there are habits and regularities, but he does not tell us the nature of those. This is where we stop doing psychology, and perhaps the issue can be approached from another point of view.

For me, there is a realism in Hume that is the realism of habits and human nature, which serves as the basis for him to say something about induction and deduction. In other words, his knowledge of human nature is the ground on which he bases his criticism. This realism would play against him: he is talking about the nature of something, in this case the nature of man as a creature of habits. And in that sense, his position cannot take precedence over a geometric-physical description. In fact, here the geometric-physical description takes precedence, as it is capable of asking why the regularities are presented to us as they are.

In short, anthropology weighs too heavily on Hume. Which is a realistic description of human nature. But being realistic, he can no longer deny the validity of other realistic descriptions that go even further and can explain the nature of regularities. Hume cannot be absolutely sceptical. And what consequences does this have for the problem of induction? That is not yet clear to me. I need to think about it more. But perhaps the problem of induction is simply an anthropological problem.

And here Kant comes in with his discrete space and time. They are the condition of possibility of experience and therefore of the recognition of regularities. I find a relationship between this and differential geometry that allows us to understand extensive and discrete space as originating from continuous spaces. And from here, everything that follows in physics revolves around the origin of the regularity of the laws of nature, and ultimately the origin of the laws themselves. Discretisation is a process that goes from the continuous to the discrete (quantisation, quantum mechanics) and much more...

In Hume, the regularity of events is a given, and has a strong psychological foundation. Hence, it is said that Hume is doing psychology. However, thanks to differential geometry, we know that a continuous space gives rise to discrete spaces where regularities can appear. Regularity occurs in a discrete space.

I wonder if it is possible to change approaches, to move from psychology to geometry (and physics). Considering that in Kant, for example, the extensiveness of space (a discrete space) as pure intuition is a condition of possibility for objects of experience, this may create a bridge in this change of approaches.

Why take regularity as something given and without genesis? If regularity is an EFFECT, this would completely change the issue of the laws of nature and their origin. Since, and this is not casuality, these laws are also presented as something given and without origin.

AI response:

regularities appear naturally in discrete spaces. In fact, discrete spaces are often studied specifically to analyze and understand these regular patterns. The field of discrete mathematics, which includes areas like combinatorics and graph theory, is built on the foundation of studying such structures and the rules that govern them.

This is so interesting.

in the absence of an asymmetric cause, the initial symmetry is preserved. In other words, a breaking of the initial symmetry cannot happen without a reason, or an asymmetry cannot originate spontaneously. — Gnomon

This does not mean that symmetry breaks are acausal; symmetry breaks belong to an ontological continuum in which the slightest variation in the environment can lead to such a break. The cause is not external because it is not the first cause giving matter its form. The cause of the symmetry breaking may be due to a discrepancy between the symmetry of one system and the symmetry of another system with which it comes into contact. As I understand, everything occurs between different symmetry systems.

And I can't see what it has to do with the topic of this thread : local cause/effect vs First Cause — Gnomon

This is related to this:

differentiation emerge from a state of uniformity — Gnomon

It is against to the thesis that matter is a passive receptacle for external and transcendent forms (first cause), while symmetry breaks give matter (to which they are immanent) the ability to generate forms without external intervention.

Is that right ?

My problem with the concept of emergence is that it does not seem to be an explanatory concept that provides us with a mechanism for moving from one level of reality to another without presupposing the already established levels of reality. And if it has no explanatory power (reconstruction rule), then I do not understand why anyone would choose physicalism as a general ontology of the world. For example, how do we explain Pythagoras' theorem with the concepts of physics? Emergence should explain how we move from talking about mass, particles, velocity, momentum, etc., to talking about numbers without presupposing knowledge of numbers as sui generis entities.

Can you explain a little about that in relation to Hume's scepticism? If that's alright.

Yes, but choose one of them and explain your answer. I've seen that you like Wittgenstein. So what would Wittgenstein's response to Hume's scepticism be?

Is your aim here to understand Hume, and then to move on to Kant's response? that is, are you after an exegesis, or are you looking for broad answers? It seems to me that you have a pretty good grasp of both Hume and Kant. — Banno

No. But is an interesting path to follow. My intention is to see how different positions respond to Hume's scepticism.

