But if the people revolted, the regime would collapse and the people could demand an end to the war. So they are responsible for not ending the war. — LFranc

By this reasoning, everyone is responsible for everything. We are all now implicated in all criminal activity we ever heard of but are right now failing to stop.

Isn't the set of all sets equivalent to the set of all members?

There aren't actually any sets within the set of all sets. There are only members.

For example, if we take the set of all numerical values (0 through 9 - ten members) and the set of all alphabetical values (a to z - twenty-six members), we could make the set of these two sets and call it the Set of all Characters (for sake of argument). So does this set of all characters (including 1, 2, 3, etc., and a, b, c, etc.) now contain a total of 36 members? I say yes. Or does it contain 2 more members, total of 38, being the prior sets called "numerical" and "alphabetical" plus their members? If we call it the set of two sets, do we need to add in the set designated "numerical" and the set designated "alphabetical" and count the members separately from the sub-sets, when we join the sub-sets into a new super-set?

I say no. We are smart animals, so we can look at the single set of all Characters which has 36 members and simultaneously see that there are sub-sets of 10 numbers and 26 letters, but we are not counting those two distinctions as 2 additional members of the set of all Characters. The set of numbers has 10 members, and the set of letters has 26 members, and any set containing only these two sets would have 36 members.

When you bring sets together, under a new super-set, the sub-set distinctions that were named for example "numerical set" and "alphabetical set" no longer exist - these distinctions are irrelevant or non-existent to the set of all characters.

Apply this when joining all sets into the "set of all sets". We take the set of numbers, the set of letters, the set of atomic particles, the set of forces, etc., etc., until we take up all sets, list them on the blackboard, and fashion the idea of "the set of all sets". Aren't we just overcounting this new "set of all sets" if we count the sets within it, and not just the members of those sets (ignoring the prior set distinctions themselves)?

If so, then we have no need to call it "the set of all sets" - the set of all sets (incoherent paradoxical term) becomes the set of all members, or just a misapplication of the term "all".

This doesn't solve the paradox. It just shows that the paradox is where logical process, which occurs between multiple things (as in between sets and members), borders on the identity of single things (like what is a member, or what is a set). Logic lives between things, in their relations. Once we say the set of all sets, we have a logical problem if we lose site of the members of all those sub-sets and just look at those sub-sets themselves as if those sub-sets could be members without their own sub-members in the first place. As we gather up sets into bigger sets, the distinctions between this set and that set are no longer relevant and do not count in the membership, and only the new set exists.

The set of all sets is really the set of all members, which is also how we use the word "all" in the first place.

what is your best description of Metaphysics? — Rob J Kennedy

How about, it is an objectified version of subjective experience.

the notion that reality can be understood is a metaphysical presupposition — Tom Storm

I agree. Although I would change "presupposition" to simply "assertion." And would add that the notion that reality cannot be understood is also a metaphysical assertion.

Despite how impossible it seems (or is) to prove a metaphysical assertion is accurate, by being a subject, a metaphysic of that subjective being (whether it is ever discovered or accurately asserted) is also there. If I assert "I am" I am simultaneously asserting "The world is" and now the subjective is seen objectively or metaphysically.

I don't see how we can assert anything and not simultaneously assert a metaphysic of the world where the original assertion has been asserted. Doesn't mean the assertion had any true content or even identifiable content. Doesn't mean you know something accurate about the metaphysical, but it does mean there is some content, and with it, some metaphysics of a content-laden world.

Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience? If so, how? If not, why not? — OwenB

Reminds me of "If a tree falls in the woods and no one is there, does it make a sound?" which is Berkeley. But without the context that could take you way off on a tangent.

Terrible question without some context and definitions of some heavy words like "existence", "perceive" and terms like "unperceived existence" and "the nature of our experience" or even "we infer". And after 3,000 plus years of writing thoughts down about (what I believe to be) this question, the answer of all the greatest thinkers is - I have no idea how. So "if so, how?" is just plain mean to do to a student.

I would restate what you have to assume the question is driving at, and then answer your new restated question. I'd reframe it as a recognition of how we are enslaved to our senses (Plato) or cut off from the thing-in-itself by the structure and condition of experience (Kant), and then re-ask it as "Do we infer that the things we experience exist in themselves in the same way we perceive them to be?" Or something.

In other words - I see a red ball. I, at first, assume there is a red ball over there in the world, whether I am looking at it or not. So I am perceiving something as it is in the world, inferring my experience in my head on the ball and in the world. But then I realize it is red because the light that is hitting that object is a red light and I'm looking at some false appearance so I don't really know what color it is, and further, I see that my eyeball builds for me an impression I call "red", so I've self-generated or constructed this experience (Plato's cave, Kant), and I know even less about the object I was calling a red ball over there in the world apart from me. So if I want to refer to "objects in the world", I have to infer my constructed perception in my head back onto them. With this context, it will be easier to answer the question, and with this context, it will be easier to answer the question if you say that it is the nature of our experience that we are cut-off from the world, constructing appearances and fabricating forms of perception and so what we infer is not necessarily correct or even has anything at all to do with the world in-itself. That's my easier answer to think about.

