What it means for me to choose is precisely for the part of the causal chain that is "me" to causally go through a decision making process, and then interact with other things that are also part of the causal chain to enact (or try to enact) the output of my decision making process. — flannel jesus

You come to a fork in the road and the cart is rolling forward and you may either go left or right.

Left or right is going to happen. So when you go left and the fork is behind you, what caused this left?

To me, in a deterministic world, there was no choice made here. What caused left can be found by adding up all of the things in the causal chain.

If one of those things in the causal chain is “your choice”, then you’ve added in an individuated “you” who made that choice. If this you is only comprised of causes before this you (like everything else must be comprised) and if this you functions only accordingly to necessity (as everything else functions), then there could never have been a you that could have possibly made any other choice but to go left. So there was no choice, and choice is an illusion having nothing to do with where you went at the time you hit the fork in the road. You didn’t choose left, you played out the deterministic forces that pushed things left.

If you think you live in a wholly deterministic world, then the notion of a choice, and a free agent who claims “my” choice, are unicorns, not actual efects, not actual causes, not part of any chain, just words.

I'm not adding to it, i'm part of it — flannel jesus

That’s a contradiction. You say you are a part of the causal chain. All of the parts add up to the chain. So what do “you” add to the chain of determined causes and effects? All of the other parts add up to the state of affairs. You say you are part of the causal chain - what part is “you” specifically. What is individuated as “you” in the causal chain?

I’m saying, once you admit there is a “you” - a thinking, deliberating, believing thing - you have individuated a thing that can be free to choose, not a thing that can only serve as a pass through for causes from outside it to effects following it.

If we were things like robots, we’d be part of the causal chain. “Self” awareness breaks the chain, can make a rational decision as “my choice” and by acting on that choice rejoin the causal chain.

Add to that the question of how these webs of physical interactions ever got the idea that they are not completely subject to physical interactions. — Patterner

Wondering if I am free requires freedom to happen. A machine that honestly wonders whether it is free or not has freed itself from the machine. Otherwise, it wouldn’t have found space to outside of the causal chain to wonder about anything.

We're part of the causal chain — flannel jesus

What do “you” add to the causal chain, if “your choice” is determined? What happens when the chain bumps into “you” if the effect of “you” is determined?

If “my choice” is caused by something that is not my choice, it is not “my choice”.

The answer to me is that the act of choosing is the same act of creating the self that chooses. I exist while I am choosing. I individuate myself in the moment of choice. If all is determined, the “I” is not individuated, and “my” “choice” are illusions at best but not existing and not part of the causal chain.

Self detemination is self creation.

I prefer to have my beliefs caused by rational thought and evidence, not beliefs without causes. — flannel jesus

The issue is are they “my” beliefs. Not whether they are based on reason. What causes “you” to claim your beliefs are “yours”. Regardless of whether they have been built of rational thought and evidence. How are they “your” beliefs if they are wholly determined by a causal chain?

Of course I use reason and evidence to base my beliefs. But one they are my beliefs and I act on them, I am the cause of those effects, I am the determinant. Not the causal chain without me.

Do you really have a solid reason to believe this? — flannel jesus

No. It’s like proving matter exists. Seems plain to me that there is a “me” as a distinct body and my awareness of this (my mind) is distinct within that body, but I can’t prove it.

That fact that I can believe I am free means to me that I have to be free, because I have a belief without causes. So that is the best proof.

My beliefs define or carve out the “me” - when so believe, I create myself, and this creation is outside the causal chain, or it wouldn’t by “my”.

but I can (I believe) make some predictions about how they would act — I like sushi

So this is a thought experiment in psychology?

This conversation seems predicated on causality to me - if it were free of the casual chain, we would just be writing random stuff. You're writing to me as if you read what I wrote, indicating that your words are not free from the casual chain. — flannel jesus

That is beautiful!

I agree language is functioning to convey meanings and yours and my logic is functioning to respond meaningfully to each other. All can be causally determined steps.

But to say what I just said, I had to step out of the causal chain, look back on the causal chain, and then re-enter the chain with this post. So whether I post anything is not determined. I am in the act of freely choosing to respond. My response has its determinants. But responding at all is not determined by anything other than my free choice.

I don’t know how this is the case. But to say I am not free would seem to mean “I am not” since of all is determined, this post was not my choice, and the “I” that chose to post did not so chose.

Determinism means there is no “I”, the agent that is free from the causal chain to deliberate about when to think, choose which thoughts to believe, and choose which thoughts to express.

Maybe I am not free, but that means maybe I am not me.

And that means this whole conversation isn’t a conversation between two individuals, but an outpouring of many many other causal determinants.

I think you lost sight of the train of conversation — flannel jesus

I don’t think I ever had sight of it.

Anyway, thinking, to me, is the ground and a condition of freedom. It is because we can think at all about anything, that we might be free. So having your own thoughts are determined, and then basing choices on those thoughts as determined, (so no choice), makes no sense to me.

This conversation means we have access to freedom from the causal chain. We are freeing ourselves right now.

So I am having a hard time deliberating (building a free choice) over whether it is better to believe in freedom or determinism.

1) Consequence is being used separate from any concept of causality. — I like sushi

A consequence is an effect. So “consequence is being used separate from…causality” is confusing and needs more explanation.

