I am not sure whether what I am about to write is on-topic but here goes.

Imagine that you are reduced down to being a "brain in a vat" but you also have eyes. Now imagine that you are floating in a universe that is devoid of all matter and all energy. Your only "experience" is that of complete and total darkness.

To me, this is a conceivable state of affairs and suggests that numbers are not independent of the real world - as a brain-in-a-vat, where would you "get" any concept of numbers? You have no fingers to count, nothing to touch or see that discloses "multiplicity": 2-ness, 3-ness. 4-ness and so on. By contrast, in the real world we actually live in, I suggest we get the concept of, for example, 3-ness, by seeing 3 apples, counting 3 fingers and so forth.

In summary, I suggest there are conceivable universes in which there is no reason to believe numbers exist as "things" in any sense at all, no matter how abstract - we need a real world that demonstrates 2-ness, 3-ness, 4-ness, etc. to stimulate us to create the concept of numbers.

Then you agree with the OP. A first cause is an 'uncaused cause'. Or something unexplained that is justified by its own existence, that then can enter into causality chains with others. — Philosophim

Not sure I follow. In the material you quoted, all I am doing is claiming that 2 different statements, each of which I believe is well-formed and meaningful. are equivalent (different ways of expressing the same thing), nothing more.

It appears that at least one poster has argued that when Jesus instructs his followers to buy swords (in Luke 22), He is endorsing the use of force in self-defence. I believe that Jesus was not talking about self-defence in Luke 22. He tells us why the instruction for the swords was given - to fulfill a prophecy that Jesus be seen as a transgressor. And having armed followers certainly would cause people to think Jesus was a transgressor.

Here is my attempt to summarize an argument made by Hume in "A Treatise of Human Nature" as elaborated on at places by me (I am a layman). I confess it may not directly engage the content of the OP, but it seems to me to be relevant insofar as it challenges the necessity of a "first cause". In case anyone is interested, I am not suggesting that I personally deny the necessity for a first cause - I just provide this for the sake of the argument. Here it is:

I challenge the idea that whatever begins to exist must have a cause for its existence.

To begin, the claim that everything that comes into existence has a cause is equivalent to the claim that it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a cause. If the second of these claims cannot be sustained, the former cannot either.

The key point is this: we can conceive of an object being non-existent at one moment and existent the next – we do not need to even introduce the notion of “cause” into this thought experiment. I can imagine the absence of an apple on the table at one instant and its presence on the table at the following instant. What underlies this intuition? It is the fact that there is nothing contradictory or absurd about the idea of an apple popping into existence without cause. Sure, our empirical sense tugs at us to insert a cause since most “comings into existence” have clear causes. However, it seems to me that this temptation can be resisted – an apple not existing at t1 and then existing at t2 is a conceivable possibility.

Since we cannot refute this possibility on the basis of the nature of the concepts of existence and cause (as distinguished from the empirical fact that these things always seem to go together), we therefore cannot make the case that it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a cause – after all, anything is possible unless it is logically impossible. And coming into existence without cause appears to be logically possible given the appeal of the thought experiment. It is then simple (see 2nd para) to conclude the hypotheses: that it is not the case that whatever begins to exist must have a cause for its existence.

Objection 1:an object that comes into existence must have a cause since, if there were no cause, the object must have “caused itself”. That, in turn, implies that the object would have to exist before it came into existence, which is impossible. Therefore, everything comes into existence must have a cause. The problem with this objection is that it entails assuming that some cause is necessary (and, in this case, that the cause is the object itself). But the claim is that no cause is needed.

Objection 2: Whatever comes into existence without a cause must be caused by nothing. The problem with this objection is the same as with objection 1 - it also entails assuming that some cause is necessary.

Although I have not read all the posts here with great care, it seems that some posters, at least, would find the idea of an eternal existence to be tiring and dreary at best, insufferable at worst. For my part, I can imagine being perfectly happy to "carry on" forever. However, I say this with a great deal of trepidation as I can imagine there would be some aspects of an eternal existence that are either not even imaginable or that I have not though carefully enough about.

Let's talk about ways we could imagine an eternal existence to be intolerable. My life, like all lives, is not entirely a bowl of cherries (however, on the whole, I am confident I have been more fortunate than most, but who knows?). I live in a very cold climate - what would it be like to face an eternity of Januarys? When I was in my 20s, I embraced the cold; in my 60s, I find it very unpleasant, and increasingly so. Perhaps after several thousand Januarys you would need to talk me off a ledge. On a more serious note, I, like almost everyone, have experience the loss of something dear to me (relationships, a job I loved). Could I tolerate an eternity of experiencing such loss even if such events were infrequent?

Likewise, would I tire of the good things in life? Perhaps the pleasure in eating an ice cream would be greatly impoverished were I to face an infinite number of cones to lick in the future.

In short, would I tire of existence? My guess is that I would not, but that is almost certainly because I expect that, were I to live forever, I would become increasingly resilient to the challenges of life and would therefore not be overwhelmed by them.

I'm not sure I agree. But want to extend the discussion to you. If you think living things are "conscious" or aware or have a "me" from which they reference the world, does this apply to all living things? Or where is the cutoff point? And why? — Benj96

I believe there are 2 conceptually distinct matters here.

First, there is the question of subjective experience - whether a being has sense experiences like taste, vision, etc.: that is, "what it is like" phenomena. For example, if one lies on the grass and gazes up at a cloudless sky, one experiences "what it is like" to see light in the blue range of wavelengths. And that "what it is like-ness" is different when you look at something that produces light of red wavelengths.

Second, there is the matter of a "me" from which, as you say, is the point of reference for evaluations of the world.

I think one can easily imagine an entity (whether an animal or some automated system) that has a "me", but does not have subjective experiences. My point is that you are talking, it seems to me, about 2 different things.

Assuming you accept my analysis, which of these 2 issues is of interest to you?