But there is the odd part of the question, "unperceived existence of what we perceive" - really, what the hell is that supposed to mean? I think they are trying to capture Kant's idea of the thing-in-itself as discussed above. My interpretation of the question is that it is about whether what we think we know (or perceive) about the world is a true reflection (inference) of the world as it is in itself. Are our inferences good if we seek to know something about the world. If it is a true reflection, how, and if not, how not so? But "unperceived...[words]...we perceive" - thanks for that clarification.

Instead of a red ball, you could treat the question itself as the object of perception and ask whether the question in your mind has anything to do with the question the teacher had in mind. Use the question itself to demonstrate how our perceptions have nothing to do with the real world, because the "nature of our experience" is to be confused when presented with just about any perception, but certainly with this question, and only once our minds re-organize things does the object of perception really take shape in the first place. The object before you is this amorphous, opaque, masked unknown, hiding in the words "Do we infer the unperceived existence of what we perceive from the nature of our experience?" Not until you redefine the terms here can you have in mind an actual question, an actual object, that you are now perceiving. So you would be answering the teacher's question, by saying it is not possible for you to have any true inference of what the teacher's question really is, since all we can do is reconstruct our own experience that is cut-off from the world. Basically, say "see Kant".

So this conversation, between two brains, conveying the idea of Universal Form, is itself two instances of Brain; (insert appropriate mental/non-physical).

everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. — SEP

If you describe the human being as a non-physical spirit with a body, the physicalist must say that the thing being identified as a non-physical "spirit", is really a supervening moment necessitated by a conscious brain.

Certainly seems plausible. At the very least, there is the physical. There is no real reason to deny the presence of the physical. Physicalism appears an elegant solution to a sensing, bodily being.

Thanks to Plato and Kant, we have to admit there are serious difficulties with really saying what a physical, individuated thing is in itself. So, though I think we have to admit the omni-presence of the physical, we haven't yet really satisfied ourselves that we have any actual explanation of physical things.

After searching round and round the cave under all of its physical, fleeting manifestations, being unsatisfied, what real use is it to introduce non-physicalism for more explanatory power? We don't even know what matter is, and so to insert something non-physical seems like a naïve way of introducing another unexplainable substance, adding confusion, making things worse.

But do we just need more science of the physical then, to really explain what an individuated, moving thing is? Though the physical is always there, I don't agree that the physical alone can account for my experience. We can't do what we are doing right now, namely, passing ideas from one mind to another through words, or, in other words, communicating, without the non-physical. Meaning is not physical. I mean, I know you are familiar with meaning, and use it every time you speak. We are submerged in meaning, because we are human beings.

I can say "you know what I mean" or I can say "you catch my drift" - these are different physical things, but with the same meaning, so we have three "things" here: my first phrase, my second different phrase, and the meaning of each, which happens to be the same meaning...if you are following me and digging what I'm laying down here. To make use of words, we make meaning, apart from the words. Same meaning, different words, means words and meaning are different. Meaning is the non-physical part, and only there when fabricated in a mind.

We, human minds in communication with one another, meaning things, become the bookends on the physical. We are the limit of the physical. Only from here, in the attempt to communicate meaning across the abyss of the physical, standing somewhere/somehow outside the physical, can we ask about the physical and physicalism. There is no question in the necessity of the purely physical, yet here we are, communicating our wonder over this experience.

Another way to say what I mean: the physical is tied to necessity, but if something is said to "supervene on" the physical, it must not be physical, or it would not be supervening, and it would remain part of the chain of necessity. There is no supervening on the physical without something non-physical. Somehow, we alone are that supervening, saturated in a world of immateriality.

Now whether this meaning matters, that is another question. (Yes I said "matters" as applied to "meaning" and meant "matters" in the sense of 'means anything to you' - and yes, I meant to make a pun of the words 'matter' and 'meaning'; the pun, where meaning makes a mockery of the matter/words.)
But for physicalism to mean that meaning can be fully reduced to the physics, does not seem to account for this very conversation, if any of us have meant anything here, or if any of us 'see what the other is saying', or might say "I understand." You feel me? Physics just doesn't cut it, at least not deep enough.

For example it's structure helps resolve the monism/dualism question. It clearly has two components but in a physicalism sense all is derived from physical matter. — Mark Nyquist

You said: "All is derived from physical matter." Physical matter here being the brain, in this form (for example): Brain; (non-physicals).

Where "non-physicals" in this case are brain states that manipulate "all" or abstractions like "physical matter" (abstract here because you aren't talking about a particular physical thing, you are talking about "physical matter" itself, now abstracted as a non-physical in this example, and all of this activity is turned into a universal form as "Brain; (non-physicals)."

Do I appear to get it?

"Who are you to choose which mass extinction event is good and which is bad? How dare you fight climate change! How dare you!" Said the three billion year old fungus.

I think you could perfectly coherently claim spatiotemporal relations exist between the things in-themselves and that the actual extension and temporal sequences do not exist. Positing that space and time exist as a relation is not the same as a substance (as far as I can tell). Therefore, you have not posited actual motion, space, or time when positing matter. — Bob Ross

So would you say matter is a substance, and motion, space and time are relations between material substances? Or is motion more substantial than relational, but maybe both?

What do you mean by time measures the change? — MoK

We need a microscope to take measure of tiny things. We need time to take measure of change.