And I have no idea why that is important to your experiment.

Note: Neither group KNOWS if their belief is True or False. — I like sushi

If neither group knows the truth of freedom or determinism, then, to them, the truth of freedom is irrelevant. Your question in the thought experiment as THEY would put it is : “since we don’t know whether freedom or determinism is true, which is better to believe?”

Or

The question is what Group belief is better? — I like sushi

But you are asking me, from outside the two groups, which group’s belief is better.

So I get to know choices are real, but the people in the experiment don’t know this.

- A choice not to choose is still a choice.
- A choice to deny that you can choose is a choice.
- A choice to believe there is no choice, against your better judgment, is a choice. — I like sushi

So all of the people in the Group that believe in determinism are morons, making all of these choices, in a world they don’t know choices are real.

- Would person A and person B faced with the same scenarios act in the same manner assuming they were biologically identical BUT possessing the opposite beliefs as outlined?
- Is having the ability to choose your fate better than not having to choose your fate?
- If person A and person B live out their beliefs and then believed they were wrong and took on the opposing belief how would this effect them? — I like sushi

I have no idea. Your first and third questions seem like psychology questions to me.

The second question is “ability to choose fate” better than “not choosing your fate?” Why is the scenario relevant to this question?

Your fate can sometimes suck - so wouldn’t it be better if, when it looked like it was going to suck, you had the ability to choose your fate?
But if you have the ability to choose, or change your “fate” then it wasn’t really “fate” at all.

So this question is not clear enough to me even though I tried to answer it and gave you my reasons.

Yes but determinism isn't telling us "don't think" — flannel jesus

So you are free to either think or not think, and nothing but free will decides when you think or don’t think.

So how is that a world of determinism?

From my perspective your reply looks a little like this example (as with many others here):

What is your favourite film genre? Why?

Answers:
- Horror films.
- I like rock music.

Why?

Answers:
- There is no objective answer
- I like rock Music

See my frustration now? — I like sushi

I see that I’m frustrated.

We don’t understand the question anymore. And this analogy isn’t clarifying.
(Why did you place “I like rock music” under both sets of answers? Confusing.)

I’m sure you have something you are going after, but I’m not seeing it.

You seem to be looking for an objectively correct answer. There isn't one. — Patterner

I agree “better” raises the subjective, or at least the relative- better for what? For instance.

I also agree it is unclear what is being asked.

If we are free, is it better to believe we are free, or to believe we are not free?

So that’s your question.

If I assume I am free, am I still free to believe I am not free?

If so, how could it be better to believe what I already assumed cannot be?

If I assume X so I can move on and base a question on that assumption, don’t I already believe X to be the better assumption?

How can I choose to believe X or not-X, if I assumed X in order to ground the possibility of choice? Not-X can’t be believed anymore, as it is already assumed not to be believed.

Are you asking a sociological, or political, or ethical, or psychological question? Seems they would only be worth pondering if we don’t assume anything. If we assume we are free, then we should ask what is the function of that assumption if we could also believe we are determined?

Once you assume freedom, you can’t believe determinism is better (you’ve ready made the best assumption in order to pose your question).

So your question is already answered by your assumption of non-determinism. Of course it is “better” to believe your are free - you already believed that was better before you asked your question.

You need to state clearly what you are looking for - what is your hypothesis? What is the object of your question? Ethics?

Because none of my answers seem to make sense to you. And I keep trying to connect.

If determinism is true, aren’t we all, in a sense, always told what to think?
— Fire Ologist

I certainly don't have a sense of always being told what to think. I'm curious as to why you would think of it as you described above. — wonderer1

Metaphorically.

You read what I wrote, and you replied. And I read what you wrote. I am replying now.
If, as I reply now, all is determined, not by choice or free will, but out of some conditions and functions and circumstances forming this reply, then either I am being “told what to say” or maybe, I don’t exist at all, and “I” is just as illusory as “choice”, in a deterministic world.

It’s like we are in the causal chain so deeply, that even if we suppose anything we say is something in itself, those words did not come from us, they just happened like everything else is happening. Determined.

….just like metaphorically, if determinism is true, and just for a moment you pretend “you” are an agent such as “me” or “electron” or “planet”, aren’t we all, in a sense, always told what to think and do?

Either I am told what to do, or there is no I at all, and cause/effect seizes all free agency, if all things are determined.

Is it better for them to wander into the future under the assumption their actions have zero causal effect on anything… — I like sushi

Well, if, in fact, all action is determined, it’s the exact opposite of “wandering” anywhere.
There is no more wandering in a deterministic world, where nothing can possibly wander off course and everything remains set on a fixed immutable path.

… or is it better for them to believe their choices are meaningful and can effect outcomes — I like sushi

Belief itself is a type of wandering off course. How are we to think we are doing anything at all when we say “I believe” about anything at all, when everything is determined and fixed? What can we make of the moment of “choosing”? Is it “my” belief anymore if I was destined and determined from outside this “my” to have this “belief”?

I asked quite specifically if Non-determinism is true. What is the better choice to believe in Determinism or Non-determinism — I like sushi

Didn’t you say to assume we do NOT know whether non-determinism is true or not?? I think you mean: whether determinism or non-determinism is true, is it better to believe in one or the other anyway.

