So you have evidence of the existence of information that precedes interpretation (the relationship between sign systems)?

Show me any. You will see that there is always a process of translation, interpretation, transcription, etc. that generates it.

Footprints mean feet, dinosaur footprints mean dinosaur feet. The Earth holds memory of the past as much as any brain. the information is there just as this post is here, but it is first in the writing, and later across the world in the reading that it becomes conscious. Or rather, a post is firstly a product of consciousness, and secondly an object of consciousness, or a content of consciousness. And to the extent that something of this is understood by another, we are 'of one mind'. This is called communication. There is a sameness produced when you see what I mean or I see what you mean. And, "where is this sameness or when is it?" are misleading, foolish questions.

I thought I knew me yesterday, because all knowledge is memory, but whoever writes this post is conscious, and that is not knowable, because it is presence, not the past. — unenlightened

Actually, you just have evidence of someone else interpreting something. That is to say, whenever we talk about information an interpreter will be necessary and you will not find any case of information exempt from an interpretation process. For example, a book is nothing more than an agglomeration of shapes and ink. For there to be reading and something to be read, you need a transcriber (interpreter, reader) who already has a language or a system of signs that can be related to the book. And what we say about a book, can be said about DNA, a hard drive, a USB memory, ETC.


Outside the scope of interpretation (or transcription) they are nothing more than marks, more or less ordered physical arrangements, like DNA sequences. Can we say that the color of a person's eyes is in the DNA sequence? No. that is imagining the future contained in the present in some mysterious way. What happens is that there is a whole network of systems that are transcribed and come into contact, where the DNA sequences acquire a function that produces specific effects on other systems, such as those of proteins; thus "eye color" is not found in the DNA sequences, but is given as an external relationship at the time of transcription.


That is, information can be understood as epigenetics. The same thing is said in spoken language: They are just structured sounds uttered by someone A, but if there is no relation with the sign system of a B, there is no communication or transmission (although we already know that nothing is actually transmitted). Information emerges through transcription from the outside in, or rather, as something never inherent/internal to the sign systems placed in relationship and contact.

I'm stating the opposite. Most of the contents of consciousness cannot be described in physicalist terms. But it doesn't follow from this that inanimate objects possess consciousness (whether to a greater or lesser degree). It's a non-sequitur.

Well, the only evidence of information you have is not the footprint, but something that you represent to yourself and assign more or less a truth value to. That is, information is the content that you have in your head (so to speak) and which you could transmit to another person. It is a representation (if that makes it clearer to you). But representation and what is represented are different things. So what you say is that there is representation before someone represents. Which makes no sense and proceeds according to a causal reversal. This is what happens with meaning: It is so ideal and quasi-universalized, making us believe that it extends into the past retroactively.

Footprints mean feet, dinosaur footprints mean dinosaur feet. The Earth holds memory of the past as much as any brain. the information is there just as this post is here, but it is first in the writing, and later across the world in the reading that it becomes conscious. Or rather, a post is firstly a product of consciousness, and secondly an object of consciousness, or a content of consciousness. And to the extent that something of this is understood by another, we are 'of one mind'. This is called communication. There is a sameness produced when you see what I mean or I see what you mean. And, "where is this sameness or when is it?" are misleading, foolish questions.

I thought I knew me yesterday, because all knowledge is memory, but whoever writes this post is conscious, and that is not knowable, because it is presence, not the past. — unenlightened

Let's assume that you discover in a footprint on the beach that it was a person who made it. Now you have the information in your head, so to speak, of "a person made this footprint on the beach." How can something in your head be the cause of the footprint on the beach? It can't . For this reason, information cannot be confused with the cause of what we mistakenly say has information. In this case you cannot confuse the information "a person made this footprint on the beach" with the "objective" person who once made such a footprint. The information was born from your relation with the foot print, the relation of interpreter-interpreted.

To argue that consciousness exceeds all possible physical description is not to argue in favor of an extrapolation of consciousness over the rest of what exists. That is, what I am asking for is a type of inference or deduction according to which an inanimate being would have any kind of consciousness.

I'm a bit confused by this. I've often made the point that one can take an item of information - say a recipe, formula, or even an anecdote - and translate it between (1) different languages; (2) different media (e.g. magnetic media, pencil and paper, engraving on metal) and (3) different symbolic systems (i.e. language, binary code, morse code). But in each case if the information is received and interpreted correctly, the result will be a correct representation of the original information in a different form. — Wayfarer

I would say, following Deleuze a bit: If the same meaning endures through different incarnations it is because there is a common and potential (but not determined) upon which they gravitate. That is, if we take translation between different languages as an example, it can be said that the output language internalizes the input language and vice versa. There is a communication, but what is communicated (insofar as it is something that transcends all its incarnations) seems more like a potential that cannot be reduced to the identical. That is, when we say that one language internalizes another, we are saying that the identity of one language extends to corrupt the identity of another language. This means that meaning is an external relationship where each term of the relationship is idealized, or virtualized, losing its particular identity. In this sense it must be said that both languages communicate through potential otherness. But the point is that the meaning that appears does not precede the relationship that actualizes it.