You said "Time is needed for any change." It sounded like time was in one bucket over there, and then something grabs some time, because it needed it, to make some change, sitting over here in this other bucket. So I meant to incorporate time and change into a similar premise as you and came up with really two premises: Change exists. Time measures change.

Change is the more substantial thing, but really time is the mental overlap with change in the physical. Time is just as real, but only recognized (or constructed) by a mind recognizing physical change.

Watch Jerry Seinfeld's Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee. Comedians talking about what is funny, how they construct a funny bit. You see them trying out jokes on each other, just goofing around, showing how they are thinking. Mostly they are just comedians being funny, but you see the art, the science a bit.

A few of them say you can't teach someone how to do what they do. And I agree with that. If you have to explain why a talking fish is funnier than a talking parrot, nothing is going to make sense, unless you already understand it, but then, why the hell did you need an explanation. Seinfeld said he was paid to speak to a group about how to be a comedian, and he said he just told them, "if you are in this class, I've got bad news for you..."

It's a really funny show, and plenty of insight.

And laughing. The comedian truly connecting with the souls of the audience, their minds grasping the words and actions of the comedian, finding some elements of expectation and total surprise, that erupts in an involuntary, physical laugh. I think it is one of the most human things there is. Super meta, and super primal, and everything in between.

In terms of the latter, I find it very plausible that spatiotemporal relations are real constraints and properties of the things in themselves. — Bob Ross

The raw phenomenal experience is of a spatiotemporal world with things relating to things. Whether this phenomenon is informed directly by things in themselves or constructed in the mind, it remains the same, singular experience. I agree it is plausible to say that these relations are there in the in-itself. Like, the mind experiences the spatiotemporal relationships it constructs, because the mind is constructed in spatiotemporal things relating to one another.

And I agree, space taken alone is not a substance. Time taken alone is not a substance.

The view I'm currently thinking about is that time, space, matter and motion are one substance (not each individual substances, but one substance). It's easy to see "matter" as the substance and then predicate it with space, time and motion. But really, time, space, matter and motion are different estimations of the experience of one substance (call it, physical reality). I can't assert one without all of the others. Experience is matter/space/time, which are motion.

This is why we are tempted to say space or time each are a substance. They immerge with moving matter, so they are not prior substances..

If I assert "motion" alone, I have simultaneously asserted a material thing (matter) here, and then (time) there (space).

Time and space can be seen as one. Before and after (time) are simply here and there (space). To assert a time, or assert a space, I need to assert a moving thing. Make a material thing in motion, and you have made here before with there after.

If I assert "matter", I immediately take up space. If I recognize that matter is three dimensional, then the space the matter takes up must have a here keeping apart from there, or a before keeping away from after. The "keeping" is the motion of a solitary instance of matter, so even a fixed object, if physical, is a substance displaying its matter/motion/space/time.

All of this is deniable. I'm not trying to prove what exists. I'm saying: if I say matter , whether I like it or not, I've said time, space and motion also, because these are really one substance.

I do think we are speeding way ahead of ourselves with our technology and invention. We have things we have no idea how to use yet - we're like little toddlers with keys to an airplane, or adolescents placed in charge of armies. We have no idea what we really need anymore. If the "progress" made between the neolithic era and the iron age only spawned the fall of the roman empire, and the advances of science brought us the power to upset the entire climate, and if during all this time we remained murderers, liars, enslavers, and cheats, fearful of everything, weak and selfish - why do we think we should keep inventing things? We've tried "progress" for at least 10,000 years, inventing our indoor plumbing, warmth in the snowy winter, waterproof shoes, no more wolf attacks, cell phone connectivity, hospitals and grocery stores and so much invention making our world, and what do we do with all of this, generation after generation after generation - we are still murdering, lying, child-beating terrible people. All of us.

We do, in fact, suck at running things. We are each individually and all taken together, our own worst enemy.

Maybe if we focused more on being better people, here in our homes, truly, and learned to get along with our immediate neighbors, hope might emerge during discussions between factions and parties over issues impacting the world, and these discussions might actually start to be discussions, leading to something that could actually be done.

Doesn't anyone find it interesting that in discussions like this, we always blame someone else? We talk about capitalists, or politicians, or oil burners, or whomever. Aren't every one of these people our brothers, sisters, mothers - ourselves? When we say people should stop doing X and start doing Y - we should stop ourselves and just say "I'm not doing X, and I'm not doing Y." And be the world we want the world to be.

Fully confess, I'm to blame for the end of humanity. Sorry folks. Working on it.

The contradiction lies in wanting a set that contains all sets that are not members of themselves that is itself not a member of itself (which appears to be the set that Russell was talking about when he asked is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves a member of itself or not). Such a thing is by definition, contradictory. — Philosopher19

Yes. But a set, by definition, cannot contain itself. The set is the act of containing. The set doesn't come to be until something else (members) are contained. Triangles and triangularity aren't equal beings. Triangularity can be predicated of something that is not a triangle. So we aren't trying to force the set of all sets to be a member of itself, just as much as we are not trying to force a sub-set as a member set to simultaneously be the set that includes itself with other member sub-sets. We just keep recognizing and restating that the set of all sets already has to not be itself a container because it is one of the members, while it has to not be one of the members, because it is a container.

