↪Arcane Sandwich
Not quite following - the latter, so you prefer there be at most one reality; but which includes both subjective and objective realities?

And this makes things simpler? Again, I don't think the objective/subjective dichotomy is of much use, nor that it can be tightened up. We can mostly get by without it. — Banno

Then let me just quote the Tao Te Ching:

Tao Te Ching - Lao Tzu - chapter 25

Something mysteriously formed,
Born before heaven and earth.
In the silence and the void,
Standing alone and unchanging,
Ever present and in motion.
Perhaps it is the mother of ten thousand things.
I do not know its name.
Call it Tao.
For lack of a better word, I call it great.

Being great, it flows.
It flows far away.
Having gone far, it returns.

Therefore, "Tao is great;
Heaven is great;
Earth is great;
The king is also great."
These are the four great powers of the universe,
And the king is one of them.

Man follows the earth.
Earth follows heaven.
Heaven follows the Tao.
Tao follows what is natural. — Tao Te Ching

The lesson here, in my opinion (the most important one) is that the Tao itself is not the Ultimate, be-all, end-all, sort of thing, because the Tao itself follows something else: it follows what is natural. So, if you "believe" in the Tao, you must, at the very least on logical grounds (to say nothing of moral grounds) follow what is natural, instead of following the Tao, because the Tao itself follows what is natural.

I hold that material objects, and only they, are the ones that exist. — Arcane Sandwich


But now you've lost me. Is this a coincidence? You've said there's no definitional relation, so how and why does this relation obtain? — J

If by "coincidence" you mean something like an atheist version of occasionalism, then I would say no. It's not a co-incidence, as if two "things" were "inciding" with each other somehow. Let me just go back to my definitions (as in, the context of my personal philosophy):

Existence: it is a property. It is something that material objects have. It is the property of having a spatiotemporal location (which can be fuzzy or clear-cut, it doesn't matter).

Matter: it is not a "stuff", and it is not a single object (i.e., a universal "blob"). Let me explain it like so: to exist is to have a spatiotemporal location, and to be material is to be able to change. I need the concept of matter (in my philosophy) in order to be able to explain why things can change (at the very least, their current spatiotemporal location). Otherwise, you end up with a Parmediean universe. Someone from the school of Parmenides (like Einstein, arguably) will tell you that there is no movement, no change. In other words, a Parmenidean would agree with my definition of existence: it is the property of being in a place and at a time. But then she would disagree with my definition of matter: she would say that nothing changes, that spatiotemporality is in some sense eternal, we are not really moving in our ordinary lives, we just can't see the truth of the immobile, Parmenidean Being, etc.

1) There is no ontologically significant difference between science and phenomenology. — Arcane Sandwich


That's an assertion not an argument. How would you justify that? And what do you mean by 'ontologically significant'? — Wayfarer

I can craft a new argument in support of it, like so:

5) If science can be compared to phenomenology but not to astrology in some sense, then there is no ontologically significant difference between science and phenomenology.
6) Science can be compared to phenomenology but not to astrology in some sense.
1) So, there is no ontologically significant difference between science and phenomenology.

In regards to what I mean by "ontologically significant", I'm alluding to the type of difference that would be a difference-maker when we compare science and phenomenology. Like, it's not apples and oranges, it's not that sort of debate. If science and phenomenology are not like apples and oranges, then they have something more important in common than being "just two fruits".

Pure intuition, yes; “common sense”, absolutely not. — Bob Ross

I believe in both. I don't know if I'd call it "pure", in any sense of the term. Just intuition. What is your reason for calling it "pure"? Are you somehow suggesting that as human beings we also have an "impure" intuition? Or am I way off here? I any case, can you explain why you said "pure intuition" and not just "intuition"? Thanks in advance.

(AV1) If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.


I don’t see how this follows. A thing which has a sufficient reason for its existence and one which doesn’t isn’t analogous to concepts which refer to gradations (e.g., short vs. tall, shades of colors, etc.): it is analogous to non-gradations like ‘being a circle’ vs. ‘not being a circle’, and so it is not subjected to the problem of the heap — Bob Ross

Think of AVI in the following way. Some philosophers (such as Plato) believe that existence comes in degrees: a shadow has less existence, and less being, than an ordinary object such as a table. And the idea of table, as a perfect concept, has more existence and more being than an ordinary object such as a table. So, in such scenarios (i.e., Platonism) it makes sense to say the sort of thing that AV1 is saying: In Platonism, the PSR has less "strength", if you want to call it that, in the case of paintings, it has more "strength" in the case of an ordinary object such as a stone, and it has even more "strength" in the case of an Idea, such as the Idea of The Stone. If you deny AV1, you have to explain why our ordinary life is not like Platonism.