And I answered you clearly, and gave you my reasoning. I said it’s better to believe non-determinism is true, because this allows me to hold other people accountable. I can say to some idiot “stop it!” and the idiot might actually stop because we both believe non-determinism is true (he is free to do it just as he can freely chose to stop it).

But I needed to narrow the question before I could start to answer it, because of the use of the word “better.” I had to fill in politics or ethics to as “accountability” to determine which is “better”.

However, I think you are looking for a logical answer - which is logically better; which is most reasonable.

I don’t think you can answer your question on those levels without addressing whether determinism or non-determinism are even adequate to describe the experience of having any beliefs in the first place.

Which is better to believe: X or Y?
I think a belief is a choice. I believe there is biological-like life somewhere else besides earth. I choose this, freely, as my belief defining a belief of mine, and so carving who and what I am in some small way. That’s what a belief does and where it lives.

So now you ask “Which is better to believe: X or Y?
What if X stood for “there is no such thing as choice.” (no choice is synonymous with no freedom and synonymous with non-determinism).

Now the question itself is confused. Because you haven’t addressed the the elephant that sits prior to a question about whether X or Y is better - the elephant of whether X or Y each are and if so, what they are.

If to believe requires a choice, or if believing is choosing, then how can it be possible (let alone better) to believe we are determined?

How is “belief” possible, in a world where each event is determined, or where at least some events are not determined?

I find it very funny how often non-determinists tell determinists how to think, or explain to them how they do think. — flannel jesus

If determinism is true, aren’t we all, in a sense, always told what to think?

Is it 'better' to believe in Determinism or Non-determinism assuming Non-determinism is true? Why? Why not? If neither why? — I like sushi

It’s a trick question to me.

If determinism is true, then, along with my “choice”, the illusory agent making “my” choice vanishes along with the illusory choice. So there is no “I” that believes in anything anymore.

As soon as you reintroduce the “I” you introduce an agent, which is ground for freedom, and so why be so quick to use this freedom to choose determinism?

All of this is to say that, you can’t avoid the elephant in the room and ask your question - the “better” choice (ironically) or argument between believing in determinism or non-determinism can only be made by assessing which one of the two is in fact the case.

Unless you want to ask the question for political reasons (are citizens to be treated as able to follow or break laws), or psychological reasons (is this person an adult or just a child, or like a mole rat); once you go philosophical, you are asking “Are you free or not?” first, before any question that follows makes sense. Especially if the answer to the first question is “no you are not free.”

Instead of a religion, ask if God matters. If we assume God matters, and/or assume we matter to God, then instead of seeking a religion, you seek a saint, or a wise, mystic sage, one who lives a religion. If you find God in that saint, then you might look to the religion that saint practices, and see if you see for yourself why that religion can be lived by that saint, and why that religion might help you become a saint yourself.

how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism — Dan

Assumptions from Dan’s paper:

“Likelihood of truth (including internal consistency and not relying on propositions that we have good reason to believe are false)
Universality
Objectivity
Applicability to all free, rational agents
Action-guidingness
Achievableness (possible to live up to)
Consequentialism
Simplicity (in the sense of not postulating entities beyond necessity)
Extent to which the theory is in line with commonly held moral intuitions.”

That’s a ton. In the interest of simplicity, how about three:

1. Objective, universal (applicable to all), truth.
2. Achievable consequences guiding action
3. Extent it is already normative (compare against the prevailing wisdom).

(I agree as well we should seek simplicity, not for simplicity’s sake, but for clarity’s sake. Why complicate assumptions you are not going to question anyway?)

With that said, I like (my) assumptions 1 and 2. As for consequentialism, I’m not an expert. I prefer the more immanent “telos” to the more distant “consequence” as a term for what is action guiding, but that may be quibbling over assumptions.

“It is only the freedom over things that already belong to a person that matters, so getting more stuff over which a person can have freedom is not morally valuable. Things are bad, on this measure of value, when they prevent a person from being able to understand and make their own choices. Doing good—which I will discuss more in the following section—using this measure of value, is just a matter of preventing or reducing bad things from happening.”

“…there is sometimes a distinction drawn between positive and negative freedom, where positive freedom is freedom to do, have, or be something, whereas negative freedom is freedom from some external constraint. I do not think this distinction is particularly helpful...”

“While I have now explained the measure of value that freedom consequentialism uses.”

More feeedom good; less freedom bad? Is that the measurement we are taking? Freedom itself is the value we measure?

“An action is bad if scenario one has worse consequences than scenario two. An action is good if scenario one has better consequences than scenario two. And….is good …to the extent … causes no bad…”

Are we saying anything when using “better” and “worse” to define good and bad? Seems “better” sits on a scale between good and bad; so we need to define “good” and “bad” without using “better” and “worse,” because “better” and “worse” are tautologous with good and bad. Scenario 1 and scenario 2 may bring “good and better” and so “bad and worse” with them, but if we are trying to bring the measuring stick with us to the table and measure Scenario 1 against Scenario 2, using our “good better - bad worse” measuring stick, we may need to define them in themselves a bit, absent all scenarios.

This sounds like consequentialism. I’m not yet seeing what “freedom” consequentialism is. Im not seeing the need for universal applicability or objective truth yet either.