The problem with information theories that seek to universalize the concept of information is that they confuse the causal origin of information with the iterability of information (that is, there is something, some meaning, that remains through signs or signifiers). . This is an erroneous causal inversion where what is produced and is an effect is taken as something that was before the process of "interpretation" or "decoding."


If someone comes across a set of marks in the most fortuitous way and intuits that these marks contain a message or information, they cannot validate that intuition a priori. And a posteriori the information that he has obtained has only emerged from translation processes. That is to say, the information that appears is not contained in the marks, but is born from the relationship between a system of signs (the language of the receiver) and another system of signs (the language of an issuer).


If the information is born from the a posteriori relationship, it must always be assumed a priori that there is a moment of uninformed reality (in the sense that there is no message hidden or stored somewhere). This would be a kind of refutation of information Platonism, according to which information is something fundamental and the essence of everything that exists.



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On the other hand, I don't quite understand the reasoning that leads to saying that an inanimate object, like a rock, can have consciousness or some degree of it. Unless you work with an ad-hoc and invented definition of what consciousness is. Consciousness, however, in the most general way, implies an immediate act of reflection in perception, intentionality and expressivity – thus self-consciousness is involved in every act of consciousness. How do you discover an act of reflection, intentionality and expressiveness in a rock? And someone will ask: Why intentionality, expressiveness and immediate reflection of perception? Well, we have no other evidence than what we ourselves verify in our self-consciousness. That is why an ad-hoc definition of consciousness contrary to the evidence cannot be adapted to fit, say, the physical processes that make up a rock. Therefore, what some people call "panpsychism" can only be a belief based on an ad-hoc definition of consciousness, but one that contradicts the only evidence we have for consciousness.

Regrettably in this case I have to agree with your opponent. That is the error of psychologism. Geometric shapes and numbers are not mind-dependent in that sense at all, even though they can only be perceived by the mind. As Bertrand Russell remarked of universals 'universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.' — Wayfarer

I would say that they are not even just imagined. That is, they have a historical appearance, through writing and through language. You find a triangle in a book or on a computer. In fact, I would say that they are more perfect in both cases than in the imagination. But the most important thing is that if someone says that the contents of geometry can be reduced to psychology, that person must carry out that reduction and show it (for example, just as we can reduce Newtonian physics to relativistic physics). That case has not occurred. And I think I have explained why any attempt is doomed to failure.

What I am saying is that there is no such difference, it is all psychological — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry but that is absolutely false. Even empirical evidence refutes it. For example, as children we do not imagine something like a "triangle" but rather we find it in books or in the virtuality of a screen. Only later can we imagine it with the help of memory and imagination. Remember it outside of a certain context. And even better is that we identify both things (what is brought from memory and what we find in a classroom) as the same.

Now, the reduction you are trying to make is done incorrectly. That is not a reduction, it is an association between elements. But there is no approach in which the terms, operations and relations of geometry are equivalent or can be replaced by other terms, other operations and other relations. That is why you can never start from psychological elements (assuming that something like that exists) to deduce the Pythagorean theorem, or the theory of relativity, which in this case would be the same thing.

Let me teach you something: When you say that something IS psychological and is reducible to the psychological, you are determining an identity, that is, you must necessarily determine it semantically as well, and go from that identity to a reduction that results in a replacement of terms, then of operations and then of relationships (since geometry is constituted, like any science, by these things). So assuming you have the terms of psychology you have to carry out a replacement, as long as you are talking about BEING X. If the reduction is understood as an identification then it is an eliminativism.

Now, you haven't been able to carry out this reduction and identification at the same time. That's why the only legitimate thing you can say is that there is an association between elements of psychology and elements of geometry. But we must remember that association is not equivalent to either identification or reduction
The principal point of my argument is that you should developed or presented a real reduction. But you didn't and just constantly repeat that something is psychological because geometry is something created by humans. That kind of statements need to be well explained and demonstrated. But that's not your case.

You are only providing more evidence that you are simply begging the question with your claim: " the field of geometry is closed with respect to that of psychology is only a necessary argument for the debate."

What you appear to be saying, is that this premise is not made "necessary" by any real evidence, it is just necessary for your argued position. However, as I explained, it is the only way that you can support your conclusion, by starting with a premise which leads necessarily to that conclusion. Begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all. That the field of geometry is closed to the field of psychology means that the geometric thing is not reduced to nor can it be identified with the geometric thing. Again, the relationships that are discovered, the semantics that are implicit, operations, terms, etc.

