Yes, I think so. But it doesn't really matter for my purposes here, for if he never intended it to operate as a justification for the state, then it presents no challenge to my view, and if he did intend it to be a justificaiton for a state, then it is a rubbish one.

oes Rawls call this a "hypothetical contract"? How does he describe it? And how does he use this thought experiment to justify the formation of the state? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, he doesn't suppose us actually to have signed such a contract. It's just a thought experiment called 'the original position'. It's designed to provide us with insight into what fairness requires. And I think it does. But it doesn't do anything to show the state to be justified. The fact we 'would have' agreed to certain rules doesn't a) mean we have, b) entitle others to treat us as if we have agreed to them.

So, as a thought experiment designed to give us insight into fairness, it has something to be said for it. As an attempt at justifying the state, it's rubbish

Rawls argues that we gain insight into what rules it would be fair to make us live by, by imagining what rules-of-the-game we'd agree to prior to knowing our fate in the natural lottery. The rules we'd agree to under those conditions of ignorance are the ones it is then fair to make us live by once our hand has been dealt. For though it is by luck that some of us have marketable talents and others not, the rules are - by hypothesis - ones we'd all have agreed to prior to knowing such matters. So, just as it is fair to hold us to the rules of a game if we all agreed to those rules prior to knowing what hand of cards we'd be dealt, likeewise it is fair to regulate our lives by rules that we'd have all agreed to prior to knowing what hand of talents and disadvantages nature would deal to us.

The problem is that this is a hypothetical contract and hypothetical contracts are worthless and do not justify treating others in the hypothetically agreed-to ways. You would have commissioned me to fix your car, but you didn't. The hypothetical contract you'd have entered into with me does nothing at all to justify me demanding payment with menaces. And with that, Rawls's view goes down the toilet, I think. It may provide us with a useful thought experiment to gain insight into what's fair, but it does nothing to justify the state.

I was some kind of Rawlsian.

And here too, you might consider looking at arguments for the state. There's obviously lots of writing there, but two I can recommend that I find interesting because they're not just theory are Timothy Snyder (whom I quoted on the Holocaust) and Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, haha, I suppose my point in presenting what I take to be a powerful case for anarchism is to extract from others arguments for the state that can overcome the one I presented.

Because Huemer's anarchist conclusion follows from his premises, then by hypothesis his case refutes all other cases. Someone who thinks there's a good case for the state would need to show how it challenges the assumptions that Huemer's argument makes.

I am familiar-ish with the sorts of case people make for the state. And to date I have been unimpressed by all of them.

For example, appeals to beneficial consequences have already been dealt with. A) such appeals are misguided given that rights operate to place constraints on the extent to which violence can be used against people to secure good consequences. Can violence be used against me to make me eat more healthily? No. I eat unhealthily. If you used violence against me to make me eat more greens, you'd definitely improve my health. That's irrelevant, though, isn't it? For I have a right to eat what I want and you have no right to prevent me, even for my own good. So those who appeal to beneficial or harmful consequences are missing the point. Their empirical claims are false - the state is terrible at everything (again, the police are absolutely rubbish - and rubbish the world over - at solving crimes). But it wouldn't matter if they were true, for again, rights constrain what can be done to an individual in the name of securing good consequences.

Others - Hobbes and Locke and Rousseau - appeal to the notion of a hypothetical contract. They point out, on different grounds, that we - or our ideal selves - 'would' have agreed to commission the state to do as it does, and so because of this that somehow justifies it in actually doing it.

That's a terrible argument though. Imagine your car has an engine problem. I decide to fix it for you (you did not ask me). Then I bill you. And my bill is low. So low, in fact, that you would have hired me to do it for that price. Ok - well, do I have a right to extract payment from you with violence if necessary? No. Perhaps you ought to pay me, but I don't have a right to the money for you didn't commission me. The fact you would have done so had I asked is neither here nor there.

I think that serves to undermine all those cases for the state that appeal to hypothetical contracts. It's actual contracts that count, at least when it comes to being entitled to extract payment with menaces for a job done.

