Comments

  • Believing in God does not resolve moral conflicts
    ↪MoK
    I’m happy to grant that at its core, morality may actually be subjective , I’m struggling to find reason behind the jump from the Is to the ought.

    I was taking some time to reflect on my arguments and have ultimately decided on a moral pluralist approach. Even if we accept the premises that 1. Life is inherently valuable and 2. It is objectively better to act in should a way that preserves life if this is the case, there is still a jump from this to the normative claim that I ought to act in such a way.

    Then again, one could argue that the jump
    From is to ought isn’t necessary for objective morality - it would still be the case that under the premise that wellbeing/ life being valuable, there are objective statements one can make about this.

    I think ultimately, objectivity is necessary for collective life, there are axioms that we just have to accept in order for society and morality to function - if we were to accept and act in a way that aligns with subjectivism on a broad scale then life would be reduced to anarchy - the truth is, pragmatically, we must act in a way that follows atleast some universal maxim, life being valuable, and it would be detrimental to reduce morality to mere feeling and opinion.

    In extreme case scenarios - a consequentialist approach is often better. But there are implications to the radicalisation of both sides.

    Thank you for this discussion. I hope you gain something from this and realise that outside of arm chair philosophy, morality needs to have an objective framework.
  • Believing in God does not resolve moral conflicts
    It makes the value of life subjective as well, by subjective, I mean that people have different opinions or feelings on the value of life. A person who is highly depressed feels that life is very awful. Life not only has no value for him, but it also is like a trap that he wants to get rid of by committing suicide, for example. The same person feels differently about life when the depression is gone. — MoK

    Sure, if we define subjective to mean something that people have an opinion about, then everything, literally everything, is subjective. To reiterate, by valuing of life I don't mean conscious intent, or how much you care for life in the sense that you'd care about your dog etc., - its more so an imperative necessary for us to even live, or rational agents.

    Yes, the value of life is contingent on the fact that life is not possible if we feel differently about it. — MoK

    Yes, exactly - its nonsensical to say you don't value life, while being alive and living as such - for all intents and purposes its a necessary precondition. This is what makes it objective - we know that there isn't any measurable laws in the universe that define moral codes, morality isn't objective in that sense.
    If the suffering of X is justifiable, then morality is subjective. — MoK

    The distinction to be made here is between something being justifiable and something being moral - but this is a huge grey area, there's other threads on the matter, and to be frank, I don't even know if my opinions are consistent across the board. Practically, how could they be?

    I think the source of our disagreement is that we disagree on what we mean by objective and subjective. Do you mind providing your definition of them? I define morality as subjective if it is based on feelings, opinions, interests, and beliefs. Morality is objective if it is on pure reason. — MoK


    Subjective meaning based on individual feelings interests beliefs etc... that is to say morality is merely what I, individually, think about something, It's more than that. Objective being something that's not constitutively dependant on the attitudes of observers, but reason also. We reason that morality is objective because it's a prerequisite for coherent thought and action. I will openly admit that this is all still grey for me - I'm still coming to terms as to where I stand definitively.

    Therefore, morality is subjective, given my definition of subjective. — MoK

    No. you stated earlier that subjective means for something to be based on opinion etc. and before that you stated that something is subjective if people HAVE opinions about it.
    here:
    It makes the value of life subjective as well, by subjective, I mean that people have different opinions or feelings on the value of life. — MoK

    These are very different. We have opinions about everything, you have an opinion on X, X can be based in facts and yet you can have an opinion on how you feel towards X. That doesn't make X subjective.
    No, my point is that according to Kant's first formulation, we can only conclude that killing is wrong if we accept that life is valuable. According to this formulation, one has to universalize a maxim, killing a human is right, to see whether the action that maxim refers to is right or wrong. He then argues life is not possible if we universalize this maxim. He then concludes that killing a human is objectively wrong. There are two issues here: 1) Why should we universalize a maxim to realize that the action that maxim refers to is right or wrong, and 2) How could we conclude that killing a human is wrong from the fact that life is not possible if we universalize the maxim? This conclusion however only follows if life has a value. — MoK

    1. To take into account the needs and lives of others rather than just our own or those close to us. 2. See above, life having value is a necessary precondition to rational agency and life itself. Life does have value and it HAS to have value and since this is the case, the conclusion follows.

