Math and little more. At least in respect to generally or widely accepted notions and definitions of numeric constants and operations. — Outlander

Let me suggest a different approach to the question “What can we be 100% sure of?”. It regards mathematics.

Suppose you put two coins to the table in front of you. After repeating the process, you count the result and the score is – five. Can we even imagine such an outcome and wouldn't we rather recount or suspect, we are under the influence of alcohol? Even if we concede, that mathematical proof is 100% certain, there remains the question: what does mathematics have to do with occurrences in nature? The interesting fact being, that all so-called laws of nature are expressed in the form of mathematical equations.

Can we be 100% certain that the sum of angles in a triangle is 180 or that two straight lines never intersect? Certainly not - considering Riemannian geometry. So the question boils down to: either we can never be certain about regularities in nature and the validity of natural science or we have to re-think our concept of material reality and its connection to a seemingly abstract endeavour like mathematics.

but i dont know why now — Kizzy

Because in his outmoded language he calls it "morality".

I can see very clear connections with the noumenon here, only that this concept encompasses primary qualities to. So, it is a difference of degrees, not of kind. — Manuel

As “substance” in Kant's system is one of the categories, there is no connection whatsoever to the “noumenon”. Please refer to the paragraph on “The Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection” especially the parts regarding the Internal and External (“...the internal determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are nothing but relations“) and Matter and Form (“...Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, just as Locke, in his system of noogony … sensualized the conceptions of the understanding“).

Kant's choice of the term “Ding an sich” or thing-in-itself is utterly deceptive and has led to many futile discussions about what a mysterious thing this might be. Careful study of the CPR reveals: if we leave the thought-process aside, there is no thing (no object) left. Objects exist only in thinking although “Conceptions without intuition are empty and intuition without conception blind”. So both of it is needed and therefore the mere thinking of an object does not make it objectively real.

The German language has only one expression for “Nichts”, whereas in English we find two of them: nothing and naught. “Ding an sich” might therefore be translated best as “nothing” or “no thing”. To call phaenomena “Erscheinung” (appearance) does not in the least diminish their objective reality. On the contrary, it is all there is for knowledge.

Phaenomenon and noumenon are like two sides of the same coin. But there is a fundamental difference between the two and considering objects in space as phaenomena implies as well, that there is some(thing?) other we could call “noumenon”. But far from being associated to Locke's substance it is devoid of any attributes or qualities whatsoever. To ask if the noumenon is the cause for our perceiving this phaenomenal world is the wrong question again as causality is one of categories. It just denotes a limit similar to Wittgenstein's limit of our world as the limit of our language.

So we have a necessary but entirely void concept and it seems, that Kant's philosophy is incomplete. But consider his Critique of Practical Reason, where he maintains to provide a possibility to fill this void though not with knowledge but with something we would call ethics nowadays.

By the way, I was going to ask you, what do time and space have got to do with consciousness in Kant? — Corvus

To be able to communicate in English about Kant's philosophy, I started reading the Critique in an English translation. As my mother tongue is German it was interesting that this translation, even if it was more than one hundred years old, seemed to me much easier to grasp than the original. Maybe it is due to the practical attitude prevailing in English-speaking countries.

Anyway. The foundation of Kant's system of ideas lies in the distinction between two entirely different faculties of human knowledge: intellect and intuition. Thinking, logic and concepts arise from the intellect. Usually intuition is regarded as inferior and by no means connected to knowledge. Quite different here. Time and space are our fundamental intuitions. Interesting is Kant's argument, why time and space are no concepts. Concepts always refer to a variety of things. Time and space, though, are single data for knowledge. Different times (spaces) are always parts of this one time (space).

Thus time and space are essentially different from the intellect but nevertheless in consciousness just the same. Please refer to Sections one and two of Transcendental Aesthetic.