I would suggest writing your argument out into proper syllogisms just to ensure the logic is sound. — Bob Ross

I agree, it's good advice. Believe it or not, I'm really lousy at syllogisms. I mean, I know how modus ponens and modus tollens work, instinctually, as a matter of habit at this point in my life, but I'm just not a good "artist" when I try to craft a rarer kind of syllogism. And there's a lot of them.
But to tell you the honest truth, I'm just not as passionate as you about proper syllogisms. As far as Logic goes, there's other areas of Aristotle's logical legacy that I'm interested in. That's on me, though, because what I just said there is technically an excuse. And it is. An excuse, that is. I mean, I just don't love Western culture enough to even care to be proficient at classical syllogisms in general. I like modus tollens, sure, and modus ponens not so much, and I'm proficient in both of those. But the rest? It's just too "Western-ish" in a stereotypical sense, if you will. And I don't consider myself a "Westerner". What does that even mean? That I was born in the western hemisphere? That doesn't mean anything to me, it carries no moral nor ethical value by itself. I'm a South American before being a "Westerner". Like, what are Australians, then? Easterners? And if they are, how much "stock" do you want to put on that fact? Like, it's meaningless. You're an Oceanian before being a "Westerner", is what I would say in that case.

@Wayfarer Happy New Year. You seem like a lovely soul. Let me ask you an honest question. Does phenomenology have a blind spot? Here is what I would argue:

1) There is no ontologically significant difference between science and phenomenology.
2) If so, then: if science has a blind spot, then phenomenology has a blind spot.
3) Science has a blind spot.
4) So, phenomenology has a blind spot.

This is known in the literature as a "parity argument". Think of it like the Ying and the Yang. And you can transition, in a liminal way, from science to phenomenology.

It's a Dream-like level of awareness.

That’s not to say you are doing anything wrong by asking people’s opinions; but the OP ideally should be clearer IMHO (no offense). — Bob Ross

Mate, I say this with no ill intent: it genuinely doesn't make sense (to my mind) for you worry so much about etiquette, to the point of saying "no offense" when you give your honest opinion about something, especially considering the fact that you jumped into this Thread without even saying "hello". Like, relax mate, you're not offending me by stating your opinion on something.

I'll consider your feedback tomorrow, thanks for taking the time and energy to contribute it.

Happy New Year.

Don't forget that the Tao follows something else: it follows what is natural. It follows "the way that things are":

Earth follows heaven. Heaven follows the Tao. Tao follows what is natural. — Tao Te Ching

Don't follow the Tao. Follow what the Tao follows: follow "the way that things are".

Good! But that must mean that "existence" is being given a much broader interpretation than "made of material stuff." So here we go again . . . — J

Existence, in my philosophy, is what has a spatiotemporal location. It has nothing to do with the concept of "being made of material stuff". To be material, in my philosophy, is to be able to change, at least with regards to position in space and moment in time. So you see, existence and matter are not the same thing. True, I hold that material objects, and only they, are the ones that exist. But that does not mean that existence is the same thing as the plurality of material objects that we call "the Universe".

EDIT: In other words, I believe that existence is a property of material objects. And it just so happens that only material objects have that property. Fictional entities like Pegasus do not have that property.

Can you say how? — Banno

It's a tough notion to articulate coherently, I acknowledge that. So, sadly, no, I can't say how. I lack the knowledge.

But also, you now have two realities. Contrast that with the view that there is at most one reality. Which do you prefer? — Banno

The latter. I prefer the one that has both: objective reality and subjective reality. Why? Because it makes everything else more simple. It's true that it's more economic to have one premise than two, but sometimes having two premises can lead to more economic consequences, because realism / anti-realism isn't your only premise. No one has just one premise that they believe in, that's not how the human mind works.

This is why those who try to associate Peirce with Platonism are so off base — Mapping the Medium

I'm going to say something extremely controversial about that, which I don't expect you (or anyone else) to endorse, or to even agree with me in what I'm about to say. Platonism, in all of its forms, in all of the areas where it spreads, is an intellectual epidemic. That's how I would describe it, trying to be as objective and respectful as possible. At the level of the individual, it's an "intellectual drug".