    No, my point is that he tries to give a general formulation that killing a human is objectively wrong. I think that killing a human is permissible, given the circumstances, so no, I don't think that killing a human is objectively wrong. To me, life, to be clear, is generally valuable, but there are cases in life where living just involves suffering. Think of a person with locked-in syndrome, a person who is terminally ill, etc. To me, killing these individuals is right if they want to terminate their lives. Following Kant, we are not allowed to kill any of these individuals, which to me is cruel. — MoK

    A common retort to his deontology, this is one that keeps me questioning too. I don't know what the 'right' thing to do is in these specific circumstances. Kant would say that killing is categorically wrong but the consequentialist would say otherwise. In real life, morality is sort of a mix of both Kantian and consequentialist ethics. Both come with their limitations.
  • Believing in God does not resolve moral conflicts
    ↪MoK

    Thanks for the elaboration. I agree that morality (not objective morality) is contingent on the value of life. But I think the value of life also is contingent on the fact that we are social animals and could not have survived if we had lived separately or had different opinions about the value of life. — MoK
    I agree but this doesn't make morality, or the value of life subjective, it just makes it contingent. The value of life is contingent on the fact we care about our own wellbeing, it's true that we care about our wellbeing... and so on.

    It just follows that suffering is subjectively bad. Consider the example of the terrorist that we discussed. The well-being of a person is a matter of opinion if he threatens the well-being of others. — MoK

    Under the framework of valuing life, suffering is not subjectively bad, it impedes the wellbeing of life which, if we value life, is bad. What's subjective is the justification behind it, whether the teleology justifies the action.
    I'd agree that "the suffering of X" is subjectively justifiable, but not that suffering in and of itself is good.

    Correct. People did not have a conceptual understanding of what morality is yet they avoided certain acts like killing individuals of the same tribe. My point is that this disposition was mainly due to their feelings, interests, opinions, or beliefs. — MoK

    This is a tricky one. At a certain level, everything is due to, or at least involves, our interests, opinions, and beliefs etc., so it'd be meaningless to make morality reducible as such. As I said before, the objectivity of morality has no propelling factor that makes us act in such a way - it's not like the law of gravity, it's just that some actions we partake in do coincide with what's moral, and other actions do not.


    Here I disagree. An action is subjective if humans do not agree on whether the action is right or wrong. — MoK

    Not true. Disagreement on any act, X, is independent from whether X is objective or subjective. What's subjective is the belief about the nature of X, not the nature of X itself. i.e., I could believe the earth is flat, and you could believe the earth is round. This doesn't make whether or not the earth is round or not subjective concern. The earth will still objectively be round whether I believed it to be or not.

    Cannibalism yes, it is vanquished. However, we still deal with human terrific. Capitalism as I mentioned is a weak form of slavary. War is unavoidable because people have different opinions, feelings, beliefs, and interests. So no, we disagree on whether different acts are right or wrong in themselves. — MoK

    True, actually. We disagree on whether the act is right or wrong in themselves AND whether the justification behind the act is right or wrong.

    Well, I think there shouldn't be any weak or strong in a great nation. — MoK

    Marx'd love you.

    That I understand. But my point is that social change or shape is due to the interests, opinions, beliefs, and feelings of the individuals that live in a society. These factors are the same factors when it comes to morality. — MoK
    I don't think this isn't the case, because its impossible to separate feelings, interests, beliefs, and opinions when it comes to agency and decision making, but this doesn't impede the objectivity of morals.

    I disagree. We cannot possibly reach Utopia if we allow the breeding of those people who have genetic problems with the rest of the population. We have to deal with murder, selfishness, etc. all the way otherwise. — MoK

    I mean isn't that what evolution is for? The natural order of life is to ensure that the best fitted survive, the ethical difference is that nature isn't a moral, rational agent. Morality doesn't apply to it.

