Comments

  • Counter Argument for the Evolution problem for Epiphenomenalism
    This is a great article! And it directly discussed my point on pleiotropic genes.

    The author of this article uses James’s Evolutionary Argument as a counter to this point: If consciousness is just an evolutionary byproduct with no causal power, how have animals learned to fear pain, e.g. burning, starvation, and enjoy pleasure, e.g. eating, sex, which all seem like mental events? Basically, consciousness cannot be a non-causal byproduct of evolution, because it seems to directly affect our survival.

    My reply: I’m working on Huxley’s Epiphenomenalism, ‘consciousness’ is just an observer in a physical body, with no causal power. E.g. if a body is hurt, physical signals are sent to the brain, which are handled, e.g. by flinching, physically. The conscious experience of thinking about the pain and feeling the pain are separate and non-causal. On this view, I believe that James’s argument is invalid, the process of handling pain and sex are completely physical, and we have physical drives to avoid / indulge in these actions.