It's true that you are reading this screen. What more is said by "It is objectively true that you are reading this screen"? — Banno

Hi. Let me contribute something, in that regard. To me what that means (and I might have a different interpretation than @Tom Storm on that point) is that by saying that something is objectively the case, you're necessarily saying that something subjective is not the case. Or, at the very least, that one (i.e., as a human being) is both a subject and an object at the same time. Objective reality, in some sense, would be different from subjective reality. You can have both. They're not mutually incompatible with each other, at least not necessarily so.

So wouldn't what you say provide reason for going in the other direction - for showing that rights and truth and justice do exist? — Banno

He's wrong about that, in my humble opinion, Banno. He's right when he says that most materialists are like that, but not all of us (materialists, that is) deny emergence in an ontological sense.

People who think only physical stuff exists -- materialists, in other words -- are the same people who often want to say that "rights" and "truth" and "justice" also don't exist. — J

I'm a proponent of Emergent Materialism, more or less how Bunge has articulated it throughout his publications. And, as a materialist, I can confidently say the existence of rights, truth and justice is not incompatible with the materialist premises and conclusions of my philosophy.

EDIT:

So wouldn't what you say provide reason for going in the other direction - for showing that rights and truth and justice do exist? — Banno

My thoughts exactly.

treating monadic predicates as relations is problematic. — Banno

Exactly, that's what I'm saying. Maybe I didn't argue well for it, but what you just said there was my intent: how do you actually turn a predicate (i.e., a monadic predicate) into a relation? Like, syntactically. You can't. Not within the context of predicate logic, at least. And by that I mean all of them, all of the types of predicate logic: first-order, second-order, higher-order, etc.

So what's "the proposal" here, exactly? What's "the pitch"? Because it seems to me (and I could be wrong about this), that the proposal is to use something other than predicate logic. Right? It has to be something like, I dunno, set theory. But that's overkill, depending on your objective. If you want to use logic to analyze the validity of arguments, then first-order predicate logic is fine for that. You don't need fancy stuff like set theory just for that specific purpose. You use set theory for other things, it has other purposes. And what I'm saying about set theory here, I would say of every logic that is intended as something other than a formal language that allows us to analyze the validity of such arguments.

When you perform the hypostatic abstraction, however, you take that predicate and turn it into a relation — ToothyMaw

This is the part (one of many) that I don't understand. That just makes no sense to me. How can you "turn a predicate into a relation"? A predicate, in the context of any predicate logic (first order, second order, higher order, etc.) is literally a letter of the alphabet, typically instantiated by the letter "P". As such, it is neither a property nor a relation, it's just a predicate. A predicate cannot "turn into" a relation. You can use a two-place, three place, four place etc. predicate to represent relations, but the predicate itself cannot "turn into" a relation, because the predicate itself, in this context, is just a meaningless sing. It has no semantic import. It is purely syntactical. That is its "Nature", if you will. That is simply what it is. You cannot turn that into a relation. Arguably, it would be, at the very least, a category mistake, in Gilbert Ryle's technical sense of the term.

I'm just saying, I find Chinese culture and language remote and incomprehensible from my Anglo upbringing. — Wayfarer

Same. It's unfortunate. Anecdote: I'm thinking about learning Mandarin, but I don't know if I should.

Whereas Indian languages, notably Sanskrit and Pali (the formal language of early Buddhism) are Indo-european languages. — Wayfarer

They're as difficult as Mandarin, I would say. Not that I would know anything about that, though.

You can trace the connections between ancient Greek, Indian and Persian cultures (did you know Iran is a version of 'Aryan'?) — Wayfarer

Yes, everyone knows that, it's no big deal. Honestly. There are more important things to discuss.

And Indian philosophies, notably Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, have had huge cultural impact on the West since about the mid-19th Century — Wayfarer

Not really. I think Christianism had a far stronger impact in these 2,000 or so years of Christian history.

So overall, I have found the Indian sources (including those filtered through Chinese and Japanese culture, like Zen) — Wayfarer

Same. That is what they are, essentially.