In Wittgenstein, those “necessary conditions” become grammatical rules rather than transcendental structures: not timeless features of mind, but conventions of our shared linguistic practice. In Davidson, the unity of apperception becomes the principle of interpretive coherence: understanding others and the world depends on fitting utterances and actions into a rational, causal, and linguistic web. And in Feyerabend, even that web becomes plural — our patterns of causation and justification are practices that can vary across scientific paradigms. — Banno

That's very interesting. But you've forgotten to relate it to Hume's scepticism.

Hume's scepticism — Banno

Following Kant the transcendental subject, through categories (pure concepts of understanding) and their schematism, is the one who imposes the rule of causality, for example, on sensory intuitions. For a sequence of perceptions to become an experience of an object, the "I think" must have unified it according to the necessary rule of cause and effect.

Kant would speak according to the tradition that a belief is true if the judgement formulated by the understanding (through categories) coincides with the sensory intuition that has been previously ordered by the a priori forms of sensibility.

Also Kant rejected the idea that the necessity of natural laws could arise from mere habit. Habit is contingent (it might not exist) and subjective (specific to an individual or species). If science were based on habit, its laws would be mere probabilities, not universal and necessary truths.

So a legitimate belief, according to Kant, is not legitimate if it is based on habit.

The point I would press here is again that what makes science work is not a series of logical rules, but a group of sociological rules. — Banno

Allow me to disagree somewhat. Sociologism in scientific theory starts from the abstraction of theories from their logical, technological, historical, phenomenological, and referential contexts. In general, competing theories have something in common in any of these dimensions of science. Often, competing theories share the same problem (historical, physical referential, etc.) to be solved, as is the case with string theory and quantum gravity, which seek to unify forces. Both theories have the forces of nature as common references. These theories were not created for sociological reasons but because of a restriction that phenomena and physical referential problems impose on the formulation of theories. For me, it is only after this abstraction of theory applied to theory that we can consider the subjectivity (or intersubjectivity) of the scientist as the cause of the formulation of theories. But that ignores a whole series of dimensions that surround and impose restrictions on the creation of theories beyond their sociological field.

So of course it is in the business of thinking ahead and getting organised by anticipating what is to come. — apokrisis

I can give an approximation from my point of view as follows: Anticipation takes the form of a future that becomes present and yet is not confused with the present. It is present-future. It takes the form of a duration, as Bergson would say. And thanks to habit, it is contracted with the past and the present in such a way that there is proximity. The future of anticipation is closer than another much more distant future with which anticipation has no contact. Intentionality directs action, but it is nothing without this contracted state of time.

However, this does not have much to do with causality in the physical dimension. I believe that there is still a gap between this internal causality and external causality. Unless we introduce the theory of time that I maintain to all causal processes. I believe this can be done, but it would be an extensive task that I cannot carry out here.

I just wanted to point out how the idea of teleology is problematic for the conception of causality we are discussing. We can talk about tendencies as regularities and stabilities that are disrupted by different phenomena that alter the regular course of events. And these disruptions are what have been called constraints.

But quantum physics does raise the issue of retrocausality as part of its holism. — apokrisis

But that phenomenon is instantaneous. It does not take the form of a process or a possible tendencie. I do not know if it is an appropriate example of teleology.

But the system’s approach can deal in grades of teleology. Minds can form purposes, bodies can shape functions and then the physical realm can have its tendencies. — apokrisis

I prefer the term ' tendencies' to 'teleology'. Tendencies are something that are created during the development of a process. Whereas teleology is the end that is found at the beginning of the process, even before the process begins. In my opinion, they are two very different things.

On the other hand, it is very different in the case of minds. To me, teleology seems like a mystery to be clarified. For me, it has to be related to subjective time, which is different from the extensive time of physics. But it is something I have not yet investigated.

I have no problem with the idea of constraint as long as we eliminate teleology. There is something with a certain regularity and stability, and suddenly something interrupts that. Genetic variability is blind, and mutations can be of any kind. But when you put it in the face of a cataclysm of that magnitude, things seem biased, and it seems as if we had cut off or interrupted some purpose. But from my point of view that is an illusion.