I.e. we would need to find a homunculus? — wonderer1

This would not help us very much, we could even regard advanced forms of AI as something like a homunculus. Awaiting an answer to the question of personal identity from neuroscientists is equally futile. All they could tell us is, that special regions of the brain are activated after a ray of light strikes our eyes.

I thought Kant doesn't make explicit comment on the mind — Corvus

I would even say quite the contrary. The possibility and the limits of metaphysics follow from his exposition concerning time, space and consciousness. Just have a look on the paragraph "What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is".

if your brain was injured or hurt in some physical way, then you would lose the mental abilities — Corvus

Nobody would contradict this and the close connection between brain and consciousness. Nevertheless we would have to find the "ego-neuron" so to speak to locate the point in space where all this information transmitted by our nerves come together to generate our experience of a "personality".

And that is exactly the crux of Kant's argument, that materialism alone does not suffice to explain our experience.

If mind is not in brain, where would it be? — Corvus

So where in the brain is it located? Kant's argument against materialism was, that we cannot find "unity" in the material world as matter as such is always divided or divisible. Our conscious experience on the other hand is basically "one", even in multiple personality.

What is it that you saw in Hegel, despite of his arrogance and lack of shame, that prompted you to invoke this thinker? — Pussycat

I was impressed by his writings on logic ("Wissenschaft der Logik"). Staring from nothingness ("Nichts") to find that being ("Seyn") without any attributes is essentially nothing, found me at home with my occupation during the last few years regarding Zen-Buddhism and the concept of "Shunyata". Applying the notion of dialectic leads quite easily to a dynamic process of everything else. Besides, his emphasis on subjective immediacy ("Unmittelbarkeit") reminded me of Whitehead's "actual entities".

Maybe I should read his "Phänomenologie" after forty years again. But in my opinion he uses to many words (idle talk) and impedes thus seeing the basic ideas, to see, as we say in German "den Wald vor lauter Bäumen nicht".

Is he? Some people genuinely can't help themselves — Lionino

This would lead us to a different type of discussion regarding determinism, causality and personal responsibility (ability to have a choice). Maybe I can provide something like that in the future.

It is a bit cheap to proclaim that AI will never be able to achieve something or other because it hasn't done so yet — SophistiCat

Thank You for Your comment, it might lead to some clarification about what is at stake here.

I have to admit my statement (“ there is no way AI could reach to judgements like we humans can”) is a bit bold and so is the title of this discussion. You are surely right that there have been predictions in history being utterly ridiculous today, for instance the claim of some scientists that no device heavier than air could ever be able to fly.

So let us assume humans in a far future are able to construct robots so perfect, that their behaviour is in no way distinguishable from the behaviour of humans. This could lead to questions like “are these machines conscious?” or “do they have an inner life like we have?”. Nevertheless we could still have our discussion about “judgement” at large. It is a matter of “principle” so to speak and principles depend on our world-view.

There have been philosophers stating, that “in principle” we cannot know anything about things independent of our faculties of knowledge at all. Even if You do in no way consent to such idealism, You cannot prove that it is wrong. All You can do is construct Your own system of ideas and provide convincing arguments for it in contrast to the other opinion.

The exciting feature of our forum is that we can discuss conflicting arguments and maybe learn from diverging points of view.

Leaving it to humans is fatal too. — Lionino

Sadly enough You are right and many a dictator even nowadays proves it. That is why, in democratic systems at least, not a single person alone can make decisions concerning a whole population. AI cannot be made responsible for its decisions, but a scoundrel very well.

In fact, AI is parasitically dependent on human intervention. — Pantagruel

The actual hype regarding AI does not take into account, that it is totally dependent on the type and quality of data fed into it. As the links You provided show quite clear, that a short-circuit in this process (AI fed on data created by other AI) will eventually lead to a collapse of the entire system.

Even today conspiracy-theories are recursively amplified by AI that present users of social networks with contents similar to the ones they have been interested before.