One is whether rights are better conceived as natural or positive. You believe natural, but you ought to at least look at the case for treating rights as positive. — Srap Tasmaner

That doesn't seem correct to me. I am assuming people have moral rights. But I am not assuming that they are natural (not that I am quite sure what that means) or that they are negative (I take it that the opposite of a positve right is a negative right, not a natural right, and the opposite of a natural right is a non-natural right).

I take the very notion of a right to have the justification of violence built into it. If I have a right to something, then that just means that violence can be used, if necessary, to provide me with it or, if it is a negative right, to prevent someone else from depriving me of what i have a right to.

My (or rather, Huemer's) case for anarchism doesn't depend on how many positive versus negative rights we have, for it is sufficient for the case to go through that we do not have a right to extract payment with menaces for deciding to police the rights or others. So long as it's clear - and I think it is - that a mafiosi is wrong in demanding protection money with menaces, then the case goes through, I think. For if we accept this, then it should be clear that the state is not entitled to claim for itself a monopoly on protecting our rights (some or any of them) and is not entitled to bill us for then doing so.

Is that what the state does? I don't receive an invoice from the police if they stop someone from attacking me. The attacker might be billed, but the protected person is not. — Echarmion

You're taxed to pay for the police whether you wish to be or not. And if you refuse to pay your taxes, the government will eventually imprison you.

Some of them are, not all of them. And mostly the threat of prison isn't really what motivates people, though ultimately it can come down to that. — Echarmion

The injustice of the government is not a function of what motivates people to obey it, but the fact it claims a monopoly on the use of violence - and this is unjust - and that it will actually use violence against those who disobey its rulings. Maybe it will turn a blind eye to some, but the fact is it does imprison people (loads of people) because they disobeyed it.

To use the Mafia example: let's say I am running a small business and the local mafia turn up and tell me that I need to pay them protection money, or else. And I decide to pay them because I think they'll do a good job. That is, my motivation is entirely to do with how effective I think they'll be at protecting my business and has nothing to do with the threat of violence they made to me. Well, that doesn't affect the injustice of their behaviour on iota. So regardless of why people obey the governments rules, the government has no business producing any rules and making people obey them.

This seems to imply that what makes governments unjust is primarily the monopoly on violence. — Echarmion

Yes, that's fair, although it would also be the unjust use to which they put violence.

I take it to be obvious to reasonable people that it would be quite misguided of me to insist that I and I alone am the only one entitled to use violence to protect other people's rights, or indeed to protect some subset of people's rights. I am entitled to use violence to protect other people's rights (if those rights are directly under threat, that is). But I have no more entitlement to do so than anyone else, other things being equal. If I attempted to stop others from using violence to protect other people's rights, then I would be behaving unjustly.

Yet this is what the government does and it is partly what makes it a government rather than another thing. The government insists that it must be the one who polices our rights, or some of them. If my house is burgled, for instance, then I am not allowed to hunt down the burglars myself and conduct my own review into their guilt and the degree of punishment they deserve. All of this, the government insists, I must allow the government to do on my behalf, whether i want it to or not.

That is unjust. It'd be unjust if I tried to do that in respect of others, and so it is unjust of teh government to try and do it.

The other thing governments do - and that seems partly definitive of them - is extract payment for its services with menaces, regardless of whether anyone to whom the services are being provided has contracted them.

On its injustice: I take it that we can all agree that if the local mafia turn up at a business and say to the business owner "we are going to provide you with protection and you must pay us 30% of your profits or we'll smash your business up and imprison you" then this would be unjust behaviour on the mafia's part.

Yet that is exactly what the government does. It does not invite businesses to pay for its protection, but insists upon providing the protection and insists upon being paid. I take it to be obvious too that labelling a mafia a 'government' does no moral work and will not render justifiable what would otherwise have been unjust.