(10,000 prize? -I hope I don’t get fined for not understanding the premise! :yum:)

“[Freedom consequentiialism] is a form of satisficing consequentialism that treats the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices as the measure of consequences’ moral value.”

The “ability to make choices” is the measure of the consequences’ value”. Sounds like freedom IS the value.

“When faced with a decision between funding a drug that saves one life every ten years and a drug that restores eyesight to five blind people within the same timeframe, how do we know which to fund? The obvious answer is “whichever protects the most freedom,” but how do we know which that is?”

You say “whichever protects the most freedom.” This is interesting to me. We assume agency and freedom exist; and then we are faced with a decision. The “good” choice is the choice we must make if we are to be moral. But I just said “must” which sounds like a limitation on freedom. (If there is something I “must” do it can be said that I have no choice.). So admittedly, morality (the objectively good choice) limits freedom. BUT, when that morality bases the “good” on “whichever protects the most freedom,” it can be said by doing what I “must” do, what I have no choice in doing, if I am to be good, if what I must do is good, my freedom is saved in the fact that what I have determined is most good is the most protective of freedom that existed in the first place.

Interesting.

“I think is most promising, that of determining the relative importance of freedom over different things by reference to a preferred order of wrongs.”

“Preferences need not be valuable in order to use them…”

“this does not tell us what to do when preferences conflict.”

I think your question here can be simply stated as “what are the objectively good rules?”

Conflicting preferences, how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism… what I see as missing are the objective rules.

We assumed universal, objectivity, but then did not identify it or use it as part of the movement of comparing scenario 1 to scenario 2 on the scale of valued freedom, applied to conflicting preferences. These applications do not get beyond the subject-agent to the objective community of agents who conflict. Meaning, the consequentialism you’ve described starts to show the process of acting free, but cannot apply that process any further where the free act is directed against the freedom of another agent. So basically, we have two free agents in conflict with no objective measure to settle the dispute (possibly limiting both of their freedoms) - so you are basically asking “what are the rules?”

If there were rules carved in stone, then we could really pay no attention to preferences. But since there are no rules, the preferences (which ”prefer” incorporates a “good-better bad-worse” measuring stick to even say “prefer”, so is tautologous) are still vital in the measurement of “good” and “bad.”

This is why I don’t find utilitarianism satisfactory in general. It’s a method to solve disputes, that requires rules to employ, but has no rules (using synonyms and tautologies for “good” and “bad” to beg the presence of rules). Utilitarian theories can’t tell you what to do - they tell you how to determine what to do, but leave it up to your preferences and pain and pleasures and betters and worses to make your own temporary rule and fight through what to actually do.

So I don’t see how to solve your problem. It’s an age old problem of “now that I know how to make a decision, what am I supposed to do now?”

But I liked the idea that “whichever protects freedom” is itself a measure of good. I just still don’t know what specifically truly is good in the end.

The problem of how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism. — Dan

. I could boil the problem down to "how do we resolve conflicts between the freedom of different persons over things choices that belong to them?" — Dan

Hey Dan.

Honestly, I don’t know what the problem precisely is. I’d have to make it up based on some assumptions. Can you state the issue more clearly?

You said:

“freedom over different things”
“”how to weigh”
“within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism”

You restated this saying:

“how do we resolve conflicts”
“freedom of different persons over things choices”
“that belong to them”

I feel unable to really get started without filling in blanks.

I would think it should take you a paragraph or two to clarify precisely what the objects are on this playing field, what the conflict is these objects in relation to each other pose, and what, in your own words you would think the answer must include.

What criteria do you use when judging someone's justification for a policy or a course of action? Is it different from the criteria you apply to justifications for an isolated act?

On what grounds do you decide whether a justification is appropriate and valid? — Vera Mont

This is a massive question.

A justification for a policy can be more narrow and include less factors, whereas a justification for an isolated act can include anything. To justify a policy, we generalize principles, objects and actors but include only a few of these generalized things. Murder shall be punished. Simple policy, few objects needed, justification is enough objects and reasonings to show murder is bad so policy against it is good, or functional, and so justified, and we are done.

To justify an isolated act, we can use specifics and particular principles and objects, and we can use as many as we need to, as we want to.

If we ask how a justification is valid, we may be asking “what is a justification?” because a justification may be a validation.

Before applying this to morality, and justifications for policies or actual individual acts, we can apply it to simply knowledge. There is a definition of knowledge that says knowledge is justified true belief. This is a less colorful use of “justified” but maybe just as necessary to knowledge as justification is necessary to morality, to doing the right thing. To selling the right drugs to the right people for the right reasons.

Massive question. Thorny knot.

We do not know so let's not waste our time speculating, and see if we can say more about how one belief may or may not be 'better' than the other. — I like sushi

So, are we really better off believing we are free or not? — I like sushi

We is a good starting point. It’s not just whether it is better that I believe I am free or not, it is whether we believe we are better.

Just to float an answer, yes, it is better for us to believe we are free.

I, at times, feel like I’m free. I’m sure we all do.
And in a world full of creatures that could feel so free as me, I wouldn’t want everyone running around without any sense of responsibility for those feelings. You feel you are free, you better believe I am going to react to you that way.