The resort to Hegel doesn't help either, much more idle talk there. — Pussycat

I agree with You. I even think that most of Hegel's writings is not just idle but pompous word tinkle. Nevertheless I find his basic assumption of dynamic evolution of ideas interesting. Wouldn't even this forum be quite dull and uninspiring without conflicting opinions that might lead us to new insights?

You are seriously underestimating the intelligence of parrots — Agree-to-Disagree

Sorry, if I did that! But still, I suppose that even today's AI can easily do what Alex is able to do. If these are the criteria for intelligence and maybe even self-consciousness, then AI certainly is sentient.

Again it depends. It is not that simple. — Corvus

Of course it is not that simple. But this is just the interesting point about our discussion (for me at least).

To come back to the parrot. There have been long debates about the relation between a concept and its meaning. The idea, that a concept can have a meaning rests on the assumption, that there is a two-fold relation between concept and meaning. Now C. S. Peirce came up with a refreshing suggestion. What, if this relation was three-fold: sign (as he called it), meaning and "interpretant" or someone who understands that sign. Signs (words, signposts, utterances) do not have a meaning unless there is someone who understands it.

Just imagine, You see a Chinese symbol You have never seen before. It cannot have any meaning to You. Someone born and raised in China thought easily connects a meaning to that character. AI can easily put forward a string of expressions You and I can link a meaning to. But AI itself can never grasp the meaning of its utterances. It is like a parrot saying "Good morning" but never realizing what that means.

It strikes me as a little like wanting one's puppets to come alive. :up: — BC

AI is comparable to a sophisticated parrot being able to say more than "Hello" and "Good morning". But in the end it just mindlessly spews out what has been fed into it without actually knowing what it says.

There's a lot of philosophy about this, it's normally anti-materialists who insist that all materialists must consider consciousness epiphenomenal, actual materialists have a wide range of views on that question. — flannel jesus

I am no anti-materialist at all, but I cannot see how we can maintain, that consciousness is not a mere by-product of occurrences in the physical world and still avoid Descartes' dichotomy as well. Please give me some clues on these materialistic ideas.

As it happens, I can say that it is impossible that everything is a simulation. A simulation needs to be a simulation of something. — Ludwig V

But just think of the film "Matrix". In principle we could connect a computer to all the nerves of a human brain and thus simulate a "real" world. Virtual reality is just a first step towards this "goal" and so is creating artificial limbs a person can activate with his brain.

Descates' argument, that I cannot even trust my memories, because some evil spirit might have created me including all these memories just an instant ago, is on similar bearings. He had to take refuge to god to reach safe ground again after all his doubts.

Immediate appearance is before the processing. Object here just indicates that which is processed, depending on which sense is affected. The object for the ear is sound, for the tongue, chemicals, etc. The intellectual system, metaphysically speaking, the brain physically speaking, determines how the object of sense, referred to as sensation, is to be known by that system. :up: — Mww

This really is quite close to the ideas presented by Kant in his Critique!

Really, what a strange thing to ask in a philosophy forum! :brow: — Alkis Piskas

Of course You are right! It was meant to be a bit provocative. I could re-formulate my question into: How can You convince someone, who thinks that philosophy is just idle talk, that at least not all of this kind is mere empty stream of words?

I have nothing to offer on Kant or Hegel, Plato or Aquinas. — BC

And this is not required at all. On the contrary, adherence to a specific philosopher or type of philosophy might even be regarded as an obstacle to the necessary ingredients of all philosophy: open-mindedness, curiosity and creative impetus.

the immediate appearance of objects to the senses is a fundamental prerequisite. — Mww

But take the signal traveling through the optical nerve for instance. Besides the fact, that it is heavily pre-processed by the retina: where is the "immediate" object?

It isn't all idle talk; sometimes it's deadly serious :up: — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course in a forum like this it would be surprising, if anyone would admit that he's talking rubbish himself. The lack of esteem in much of the rest of the population might have its cause in that for common sense the relation to our daily life is not easily visible and sometimes even wanting. To unprepared people it might sound like mere word tinkle.