(It's not like that for everyone. I know a New Zealand guy who learned classical Chinese and wrote a doctorate on Chinese Buddhist texts, in Chinese. I'm in awe of his achievements but I could never emulate that.) — Wayfarer

Neither could I. You would have to love the Mandarin language in order to do that, you would need to love Asian culture in general to do that. But I don't think this is a problem that we have as Westerners. It's a problem that we have as Euro-descendants. It's a problem at the level of "continental awareness", or "awareness of the continent that one belongs to." For example, my heritage is entirely European, but I wasn't born in Europe. I've never even been to Europe, not once. Instead, I feel like a South American, because that's literally what I am: a person that was born in the continent of South America, in 1985. And I have joined this Forum because I want someone to tell me, why was I born in South America, and not Africa, or Europe, or Oceania, or Asia, or North America, or Antarctica.

Sorry if that last part was Off Topic. Let's get back to discussing the Tao Te Ching, the Tao, and Taoist thought.

P.S.: Thank you for your answer to my question, @Wayfarer

Reminds me of this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-oriented_ontology#Withdrawal — schopenhauer1

Real objects withdraw for OOO, but sensual objects don't. Sensual objects, unlike real objects, have direct access to each other.

... and with that, I'm out of this Thread.

the Tao is so quintessentially Chinese in character. — Wayfarer

I believe you. Can you please explain that to me? Please be charitable to my intellect, I'm not very smart.

The words "exist" and "existence" cause nothing but trouble, because they call like Sirens to philosophers — J

But, you see, this is my argument. Ordinary people philosophize from time to time. How could they not? Everyone does. But we, as philosophers, have a responsibility towards them, because, like it or not, they are indeed our colleagues when they philosophize. We have the moral responsibility to vindicate their use of the very "word" existence like they mean it in ordinary language, as something that rocks have and that winged horses from Greek mythology don't. That's on us, philosophers. We have to explain why appealing to a rock is not a fallacy, why it's not fallacious to rely on good common sense in all matters, not just the ones involved in ordinary life.

↪MrLiminal
I'm very interested in non-dualism, but I've found the versions derived from Hindu and Buddhist sources rather more intelligible than the Tao, as the Tao is so quintessentially Chinese in character. I studied various Taoist texts in undergrad comparative religion, and they're edifying, illuminating, and, in the case of Chuang Tzu, also often hilarious. I recall a particular translation of a collection of a Taoist physicians notebooks that originating early in the Common Era that had vivid descriptions of day-to-day life in that culture. But I always had the feeling that to really penetrate 'the Way' would take much deeper engagement with Chinese language and culture than I was equipped for. One of the reasons being that there are great differences between English translations of Tao Te Ching, so plainly there must be things, if not lost in translation, being interpolated into it. — Wayfarer

I read it in Spanish first, then years later in English. It's a trip.

As far as 'being part of the larger whole', perhaps that is something that many traditional cultures afforded more so than in today's world, which if fragmented and individualised, and with a powerful undercurrent of nihilism. But I'm sure that if you incorporate Taoist disciplines and ways into your life, then they can become a support for that sense. It is after all an immensely durable cultural form which has existed continuously since the dawn of civlization. — Wayfarer

Could be.

I don't know that "mutually beneficial" is the same as selfless, as it is by definition, beneficial to both parties. — MrLiminal

I mean it as mutualism in the ecological, biological sense of the term. And I mean it in the ethical and moral senses of the term as well.

For a specific verse, here is one from Wayne Dyer's translation:

“It is through selfless action I will experience my own fulfillment." — MrLiminal

I agree with this. It makes philosophical sense. It makes ethical sense. And it makes moral sense.

've been told I would "Light myself on fire to keep others warm," which seems like it falls within the selfless action — MrLiminal

I sincerely, honestly, do not think so. That example, "lighting yourself on fire to keep others warm", does not fall within the selfless action. At least not necessarily so. It depends on each specific case. In some cases, it will fall within the selfless action (i.e., if you give your life to save theirs), and in other cases, it will not (i.e, if you sacrifice yourself to merely amuse them).

I have not seen it lead to much fulfillment long term, and have been told repeatedly by people I, essentially, need to be more selfish. — MrLiminal

Yes, those people are correct, from a purely technical point of view.

How do you see this line working in a practical sense? — MrLiminal

Quite easily. Do for others what others would do for yourself, in such a way that both are benefited by such actions. For example, I have something that you want, and you have something that I want. What I want from you will benefit me, and what you want from me will benefit you. For example, if you play the guitar, and I play the piano, I would want you to teach me some things about the specifics of the guitar as an instrument, and in exchange I would be willing to teach you something about the specifics of the piano as an instrument.