Constraints — T Clark

I believe that the idea of constraint is fundamentally incorrect, as it adds a dimension of possibility to reality that I consider unnecessary. We can speak of a certain regularity that existed (the continuous evolution of dinosaurs) and that was completely disrupted by an asteroid. Extinction is an effect of the asteroid striking the Earth. However, it is not the constraint of a possibility. For that possibility would make us think of a world where that possibility exists. I prefer to speak of a rupture in the regularity or stability that the dinosaur species possessed, without needing to introduce the concept of possibility into the constrains.

For Hume, imagination is the faculty of the mind that has the ability to associate or connect ideas with each other. Unlike memory (which only preserves the original order and position of impressions), imagination is free to combine ideas in infinite ways, producing both fictions (such as a unicorn) and the fundamental ideas of philosophy. In this sense, imagination plays an important role in legitimate beliefs. However, the fact that legitimacy is based on imagination makes its legitimacy even more problematic. Imagination provides the mechanism of association, but habit is the force that imprints the certainty of belief in those repeated associations. Without habit, imagination could only offer us fictions; with habit, it gives us the "legitimate beliefs" necessary for practical life.

Don't ask me why I said "certainty". Hume also discusses illegitimate beliefs. These consist purely of imagination and lead us to fictions because they are not based on habit. Among these illegitimate beliefs are the ideas of traditional metaphysics, such as causality as a necessary rational connection.

So, you can’t trust induction, so just act as if you can. After all, what else are you going to do? — T Clark

That is the pragmatic position. The world seems to be ordinary, and we act accordingly. But a philosopher pauses and asks about rational truth. Pausing seems like a suspension of everyday action and pragmatism, the things to be done. There is a relationship between the philosopher's contemplation (pausing) and not following inductive everyday life, if one can say such a thing. Can it be said that philosophy has classically rejected this more fragile aspect of empiricism? Heidegger spoke of an authentic and inauthentic mode of existence. I believe there is a relationship between philosophical thinking, rejecting everyday life and this authenticity, but it is not yet very clear to me.

If you believe as Hume does that constant conjunction has little or nothing to do with necessary connection, then belief in the necessary connection between two constantly conjoined things, is fancy, or practical for now, or whatever else you want to believe about it. It’s not actually true or actually legitimate. — Fire Ologist

It is surprising to me that we can survive with these kinds of beliefs that are imposed on us most of the time. Of course, this is assuming that truth is subsumed by reason. We are beings who live in constant ignorance of truth and reality. I would say that these beliefs work on a practical level, but I wonder how they can work at all. It seems that another belief underpins legitimacy: that the external world is regular. But we are back where we started, as this belief is also illegitimate.

Thank you for the references. I will take a look to see if I can find something that suits me.

I'm not sure what you mean in this context. Previously I suggested just describing the conditions rather than attributing causality. Is that the same thing you are talking about. — T Clark

It has nothing to do with that. In fact, what I am talking about hardly has anything to do with the issue of causality. It is simply to express the inadequacy of causality as it is classically understood (linear, regular, general, proportional, etc.) with respect to the irreducible novelty of becoming. In my view, you are looking for a theory that continues to subsume the case to the generality of a law and its universals. I am also looking for a better law or principle that accounts for the production of the singular, which is neither particular nor universal, neither general nor specific.

I have taken a look at it and I do not see the connection with what I have said. Probability imitates reality through similarity and subsumes it into the predictable. What I am talking about is very different from the predictable; it is something that cannot be predicted and consists of the production of the real as a unique, unrepeatable event. This is related to the nature of time, in which each moment is absolutely unique.

Something that interests me greatly is the singularity of the effect that cannot be reduced. Its irreducible novelty with respect to regularity (same causes, same effects) which similarity is its condition. The central question, for me, is how singularity occurs, rather than a theory of the regularities of nature (causality as regularity), which for me remains an abstraction from the real production of becoming as singularity. Classical theorie of causality cannot account for the singular (that which is neither particular nor universal but a difference and novelty).