    My point is that we can conclude that killing is wrong based on Kant's formulation if we accept that life is valuable. Well, I wouldn't simply kill a human if life is valuable though. So I don't understand why we should follow his formulation if we accept that human life is valuable. — MoK

    Your second sentence is the logical succession of the first. You state that you wouldn't kill a human being if life is valuable and Kant's imperatives state that if life is valuable we shouldn't kill human beings. You're already in agreement. His formulation doesn't just apply to killing, but moral actions as a whole - it's something that provides framework and consensus - granted, you're not compelled to accept it and it doesn't solve all moral qualms but something is better than nothing I suppose.
  • Believing in God does not resolve moral conflicts
    ↪MoK
    I’ll be busy for the next few hours- if I don’t reply today I’ll aim to get back to you tomorrow!
  • Believing in God does not resolve moral conflicts
    ↪MoK
    ↪MoK
    Are you saying that objective morality depends on the situation? If not, do you mind elaborating and giving examples of X and Y? — MoK

    Morality as a whole depends on agency and conscious beings, viz., rocks aren't moral or immoral, they're amoral, they just are. The objectivity of morality, however, is contingent on the valuing of life (or wellbeing) - and to reiterate, by 'value' I don't mean conscious intent.
    To give an example of X and Y: Iff we value well-being (X), then it is objectively true that suffering is bad (for the well-being of life) (Y).

    Quite oppositely, an understanding of morality and good linguistic skills are required to obey morality. How could one obey morality if he has no understanding of it? Linguistic skills are also required to pass the knowledge of morality from one generation to another. A rational agent who is not mentally evolved to understand morality just follows his feelings and interests. — MoK

    I think in using the word understanding there are two underlying assertions - we could take understanding (of morality) to mean an understanding that an action in particular is right or wrong - which is what I was referring to with my Amazonian example, or an understanding of morality conceptually. Right or wrong, should or shouldn't, better or worse, all of these are in having agency - following your feelings and interests is still behaviour predicated in the assumption that whatever you're feeling is either right or wrong.

    The example of a rational agent who hasn't evolved to understand morality and saying they can't act morally is the same as saying a child couldn't do an action that is considered moral or immoral. From their frame of reference, they may not know they're acting morally or immorally but that doesn't mean they aren't (or are). You wouldn't say that my donation to charity is an amoral act just because I'm unaware that donating to charity is good.

    It does undermine the idea of objective morality. In all conflicts there are two sides each believes they are right and doing right. All conflict would be resolved if people as rational agents agree on objective morality. I still do not know what you mean by conditional objective morality though. — MoK

    Objectivity doesn't entail the compulsion to act in such a way that aligns with it, or that humans would agree on it. Even still, it's not something that happens in an instant. Over millennia, we agreed, explicitly, or implicitly, that cannibalism is bad for the survival of our species, that slavery is bad, and I'm sure even today nobody agrees that war is good, it just so happens that the teleology behind is what we disagree on, not the act in itself.

    We have many bad genes that are hidden and circulate in the human population. Selfishness is related to one gene. Psychopaths have another common gene. Some people are not intelligent enough to understand morality. And many others. The only way to get rid of these bad genes is to either monitor unborn children and abort those who have bad genes and disallow people with bad genes to have a baby otherwise we have to deal with this problem that there is no solution for it. Whether people ethically have the right to follow this approach is subject to discussion. — MoK

    I'd like to think most of us would agree that mass selective reproduction and weeding out those deemed to be genetically inferior is highly unethical.

    Morality is a very crucial concept when it comes to any society. I don't see how one can divorce sociology and morality. — MoK

    What I mean is that sociology and morality/ethics are different subjects. A ethics professional would not be a qualified sociologist and vice versa.

    Yes, we shouldn't live under such conditions. But the question is why we still do. I think that Capitalism is a form of weak slavery. The minority takes advantage of the situation and gets the most profit while the majority just receives a minimal. All intellectual products are confiscated by the minority. The majority have no right to have a secure job and life. Etc. — MoK

    ' A nation's greatness is measured by how it treats is weakest members ' - Ghandi or something

    We cannot reach Utopia until there are bad genes that are hidden and circulate in the human population. Once these bad genes are removed either by evolution or by us then we have a chance to live in Utopia. I read about Kant's categorical imperatives and I am discussing his first formulation with Corvus right now. My main problem with this formulation is that he suggests that one has to universalize a maxim to see whether the action that the maxim refers to is right or wrong. I am questioning why we should universalize a maxim to see whether an action is right or wrong. I also have a problem accepting how reaching a problem by universalizing a maxim helps us realize whether an act is right or wrong. Let me give you an example: Consider killing a human is right as a maxim. Now according to Kant, we need to universalize this maxim by this he means that all humans should act according to this maxim to see whether killing humans is right or wrong. Well, of course, there could be no human if everybody attempts to kill another. He then considers this as a problem and then concludes that killing is wrong. This however requires accepting that the existence of humans is objectively right otherwise you cannot conclude that killing humans is wrong. — MoK