This very poor logic. There is no "absolute difference" implied, even though I cannot say that I understand what that would actually mean. As I explained already, two things of the same type can be called by the same name. Two different dogs are both called "dogs". Two different numerical systems can both be called "numerical systems". And, the two incommensurable numerical systems can exist within the same field, mathematics. Your claim that only one could be called a numerical system, and the other would have to be called something else, is nonsensical and clearly illogical, as being not supported by any premise which would produce that conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not all incommensurabilities act in the same way. Furthermore, we can take your example of the incommensurability between a leg and the hypotenuse. Well, when you say that both are incommensurable, you are saying that they are different natures, one is rational and the other must be irrational. Well, in the same sense it is said about geometry and psychology: they are things of different natures.

Well, if you do not agree that two different things can be said to be the same type, then I believe this discussion is pointless. And I really do not see how you conclude that this would make it impossible to speak of two different types. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ask yourself why in both cases you call them "dogs." If you want to stay in a rational discourse you have to say that they are the same in one sense, but also different in another.

In fact that is precisely what I said. Things can be said to be the same in one sense and different in another. Now, when you choose equivocation you restrict your right to call two things the same way. Whether we're talking about dogs or number systems. I'm just taking your statements to the absurd (as they are more categorical statements than arguments, in my opinion).

This is all psychology, as explained above. The supposed "elements", lines and angles, along with the internal relations, are completely imaginary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I think I've refuted those claims.

Let me quote you:

. I think that any instance of the conception of a triangle actually does reduce to a purely psychological act. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, here you are talking about reducing the concept of a triangle to a pure psychological act. And this is where my refutation comes in. The processes that lead to the discovery of an essential relationship in a right triangle cannot be determined as psychological operations, since the difference between the terms and operations of both fields is necessary. You would have to make this reduction and explain it. But I know you won't do it, because it can't be done. Any attempt at something like that would only establish association relationships between elements. But association does not mean identity, much less identity in operations and relationships.

It doesn't matter if you want to include the larger geometry context where you can define primitive notions such as line or point. My point has been developed on that reduction that you have pointed out from psychology. If you want to do meta-theory or meta-geometry from the field of logic, that's fine with me. Better for this point, since logic is precisely a field that also transcends the psychological act.

The field of geometry is closed in relation to the field of psychology. You are not reading, you are assuming things and creating straw men. Saying that the field of geometry is closed with respect to that of psychology is only a necessary argument for the debate. That is, certainly the field of geometry is closed to a psychological approval that attempts to found and determine it.
The incommensurability between both fields is especially present in the methodological order: Association is not equivalent to identity or equality. At any point in the reduction that you propose, but do not justify or explain, it will happen that you will fall into a question-begging where the object you want to reduce (the terms of geometry) will need to only establish associations with terms (those of psychology). ) semantically different.

OK, now the point is that there is incommensurability between the different types of numbering systems. And, this incommensurability exists within the same field. Therefore your conclusion that fields are closed to each other when there is incommensurability between them, is unsound. Furthermore, your argument that geometry and psychology are distinct fields is also unsound. And, we can conclude that your presumption that these two names are representative of two distinct fields is nothing but a prejudice which is presented a premise for a fallacious argument, due to the fallacy of assuming the conclusion, begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have said that they are incommensurable, but that incommensurability, as you treat it, if we follow your strange reasoning, since it evokes an absolute difference, you cannot speak of two numerical systems. You would have to talk about a numerical system and something else that can no longer be a numerical system. That is why you fall into a performative contradiction, because you are involuntarily assuming the same within what you try to express as different.

Did you not read where I explained the difference between "being the same thing", and "being of the same type". I'm really starting to think that you do not even bother to read half of what I post JZ. — Metaphysician Undercover

I read it and refuted it. Showing how your argument leads to the misunderstanding that would not allow us to talk about two types of anything. Well, I contrasted analogy with equivocation: that a thing be identical and different at the same time.

When I talk about "meaning" I am not referring to something that happens in language, or something from authors with intentions and purposes, or anything like that. I am talking about the sense of, for example, an internal relationship between the elements of an object called a triangle. They occur from the object itself and have a meaning that is contrary to our intentionality, in the sense that it affects us from the outside, so to speak. The meaning here is that of the thing itself, that which belongs to its being.

Otherwise the rest of your answer is based on introducing notions such as intentional acts (voluntary, with a purpose, with priorities and scales of value). But introducing these notions is wrong, in the sense that they are far from being able to describe the non-intentional and non-voluntary aspect that belongs to the thing that occurs as an internal relationship between elements of something like a triangle. Except for the notion of "order" which is referred to formalization of set theory then also transcends the psychological act. But I suspect that what you understand by order is rather referring to the human act of ordering things.