For me, reducing philosophy to the "why" is a simplification. But there is something interesting implicit in what you have said. To say why the "why" is important is to say that in order to do justice to philosophy in terms of its goal and purpose, you must do more philosophy. For example, my idea of what philosophy is (the discovery of problems) is linked to the ontology I adhere to (the virtual, the problematic and the actual). This is why different philosophers, according to their own philosophy, have different ideas about what philosophy is and what it is for. There is no single answer to what philosophy is; it depends on the philosophy from which you position yourself. In other words, meta-philosophy is philosophical in itself.

For me, philosophy consists of discovering problems. A problem is discovered in the unthought-of relationships between objects, situations, beliefs, systems of thought, etc., about which concepts are invented. This can be done in a profound or superficial way. But the more profound the philosophy, the more problematic it is. Philosophers train themselves by reading other authors in order to discover problems that require an updating of the virtual. The problem of justice encompasses subjects, social relations, legislation, ethics, and morals, all of which establish virtual relationships with each other that the philosopher must shape and update into new concepts that make you think differently through new concepts.

Do all fall under the umbrella of thoughts? — Patterner

It is difficult to answer that question. We would have to define what a thought is. In my view, a thought is a relationship with an idea where the idea is actualised, but the idea is a diffuse problem, so the thought does not represent the idea. If we think of something as simple as a football, the thought extends to consider football as a sport, the players, how a ball is thrown, how it is kicked, a whole context that nevertheless remains virtual, waiting to be actualised as the thought progresses in its determinations. Thought is that mental phenomenon such as an image, a notion, a concept that is constantly being determined. But the important thing is that this is not a representation of something outside the mind. A football does not represent the kick or the throw; both are a virtual objective that happens to the ball and is determined as a concept in our thinking.

Now think about it the other way : I take a walk in the woods. Does that affect, say, the orbit of Jupiter? Let's think about one of the countless human actions. Since there are so many, shouldn't they alter the orbit of Jupiter?

I call causality a metaphysical principle. Is that what you mean by "epistemic construct?" — T Clark

No. I mean, is the discontinuity in the chain of causality something that we simply draw subjectively so that we do not have to go to infinity, or is it something objective in the world, that there is actually a type of discontinuity in the causality of the world that explains why we explain some things better with a specific causality and not with just any causality?

I think you're talking about the same thing I was when I discussed the idea of cause only being useful when we can separate the events in question from their surrounding environment. — T Clark

The question is: when we separate the events in question from their surrounding environment, is it simply an epistemic construct or is there really an objective kind of disconnect?

It is only because the ball encountered both friction and a gravitational field that it was caused to instead curve — apokrisis

I do not deny that this is related. But I wonder: how far should we extend our view in casual relationships? If it is true that the movement of the stars does not explain why the ball fell to the ground from the fifth floor, it follows that there is a kind of causal disconnection. In that sense, one might say: there is continuity and there is causal discontinuity. This reminds me of Plato's concept of symploke.

Is everything causally connected to everything else? If I throw a ball from the fifth floor, I know that the cause of the ball falling is because I threw it. And I don't have to look for the cause in, say, the movements of the stars. So it seems that not everything is causally connected to everything else. There are limits to causal influence.

But is it not so much more complex than this? Why is a marble a marble and a pebble a pebble? Or for that matter, a stone a stone, and a ball of dough a ball of dough. They're all similar, aren't they? — Outlander

A classic way is to play with the object by adding or removing properties until you find the essence of the object. Like a triangle: by removing or adding an angle, suddenly the object becomes something else, a square, and then you realise that a triangle is an object with only three angles. Then you have a general and universal concept or idea that subsumes the particulars. Another way is to make some colours "pass through a convergent lens, bringing them to a single point," in which case a "pure white light" is obtained that "makes the differences between the shades stand out." This second case, on the contrary, defines a differential Idea: the different colours are no longer objects under a concept, but constitute an order of mixture in coexistence and succession within the Idea; the relation between the Idea and a given colour is not one of subsumption, but one of actualisation and differentiation; and the state of difference between the concept and the object is internalised in the Idea itself, so that the concept itself has become the object. White light is still a universal, but it is a concrete universal, and not a genus or generality.

The world perceived by a mind has an external cause that may be of a different nature from the mind (classical dualism).