I say this is because, as we keep drawing sets, and keep getting bigger, by the time we get to the most inclusive set, the set of all sets, if we want to use logic, we need to stop thinking of the set of all sets as a set. At that point, we've reached a new kind of thing, at the end of members, just like we do when we create any set (We go, penguin, penguin, penguin, and then new thing, set of penguins). When those members are sets themselves, we reach the definition of all sets, or the concept that all sets share. The set of all sets is an empty way of exemplifying the definition of "set".

I don't see anything wrong with the "all of all alls". You have alls of various sizes with one all encompassing absolutely all alls. By definition, this all that contains absolutely all alls has to be infinite. — Philosopher19

Agree, but wouldn't it also, in a naive sense, have to also be finite, because it is now an "encompassing" container? A container that ever-grows because its members ever-multiply is not a container at all. And we arrive where we started. Again. Or I guess I'm now saying a set of infinite, ever-increasing members, never gets to be a set.

I admit that this subject clearly needs careful focus that I've never done. Russell himself didn't resolve this - I doubt I can.

But I don't think it can be resolved because resolutions are logical, and with the assertion "set of all sets", we stand at the edge of all things logical facing, raw assertion - if we retreat, we remain logical and ignore the issue; but if we press on beyond the edge, trying to explain the shape of this edge, we find that logic alone, so reliable on the way to the edge, no longer works and the things we say are difficult to make sense of.

P1) Time is needed for any change
P2) Nothing to something is a change
P3) There is no time in nothing
C) Therefore, nothing to something is logically impossible. (From P1-P3) — MoK

"Time is needed for any change." Although "time" is treated as a substance here, and "change" is really the question here, I can grant this premise. I also don't like "needed." I would replace this premise with "Change, measurable over time, is."

Nothing to something is a change. Parmenides broke this down as being and not-being, which I like better for such a concise argument. I can grant this premise too as "Not-being to being, or nothing to something, is change."

So we've asserted the existence of change, asserted time measures it, and then asserted one example of change as nothing to something, or not-being to being.

"There is no time in nothing" This needs more explanation to be a meaningful statement. I mean I get what you are driving at, but this premise is supposed to do all the work in the argument, and it ranges from meaningless, to meaning not enough to do the work. Let's pretend there is nothing. Then let's pick a point and pretend it is time 1. Now let's wonder about was before time 1 and after time 1. There still is nothing before time 1 and nothing after time 1, no seeming change, nothing to mark or measure, but by now we have still asserted there is time in nothing. The point is, to merely assert "there is no time in nothing" without explanation, as to what time, and a concept such as "in nothing" are, I am left wondering if we can conclude anything yet. But you then just leap to your conclusion.

Time is a component of spacetime that allows change to happen. Spacetime is a substance, by substance I mean something that exists and has a set of properties. The property of spacetime is its curvature. The gravitation wave was observed experimentally. This confirms that spacetime is a substance. — MoK

I get it. I agree something from nothing is a logical impasse. And I agree that there is physical, changing, moving substance. But the above isn't an argument.

Parmenides said:
"Being is; for To Be is possible, and Nothingness is not possible."
"What is, is. Being has no coming-into-being or destruction, for it is whole of limb, without motion, and without end. And in never Was, nor Will Be, because it Is now. How, whence could it have sprung? Nor shall I allow you to speak or think of it as springing from Not-Being; for it is neither expressible nor thinkable that What-Is-Not, is."
"Nor will the force of credibility ever admit that anything should come into Being... out of Not-Being."
[Just as Being cannot come from nothing], how could Being perish? How could it come into being? If it came into being, it Is Not; and so too [it Is Not] if it is about-to-be at some future time. Thus coming-into-Being is quenched, and Destruction also, into the unseen."

Parmenides would agree with you that something from nothing, or nothing to something, are impossible. But his reasoning is from the fact that motion itself is impossible because motion itself requires what is not, to change into what is, which is impossible.

Parmenides was saying you can't pull a rabbit from what is utterly not-rabbit, and therefore, there is no such thing as change, as in change from what was not into what will be, also as in change from nothing to something.

You seem to be arguing that, just because there is change, just because we see rabbits come from things that were not rabbits, it still can't be true that something can come from nothing. Time as something that sits with things, but something that cannot sit with nothing, doesn't really do the work to explain how change is possible, or rule out how change is impossible. In fact Parmenides used the same assertion (something can't come from nothing), to more logically demonstrate quite a different result - time and change are not.

I agree something from nothing is impossible to depict, to logically assert, to know about or conceive of.

There is no time in nothing — MoK

But I don't agree we can posit "time" as if it was a prior substance that some other prior substance like a "thing" or a "nothing" (or a thing seeking to change) combines with in order to build a "thing changing over time" or a "something from nothing." Speaking like this may help animate an argument, but to say "in nothing" at all presupposes something (not sure what but you at least have a "nothing" with an "in").

This is the problem of motion, Parmenides resolved by simply denying motion. Since something cannot come from nothing, or since nothing has no thingness that could be changed to something else, change or motion is impossible.

