What is a strong argument against the concievability of philosophical zombies? The argument against the conceivability of zombies could be that there is no logical way to know whether you are conceiving of zombies without qualia, or simply conceiving of replicants. Since qualia is inherently subjective in nature, there is no way for us to conceive of "what it would be like" to not have a "what it would be like", as that would be akin to conceiving of nothingness, which we (or at least I) cannot truly do. So in the end, you could say there's no real way to differentiate between zombies without qualia and simple replicants that just act like zombies. The subjective nature of conscious experience makes it impossible for us to conclusively conceive of the scenario of "zombies" as a coherent metaphysical possibility. We're really just imagining duplicates, not true qualia-less beings.