I accept that it may be that we can find no definition of a government that adequately distinguishes it from a mafia......but that, in effect, only operates to prove my point. For if we can recognize the injustice of a mafia, and if there is no relevant difference between a government and a mafia except in terms of how effective they have been at monopolizing the use of violence, then the injustice of one transfers to the other.

What a mature response. You confirm what I already believed about you.

But you are not paying respect to the reality (truth) of the situation. The truth is that there is significant multitude of individuals in the world who do not have "moral sensibility", by your standards. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am just repeating myself, but if someone wants to resist my argument by doubling down on grossly implausible claims, then that's fine. It'd be one thing if you could show how an apparently implasuible claim was entailed by some very plausible ones, but that's not what you're doing. You're just asserting that violence is justified under most circumstances. Fine. I think that's obviously false, but I don't think it's going to be worth arguing with someone who thinks it's obviously true, for I could only argue for it by appealing to cases about which you will think violence is fine and I not. So what's the point? You're welcome to your view, but I don't think it has anything to be said for it and so I don't see it as providing the basis for a reasonable challenge to anything I have argued. I am simply relieved that we are discussing this remotely and not in person, otherwise you'd no doubt have used violence against me by now!

Ha, ha, your logic (illogic) is laughable Clearbury. — Metaphysician Undercover

You see? I can't argue with someone like you.

Actually the Holocaust may not be the best example for your case. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it's perfect. For every reasonable person - and it is only reasonable people who are worth discussing philosophical matters with, as philosophy essentially involves consulting reason - agrees that the Nazis violated the rights of those whom they exterminated. And so as there is such universal agreement on the matter - at least among those who are sensitive to reason and not indifferent to it - then it serves as a useful and powerful demonstrator of the fact that moral rights are not given by our communities, but are had already by persons and that the whole business of trying to justify governments is about trying to show how a government of this or that sort is a more effective way of respecting them than another.

One, that it is unjust to use violence except in "rare cases" — Metaphysician Undercover

That claim of mine is true, but - as I just explained - my case for anarchy does not depend on it, for it is sufficient for it to go through that the two premises I described are true.

If you think you're often morally permitted to use violence against others then that's fine - I simply disagree and so, I'd wager, does virtually everyone of moral sensibility.

But to get to anarchy, it is sufficient that we are not allowed to decide to protect someone's rights and then bill that person and extract payment with menaces.

You don't think that a person has a right to get paid for their work? Is that what this claim is about? If you work for me, and I refuse to pay you, am I not violating your rights by not paying you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I am getting impatient with this constant strawman you keep setting up. If I, without asking you and without you commissioning me to do so, decide to make it my business to protect your rights, can I send you a bill for doing so and use violence against you if you decide not to pay? The answer to that question is obvious to virtually everyone: no. That's all my case requires.

As I pointed out to you, and you have still not replied, no logic allows you to move from the premise that it is only acceptable to use violence to protect rights, to the following conclusion, that it is almost always wrong to use violence, or that these are "rare cases". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a strawman version of my view. There are TWO premises that get one to the anarchist conclusion, not one.

First, a person is only entitled to use violence to protect rights (either their own or someone else's). Therefore that is all a government is entitled to do.

Now, if you had read carefully what I said in the beginning of this thread, or what I just said in the sentence above, you'll note that this means the government IS entitled to use violence to protect our rights. You've completely misrepresented my view, then, in supposing that I think the government is not entitled to protect our rights. It absolutely is entitled to do that, for that is something we're entitled to do.

The SECOND claim - that in conjunction with the first gets one to anarchy - is that though a person is entitled to use violence to protect another's rights, they are not entitled to use violence to extract payment for doing so (not from the person whose rights one has decided to protect, anyway).

As I stated very clearly, it is at this point that the government, if it sticks to what it is entitled to do, ceases to be a government at all, and is just a bunch of people touting for business in a free market.

Note, it does not matter how extensive or minimal our rights may be - that's not what my argument turns on - for all it requires is the truth of those two claims above.

In case you think governments do a good job of protecting your rights, look into how well police perform at solving crimes.

