Husserl would ask you not to use the term "organic aware-ing" simply because something being organic refers us to the naturalism that one has to suspend in the reduction. — Constance
Understood. My observation is that, while thinking that the phenomenological reduction ought, also, to bracket Nature, H did not take the phenomenological reduction far enough. It is all "modes" of Mind, including the ego, and all "modes" of the ego, including a so called transcendental ego, which ought to be bracketed so that the practitioner arrives finally at the aware-ing body, not as yet another "mode" of human being for the ego to contemplate or experience, but at being: just being.
Whether or not that aforementioned interpretation of H is even possible to execute is an open question. But I do think, notwithstanding H's language, that such being is what he was truly after. Like everyone from Plato to Descaryes, to Heidegger, he stopped just short of transcending Mind, because of attachment to ego.
the "qualitative movement" of Kierkegaard's away from naturalistic thinking. — Constance
Isn't SK's infinite resignation, ultimately acceptance that ego and its attachments are not the ulrimate; that ego has no means of grasping the ultimate; and, his leap and teleological suspensions, like N, H, H and S to follow, prescribed methods to "transcend" that ultimately incapable ego, for [a more authentic way of] being [one with God (for SK) or Truth (TE for H1, Dasein for H2, Good faith for S)? Yes, I am over generalizing their processes and methods. But even if unwittingly, they are all recognizing human perception is mediated, desire constructed; we need a means to return to unmediated sensation and organic drives?
But we are not
to think of Dasein as a conscious subject — Constance
. Right. Because a conscious subject is still Mind and its mistaken being, the ego. But real being is not. Yet, H2 goes on to describe some complex construction more burdened by ego and its constructions than what preceded him. This I submi
4Heidegger,
however, warns explicitly against thinking ofDasein as a Husserlian
meaning-giving transcendental subjec — Constance
And so H2 recognized the "problem" H1 encounters when he imbues the ego with a residual reality after shaving off most of its Fiction by way of the brilliant Transcendental Phenomenology. H2 acts as if he hasn't done the same. But as long as Dasein has "qualities" we can "know" it is "away from" Truth and Reality.
We ARE this institutional interface in the world, and General Motors and ham and eggs for breakfast is part of the conditions of our "being there" and thus IN a constitutive analysis of our existence. I think of Hirsch's concept of cultural literacy, which conservatives love so much as it curtails cultural acceptance down to a finite body of identity features that belong to us-as-a-culture or a race, is what Heidegger had in mind when he described human dasein, and Haugeland was right about this — Constance
I should be reiterating this incessantly, but especially now. I did read Being and Time, once, slowly. A wealth of tools it added to my mind's locus in History. But I am so far from being able to understand him, that I should just re-read and reserve comment.
However, Heidegger's seems an excellent "ology" of how [the constructions and projections of] Mind and its autonomous processes function. And that both on the local level of individual minds (psychology) and universal mind, history or culture (sociology). Yes, he is more ontological in approach but he's right, a primordial ontology cannot be made, because, being pri.ordial, it pre-exists both maker and making. So his is a restructuring for the purposes of projection into the world, of the deepest structures of Signifiers and their dynamics and there function. But they are still signifiers about signifiers. Good as it is.
take Husserl's reduction more seriously, I say, down to the wire where language ceases to be in control at all in the job of encompassing what lies before one as a perceiving agency. — Constance
Where language ceases, and yet he clings to a very feature of language, the Subject, then purports it to be outside of language. I say he really means the aware-ing our body has of its sensations, drives, bonding, and movements, and tge feelings associated with each unbound by language. That being is necessarily no ego, no lingering objects, no relationship thereto qua objects; transcendental or otherwise.
I am grateful that you already forgive my misuse of terms which is beyond the understandably (pedantic?) orthodox approach, and even places you at potential ridicule for being open. So I apologize for persistently responding not with total agreement but rather agreement with modifications. Believe me, I am being highly moved by your input. I hope that provides some gratification for your honorable efforts.
Please feel free to move on, although I welcome your further input.