    I'm likely in less of a position to answer than @Corvus, but if I may, I presume it boils down to the consideration of not how our actions effect ourselves, or the people we care about for that matter, but everybody. Your example exemplifies exactly why killing a human isn't *generally* considered the right thing to do. Under Kant, it is wrong. I'm unsure if you've seen the movie Purge, but this highlights how, on broad scale, the permission of theft, murder, and other heinous acts are detrimental to society and life. And to your last statement, that falls in line with what I was saying earlier, life inherently values life - the acceptance of the axiom that life is inherently valuable is necessary for life to exist, and to continue existing, even though this may not be a conscious acceptance, we imply that we accept it by living, to live and to state that you don't care would be paradoxical. And not only this, it's also a biological imperative, otherwise the life wouldn't evolve and reproduce. From the acceptance of this, the rest follows.
  • Believing in God does not resolve moral conflicts
    ↪Corvus
    ↪Corvus
    Generally, we're on the same page, it was more so targeted at MoK, trying to help them understand how moral objectivity could exist etc. Apologies for any confusion.
  • Believing in God does not resolve moral conflicts
    ↪MoK
    What do you mean by conditional objectivity? — MoK

    Conditional Objectivity is state of objectivity that is contingent on predefined conditions or framework(s). That is to say, if X, then it is objective that Y. Y would be conditionally objective, with the condition being X.

    I don't think that it is morality but "common" interests, beliefs, feelings, and opinions. I used "common" to stress that we are social animals and we could not possibly survive without collaboration. Humans managed to survive and evolve a long time ago when we had no idea about morality. Unfortunately, we are still tribal creatures so we have conflicts in interests, beliefs, feelings, and opinions when it comes to my tribe versus your tribe, my group versus your group, my country versus your country, etc. These conflicts are still the main source of tension between human beings. The conflicts unfortunately even exist within a human group. We still have poor and rich people in many countries while we are familiar with the concept of morality. So the question is why we as rational agents cannot manage to reach a state of harmony where all individuals' needs are fulfilled, all individuals are treated equally, all individuals are governed by universal laws in a united state, etc. I think the answer to this question is that we haven't yet evolved well enough. What do you think? — MoK
    An understanding of morality is not needed to abide by it. Morality is the principles by which right and wrong are judged. A tribal community in the amazon unexposed to the idea of morality could still act moral (or immoral) based on the actions they do. The conflict between human beings is very much a real thing, but this does not undermine the idea of (conditional) objective morality.

    By equal treatment I'm going to assume you mean equitable treatment, but to answer your question, I'd say because human beings, while rational, are selfish. I'm unsure as to why we haven't evolved to otherwise yet, I doubt I'm qualified to answer, but one thing is for sure, throughout history, we've seen a gradual progress towards better societies, and better laws that govern us, this at least implies that there is some standard.

    I think you are referring to Utopia. There are still power abuses even in well-developed countries. There is a boss who has all rights to the intellectual properties produced by workers. He is rich and workers just receive minimal wages to survive. He has the right to fire workers. Unfortunately, humanity can function under such a condition. It was working under such a condition and it will. — MoK

    I agree, there are. All this does, however, is highlight that there a yet flaws and iniquities in our nature, its a matter of sociology *and/or capitalism if you ask Marx* rather than morality. As much as humanity can function under such conditions, it does not mean that it should, or that it is beneficial for the interdependent wellbeing of those in such a system - there is a reason why we progressed from slavery and accepted it as abhorrent.

    Well, that is true if we live in Utopia. Is that right to torture a terrorist who put a bomb in a location to get information about where the bomb is? You can save many lives just by torturing him. What do you think? — MoK

    It's not just true if we live in a Utopia, but also true if we wish to better as a species, or care for our wellbeing, and everybody cares for their wellbeing, and by care I do not mean conscious intent, but goal-directed behaviour, life values life, its inherent. Even still, if everybody abided by the moral laws within a system, then a utopia would be the end result - think of Kant's categorical imperatives.