It's awful. I live in a first world country. And in my country, the police only 'solve' (and I put this in scare quotes because it reflects arrests, not convictions) 38% of reported crime (and note, they reckon most crimes aren't reported).

I just read an article on American conviction rates for serious crimes involving violence...the author concludes that approx. 2% result in conviction. 2% of the worst crimes are properly solved and result in the punishment of their perpetrator.

Feeling safe now?

The police are terrible - terrible - at their job. And of course they will be - why wouldn't they be? There's no competition.

No, I am ignoring those whose views seem to me to be indefensible. Like I say, life's too short to argue with people who a) can't recognize an argument and b) assert claims that enjoy no support from reason (and thus have no probative value whatever). But I am not preventing others from engaging with those people if they so wish, I just think that it's pointless for me to do so, given all they're doing is doubling-down on implausible claims. That's simply not interesting. What's interesting - intellectually - is showing how superficially implausible views are entailed by highly plausible claims.

This topic, note, is not about how best to argue and with whom. It is about the defensibility of anarchy. I have argued - and I really have made a case, whether you like it or not - that all governments are unjust.
My case, incidentally, is not original. It is a case made recently by professional philosopher Michael Huemer. So, if you think I have made no case, then you think that the argument of a well-respected professional philosopher is not, in fact, a case at all, but just a series of arbitrary assertions. How likely is that to be true? That doesn't mean the argument is sound, of course, but it does underline the absurdity of supposing it to be no case at all. It is a case. And it's a strong one.

It is clear to reason that it is unjust for individuals to use violence or the threat of violence against others apart from in rare cases where this is needed to protect a person's rights. And it is equally clear to reason that if a person decides to protect another person's rights, they are not entitled then to bill that person for having done so and extract payment with menaces. From those claims - claims that seem intuitively clear to the reason of most and that it would be intuitively highly costly to reject - anarchy follows.

In a democratic society they can be removed. — Outlander

In an anarchy there's no one there to be removed! Elections are a wholly inadequate solution to a problem that governments create: concentration of power.

Elections do no moral work when they have not been agreed to by all of those involved. For example, if you and your friends vote to put me in prison, doesn't magically justify you putting me in prison. Why? Because I didn't agree to the vote.

I've made my position very clear and argued for my view. A view that entails that the Jews who were exterminated by the Nazis did not have their rights violated is obviously false - it is refuted by the absurdity of that implication - and someone who simply doubles-down on that implication isn't worth arguing with. Again, I wouldn't discuss the merits of an interesting sum with someone who it transpired is convinced that 1 + 1 = a banana.

You keep saying things to me. Manners require that I respond.

Saying that your opponent is obviously wrong and leaving it at that is a conversation-ender. — SophistiCat

Yes, that was my goal. I don't wish to have a conversation with someone who thinks the Nazis didn't violate the rights of those whom they exterminated, or who can't see that this is what the view that rights are created by society implies. I wouldn't discuss mathematics with someone who thought 2 + 3 = 95 or 'an elephant', for what would be the point in that?

Thanks. I agree that the vulnerable would still be vulnerable under an anarchy, but I think they'd be better off overall. For the weak are weaker still under a government, as they are not allowed to protect their own interests in the way they see fit but must instead allow the government to do so on their behalf (if it sees fit, of course - there's nothing in the idea of a government that ensures those in power will care about promoting the interests of the weakest...indeed, this is unlikely given that the priority of those who seek out power is going to be to keep power, not promote anyone else's interests).

But whatever the consequences, we can, I think, see that a government - even one set up by those who think they know best how to look after the weakest - is unjust. For if all government employees ceased to be paid tomorrow, would they be obliged to continue doing their jobs? And obliged to such an extent that the rest of us could force them to do so? I think the answer to that is a clear no. And that shows, I think, that the obligation to look out for the weakest (which I do not deny we have), is not such as to permit others to use force to make us fulfil it. And so therefore the government is not allowed to use force either

The poorest and most vulnerable are not safer under governments. Rather than depending on the generosity and decency of those around them, they depend on the generosity and decency of those in power. Now given that those in power are bad people - for good people do not seek it out - the vulnerable come to depend on the good will of bad people. That's not at all in their best interests.