But take for instance the controversy regarding determinism. The related question "does it really matter, how we live or does it make no difference in the end?" has a strong relation to daily life.

Dunno, but maybe these days the term has been transitioned onto one of those newfangled language games, where idealism of old is now raw subjectivism, or some other such nonsense. — Mww

But why is it nonsense? Maybe You can explain it to me. Otherwise I can take it only as subjective opinion and further discussing nonsense does not interest me.

If that in which we live exists merely from our ideas of it, why do we have and employ apparatus for the receptivity of various modes of physically real affectations caused by really existent things?
————-

“….. In the transcendental æsthetic we proved that everything intuited in space and time, all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as presented to us—as extended bodies, or as series of changes—have no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought. This doctrine I call Transcendental Idealism….” (A491/B519, in Kemp Smith,1929) — Mww

What do You mean by "really existent things"? That term is exactly what is at stake here. Not many people would earnestly doubt the real objective existence of things in space and time. At least I do not. Nevertheless the question about the nature of space and time and the validity of scientific theories remains. Your quote regarding Kant's Critique shows it quite clear, that Transcendental Idealsms has nothing whatsoever to do with ordinary idealism or solipsism.

If it is the case the spatialtemporal world resides in our intelligence, insofar as “it is of our own making”, it’s absurd to then suppose we live in it. — Mww

Interesting objection indeed. Would You not say a dream is of Your own making? And as long as You dream is it absurd to say You live in that dream?

Eg 2 hydrogen atoms consistently bond with 1 oxygen atom when they can because the stuff that makes these atoms up is defined, at it's very core, to behave in a particular way? — flannel jesus

If You can omit the notion "atom" at all, I am quite familiar with Your idea. An oxygen atom, for instance, is then only a bundle of laws, or as I would express it "a compound of related properties" and nothing else.

like the Michelson-Morley experiment didn't go so well with Newtonian physics, then we try to find a logical model for it. — ssu

The formulation for this discussion has been chosen to be a bit provocative on purpose. The question which laws are meant has not even been touched. The evolution of (incompatible) scientific theories is a different topic. The general issue then is: are there regularities in nature or are we only imposing them to be able to better plan our lives.

Nature does not comply to any laws, simply because nature is the laws. — Sir2u

But should laws not refer to something? Law itself being nature sounds, for me at least, a bit inconceivable.

Perhaps discovery and invention are not so opposed as common belief would have it? — Moliere

I quite agree to Your interesting contribution. In the German language "to invent" translates into "erfinden". "Finden" i.e. "to find" is actually part of this word.

The most that philosopher Kant claimed about our knowledge of what exists outside us is in his Refutation of Idealism in B275 of the Critique of Pure Reason. He concludes "I am conscious of things outside me". IE, he can neither know what these things are or even why these things are as they are. — RussellA

I am glad You mentioned this. It might be considered weird, that someone describing his philosophy as “transcendental idealism” writes a paragraph called “Refutation of Idealism”. The sole point of interest here hinges around the notion “outside”. Kant's ambiguous use of the term leads to many mis-interpretations. Here “outside” can only mean “outside in space” because otherwise it would be a contradiction to the rest of his philosophical system. Space however is one of the intuitive conceptions and therefore in consciousness.

Well I disagree with this antirealist suggestion, — 180 Proof

Sorry, if my remarks have led You to think I am antirealist. If being a realist means to believe in the objective reality of the world surrounding us, I am no antirealist at all. Still conscious experience is our only means of getting in contact to this world. The question, if we can infer from this experience to something outside of consciousness, has been a long dispute among philosophers.

My position is: we cannot. The paradox situation here is, though, speaking of a world of conscious experience automatically implies the notion of something beyond this experience. In Kant's terminology this something is called “noumenon”, a necessary concept, but “like an empty space” without any trace of structure. If You are interested in Buddhist philosophy a comparison to the term “shunyata” might be of interest.