But If WE do not believe we are free then just as no one could hold you responsible for anything you do, you cannot hold anyone else responsible for anything they do.

So, gut reaction, it’s better if “we” believe we are free regardless of whether in fact we are determined or free. (Basically, I don’t want to let anyone off so easily, not even me, sly dogs, not so fast.).

But there are many way to approach this question besides from the gut. And I threw out the word “responsibility” relating this conversation immediately to ethics/morality.

YET, I will admit, once you start talking directly about belief on the freedom/determinism question, you may as well be talking about agency (does agency pass through you, so you are almost not there, or are you an agent, an end point separate from the last link in the chain and with its own influence on the next link in the chain.). It’s a natural digression to think what happens to ethics when wondering about “better” and worse and freedom and determinism.)

I think a better digression is to stick with the same question “are we better off believing we are free or not?” and spending some time defining:
“free”, “not free or determined” and “believe”.

“Believe” all by itself seems to have an element of freedom to it. Very quickly, compare “believe” to “know” and you see the freedom in believing; when we know something, we are not free to believe otherwise, but when we do not know something, there is room to believe anyway. We freely choose to believe, in a sense. So freedom needs to be discussed along with whatever it means to believe, and believe needs to be discussed a bit in the context of “know”.

(Note to self:
Believe is to know
What freedom is to determined.)

As you said, it was the conflict between knowledge and belief that got us into this mess:

We do not know so let's not waste our time speculating — I like sushi

The other digression is that we can’t really avoid speculating about what it means to be “free” and what it means to be “not free”. We are talking about “being” free or “being” determined. In the moment. Me included. You too. Right now.

If you are asking whether it is better to believe this or that, I need to know what “this” means and “that” means to some degree to process this question. Immediately when we make this and that “freedom and determinism” we’ve set two polar opposites against each other. There is no in between a belief in freedom or a belief in no freedom. They beg further definition.

What does “not being free” mean? So can I really not be free?

I am writing now. So if I am determined only, then these words as well and all above and below, cannot be otherwise than they are. If we are to decide if it is better to believe that we are determined, I still have to answer for this moment now, as I continue to write things like “this moment now” and say to myself and to you “none of this is ‘me’ and nothing could be otherwise in these words as all is determined.” And you believe it too - your response to these words is not free and you will or will not post a reply, and you will or will not agree with me, or understand me, all minus “you” and “your freedom” as nonexistent as “me.”

I hope that made sense. (A further digression would be into how determinism destroys identity, or contradicts the “we” or the “I”, the subject of the sentence, the one who believes anything.)

If I am not actually free, then I might not be able to believe anything in the first place, because believing has a hint of free choice hiding in it. Yet I have to assume I “believe”, just as I have to assume “I” believe, in order to believe, either freedom or determinism is better (as here questioned).

But I digress again.

So I gave you my first answer, “better to believe we are free,” took it from my gut,
and then I showed you some of the many pieces that I think would have to be diced and sliced before I might give you the right answer of what is better.

Otherwise the answer to what it is better to believe could be psychological, or it could be political, but I like the metaphysical, epistemological, existnetial/ontological elements better, as I think you are trying to get at.

Good stuff in there!

All of nature hunts, kills, consumes, devours; vines strangle, weeds crowd out and take over, each animals draws oxygen from the air leaving waste in its path.

The question becomes whether we can give more than we consume, whether we can do something unnatural, and NOT consume meat, not crowd thing out, and whether this would be better for us and the animals and plants we don’t consume (because they will all go on devouring, hunting, eating meat, causing suffering and torturing each other).

It becomes a moral question by choosing not to be natural, but to be human.

Determinism frames the premise that our futures are set and unchangeable (human choices are not real), whereas non-determinism frames the premise that humans can change their fate (human choices are real). — I like sushi

I don’t think we should frame things in the future.

If determinism is true then the present is set.

If determinism is true, at no time in the present is my state the result of my own choices. If I am eating chocolate ice cream and I think this is because I freely chose it over the vanilla, the truth is, I am eating it presently for other reasons.

I can only know that the future is out of my hands, but I can’t say it is set.

All I know is that my present state is not the result of me being free from forces that always precede my present state, and free enough to insert my own choice into the chain and tide of forces that placed chocolate ice cream in my mouth.

But those forces could be random. They could be some other free agent, operating me like a puppet at their free will - who knows? But I need not conclude that my future is set; only that my present was constructed by other than my choices. And that my future is not mine to set by my “choices”.

Maybe this is the same result, but I think it makes it more scientific if a question, and less dramatic with words like “fate”.

truth does not tell us what is better. — I like sushi

I honestly think a conversation about whether or not we are free is like a conversation about whether or not there are words.

“Do words exist?”

Once you ask it, you are using the very objects you are looking for. It becomes absurd to speak this way.

Same thing with freedom. Stopping to deliberate IS freedom. We are free no matter what we choose or why we choose it once we deliberate, in that when we deliberate, we are no longer choosing or acting on choice but instead not acting yet as we deliberate.

So, instead of acting, we choose to deliberate. This sets us free.

Now if determinism is so thorough, each word my deliberation is bound to follow, then Inam not deliberating, but acting out a script forged in the moments leading up to that script.

Maybe.