I disagree with Parmenides that he has said anything of actual things. Motion still is. He has noticed something about the limits of logic and speaking. We speak by fixing immobile things, nouns, and then predicate them. We separately, move, are moved and experience motion. Drawing from the experience of motion a stagnant, unmoved, unchanging permanent definition of what motion is, how motion is, this is a problem. We are seeking to fix motion permanently in explanation, but by fixing motion, we deny motion.

I think it is a problem because motion, and the explanation of motion, are not the same kind of thing. Explanations, if they are good ones, never move or change. Explaining explanation moves one towards something that does not move. Explaining moving things, or typical things, creates a conflict of two different types of things - namely, things and explanations.

But it's a problem.

Basically I agree with your conclusion but don't see your argument.

Where do we have a paradox in what I have proposed? — Philosopher19

Your own conclusion is the answer to this question.

The set of all sets which contains all these sets, is a member of itself because it truly is a set. — Philosopher19

If all sets are contained in the set of all sets (that are not members of themselves and nothing more), then still, no sets are on any other level than the other sets, all of them now being contained together inside one container (that is what contained in means)... except the set of all sets, itself also being a set. But if it is a set, it would have to be contained along with the other sets. But it's not. But it is. This is paradoxical.

I don't think there is a way completely out of the paradox. You don't undo this paradox. It manufactures itself as we speak about it from any direction.

To skip to the end explained a bit further below, the set of all sets becomes the definition of what a set is, hiding in an example of what a set is. The paradox arises from the fact that the set of all sets serves as an example of one of the sets, and the definition of any/all of the sets at the same time. The set of all sets, is itself a setting of objects into a mentally constructed container. But when we are seeking to contain all sets (mentally constructed containers) in a set, it could equally be said we are seeking to define what a set is. If we say what a set in-itself is (if we define a set), we say something of all sets. We have created a set whose members include something of all sets, or we have created a definition that applies to all sets, namely the definition of all sets.

This doesn't resolve the logical problem; it merely restates it. But I think shows how the assertion "set of all sets" points to an edge or limit where logic itself and the language used to communicate mental constructs and logic, are distinct from each other, and here, unable to overlap. Basically, we can't say what we mean here, but we somehow still know something and know what we mean.

Stepping back, a 12-year-old child who understands what a set is, can look at 5 different sets on a blackboard (numbers, letters, shapes, etc) and can easily point to all 5 of the members of the "set of all sets on the blackboard". Thus the concept of "the set of all sets" is simple, easy, useful, logical, functional, even for children. But then you ask the child "But what about the set of all sets itself? Isn't that now one of the sets on the blackboard? What happens when you point that one out too? You've just added another set to the blackboard, making your prior answer of "5" wrong. Or you failed to show how the set of all sets on the blackboard is itself one of the sets on the blackboard and given the answer '6' in the first place." Now a grown, seasoned, pioneering mathematician and logician is perplexed. Thus, the concept of the set of all sets is both really child's play, and seemingly impossible to penetrate for a wise old professor.

But I think if you look at it from other directions, (like a child perhaps), I think we start to see why even the child can make easy use of the "set" (one example being the set of all sets) despite the fact that these sets can be made to appear and disappear both within and without themselves when we say "the set of all sets."

What is a set? A set is both 1) a membership (usually of multiple members but not necessarily, but comprised of membership nonetheless), and 2) their gathering as one containing reference. Four penguins and four seals in a zoo - the set of penguins, which is a unity as one containing reference, is the multiplicity of four member individual penguins. This set is not a penguin itself, because it is a set, and this set must not be a penguin because it has to sit beyond the penguins in order to contain them all as a set. But this set evaporates if we remove all of the penguins, because it is a set of four penguins.

These are the moving parts here. Sets must be distinct from their members in order to be sets of any members. And when looking for a set of penguins, we see that the set is not only distinct from its members, the set is distinct in kind - it's not a penguin. Sets are not their own members. But sets must have members, or be comprised of membership. (Please ignore the empty set here, or pretend the empty set has one member, the object "nothingness".)

So what are we actually doing when we say "set of all sets"? Are we taking all sets, turning them into member objects like penguins, and then stepping outside these objects to make something that is different in kind to those objects, calling it a set, namely a set of all sets? Are we just misuing the word "set" somewhere when we say "set of all sets"? Or have we left the sets alone and created a new class of set so that the set of all sets is different in kind from all of the sets that are its members?

Crack it open again. What is a set? A set is a form of "all". You have four penguins and four seals in a zoo, and someone asks "how many penguins are in the zoo?" The answer can be to count the members of the set of penguins, or it can be to count all of the penguins. You don't need to clarify the "set of all penguins" to come up with same answer. You can count "the set of penguins" or "all penguins" and conduct the same operation. All of the penguins is the same thing as the set of penguins. Therefore, a "set" is a semantically distinct but nonetheless an equivalent form of "all". "All" seals means the same thing as "the set of" seals here. Part of the essence of "set" is the notion of "all" or part of the notion of "all" is to create a "set".

Now apply this to the proposition "the set of all sets." It becomes the "all of all alls". This just sounds like poetry in need of analytics to clarify. The set of all sets is the be-all end-all of alls, cried the poet!

