I don't think it possible to go back to business, — Constance
I must have confused you. "Business" is what we can't leave. Assuming the hypothetical staring at the abyss of being is even possible (if anything, it's a micro-glimpse, not a stare; an aware-ing, not a vision), it's not so much a returning, as a being smothered (once again).
something there originally that made their thinking compelling. — Constance
Not just originally, continously. We "pursue" being because we
are being.
It's just that we "pursue" being; thereby, ignore that we are.
thin line between existential enlightenment and schizoid personality, — Constance
Though the latter may suffer from the misfortune of thinking they are two things. Both are "pathological," if by existential enlightenment, you are referring to the "pursuit" of being,
thinking you will access being by such pursuit. It's the same for you and I, if either one of us denied the inherent contradiction/futility in a dialogue which intermittently (to wit: now) pointed out it's own futility.
While schizoid, as you say, or any other pathology recognized as such yields no functional benefits, not so for philosophy, though the latter seems futile. Philosophy, just as it is wilfully blind to the futility of its pursuits, is wilfully blind to its own actual role: to make sense/navigate the meaning making system. To order the Narratives in functional ways.
Philosophy gets us even to the essence of religion, that pursuit of and glimpse into the real truth outside of our Fictions.
One direction the OP takes us is toward the self, the ontology of the self. This is value-in-being. — Constance
I think that to be both a valid and worthwhile discussion, but through my lenses that takes place as two discussions. Ontology of the real self would exclude the ego/subject and therefore necessarily all signifiers, including but not limited to all words/thoughts/ideas. So called ontology of the so called Subject self, I, would yield much intriguing discussion, but I would recognize that we are analyzing the laws and mechanics of Mind.
I have argued that the notion of "no self" is not taken up very analytically in the East. — Constance
With all due humility and modesty, we are applying western analysis to the concept of no-self; not to the level of technical precision you might prefer, but still; despite phenomenology, mahayana is permeat.
Heidegger called gelassenheit, his meditative thinking that does not dogmatically seize hold of the world but yields to its possibilities of disclosure. — Constance
Hah, like an uncarved block, actionless action. That Heidegger! I have to imagine he knew more than he let on to, delivered it to his world in the most progressed language of the day. But that sounds like wisdom beyond logic.
It is our own finitude that is somehow lost, but lost IN that very finitude — Constance
Oh yah. That's perfect!
Ironically, I may be diverging from your position (I hope not) but the first finitude is what we exactly are, and always are, a finite, organic, mortal animal. We create out of that finitude, out of its imagination, a filter which without escape modifies how we perceive the first and real finitude.
It is only by disclosing transcendental intersubjectivity (even if only in its protomodal form) that constitutive regressive questions, which in every instance
proceed from the construct of acceptedness which is "the phenomenon of the world," achieve the rank that makes possible adequate understanding of the intersubjective world as the correlate of a transcendentally communicating constitution — Constance
I don't want to jump to conclusions (need to read Husserl now, and him, within context, understand especially their use of "intersubjectivity") but this seems very compelling (Mind/History).
Fink is no mystic. He is a very rigorous intellectual, but his thoughts attempt to find where in the already given world transcendental impositions have their ground — Constance
Ok, right. Reduction, as in, can I put it this way, "trace signifiers down to the root in "nature" for the first signifier"?
All of the "metaphysics" in the ancient Eastern texts are reducible to phenomenology, whether it is in Pali or Sanskrit. How can I say this so emphatically? — Constance
No disagreement here! I totally agree. Just as, and I say this in support of your point, not as a "tit for tat"
one has to read Derrida: — Constance
I totally agree again. I'm no Derrida scholar, but having actually enjoyed reading Grammatology (enjoyed as cf to Hegel or Lacan) same has built Foundations in my mind.
Consider that I am the scientist that is asking the simple question about a relation between two objects, a brain and a fence post. One has to isolate the condition and study it as it appears, and nothing else. — Constance
Ok. Got it. So hypothetically, though we don't know what other animals see, can the question be asked of other beings? Obviously my dog will see the ball in the air that he lead to catch. Same question applies dog brain here ball mid air, how is it the two meet?
Isn't that a question biology/physics can answer? Leaving the real question how is it object becomes "fence post" in a human mind after science explains the optic system.
Within my current thinking, there is no question the object in the distance exists outside of my Mind and is a real thing in a real world. Any confusion over that, I submit, betrays the absurdity that logic/reasoning, though functional, can sometimes create. It is
The answer to this question is that everything we experience is interpretatively received. The "good" as Wittgenstein called it does not wear its interpretation on its sleeve in the entanglements of familiar affairs.
Such is the problem of the "simplicity" of analysis-free living. — Constance
Worthwhile points. Ignorance is not bliss. Knowing that you cannot know does not mean stop pursuing knowledge.
I'm triggered by the urgency in your tone to read and think about these things, especially my current hypothetical place, in more of a Phenomenological context. See where it leads