Seems to me must make a choice on this question. Even if we deliberate and choose to believe that we are not free, that our thoughts and deliberations are determined, we are saying that, despite not being forced to KNOW this by reason, we BELIEVE it anyway, by choice. So we must even give our consent before we can accept we are determined.

This show to me the mechanism that is freedom. Thinking is free (or can be). In thought, is where a ground apart from all other forces can be born, and where one can claim “chocolate need not be, but is nevertheless, my choice, as I claim it.”

Maybe chocolate had to be, but at least in a compatibalist sense, I agree chocolate had to be if it was to be because of my choice. I agree. I take responsibility for it. I consent to the flow of forces.

I admit I haven’t shown anything, except that, like wondering if there are any words we seem to always use words, in wondering if we are free we seem to always be left with a choice.

Hey Banno.

And yet we would say that, for instance, the ass chose the trough on its left.

So I'm suspicious. It looks to me as if you are obliged to discount the ass's choice in order to avoid your thesis being falsified. — Banno

I would discount the ass made a choice. If I could ask the ass what his deliberations were that led him to his “choice,” and the ass didn’t say with his mouth full of trough food, “A what? I just started eating,” then I couldn’t say whether he choose anything. I have no idea if the ass recognized options, considered one and the other, and therefore deliberately determined one, not the other, before eating.

We should stick to an example where we know a choice can possibly be made, as in the act of a human, not an ass. It’s just a bottomless pit of “but what if..” that will illuminate nothing. And why go beyond our own experience as potentially deliberate choosers to find material to hypothesize about?

consider if a single principle ever implies a certain action, or whether a given action can be explained by any principle, given suitable ad hoc hypothesises. — Banno

A principle “implies” a certain action.

I wouldn’t say a principle implies any action. That’s backwards. Choices imply deliberations using principles. Principals don’t imply choices.

If you know a person is reasonable, and they appear to make a choice (or say they made a choice unlike an ass) would say, you can imply from this that they considered principals while deliberating and making that choice. But the principles don’t require any action or implication in themselves. We need principles, objects to choose, and deliberation among these to end up with a choice.

But you said

it is often the case that we must act despite not knowing which principles to apply,
— Banno — Fire Ologist

This implies deliberation, and other acts where sometimes we do know which principals to apply, or at least think we do as part of our choice when we act.

And you said “an action can be explained by any principle,” which sounds like an action might also be explained by no principle, and really, therefore, that we may as well avoid discussing any principles when discussing all acts.

So is there a such thing as an act based on principles or not?

If you say “no” then all of your statements above that you say address my point that use the word “principal” to make your point, don’t signify anything. If you say “yes” then I am simply saying that a discussion about “choice” starts where there is an act involving deliberation among objects and principles.

You can’t deliberate without the choices and the balancing between them, which balance is equivalent to some principal. You don’t choose without deliberation. You do something else maybe, but not by choice.

Or look at the discussion between Lakatos and Feyerabend about what constitutes a rational methodology, and apply it to choosing what to do.

Or consider how the Duhem–Quine thesis might apply to explaining an action in terms of a principle. — Banno

I’m familiar with Lakatos and Quine. But I’d rather hear your take on it addressing my take. You make sharp clear points at times. Maybe I’ll learn something.

I don't see anything here that has not already been addressed. — Banno

You can’t talk about “must act” as in a more deterministic act, like a reflex, and say “act without knowing the principles,” as both involving choice. AND then talk about simply needing a suitable ad hoc, after the fact explanation using “any principal,” as if there need be no such thing as an act based principal, and retain that there are any acts based on any principals.

Seems to chase its tail in order to devour the whole possibility of a chosen act.

Maybe that’s your point - we never actually deliberate or ever choose. But if we do, principals have to be in the mix, inside the deliberation, with the optional objects chosen.

it is often the case that we must act despite not knowing which principles to apply, — Banno

You said “we must act”.
And you said “act despite not knowing the principles.”

So there is acting based on principles,
and there is also acting despite not knowing the principles.

Putting aside the use of the words “must” and “knowing” for a second, it seems to me a decision or choice is a kind of “act” that only occurs when one deliberates among principles and objects chosen (or not). You need all of those things to have a choice, an act of choosing.

Like an instinct, or a reflex, some acts are not deliberate. Reflexive acts are not choices made “despite not knowing which principles apply.” They are not choices at all. They are other acts.

If you want to put acts on a spectrum where “choice” is on one side and “reflex” is on the other, you can, but this just judges how deliberate the act is, not whether a deliberate act is a choice, and a non-deliberate act is not a choice.

So if an ass appears to pause and deliberate, and then “choose” this hay or that food but the ass does not deliberate, then the outcome, whatever it may be, is not a choice, but some other effect, some other act. Like a heartbeat, it’s an act not involving choice. Nor involving principles (like “must”). Or deliberation (reasoning, or “knowing”).

Basically, if we act despite not knowing principles (along with the objects we know now deliberated as “options”), we don’t act based on choice; we, like the ass, may not be choosing anything, though we act.

And all of this can be done in an instant, because we are quick thinkers. Or some of us are.

I prefer the frame of intersubjective communities of agreement such as Joshs posits. — Tom Storm

That’s certainly fine.

Would you agree that communities do change and change their minds, so the agreements reached can revise and change as well?