But I think there is some analytic clarity here. Think now of encircling members as an action we will call "setting" things; instead of fixing a set as a stagnant "x", think of it as an action of "containing". Setting as an action can be made distinct from a stagnant "all" which the setting action constructs. (I could do this by all-ing a stagnant set, but did I just actually say "all-ing"? Hope I don't have to do that to this conversation! But the fact of this temptation shows how we are at an edge or limit between what is logical and clear, but what can't be communicated in language.).

Now, the definition of "setting" is "the act of identifying all members as a set." When we say "the set of" in reference to anything, we are in the act of drawing a container, we are containing members by distinguishing those members from non-members, but we are acting, we are "setting" the membership. We have to sift through the 8 animals in the zoo, identify each individual uniquely, and then by drawing the container, by setting the membership, we claim "the set of penguins has four members."

This becomes as metaphysical as it is logical/mathematical. Now we are talking about "the all" and the "the individual identity of a single member" and "sameness" of membership and "distinctness" from non-membership and the action versus the thing acted upon versus the thing thereby constructed, namely the "set" which is the same as the "all".

Step back one more time. What is a set? It's a construction. It's a mental construction. It takes even physical objects (penguins) as members, but, of them, (as in "set of"), makes a mental construct. So a set of, or the act of setting, becomes the equivalent of making an idea of, or defining a limit or container. Now, we can analogically see that the "set of penguins" is equivalent to the definition of one of those penguins, equivalent to those defining characteristics that both identify each individual penguin as they do place all penguins as member of the set of penguins.

Setting becomes defining, or a set becomes a sort of quantifiable, demonstrable way of making a definition.

Applying this to setting itself, as when setting "sets", the container for all containers, therefore, is also the definition of all containers.

So the set of all sets means the same thing, or serves the same purpose as the definition of any set. A set, is like a definition; a definition is a statement about all of example members; so the set of all sets, is a mathematical way of denoting the definition of all sets. This is why the child blows right through this. If you understand what a set is, you can easily populate the set of all sets.

This doesn't resolve the paradox. It maybe explains how we, like the 12-year-old above, already live with it. Setting is defining, so when setting all sets, in a practical sense, we are defining what all sets are. In a logical sense, we are still creating a set that can't be a member of itself, but at the same time is a member of itself.

Hard to analogize completely unique things like a fetus (lump of flesh that can become a person), or a pregnancy (now put the lump of flesh that becomes this person inside the body of another person to grow the lump of flesh). These things are difficult to understand and utterly unique. Even before clearly defining these things, it seems to me there is nothing else in experience like these things to ground a good analogy. Pregnancy itself as it relates to the personhood of the pregnant woman and the personhood of the fetus, and the act of being pregnant for months, and the act of growing inside another body until one might become a person, and the act of giving birth, and a newborn "baby" that is not a finished product and needs as much care as ever, or the act of killing this fetus before birth to terminate the pregnancy - utterly unique situations and things.

There is just too much lack of clarity with these terms, like "obligations" and "rights" as applied to "a fetus growing towards personhood in a pregnant woman", to then build an analogy and expect that it will lend clarity to the terms that could not be plainly put in the first place.

Henry Fonda imparting his healing powers by walking uphill in the snow for nine months and then chopping off his hand. Or maybe the sick person, after having their face touched and healed, has to move in with Henry and scream at him when they are hungry or need new pants fort the next 18 years.

The pregnant woman knows that if she gives birth, if she touches the face, there will be a new thing screaming with more needs. Nothing is finished at birth, unlike after Henry touches the face. That has to be part of the question regarding obligation. We need the fact that a baby, after birth, still must oblige others for it to survive to contextualize a question about what rights that same creature might have before birth. This creates the tension that makes us question killing a fetus in the first place. This analogy does not have that context at all.

I've never seen a good analogy involving pregnancy that doesn't create more distractions than it does elucidations of anything.

I would appreciate a refutation of this position:

There is no such thing as freedom because everybody is enslaved to either ego or conscience. — Piers

I greatly appreciate the concise, stark gauntlet you've laid down. I'd rather not be forced to play the adversary and refute your words, but in your spirit of directness and shear clarity, I humbly proceed on your terms.

The clearest way to refute "there is no such thing as freedom" would be to demonstrate there is such a thing as freedom. I'll just look at this assertion here as the question "Is there such a thing as freedom?"

The real content of your assertion is "everybody is enslaved to either ego or conscience."

Let's break this down. "Everybody is enslaved." This, to me, restates we are focused on freedom, but in this case, we call it enslavement or a determinate not-freedom. So it's just an inverse restatement of the question. "Is there such a thing as freedom or are we enslaved?" (In a way you've sort of created a tautology, where you said "no such thing as freedom...because everybody is enslaved" which means the same as "everybody enslaved because no freedom", but that is why I just see all of this as the question.)

The real, real content, then, is "enslaved to either ego or conscience."

I have a real problem refuting this because I would say, I agree that, we are enslaved, thrown in a deterministic world of efficient necessity. I'd rather use different pivots than "ego" or "conscience" and simply say I agree that, because we become what we become, we are enslaved to either this or that. Always in chains, to either this, or that.

I agree with "we are enslaved to either or."

However, the "either or" seems to create a place for freedom. Maybe I am not free, and whether I "choose" this or I "choose" that, I am choosing this or that enslavement. But then is there really an "either or" at all? There is not this versus that, when there is either enslavement or enslavement. If instead I carve out a space where "either or" does exist, am I not forced to admit I've created a space for freedom at least?