Takethe police. They're rubbish. Everywhere they are rubbish. They're incredibly ineffective at solving crimes. And why wouldn't they be? There's no competition. How's that good? The most vulnerable are worse off for there being a government monopolized police force, not better off. A wholly unregulated private sector would provide much better policing than the state ever would. Or at least, I can see no good argument for thinking otherwise.

The problem here is the complete omission of those who would not only defy your basic rights, but use -- not only threat of force -- but force, willfully and in many cases gleefully. Often times for the sheer joy of it absent of anything to gain or rectify ie. "for fun". This is the dynamic of the world we live in. So, your options are a structured society where disputes can be solved in a court of law and grievances can be made known socially enacting real social change, or you can have the same threats of force and use of force, with no accountability or avenue for recourse on your part whatsoever. Any sort of attempt to reframe this unchangeable dynamic is simply dishonest. — Outlander

I'm afraid I don't follow your point. Are you just observing that there are people who enjoy violating the rights of others? I don't deny this. I am pointing out that those in power are among them!

What governments do is allow some of those who enjoy violating the rights of others the opportunity to do so on an industrial scale.

I don't follow your argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're just confusing violating someone's rights with them not having any. Look, if you think the Jews had no moral rights under the Nazis then it follows that the Nazis did nothing wrong in exterminating them. I can't argue with someone who thinks that way.

I am arguing that all governments are unjust. That's a moral claim. I am not claiming that governments don't exist or won't emerge over time.
If I argue that killing someone is wrong, it is no reply to point out that people will kill people.

I explicitly addressed concerns about consequences in my opening post!

As for 'proving' things - I don't have to 'prove' anything. That's a ludicrous standard. In my opening post I made an 'case' for anarchism - I showed how it is implied by some moral claims that are not seriously in dispute. What you need to do is show that my conclusion is not implied by those premises, or that those premises are false.

My case for anarchy is based on moral evidence. The issue is much simpler than people think. It is almost always wrong to use violence or the threat of it against another person. No one - no one worth arguing with, anyway - seriously disputes that. Yes, it can be justified under some circumstances - when one is in immediate danger or someone else is - but not otherwise. (There's of course room for a bit of debate over when one can legitimately use violence against another, but not much....every reaonable person is going to agree that the boundaries are pretty tight, even if there's no consensus on precisely where they lie).

It is also obvious that having more power than someone else doesn't make one more entitled to use violence against another. I am much stronger than Susan - does that mean I can use violence against her? No, obviously not. Might does not make right.

From those simple and uncontroversial moral axioms, we can derive the verdict that no one in power is entitled to use their power - their ability to use violence and the threat of it - against others in ways that we ourselves would not be entitled to.

And in one fell swoop, that reveals the injustice of the vast bulk of what the government does.

But that leaves those exceptions - the cases where we are entitled to use violence against another, such as self-defence or the defence of another's life. If someone is attacking you, I am entitled to defend you against that attack, with violence if necessary. So, aren't those in power entitled to do the same?

Yes, of course, for that is just an application of the same basic 'might does not make right' principle. If I am entitled to protect you from attack, then so too is someone else.

The problem is that though I am entitled to protect you from attack, I am not entitled subsequently extract some payment from you for having done so and use violence against you if you fail to pay. And I am certainly not morally permitted to announce that I will defend you from attacks (whether you wish me to or not) and then insist you start paying me for that service (and threaten you with violence if you do not pay me).

I take that to be obvious. Yet that is what the government does. So, if we imagine - for the sake of illustration - that government to be a person, then it is behaving immorally, for though some of what it undertakes to do it is perfectly entitled to do - as is any person - its insistence that we pay for its services or face violent consequences is clearly unjust.