That may be all there is. Rolling with the change.

It’s getting along in a world where there are no absolutes, no agreements that all communities for all time would make. Again, no absolutes, only temporary agreements subject to revision and just change, may be all there is for us.

Is unsophisticated bad? — Tom Storm

We would need an objective judge to settle the issue. Otherwise we can make it bad, or good, or neither, or both. And we could argue it all day.

I have no faith in the freedom of will, but I live as if it were a constant reality - because: What are the options? — Vera Mont

Interesting - we have no choice but to live as though we make choices.

unsophisticated theists — Tom Storm

Billions of theists for thousands of years, since the time of the Shaman and medicine man - all of them so unsophisticated.

They probably don’t even know when they are being insulted - need a priest to tell them “unsophisticated is bad.”

(A) I believe there are objective truths.

(B) I believe moral naturalism consists of objective truths — 180 Proof

Great! Interesting. Do you agree with me then, that anyone who does not believe in natural, objective truths, really has no ground to stand on to build up a morality?

Would you call your morality utilitarian? It’s built in part based on pleasure and pain and the habits we can build around these indicators?

I believe that any 'morality' based on or derived from merely subjective ideas like (theistic) gods are also merely subjective (i.e. arbitrary, relativist, emotive, dogmatic, superstitious, etc), therefore not objective. — 180 Proof

Is it necessary logically that “any 'morality' based on or derived from merely subjective ideas like (theistic) gods are also merely subjective”? Just because God said to Moses “thou shalt not murder, steal, and lie” doesn’t mean “any 'morality' based on or derived from merely subjective ideas like (theistic) gods are also merely subjective” and needs to be thrown out. It’s still an objectively good idea to say murder is wrong, no matter how you derive that idea. Or at least it can be.

Aren’t suffering, pain and pleasure subjective, and in part used by you in your argument to develop morality?

I’m picking up that you look down on superstitious children who say “God” emotively. Thought I’d let you know, I’m a thinking adult.

I don't believe in "God" ... and, because there are objective truths, I'm a moral naturalist. — 180 Proof

Well then you might be agreeing with me!

Some people who don’t believe in God, also say things like “there is no truth” or “there are no absolutes.” So, again if you didn’t believe in any of that, why play moralist.

But you, you don’t believe in God, but you do believe there is objective, universal, natural law. An absolute standard. So something is there for you to work out a morality.

If, along with God, you did not believe in objectivity, what do you think would animate a debate over some moral law? I found, not enough.

[W]hy make moral laws we all should follow if there is no such thing as laws we all should follow?

Morals =/= laws; your question doesn't make sense.
— 180 Proof — 180 Proof

Why make moral laws we all should follow if there is no objectivity we all must follow?

If there is no possibility of obtaining objective, universally applicable truth, why would we bother to debate universally applicable morality?

How about now? You seemed to understand it before. Just a rephrase of a simple question.

Why bother with ethics if there is no chance for a standard, any standard?

There, I said it again. How about now?

Now that you've become a theist, you still aren't looking for answers. Instead of looking for answers and think critically, you assumed that the answers are about being an atheist or theist, and that objective truth is contingent on being one of those. — night912

No, that’s backwards. When I was an atheist, I figured out that there has to be an objective truth. So I was still thinking critically ( not about morality because that seemed pointless). But once I realized I couldn’t shake objectivity, in my case, it eventually led me back to theism (along with other things).

If there is no objective truth, questions and answers about morality are pointless. The answer to every question is the same - we’ll never know for sure, because there is no absolute objectivity.

You would want to refute that instead of diagnosing my problem.

[W]hy make moral laws we all should follow if there is no such thing as laws we all should follow?
— Fire Ologist
Morals =/= laws; your question doesn't make sense. — 180 Proof

Started this few posts back saying if I didn’t believe in God and objective truth, I’d see no reason to make moral laws or argue with anyone about them.

Does the above make sense to you now?

We can't even agree on which gods or why gods or how gods. — Tom Storm

Sure we can - it’s possible. It’s called a religious sect, or maybe a Church. Some ideas are stupid, and others ring true. Same for ideas of God. Same for all ideas.

It’s like you are looking for someone else to tell you where God is, before you will even look for God in the first place.

Even those who see God can’t tell you where God is, for you. Your own eyes alone see God. I can only tell you where God is, for me.

For instance, I can tell, God is in your life. I see it in your posts (some of them).

I wrote the rest of that for nothing?

You won’t speak to my point at all?

You can’t get there? It’s a simple point: why make moral laws we all should follow if there is no such thing as laws we all should follow? Simple, didn’t work and you asked for more, so I wrote more and showed you I understood you.

Have no idea whether you get what I said. Just that you don’t like it.

All you were saying misses my point, and I responded to it anyway.

Thanks for the winky face :broken:

We can debate what is right and wrong and we, as Christians, can invoke god's name, but we don't have any certain way to establish how god wants us to behave. ' — Tom Storm

I agree we don’t have any certain way (that comes from anyone else but our own selves) to establish how God wants us to behave. God doesn’t send everyone text messages. How we each decide to actually behave and what we actually do is for each of us alone, even alone from God. So I can sit with that part of the quote.