Hello everyone, my name is JuanZu.

I am a lover of philosophy, I have some academic studies in philosophy but incomplete.

My interests mainly cover metaphysics, ontology and epistemology.

You can say that I am materialist. But I have adopted materialism from the Platonic symploke. That is, a materialism that respects the irreducibility of what exists through categories. Materialism of "parts extra parts." I am not a materialist of the physicalist type. I have adopted a Materialism without substance, which can be presented through the types of structures that exist in the world. My interest is to discover how otherness and difference (materialism) occurs in the most intimate part of identity and being.

My main references:

Plato
Immanuel Kant
Edmund Husserl
Gustavo Bueno
G.W Hegel
Martin Heidegger
Quentin Meillassoux
Jacques Derrida

Yes, I am an apprentice of the continental tradition. And it is very interesting for me to compare perspectives with the Analytical and English-speaking tradition. I hope to live up to it and contribute good things to the forum.

Greetings.

Thank you. I'll give a try to present that self-intro.

So you're argument amounts to "I stipulate that these fields are different", and you think that this validates your perspective. That's called begging the question — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all. I start from the assumption that we are talking about the same field, in order to take that assumption to the limit where it can be demonstrated that they are actually two fields that are irreducible to each other.

You've presented exactly zero evidence, only some blabbering about relationships between fictitious imaginary elements. On the other hand I've presented the example of learning, the problem with infinite regress if concepts are only learned, Plato's proposal of "recollection", the problem with this, and Aristotle's resolution to that problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Among the evidence is the impossibility of carrying out a process with the same results based on certain terms and operations. The terms and operations of psychology and geometry are radically different. The terms and operations carried out in geometry reveal internal relationships that you cannot discover by exchanging these terms for others in psychology.

I explained why no field is a closed field. You don't seem to know how to read Juan. Or do you prefer just to ignore evidence which does not support what you believe? — Metaphysician Undercover

You didn't . The only thing you said is that geometry objects are not isolated objects. But that's assuming you can delimit the field of geometry from every other field, which is not the case, I assume you can't do that. On the other hand, I have exposed the incommensurability between one field (geometry) and another (psychology). Relative to the field of psychology the field of geometry is closed in the sense that none of its terms, operations and relationships can determine the nature of the field of geometry.

Yes, two very different instances of the same type of phenomenon. This implies a difference between the two specified things, and in no way implies that the two are the same thing. However, two different things may be of the same type, so your objection "that you cannot speak of the different as the same" is ridiculous. Two different things cannot be the same, yet they can and often are, said to be the same type. So, very commonly we speak of the different as the same, so long as we maintain the distinction between particular and universal, and recognize that "the same type" does not mean "the same individual". — Metaphysician Undercover

They are the same insofar as they are numbers, they are different insofar as they are different types of numbers. Have you ever read about being as equivocity, as univocity and as analogy? Well, it seems that you speak from equivocity (all things are different and none can be the same in any sense), but contradicting yourself by using the same numerical system sign. "Things are different in one sense, but in another sense They are the same". Thus, there is evidently no contradiction. Things can be the same as genres, bus distinct as species.

What I saw as contradiction was that you said a right triangle is "objective" because it "gives itself" and presents itself to us. This was the alternative to my claim that the right triangle was created by us. Later, you said "But of course the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective."

Therefore we need to conclude that whether or not the right triangle is objective, is irrelevant to whether or not it "gives", "presents itself" to us, or whether it has been created by us. And all this talk about objectivity is just a ruse. — Metaphysician Undercover

A geometric object is presented to us and given to us even though it is a human creation. But it is given to us as a set of internal relationships and meanings that transcends the acts of its creation. It is in this sense that it gives itself: Depending on its autonomy, a property of the object that emerges from relationships between the parts of that object that are discovered beyond our will. That is, when we talk about a property of triangles we are talking something about triangles, not something about imaginative acts. It is something that comes up from the thing, not from us. Thats why it presents itself.

We can say that it is something created and discovered for the reasons I have given (genesis and structure). A straight line could perhaps have been imagined once, or imagined by three different people at different times, or simply be an imaginary act repeated three times. That doesn't matter (and it's important that it doesn't matter), the important thing is when those lines entered into a relationship and crossed forming a triangle (three angles appeared). Something like a leg and a hypotenuse appeared and relationships emerged between these elements, regardless of how the lines were created.

The argument which amounts to an ignorance of the difference between 'being the same thing', and 'being of the same type'? — Metaphysician Undercover

Univocality, equivocality and analogy.