The mind-created world, as I understand the OP, has no external cause and is a monism where everything that exists has mental properties.

Any simple object. A marble. Right now you have the idea of a marble in your head. What is the nature of that idea? What is it, so to speak, made of? — Patterner

It is difficult to think about what an idea is made of. According to Platonic tradition, an idea is a sui generis and eternal element, but external to the subject who accesses it. But I do not know if it is legitimate to ask what it is made of. It is like asking what the smallest thing in physics is made of. They are sui generis things.

From my point of view, when we think of a marble, we do not think of an idea. We have a concept, a notion, or an image. But the idea is something external and virtual, constituted by external relationships and encounters. They are immaterial, and cannot be broken down as we break down an atom, for example.

Or is there a difference between thoughts and ideas? Are there thoughts that aren't ideas? — Patterner

If you are an objective idealist like Plato, ideas are something external to the subject, and thought simply access to these ideas.

From my point of view, ideas are the objective relationality that takes concrete form in thought. For example, the idea of justice involves human beings, relationships between them, coexistence between them, duties, power and legislation. These things are objectively related, and the subject perceives them as a problem that is decided in the concept. For example, distributive justice is the concretisation in the subject of these virtual relationships.

We would then need a machine capable of writing (not just reading) to your brain using your specific encoding. Now, when i look at an image, you would see and experience everything i see. — punos

That's not a good answer. It doesn't address the issue of decomposition or methodology. A good answer would be: We can actually see neural processes first-person, and not only that, but methodologically we have discovered how to create consciousness without needing to be conscious ourselves as a necessary evidence.

I don't know what you're asking here. Perhaps you can rephrase it? — punos

In our experience, we do not see the neural processes that would compose the glass of water. This points to an irreducible qualitative difference. Because if we try to break down the glass of water, we do not obtain those neural processes.

Experience is a stream of information — punos

"So we have to differentiate between information and experience (Mary's room then). Because you're not seeing the experience, but rather a reconstruction in a monitor, in a flat screen. A few pixels, but the experience isn't made up of pixels. It is a translation from something to something totally different."


The information is arranged on a substrate in which the experience cannot be broken down without losing what we call experience (when we see a glass of water, we do not see the neurons acting). It is like when we say that experience is nothing more than neural synapses. But methodologically, we have a one-way path: the association from experience to neural processes, but not a return path: from processes to experience.

In fact, this is confirmed in the video you brought: we FIRST have evidence of what experience is, and then we adjust the monitor so that the electrical signals resemble what we see in experience. But we can translate those signals into anything, not necessary into an image on a monitor. This raises a question: could we reconstruct experience in a physical way without first knowing what experience is (not seeing neurons, neither electrical signals, just a glass of water) and what it resembles? The answer is no.

All mental events are private. No one is aware of what other mental beings are having in their minds.
If AI can think, then we are not supposed to know about it. We can only guess if someone or being is thinking by their actions and words they are taking and speaking in proper manner for the situation or not. — Corvus

Exactly. But behaviours and words can be repeated by a robot without consciousness. In that sense, all we can know is that a robot acts AS IF it were conscious. But that knowledge is not enough to know that it has consciousness.

That's fine, but my original response was about finding an image in the brain, not about the experience of the image. — punos

To avoid misunderstandings, what do you think about the idea of finding the "living experience" in the brain? The fact that you can transfer neural information to a screen and construct an image says it all. When you see those images on the monitor that "reconstructs" them, you are not experiencing what is supposedly being reconstructed. In fact, the word reconstruction is misleading. I prefer to say objectifying what is subjective, but then something is lost, something that is no longer on the monitor. Basically, everything is lost; the experience itself is lost.

Now, when i look at an image, you would see and experience everything i see. Do you see? — punos

Not at all. Because each person will experience it differently, due to their uniqueness.

The brain does not store information, such as an image, in the same modality in which it was received. You are not going to find an actual image in the brain. What you will find, however, is information — punos

Ok. So we have to differentiate between information and experience (Mary's room then). Because you're not seeing the experience, but rather a reconstruction in a monitor, in a flat screen. A few pixels, but the experience isn't made up of pixels. It is a translation from something to something totally different.