I also agree that when we are together talking about how we might behave, building moral systems together, we struggle to interpret the words and traditions. And this debate among even members of the same religion, is really the same activity (just a different subject) as people discussing the best government or best economy, or even the best interpretation of any data into any system.

But what are these debates for? What will my behavior actually be? What can I use from outside of my own wits to inform this behavior? Is there any objective end to the debates and interpretations?

Personally I have to believe the reason for certain debates is to find one truth, one morality for all of us equally, for all minds and for all gods.

If the above Christian who says he has no idea how God wants him to behave, and who said we must debate interpretations when talking about it, if he ALSO thought there was no such thing as objective truth, and no actual knowledge of God was possible at all, then what would be the point of all the debating? He may not particularly know God’s will, but if he thought he never would or could know God’s will, why ever discuss God’s will again? And if that was his final lesson to you, he was a poor priest, at least on that occasion.

I’m not disagreeing with the conundrum it is to be a human being, to figure out what is the right thing to do is, to know no matter what happens at least I tried the best that I could. It’s as hard for a theist as it is for an atheist to figure this shit out.

But from that starting point of nothing to go on, just like anybody else (no one telling me how to behave, free to figure it out), I happen to believe we can get somewhere together, that that are a few places all minds are already participating in, and that is objectivity, or truth, or when universalizing moral systems, for me, God is equivalent to objectivity or truth.

If I didn’t think there was anywhere in the universe where the truth was laid bare for anyone to see, where something good was only good and so forever good, then I (ME, doesn’t have to be anyone else) wouldn’t talk to Christians or argue with atheists, or theists or philosophers about any of it.

And just because I can’t prove to you what the objective truth is, doesn’t mean it is not still apparent to me that it exists.

I tried to show you how it works for me, just to attempt to fight off the tactical straw man accusation.

Like proving I have a body, and there is a physical world of causes and effects. I can’t prove any of it is real to a well schooled modern philosopher, but I have no problem believing it is real and even obvious at times (pain and pleasure), as it gets murky at other times (hallucinations and dreams).

Just like that, I see objectivity all around me. And in the objectivity of morality, Insee God. So now it’s worth trying to articulate what I see to other people, to debate, to have discussions arguing scriptures or eastern mysticism. There really is truth, so it’s worth the struggle.

But if I didn’t think that, I would understand not seeing the point to any debate, to any label or objective truth, to any indication that X is something God must want.

All the religious person can do is interpret scripture or respond from personal perspectives regarding how they 'imagine' god wants them to behave.

Again - this is not about the nature of theism or atheism, it's about the nature of moral systems which can help but be pragmatic, adaptive and evolving. — Tom Storm

All the religious person can do is the same thing anyone can do.

Think of it this way: objective truth is to logical discussion, what God is to moral behavior - it’s the reason to pursue the activity, and join others to the debate for as much help as we can get.

If didn’t believe in God, I’d see no point in debating moral behavior with a bunch of other monkeys like me - I already know you, just like me, we’ll never settle any debates. And similarly, if I didn’t believe in objective truth, I’d see no point in debating really anything philosophical. Just like if Indidnt really believe I had a body, living in an ecosystem on earth, I’d see no reason to debate biology and physics or anything philosophical. (Body is a no brainer to me, yet people debate it.)

Objectivity, like God, is there. For me. Just there.

Or I wouldn’t see the point in debating.

I truly wish I could show you, to give you the meat you seem to be demanding (which is not my point and why we are talking past each other, or at least I’m talking past you).
Here, I’ll try. Proof of objectivity and a pointing in the direction of God.

Objectivity is the law of non-contradiction. It is math and logic itself. We can’t speak at all, and language would never have developed if there wasn’t before this development an objective world of many different objects in reasonable, intelligible relations. Just is. Like gravity. There is shot that can be known for what it is. That’s the shortest way for me to say why I believe (not know for certain) that there is objectivity. I don’t see how objectivity can not exist without it not existing in the context of an objective world (so it still exists). An object cannot both be, and not be, in the same sense, at the same time. You need an object in this world for non-contradiction within that object to be in this world.

As for belief in God, there is no way to be short. But maybe the most logical thing to say is, if I believe in an objective world I can truly know (once in a while), and I see there are other people like me who see this same truth (or are capable of it), and they share their lives with me, and we need there to be a moral system among us all, wherever we together call something “good”, this moral good between us is now personal; it’s something now shared only among persons, and so this shared good may as well be God, and to me, is in fact God. By seeing, for instance, that it is good to sacrifice to save the people we love, to go to work to help not yourself, but others, I see this love itself between the two people as part of the substance of God. It’s tied up in words and actions and intentions and reasons and meaning - all things human and Good, are of God, with God, in God, and if we choose, for God. We make God up together, and when it is good what we have done, God is really there. And immediately God is so much more than that, while at the same time, that enough to know all of God.

But I’m not going to be able to prove God exists or show you something objective about God. Only grace will open you up to that, so that is up to you and your God, or maybe you know there is nothing objective to ever know about God so I’ve just been talking to myself again.

I don’t have to prove that to make my point. I know you aren’t seeing my point without some example of one objective truth or something objective about God, so I gave it a shot.

I keep just saying my point is simply that, if I didn’t believe in God, I’d lose sight of all objectivity among us people, and so I wouldn’t bother to philosophize about morality anymore.