Freedom is a noun. You made it a thing, and called it freedom. You said, "There is no such thing as freedom." Freedom, the will, a choice - these are stagnant things.

To see whether "everybody is enslaved" (an act) I think we should look at what is happening (an act) at the moment we think we might be acting freely.

I look for freedom in an act of consent, consenting to whichever enslavement. We aren't necessarily freely choosing the things we choose, but we can give our consent to the choice anyway, and this consenting is the act of freedom. We are not free, we are free anyway, when we consent to this or that.

The free act doesn't come from my will. I don't know what a will is. Freedom doesn't exist over there in my closet and sometimes I grab some freedom when I act, sometimes I don't. Freedom is created during the moments I am consenting to whatever else is, be that enslavement or something else. I consent anyway, and thereby am freely acting, (and thereby, I am). This consent creates the consenting subject who is then immediately chained back to its enslavement.

It might be that moving to a new word, "consent" is just smoke and mirrors. The real either or in this discussion is: am I free to either consent or not consent? And we are really back to square one.

Here is where the word "consent" is better than simply freedom. It does not matter if you are free or not, you can still create your own consent. This is where freedom might be.

I think a surfer creates a perfect picture of where I think freedom lies. Picture yourself on a surfboard, riding a wave. You are not free to run, or maybe even sit down. Really you have limited options now.
In fact, riding along, in total command, you are actually just carried along by the wave, pretending you are taming the wave while you ride at best; if you stand rigid and stiff the wave takes your balance and you are carried along by the wave; if you want to stop surfing and you dive off your board you are carried by the wave. Nowhere in this picture do you really have a choice if you seek to avoid the wave. There forever is the wave and the ocean enslaving the surfer. But while on this ride, for a few seconds or maybe a minute, the surfer is distinct from the wave. Only for these brief moments might there be freedom. During this time the surfer can admit "I know where this is all headed, just as I know how I'm going to get there (the enslavement of the ocean waves), but I consent to ride the board, or see how long I can sit on the board, or dive, each and either or being a rejoining oneself to being carried along by the wave carrying you all along with your consent, with you consenting.

Those fleeting moments where we might give our mere consent to the next enslavement, be it even my own ego or conscience (riding the wave of my psyche), that is such a thing as freedom.

I haven't really analyzed "ego" or "conscience". So I haven't really refuted anything . Or maybe my little surfer story caused a total 180 in your thinking and you think there really is such a thing as freedom now. I can't decide which is more likely (or can I?).

Have you read any Wittgenstein, particularly his later work? He tried to show how the kinds of questions you’re asking result from confusions caused by how our language is grammatically structured around the subject-predicate relation. This linguistic heritage straitjackets the way we think about meaning into boxes, generalities and abstractions like assuming the mind as some kind of container, the existence of a thing as an inert property , and factual knowledge as divorced from the context of interactions in which we use that knowledge and make it relevant and intelligible. In other words, your puzzlement comes less from the way the world is than the presumptions you are tacitly relying on in posing your questions. Start by asking yourself , not what something means in itself, but what you are trying to do with it. — Joshs

I have read Wittgenstein. I think Wittgenstein would agree with me that it is hard to say whether anything I took from him is what he meant. I agree that language and logic are just as much chains as the senses are chains, and the things we seek to understand, are just as foreign to the words we use to express them as things in themselves are to the senses.

What if the self is the linguistic heritage? This question is as confused as any other, but then, we are trying to communicate and only have words, our linguistic heritage, to do so. And that is where my "question" lives - only a mind can make any sense of these words at all. I would agree that maybe I don't know the language to properly ask myself "what are you?" (already this sentence is absurd) but I do not agree that because I don't know the language, I can't even conceive my question. Whether I can express it or not, something is being straight-jacketed; therefore, there is something beyond the words. I disagree that meaning is simply use. Use ties meaning to the words, but it does not tie the words back to anything else, and I don't agree that meaning is merely use.

But I should re-read Wittgenstein, and I appreciate that. I do believe that there are subjects/objects that language and logic can't contain or penetrate, or at least that language is not best suited to. I don't believe that those objects, therefore, do not exist.

I realized another way to put these nebulous thoughts. You know when your sunglasses are on your head, and you are running out the door, gathering your keys, found your wallet, and dammit, you can't find your sunglasses. And you are looking everywhere, check the car, back upstairs, until you realize they are right there on your head. Isn't that what we are doing when we ask what a mind is? We just haven't had the epiphany yet.

...what we think of as the self, mainly comprises those things and circumstances to which we are attached and that we identify with. — Wayfarer

This sounds a bit like "consciousness is consciousness of" which is Sartre. I always liked that. I am conscious of a cat, so the cat in a consciousness can also be called me being conscious of a cat, or just summed up as a particular moment of me, of self. Self is consciousness of...whatever. But why not be conscious of my own particular consciousness? Consciousness of the cat is not the same thing as the cat. I actually am conscious of my own particular consciousness, but at the same time, I have no real object in mind when my object is mind. As you said, the self may be unknowable.