And now we have arrived at anarchy. Nothing the government does is just. For if the government sticks only to interfering in our lives in ways that we would be entitled to interfere with each other, and sticks as well to inviting payment for such justified interference rather than extracting it with menaces, then it ceases to be a government at all and is just a bunch of individuals touting for business.

I think conseqentialism is false (consequences are clearly not the only things that matter morally speaking). But even if it is true, it's not at all clear to me that anarchism has the worst consequential profile.

When most people entertain the idea of anarchy they think of the first weeks. But as a consequentialist you must think of the longer-term consequences.

Governments are terrible at everything they do (apart from waging wars - they're extremely good at doing that).

Imagine shoes were government issued. Everyone needs shoes....so it's too important to let individuals sort the matter out for themselves....no, some people who like being in charge and spending other pepole's money on things to make themselves feel good need to take charge of shoe production.

What would shoes be like? Would there be lots of choice of cheap shoes? Er, no. The government would produce shoes very inefficiently (contracts given to friends, no free market to drive down costs or improve the product). And the shoes would be terrible.

That's going to be the same for everything else. It's going to be the same for security and justice systems, for example. You think the police do a good job anywhere? I don't. Why would they?

So, as a consequentialist I think you need radically to rethink what things would be like with anarchy.

Long term, virtually everyone would be better off under an anarchy. Apart from criminals and power-hungry war mongers.

If you’re only going to argue with people who agree with you, you probably don’t belong on the forum. — T Clark

Willful misunderstanding. Did I say I can't argue with people I disagree with? No. I said I can't argue with someone who thinks the Nazis didn't violate the rights of the Jews they exterminated. Why? Because that person isn't worth arguing with.

I also can't be bothered arguing with people like you, who misrepresent positions. Life's too short.

I have justified my belief. Perhaps you missed it. Here it is again: if governments determine what rights people have then the Jews had no rights under the Nazis (and thus in exterminating millions of Jews, the Nazis violated no one's rights, certianly not the Jews they exterminated).
The Nazis violated the rights of the millions of Jews they exterminated
Therefore, governments do not determine what rights people have.

That is a case. It is an argument and its conclusion follows from its premises and its premises are obviously true.

When it comes to making a case what one must do is appeal to premises that have some degree of self-evidence to them, otherwise one is merely reporting one's own views and not giving others any reason to think your views may be true.

I think someone who just blankly states that governments confer rights on people is the person who is making no case and is just expressing a patently false view of theirs.

Governments can and regularly do - and if I am right, are doing so all the time by just existing - violate people's rights.

Insofar as one can justify a government, one needs to show how the existence of a government respects - or does not disrespect, if that is different - people's rights.

Note, I am talking about moral rights here, not legal ones.

I am making the point that anarchy is just and all governments are unjust. I don't think that's a trivial point. That seems highly significant, if true.

I do not understand your question. My defence of anarchism is not an expression of personal preference. I would prefer to live in a society in which everyone is made to do serve my every need. But that would not be a morally just set-up.

Similarly, there are many decisions I have made that, looking back, were rather silly and didn't maximally benefit me. I could now be much richer and healthier if I hadn't made them, and so would prefer that someone had overridden my freedom of choice on those occasions. But that too would be unjust.

In arguing that anarchism is the only form of just government (or, which is the same thing, arguing that no government is a just government), I am not describing what I think will maximally benefit me or you or anyone else, or expressing any desire of mine.

No, they did have rights and those rights were not respected. I am not sure I can argue with someone who thinks a person has a right if and only if the government of any community of which they are a member says they do. That view is so plainly false to me that I am at a loss to know how to argue with someone who is willing to embrace its implications.

1. There is no such thing as entitlement, the universe does not have an inherent karmic system. No one is entitled to anything.
2. The concept of "rights" only makes sense in the context of a governing body which can establish and protect those rights against negative actors. Otherwise its simply a value you hold, which has no bearing on anyone else but yourself. — Ourora Aureis

Those seem like indefensible claims.