In this regard, Husserl spoke that in iterative moments there must be a sedimentation in which the meaning is recorded to be "revived" by intentionality in different moments and places. Aren't these sediments language, writing, archiving, for example? An ideal object, to be ideal, must be available for the subject. In a certain sense consigned, registered, etc. These sedimentations, such as language, writing, archiving, computing, etc., are not precisely " "empty" until a living intention animates them? And yet they are necessary conditions for meaning to appear in iteration: in an interlocutor, in another culture, in another time, etc.

I still don't know what you are trying to say JuanZu. My point was that one is prior to the other, as the cause of the other. Minds are prior to ideas as the cause of ideas. Since ideas and minds are subjects of the very same field, there is no attempt to reduce one field to another here, and your supposed "a fortiori" assertion is irrelevant. You seem to be wanting to claim that ideas are prior to minds, so please address the arguments I've made, instead of attempting to change the subject and using that very change of subject as the basis for your claim of a fortiori. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I precisely maintain that they are different fields, not only in terms of validation but in their terms, their relationships and operations. But you are assuming it is the same field (psychological acts) by simply repeating it, ignoring all the evidence I have presented to you and in no way refuting it.

Geometry is not a "closed field", there is no such thing as intelligible objects which exist in total isolation from others. So geometrical terms get defined by a wider field of mathematics, and concepts of spatial dimension. This issue is often addressed by philosophers, such as Wittgenstein in On Certainty, because it appears like it may produce an infinite regress of meaning, leaving no concepts truly justified as "ideal", in the sense of perfect, absolute certitude. — Metaphysician Undercover

you are saying that it is not a closed field but without giving any justification or argument. I, on the other hand, have given "evidence" that you have not even tried to refute: The internal relations between terms of the same type, their semantic difference with respect to the field that you believe is the same. For example, we have hypotenuse and legs, both are straight, both are two-dimensional, etc. I ask you to make an effort to argue more and spread fewer categorical statements.

A more modern, and also very clear example, can be found in numerical systems. Currently we use what is known as "Arabic Numerals". — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet you continue to refer to both cases as "numerals". You have not yet understood that you cannot speak of the different as the same. That is, if you speak of two cases (Greeks and Arabs) as species of the same phenomenon (numbers) , you are only arguing against yourself. I say again, you do not explain the same thing by what is different.

Why are you arguing against yourself now? You used "objectivity" as evidence that ideas are discovered, presented or given to us, rather than created by us. Now you claim "the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective", so you've just undermined your entire argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no contradiction. In fact, if I can alternate between creating and discovering it is because it is in a certain way undecidable. On the one hand it has human genesis; On the other hand, it has a structure in which terms establish and maintain autonomous relationships that are no longer reduced to human creativity (for example, the Pythagorean theorem).

What you see as a contradiction between creating and discovering is actually a difference between the pair of concepts called "genesis" and "structure." That is, the first geometer may have imagined a line, the first line in the world; However, this line was already the object of a length, and the object of union with other lines that formed a triangle. But then the lines autonomously maintain a relationship with each other, which, depending on the measurement or value of their length, is equivalent to this or that other value. The key here is autonomy and the internal relationship between a set of elements. This relationship between elements can no longer be thought of as a psychological act of the imagination. Why? Because these relationships are said of the elements and not of the imagination. That is why geometry is objective, created and discovered at the same time.

With respect to the identity of an object, each accidental of that object must be accounted for, or else two distinct objects, with different accidentals would have the same identity, and therefore be the very same object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here I repeat the argument that I have presented in relation to your example of numbers.

I do not reduce the psyche to synaptic processes, so I do not see how this reply is relevant at all. You have in no way addressed the points I made. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe you think it's not relevant because you're not understanding it very well. For example, if you don't talk about neuronal synapses, you can talk instead about cognitive processes, or psychological acts. So what I have said about neural processes a fortiori is said of any theory that attempts to reduce (reductionism) one field to another.

Furthermore, as I indicated, you have in no way justified your claim of objectivity in knowledge. And now you simply repeat your unjustified assertion that knowledge is "objective", and use this unsound premise to support your insistence that knowledge cannot be an artificial creation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did. As I have exposed an internal relationship between the elements of a closed field, in this case geometry. And not only that but also its ideality has been exposed (repetition in different cultures, different subjects, different psychological acts, etc. Or can u say that geometry theorems are different through different cultures? ). Then we have a field where an infinity, so to speak, of internal relations that is established from some constitutive elements. Just as we could compose the field of quantum physics from elementary particles.

Now, you will say "but geometry does not represent anything and is something created." Quantum physics is also something created, logic is too. But of course the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective (even if we follow ur argument no one can say that a computer or a sintetic chemical element is non-objective just because it's artificial) . Physics has its means of objective validation in technological operation and mathematic consistency (a field bigger of terms, relations, operations, etc) , while geometry has its validation in the internal relationships that are discovered through iterative operations) and demonstrated accurately in most cases.