    W/regards to your trolley-problem esque question, that would depend on the ethical framework you abide by, but doing so involves the implication of caring for well-being to some extent. Anyway, pragmatically, I would probably opt. for the option that saves many lives, however, I'm not saying, or necessarily conforming to the idea that, this is the right thing to do.
  • Believing in God does not resolve moral conflicts
    @MoK @Corvus Allow me to chime in here. I was recently convinced of objective morality (after being a strong believer in anti-realism) when I was made aware of my conflation between moral subjectivity and conditionally objectivity.

    You have to think of morality as a framework by which life abides by. We, as humans, depend
    on the well-being of ourselves and each other, that is true of life just as 1+1 = 2 is true of math.

    Under the condition that this is the case, it is objectively true that in accounting for well-being, *and by well-being I mean the interdependent well-being of life (or humans for arguments sake), some actions are *better* or *worse* than others.
    ( I say better or worse because I still don’t believe one can make definitive moral oughts without taking into context the thing in which they’re referring to )

    It is objectively true that preventing suffering is better for the well-being of the human species than allowing it, and by that standard, suffering is bad.

    To say there are inherent laws of morality that are prevalent in the universe, the same way laws of logic are, would be untrue, but also an irrational standard to hold morality to.
    Morality is agent dependent - this just isn't the case for i.e., the law of excluded middle - you could retort and say well in that case morality isn't objective - sure, but at that point it would be a meaningless discussion, as everything is conditional to some extent, and be weary not to use moral subjectivity or relativity in its place.
  • Is Philosophy the "Highest" Discourse?
    ↪J
    [quote][/quote]
    Thank you for your welcome!!
    That's a good point, and my example was loosely worded. Better to have said, "An acoustician conducts their research in complete independence of what theory may do with it, and it will not be possible to find any relevance for that theory to their work." Is it still clear that relevance isn't symmetric? I suppose this wording is slightly more deniable, because by shifting modal ground and talking about what is and isn't possible, we have to meet a higher bar. But let's not get caught up in extreme and/or unlikely cases. The idea was to question whether relevance is symmetric in a much more powerful and common way -- so that @fdrake's conclusion about what we've calling the Q recursion is true. I think his argument necessitates a near-perfect match of symmetries in order to go through. But perhaps he'll weigh in on this.

    I think the matter of contention isn't whether the relevance is symmetric or not, but more so the extent to which that symmetry is met. X having a relation with Y doesn't necessitate that Y is relevant to X to the same degree, denying @fdrake’s (6th) Premise, but I guess that sort of makes it a trivial matter.

    Well, that's the question, and I think you need to do more than restate it as a conclusion. At issue would be "the connection X has with it" -- how does that show the relation must be symmetrical?

    With regards to how it shows that a relation must be symmetrical, I'd have to think more on this - it seemed to me, prima facie, that X's connection w/Y indicated that Y was, in some regard, relevant to X - but upon fleshing out this practically, I'm not sure that this is the case. When we say relevant, I think a distinction needs to be made between a use of the word in ordinary language, if we mean ' important ' or something similar, then I'd have to agree with you and say that last statement of mine doesn't hold - even in a purely relational sense, I'm unsure I can prove this - and it seems like the awareness of such a relation is enough of a decisive factor to determine symmetrical relevancy or not, especially with conscious beings such as ourselves.
  • Is Philosophy the "Highest" Discourse?
    I want to return to this loose end. Am I right that we can avoid the conclusion in (8) by denying (4), the symmetry of relevance? Apart from it being a good thing not to have to conclude (8), I think there are independent reasons for denying (4). Consider this example: The natural acoustic properties of tones are relevant to Western music theory, but the reverse isn't true. An acoustician can conduct their research in complete independence of what theory may do with it. The only way I see that we can get "relevance" to be symmetric here is to define it as such, so it means something like "possibility of making eventual connections." But that seems much too broad, and misses the interesting questions about why we care about relevance in the first place.
    ↪J


    This is an interesting take, although I'm not sure it denies relevance, or atleast the reflexivity of such. As far as I can tell, all it does is show that an awareness of said relevance isn't necessary to produce a desired result.
    Insofar as Y exists, and X is relevant to Y, Y will always be relevant to X due to the connection X has with it.
Home » KantRemember