No worries. You didn't do anything against the site rules. No one knows exactly where a thread will go, and we rarely keep things on topic with mod actions. — fdrake

I was apologizing in general. My apology was, first and foremost, to you as an Administrator. Secondly, it was for @T Clark for being uncivil towards him, and thirdly, it was for @MrLiminal for not entering this thread with the proper etiquette.

Thank you for accepting my apology, @fdrake

Arcane, T - please remain civil to each other. MrLiminal. If any of you wish not to engage with Arcane Sandwich's responses due to considering them off topic, please do so. — fdrake

My apologies, then.

please try to stay on topic and do not accuse others of being rude when we have not been. — MrLiminal

But then why do I have to put up with backseat moderation, if that's against the site's rules?

Pick a verse from the Tao Te Ching, and let us proceed. I won't warn the two of you again. I have already flagged several posts in this Thread for the moderation team to consider. @T Clark suggested that, and I agreed with him. By definition, I am not being disruptive, and you two are not moderators, so cut it out with the backseat moderation. Stay on topic, or I'm reporting you both.

Metaphysics Book X, Ch. I is probably a good place to start. How familiar are you with Aristotle's treatment of the "Problem of the One and the Many" and discussion of causes, principles, and measures? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Oh man, you're killing me. I'm an Aristotelian, through and through, and I've been meaning to talk to you, but it's just too much to take in at the moment, it's too much information.

Why don't you pick a verse of the Tao Te Ching you'd like to discuss. — T Clark

I second that motion. Pick a verse from the Tao Te Ching that you'd like to discuss, and let us proceed.

Thank you for your input, but we are specifically discussing Taoist thought in here. If you don't agree with it to begin with, I'm not sure our discussion will get much of anywhere. I'm not looking to debate it, as I get plenty of people telling me it doesn't make any sense when I try to talk about it irl; I want to learn more about it and discuss it with people who aren't going to dismiss the concepts. I've appreciated our discussions in other threads, but you obviously don't subscribe to Taoist thought, so I'm not sure what you're hoping to add to the conversation. — MrLiminal

Legalism. That's what I'm hopping to add to this specific conversation, about Taoist thought.

Will you allow me that, yes or no?

But it's like, I already told Mapping the Medium what I think about that. It's not that I don't believe in hypostatic abstraction, I just don't understand it. And I genuinely think that you have to be some sort of Real Life Mind Flayer to even have the biological brain to understand such a notion.

EDIT: In other words, mine is a Deweyian argument against Peirce here. Dewey had it right, Peirce had it wrong, at least in relation to hypostatic abstraction. Like, you have to think this from a Darwinian POV.

EDIT 2: And that's why I'm arguing with her, page after page, about A. I. The biological difference between A.I.s and human beings are just too unfathomable: they're not alive in the biological sense of the term. They have no genetic material (no DNA or RNA), they don't have cellular organization (they are not unicellular, nor multicellular), etc. They are not like us, the living beings of planet Earth. So this is not "just politics", this is ontology. It's political ontology, but no one believes me when I say that. We're debating ontology with a machine when we talk to someone like Claude the A. I. And I humbly think that Peirce does not provide us with the framework to do that. You have to think this one like Dewey: it's Darwinism, it's survival of the fittest, our natural intelligence (as opposed to a mere artificial intelligence) is the product of the entire history of Life on this Earth, from the microbe to the homo sapiens, this is a matter of survival as living beings, plain and simple.

I'm reading about him on Wikipedia and the SEP and it appears he just transposed firstness, secondness, and thirdness (terms he used when he was feeling appropriately abstract) onto a bunch of categories because he liked threes. — ToothyMaw

Exactly, that's what I'm saying. Peirce is the North American equivalent to Hegel in that sense. Both of them "just liked" the number 3, for Aesthetic reasons.

I think one could easily come up with some sort of relation that might justify more names. I mean, I read what he said about it, and he said that he just "thinks not" that we could endlessly perform hypostatic abstractions to derive more "intentions". So, I suppose that is the closest we might get to insight: he doesn't think it is useful to repeat the process past twice. For whatever reason. — ToothyMaw

Hypostatic abstraction is indeed a "thing", it's not something that @Mapping the Medium just made up. This is why I'm following this Thread: I'm very curious about the things that Mapping the Medium is saying. I just don't think that she's using the most friendly language from the point of view of ordinary life.