Ur argument, if I understand correctly, is based on a sense of objectivity as representation wich grounds it. That is, as the correspondence between the theory and a referent wich is provided by the sensory system. But if we abandon that idea of ​​objectivity as representation we also abandon what you say about geometry as something non-objective. And let me tell you: We have to abandon your sense of objectivity as a representation or as a necessary link between theory and an empirical reference that must correspond to. In the case of geometry it can be said that it is its own reference, and to the extent that we discover its internal relationships we discover things, regardless of the fact that it has no other origin than Humanity.

U can call this "objetive constructivism".

The point is that this idea, that "it is the same meaning and is repeated in different minds" is simply false. Each mind relates to the same words in ways exclusive, and unique to that mind. We might say that it is "essentially the same", but we cannot ignore the accidentals which actually make it not the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not false. You are pointing out particular accidents to say that we are not referring to the same thing. But obviously in the act of communication an identity and repetition must take place so that there is a minimum of understanding, this is the meaning. If you say to a Greek and an Egyptian to give you 5 units of that fruit and not 4, they will probably both give you the 5 units; Well, this fact is not a simple coincidence and must be explained. But obviously we cannot explain the same from what is different. We cannot explain, for example, why the Egyptian and the Greek acted in the same way based on the sound differences that each one heard, on their culture wich they belong, on their language, etc.

Regarding how our perceptions provided by the senses occur, I am very close to Kant. There is no pure and passive receptivity. For Kant, such a thing would be undifferentiated chaos. For example, taking the case of the snake mentioned above: One does not simply have a glance, but there is recognition of the thing lasting, having a duration and a location in space, which will allow us to carry out the action. (let's say an act of evasion).

Let's take the case according to the assumption that our perceptual apparatus is a kind of film camera: The snake is not shown simply as a frame but as a series of frames. How can we say that it is the same snake that appears through different frames? In this case there is a sitensis, a non-passive activity of consciousness and sensitivity, although this is not voluntary. The activity is the work of a "something in general" that enables something like a recognition of the snake through duration and through upcoming events. That is, there is an act of transcendence applied to sensitivity, in the sense of inscribing something in the conscious system in order to be repeated under similar conditions [thus The memory functions as a trace register. And the trace is abstract enough as a written sign] This is where something like "the snake" appears, which is repeated for all the others, the concept, one can say.

I have always found especially interesting that step to the limit that characterizes Husserl in the discovery of essences. Said step to the limit consists of showing how when crossing it the thing stops being what it is to be something else. For example, Husserl tells us about how, taking the limit of predicates, we cannot conceive a color without extension. Something like this would happen with geometric essences. Isn't the limit something that is imposed on us from the things themselves? (I.E. imagine a perfect triangle-square) We cannot impose that limit on ourselves at will, it is shown as something foreign to our will.

This is what i disagree with. I think that any instance of the conception of a triangle actually does reduce to a purely psychological act. If you assume that it "presents itself" to us, you need to ask how it does this. Then you see that it is a matter of learning, the concept must be learned, and learning is a psychological act. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, you can't. Since we are talking about an internal relationship that is deduced from elements of an object that differs in its identity from the mind. That is, in order to reduce it to a psychological act you would have to express the internal relationship in terms of a relationship of psychic elements. For example, if we assume that the psyche is nothing more than synaptic processes between neurons, your claim would have to be represented in the form: "this synapse is the relationship of equality between two elements, and it is also an incommensurability." Which is obviously doomed to failure.

It is for this reason that you cannot reduce knowledge to a creation of human genius, even if it has no other origin than humanity. Because knowledge is something like the relationship with something objective. In no case can it justify the objectivity of knowledge based on the particular psychological movements of, in this case, Pythagoras. You may say, “but logic is the condition of objectivity” Well, what you say about geometry (its reduction to psychological acts) you say a fortiori about logic.

What I say about geometry I say a fortiori about knowledge and knowledge as language. For example, you and I possess the meaning of a right triangle (or the identity principle of logic); If the meaning is nothing more than psychological acts... how can you say that it is the same meaning in each case if they are two different psychic phenomena? The particularity of each case denies its universal formulation, and is not able to justify why it is the same meaning and is repeated in different minds, different languages, different cultures, etc.

In a nutshell: because correlation doesn’t explain consciousness — Art48

Also: Because Physicalism can't stop trying to engorge everything.

That would be a part of the whole as it is physica — Lionino

If one system belongs to another it does not imply equality between the identities of each system. For example, a living system may seek survival and reproduction; But, although the living system belongs to the solar system, we cannot say that the solar system seeks to reproduce and survive.