First, to think people are entitled to things is not equivalent to thinking the universe operates karmically. A person can be entitled to something and never receive it.

Second, the claim that people are not entitled to anything is obviously false.

As for the concept of a right, what you say there is again just plainly false. By your logic, the Nazis did not violate the rights of Jews, but instead made it the case that they had none. And thus by your logic the Nazis - and indeed, any and all governments that are in power - are incapable of violating the rights of those whom they govern, as they are the arbiters of rights.

These are indefensible views.

The only possibilities in philosophy seem to be reductionism or emergentism. — Ludwig V

I don't think that's right, though that may accurately characterize the positions most (?) contemporary philosophers hold about the matter.

But another option - I think the one most of the great philosophers of the past held - is that our minds are distinct entities from our biological bodies. A dead human is still a human animal, it's just not got a mind anymore - the person has left the building.

Yes, though I don't think you took it anywhere at all.

and again illustrated by the post following

It's the person associated with the human animal who is doing the thinking.
— Clearbury
Not necessarily. — noAxioms

That's beside the point. The point is that this claim 'it is the person asociated with the human animal who is doing the thinking' is not question begging, whereas 'it is thet human animal that is doing the thinking' is.

Note, I am not arguing for or agaist the thesis that it is the human animal that is doing the thinking. I am pointing out that Olson's argument is question begging. Question begging arguments can still be sound.

magine there is a weightless box into which a 90 kg person has been placed.
— Clearbury
OK, to apply that directly to the OP:

(P1) Presently resting on the floor is a box.
(P2) The box masses 90kg
(P3) You are the contents of the box.
(C) Therefore, the box is you.

That doesn't seem to be begging anywhere, yet the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, — noAxioms

That is not an accurate rendering of my implied argument. I mentioned the ambiguity of the word 'is', yet you've removed that very word from the crucial premise.

The argument would go as follows:

1. The only think on the floor is a box that is 90kg
2. I am on the floor and I am 90kg
3. Therefore, I am the box

If premise 1 is interpreted one way - interpreted as meaning "the only thing on the floor is a box that may or may not contain something and that including whatever it may contain weighs 90kg" - the argument is invalid. For it does not then follow from my being on the floor and weighing 90kg that I am the box, for I may instead be something that is in the box (and is thereby responsible for its weight).

If premise 2 is interpreted much more literally - as meaning that a box alone - a box without any contents - is the only thing on the floor and weighs 90kg, then the conclusion does follow, but is clearly false.

I explained why 'worked' is question begging. You either mean by 'worked' - achieves justice - in which case by hypothesis it does work, or you have some other goal in mind, in which case you're simply not addressing my case and your point is irrelevant.

But I am not arguing that his argument is invalid, but that its second premise (and its third) has to be interpreted in a way that makes it question begging.

premise 2 is ambiguous, for it could be interpreted to mean (as it does in 'the box is 90kgs') that the human animal sitting in the chair has associated with it something that is thinking). And then 3 could be similarly interpreted to mean 'the thing that is thinking is you'. So interpreted, the conclusion does not follow.

So that cannot be the meaning that Olson has in mind. Instead we must interpret 2 as simply asserting taht the human animal is itself doing the thinking. That's question begging for that's precisely what's at issue.

So, if we interpret the relevant premises in a non-question begging way, the argument is indeed invalid. But if we interpret the relevant premises in a way that preserves the argument's validity, then the premises become question begging.

There's no dispute that we think. And there's no dispute that our bodies are human animals. The dispute is over whether the thing doing the thinking is the human animal or something merely associated with it. That dispute cannot be resolved to everyone's satisfaction by fiat.

I think Wittgenstein is quite right.

Psychologists (those who stay in their lane, anyway - and a lot of them don't) study human behaviour.

Philosophers don't.

For example, psychological egoism is a psychological thesis (a very implausible one). It states that all humans are motivated purely by self-interest.

Ethical egoism, by contrast, is a philosophical thesis (also very implausible). It states that we ought to be motivated by self-interest.

They have nothing to do with one another.