It seems to me that just as an eye does not appear within its own visual field, a hand cannot grasp itself, and willing does not will what it wills ... "mind" is necessarily transparent to itself in order to mind – attend to – nonmind (which includes, among all other ideas, also the idea of "mind"); thus, "being a mind" is functionally perspectival. — 180 Proof

Mind can't see itself when it is busy minding something, like an eyeball can't see itself. And a bit like the mind is pre-occupied with it being consciousness of, and not just consciousness. All seems true. But at the same time, eyeballs can be seen. Hands can be grasped (just not by themselves). Unless we are saying that there is no such thing as mind, or there is no such thing as consciousness. We are thinking of a particular state of affairs when we point out "consciousness". Yet, in a sense, I keep finding that I am saying there is no such thing as an objective "mind" when I am minding my own mind. Or minding my own minding. Is there nothing there anymore, or was there nothing there in the first place? All that said, mind as a perspectival function seems important. I have to think about that.

What are you hoping to find and how does this nebulous introspection differ to smoking weed and postulating infinities? — Tom Storm

I might have been smoking a little weed when I wrote this. What do you mean by introspection? If we could really define what introspection is, we would have to include a firm demonstration of the being who is introspecting, and that is what I am hoping to find, or more like, interested in here.

So what in particular are you looking for an answer to? — Punshhh

It's a fair question. Goes right along with Tom's use of the word nebulous. I don't know. Am I body and soul, material mixed with the immaterial, or am I just a body? But I'm really just making the observation that, if in fact I am a soul, I am currently a soul that has no idea whether souls exist, as I use my soul to wonder about it, which is ironic, I think.

We as conscious thinking subjects, do not seem to operate in terms of the very natural law by which we understand the operation of all natural real things. — Mww

That is interesting. Our very presence is like a contradiction in the regular flow of things.

The brain operates according to natural law, but none of the terms of it are present in our direct, first-person, unmediated thinking. We can never understand how the self-conscious thinking subject arises, by the same means by which we understand all other natural events, so perhaps a better question is….why does it seem like there is such a thing at all? — Mww

Why does it seem like there is a self-conscious thinking subject arising? One answer is, this very exchange of ideas makes it seem like subjects in-themselves exist, but honestly, I don't know! Here, I'm wondering how stupid I would feel if not only does it in fact arise, but it arises right there with me when I ask if it is there, but still I don't know!

The account for the seemingly self-conscious thinking subject ... science proper is not yet sufficiently equipped for it, which is the same as saying the scientist presently has no sufficient method for how to proceed. — Mww

I noted that where I said that maybe we don't have the right tools yet to measure and weigh this "self". I just have no patience for the science on this one, because we can't even seem to get started: right now, it looks like the scientist can't identify an object to study, even though the object is that same scientist.

All that being said, I reject that the things that must be us are the hardest to see. I rather hold the view, that for which the negation, for all practical intents and purposes, is impossible, one had best figure out how to see it, in order to get the best and most out of it. — Mww

I'm with you here. That's why I posted this in the first place. Soul = that for which the negation is impossible. Now, on to the next question, what does this soul smell like.

I never really understood how anyone could pick one philosopher out as the most...anything. Most of them (us) admit the basic conclusion is that they (we) know nothing, or that they have only scratched the surface of what may be the case. If I was to say whose thoughts continue to interest me the most, they would certainly include Nietzsche. But I love metaphysics. I love Nietzschean metaphysics. I get that it is easily kindling, gathered carefully into neat formal piles only to be shown its true purpose in flames. I get that the metaphysician walks on quicksand at every step, on a tightrope. But even Nietzsche did not destroy the Apollonian; he did not banish the spirit from flesh (quite the opposite, he caged it in the flesh, but then, it is spirit to him nonetheless); he did not truly get beyond good and evil (he's basically a grumpy old monk telling us all how wrong we are), but maybe instead he redefined what is good (all-overcoming power of will) and what is bad (weakness hidden by despising). He gave us volumes to think about, but as with so many others, I am left craving. He does not account for everything in my experience.

I currently look at it all like this: all of the philosophers (and many other types of sages and wise folk, and shaman) were essentially trying to put to words the same object, the same subject, the same experience - human experience. They are all beating around the same bush. So the interesting question is "why would Plato come up with what he said, and Nietzsche come up with what he said, when they were both trying to describe the same experience?" It's like they all looked a sculpture and started arguing "it is essentially form and beauty" and "how can you say that when it is chaos and destruction" or "how can you say 'say that' without saying first what 'that' means?" Why would Berkeley say all we need are ideas, and Lucretius say all we need are atoms and void - what object produces such seemingly opposing pictures?

Can't go on without Nietzsche, but I love the pre-socratics, and we have to deal with Kant and Hegel, and Descartes goes on and on way too long imagining God, but he really did say something when he noticed that he existed. The being for whom being is an issue. So many important worldviews to consider and reconsider.

But I generally agree, prior to Nietzsche ethics was more like a fairy tale that would not admit of reality, and post Nietzsche, ethics as a branch of philosophy should be over, but lingers, like a corpse occasionally moving in place as it decomposes.

Maybe philosophy is paradigm recognition. The search for the paradigm.

Thales said to his buddy "See that tree over there?" And his buddy said "yeah, so what?" And Thales said, "It's not what you think it is. It's water." And we've been scratching our heads, asserting "paradigm shift" ever since.