What relationships? — Lionino

Like synapse between neurons.

We are not only parts, we are relationships between parts. The parts that make up us are not simply aggregated, but also have functions around a directing teleology.

Probably what we call soul (or that "I" that endures through all my representations) is nothing more than a relationship that endures through constituent parts that possess functions.

Expressible... It is expressible. But in an anexact and generalized way. It is not a value that confuses or leads to ambiguity [If I want to determinate the value of the hypotenuse given the value of two legs, I obtain an specific value and not a random one every time ]. It is not just any value and can be located on the real line. In Cartesian terms it is "clear and distinct." This X, however, is objective, since it is properly deduced from the relationship between two parts of a right triangle.

In my opinion the term "Real" has no place in the discussion because a thing like that, a thing like a triangle simply "gives itself" and presents itself to us as an object of study, without being able to be reduced to a psychological act. To say that there is an incommensurability in its being does not add to or take away anything from the fact that it is presented and given to our knowledge and has effects on it. That is why it is objective, since an internal relationship can be established, whether one of incommensurability, which tells us what a triangle like this – is.

Now I understand. In that case the equality would be rather an approximation between the value of the sum of the square of the legs and the value of the hypotenuse that connects them. As an asymptotic approximation, if it is valid to say so. This value of the square root of the sum of the squares of the legs would be closer –closer than anything– to X, with X being an irrational number.

On the other hand, you call a real object one that is logically consistent. I, however, regarding the case, would speak of a qualitative incompatibility in the objective nature of the right triangle as an object. Adding the term "Real" or "not real" would not make much sense once we consider it this way.

If we accept the definition that every knowledge is justified belief, then scepticism is a methodology to obtain the justifications. If one rejects scepticism, then one is rejecting the methodology for justification allowing possibility for mistaking groundless beliefs, superstitions and dogmas for knowledge. — Corvus

Well, what I say about the skeptical subject is said fortiori for what he thinks is his act of doubting. That is, I claim that skeptical doubt is already rooted in a decision or an assumption I.E. the clear distinction of the subject and the world. And in that case it would not be a coincidence that methodological skepticism finds its formulation from an "undoubted" subject (Descartes).

The problem is that there is no such equality between the parts, hence the irrational ratio between the two legs. This irrational ratio is known as the square root of two. If the proposition states that the two legs are equal then the straight distance between the two defined points, known as the hypotenuse, is an indefinite distance, unmeasurable. It is said to be irrational. This indicates that in actuality there is an incommensurability between the two legs which are assumed to be equal, such that they cannot actually be equal. The proposition that they are equal, forces the logical conclusion that the hypotenuse is indefinite, irrational, therefore the proposition that they could be equal must be rejected as illogical. — Metaphysician Undercover

But isn't that just for the case where the length of each leg is 1?

On the other hand, I would like to know what you mean by "Real Object."

Isnt it precisely the intention to objectivity that lends itself
to skepticism? Since Descartes the modern formulation of the subject-object relation depends on a gap that courts doubt. — Joshs

That would be the case if we talked about truth as correspondence. But for me, correspondence and adequatio are forms of thought by which it becomes frustrated, leading it to skepticism. And yet I claim a meaning of "objectivity" that is discovered by the impossibility of closure of the subject in the monad. This impossibility is what grounds the theoretical activity of the subject and forces him to be oriented to an other (which is also the world), including himself as another in the case of self-knowledge.

The skepticism that questions the "external" world (as if we were not already world) would be, in a certain sense, the closure feigned by the subject in the absolutely immanent monad. A subject who believes he can distinguish himself absolutely from something else that he calls the "external world."

But there are many other kinds of matters where perspective might be relevant. Consider complex historical questions for example. There might be levels of complexity which a particular individual is familiar with and which result in their ability to arrive at a superior analysis of the subject — Wayfarer

But doesn't the historian present himself in a clearly theoretical attitude? I mean, the historian tries to affirm something about some historical moment. Is it not a fortiori an intention of truthfulness? The historian carries out a judgment, which jumps squarely into the field of transcendental validation with a claim of superiority over other views and perspectives. He aspires to universality and the neutralization of his perspective as opinion (doxa) and finally establish an impersonal statement about a state of things.

Does the act of measurement create the state of the particle, or does it reveal a pre-existing but unknown state? I had the idea it was the latter.
15h — Wayfarer

The term "create" seems to me to lead to confusion towards the thought of a creatio ex nihilo. I prefer to say "catalyze", "induce" or "provoke".

You seem to have a restricted concept of a “real object.” It is also not clear to me how you deny that the Pythagorean theorem tells us anything about right triangles. "Something about X" means that we are pointing out a property of X. In this case, an equality between the parts that constitute the object called "Right Triangle".