Knowing what will happen does not mean we know why it will happen — RussellA

Indeed, that is the case. But philosophy might be considered as an attempt to understand why we can know what will happen (if at all). Newton's laws of gravitation describe what will happen to an apple falling to the ground. But the connection between mathematics and natural science is not part of his formulas.

...these concepts are actually the respective world we live in and beyond our world-view and in abstraction from it there is definitely nothing left we could talk about – — Pez

I don't understand what you're saying here. Please reformulate and clarify. — 180 Proof

Just imagine someone living in the Middle Ages, believing the earth was the center of the universe. Such a person lived actually in a different world than we do today. To say, these people only believed, the whole universe is rotating around the globe whereas “in reality” our sun is just one star among millions and earth a planet circling it, does not meet the case in point. It describes only the world-view until the beginning of the last century. Nowadays we'd have to reformulate this view according to new theories regarding the universe and the structures of matter at large (Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics).

What I wanted to say is: “in reality” can only mean “in relation to our concepts regarding reality”. These concepts change and so does the world we live in.

I tend to look at maunderings of these kinds as a kind of affectation — Ciceronianus

Sorry, that You can see these questions as mere 'maundering'. I am interested in serious discussion, so, if You can, come up with something less idle talk.

Nature doesn't 'comply' to anything — Vera Mont

The expression was chosen deliberately, I could have used 'obey' as well. The implicit question here is: what is the difference between the so-called laws of nature and civil law, that is: do we discover these laws of nature or do we just invent them.

Acceptance of the lack of certainty, and the lack of any need for it, alters the conception of natural law. The most interesting view of natural law I've come across is the "evolutionary view" of natural law favored by C.S. Peirce. It happens that the universe evolved the way it did, and as a consequence certain "habits" developed on which we can rely (statistically, but not as absolute laws), but in other respects the universe remains subject to inquiry and undetermined. — Ciceronianus

In other words, "physical laws" are invariants in the structure of physical models which attempt to explain regularities experimentally observed in the physical world. To the degree such models themselves are objective, the "physical laws" derived from them are objective. — 180 Proof

I am pretty sure that almost all of us will agree to the assertion that a concept (model) referring to a thing (phenomenon) is not this thing (phenomenon) itself. But to stretch this conclusion to its limits by saying: these concepts are actually the respective world we live in and beyond our world-view and in abstraction from it there is definitely nothing left we could talk about – not many people would subscribe to.

But the philosophical system brought forward by Immanuel Kant is indeed of that kind. This philosophy, like any other, is itself a mere complicated system of concepts. When he asks therefore “how are synthetical judgements a priori possible” we should read it like this “how can we conceive the possibility of synthetical judgements a priori”. Charles Sanders Peirce can be regarded as someone generalizing Kant's ideas. His main focus was on symbols and their meaning. He maintained, that every cognition is mediated by symbols and therefore we can never know anything regarding things per se. Instead of Kant's static system of categories and intuitions he was advocate of a dynamic view of symbols. We constantly invent new concepts regarding nature and therefore new ways of knowledge, e.g. Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics in contrast to Newton's classical mechanics.

C. S. Peirce died in 1914 and Kant's Critique is nearly 250 years old. Are these ideas therefore out of date or still a valuable source of insights?

It depends what the expression "the laws of nature" is referring to. It could be referring to "the laws of nature" existing as concepts within the human mind, or it could be referring to the laws of nature existing outside the human mind and independently of the human mind. — RussellA

The "laws of nature" are just descriptions of how things behave. — Michael

This is exactly the question. To Bertrand Russell we owe a nice bon mot regarding causality: The farmer's wife calls her chicken every day 'put, put, put' to feed them. But one day 'put, put, put' they are slaughtered. Now the question is: are we in the position of these chicken or can we rely on being fed every day?