Hello, I come from the topic that talks about quantum physics and consciousness. I find what is said in the OP very interesting. My position is the following:

I would say that an impossibility of perception is not an impossibility of the perceived object. Think, for example, of a triangle. Think about the Pythagorean theorem which tells us something about a type of triangles. Now let's think about two people who have knowledge about that theorem and both people accept its universal truth. If the perspective adds something extra, this something extra cannot be the same for the two different perceptions and perspectives that each person has. And here comes the question: what does perspective add in each case? Does it add anything that would affect the theorem in its objective sense, to be different in each case?

Well, in both cases it doesn't add anything that we can say is a property of this type of triangle. With this example we can deduce that the objective properties of things, the being of things, is not reducible to subjective experience, whether understood as perspective. A judgment, therefore, if it hopes to be true, must exceed the order of perception and perspective.

That is exactly what I have referred to: the moment in which the scientist and his measuring devices intervene and affect the coherent system. Such a thing supposes an ontological continuity between the scientist, the measuring devices and the system in a state of "coherence". It would not be legitimate to say that perception or having a "mental representation" alters the system. No, the scientist needs measuring devices (physical devices) to be able to "observe" the system. The effects produced by the measurement are caused by a physical cause and not a mental one.

Something that skepticism has always been criticized for is its inability to account for its intention of universality, truth and objectivity in its own statements. Parallel to this impossibility, Kant made his criticism of empiricism, opening the space for an experience of the true that is not reduced to weak connections such as associations, comparisons of impressions and different problems related to inductivism:

_____________________________

"Empirical judgments, in so far as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; they, however, in so far as they are only subjectively valid, I call mere judgments of perception. … All of our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception: they are valid merely for us, i.e., for our subject, and only afterwards do we give them a new relation, namely to an object, and we intend that [the judgment] is supposed to be also valid for us at all times and precisely so for everyone else; for, if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments about the same object must also agree among one another, and thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else but its necessary universal validity."

Kant, Prolegomena (4, 298; 51).

_____________________________

Is there not in all philosophy and science an intention of truth, of objectivity, of universality of discourse? Therefore, isn't the skeptic's doubt a gesture in a certain sense that is anti-philosophical and anti-scientific? Doesn't it necessarily fall into the liar's paradox? Doubting the world would be like cutting the branch on which I am sitting, waiting for the tree to fall and not the branch.

You say:

we are physically intervening...
— JuanZu

But Greene's quote seems to question that, doesn't it? — Wayfarer

If I do not misunderstand what he is referring to, it is that a quantum system has its properties of uncertainty even without the intervention of the scientist's measurement. And what I have referred to is that the loss of that property of uncertainty occurs when the scientist measures with his physical devices.

Both positions are not contradictory. In fact they complement each other. Since I have not said that the quantum properties of a coherent system are an effect of measurement. Instead, I have said that the loss of these properties is an effect of the measure.

When we measure [for our case in the process of wave function collapse] we are not “Becoming aware” of a phenomenon, but rather we are physically intervening in the state of quantum coherence, which causes the collapse of the wave function
— JuanZu

Not according to Brian Greene.

The explanation of uncertainty as arising through the unavoidable disturbance caused by the measurement process has provided physicists with a useful intuitive guide… . However, it can also be misleading. It may give the impression that uncertainty arises only when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement.
— Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos — Wayfarer

Sorry if I misinterpret, but where would he disagree with me?

Since the appearance of subjectivity described as interiority separated from the world, we have called the external world as that which is not subjective, that is not a perception and that it is in its being to exist independently of perception, as an exteriority. I have deduced an external something, which also implies non-perception in its being, and also its being independent of perception, and also its exteriority, taking as a resource the question about objective truths..

Objective truths do in fact depend on an external world, a world that I have defined as a non-perceptual exteriority beyond subjectivity that also encompasses subjectivity. And this includes truths about subjectivity. A statement like "It is true that only my subjectivity exists" is a contradictio in adjecto. And we deduce this from the conditions so that a statement, whatever it may be, can be true. And these conditions imply that a truth to be in effect a truth must exceed the subjective order, just as the truth exceeds the order of opinion [doxa], to take an example.

Your claim here suggests that you think that a statement can only be true if it "corresponds" to something that exists, and so that if a true statement is about something non-physical then it must correspond to some non-physical thing that exists. — Michael

No. I claim that the essence of objective truths cannot be reduced to either perception or subjectivity. If there are truths it is of condition of this excess with respect to subjectivity. A truth can be about something physical, about mathematical, linguistic, sociological, economic objects, etc. But for it to be true it must exceed the order of perception and subjectivity. Even if it is a truth about subjectivity itself I.E “I perceive, therefore I am.”