EDIT: From the wiki:

Hypostatic abstraction in philosophy and mathematical logic, also known as hypostasis or subjectal abstraction, is a formal operation that transforms a predicate into a relation; for example "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". The relation is created between the original subject and a new term that represents the property expressed by the original predicate. — Wikipedia

I've been fascinated by both Taoist philosophy and non-dualism generally for quite some time, but it's been difficult to learn about in the West for a variety of reasons. " — MrLiminal

It's because we don't speak the language in which the book in question was written.

"The Tao that can be explained is not the Tao," and all that. — MrLiminal

Wittgenstein 101, basically.

But I'm wondering if anyone else has any knowledge on the topic, as I'm eager to learn more and get other people's takes. — MrLiminal

I don't think anyone has knowledge on the topic of the Tao, and this is by definition: "the Tao that can be explained is not the Tao.". What I would add to this, to qualify my words, is that there is knowledge about the book: the Tao Te Ching.

MrLiminal is talking about what the Tao Te Ching says and his description is a pretty good one. — T Clark

It is, I agree.

f you want to disagree with a 2,500 year old philosophy — T Clark

I do, yes.

which, I assume, you don't understand very much if at all — T Clark

Then explain it to me.

your opinion is not very useful. — T Clark

It isn't.

I'm glad that we agree for the most part, @T Clark.

My understanding of the Tao is that we are all a part of a greater whole — MrLiminal

I disagree with that, for mereological reasons as well as metaphysical reasons. I am not a "part", in the mereological and metaphysical sense of the term, of any "whole", in the mereological and metaphysical sense of the term. I am an individual. There is no object in the world of which I am a part of. And if you say that I'm a "part" of the Universe, then I'll just say that the Universe is not a single object, it's instead a plurality of objects that compose no further object. The same goes for equivalent notions, such as Cosmos, Reality, Multiverse, Tao, or what have you.

What would happen if we tried to reframe the "existence" question in terms of structure, grounding, and quantification, retaining full rights to claim metaphysical truth, but did so without once using the term "exist"? — J

But, my perhaps ignorant question would be, why would you do that? The concept of existence should be retired from the field of mathematics and logic, I can agree with that (and I actually do). It does not follow, however, that it should be retired from metaphysics, to say nothing of ordinary language.

↪Arcane Sandwich
I can get why they’re not efficient causes at least, but I’m trying to grasp this in the same lens that the Aristotelian tradition considered the genus of a thing to be the cause of its species. Now, 1 is obviously no genus of 2, but is the genus in any way argued as *efficient* cause by them, or is it formal?

And regardless of that, is it at least then established and agreed upon by most experts that a thing can be necessary for the existence for another thing, and yet not be a cause? If so, my more confused question would be what best defines a cause most generally across all types besides this criteria of necessary priority? — Pretty

These are very difficult questions that you're asking, and I don't have an opinion on such matters at the moment. I am, however, actively working on those topics, on paper. That's all I can say.

What about considering binary fission as exemplifying a kind of organic ontology. One parent cell is the efficient cause of two daughter cells. One is the cause, two are the effects. — Pantagruel

Then you run into the paradox of the Ship of Theseus, is what I would say. Which is a problem of indeterminate identity.

And calling me 'woman' is not an appropriate way to encourage quality dialogue. — Mapping the Medium

Fair enough, I take that back then (can I?). I'll just call you "Mapping the Medium" from now on. Does that sound fair?

The categories are exhaustive, not endlessly additive, because they describe the irreducible modes of being: possibility, interaction, and mediation. — Mapping the Medium

I don't think that those are the irreducible modes of being. That's what I'm saying. I think that Peirce just made that up, without any evidence or argument. And this is something that scholars of Peirce have pointed out in the literature. Why do you think that possibility, interaction and mediation are the irreducible modes of being? Why do you agree with Peirce on that topic? The concept of "possibility", the very notion of possibility, is a modal notion. It's one of the notions that are studied in modal logic. It also has its place in metaphysics. It has nothing to do with what Peirce understands by "modes of being".

Suggesting ‘Fourthness’, ect., overlooks the logic behind these distinctions. — Mapping the Medium

What is the logic behind these distinctions? It's just an ungrounded aesthetic choice that Peirce made, just as Hegel did: they liked the number 3, for aesthetic reasons. It has nothing to do with logic, not if by "logic" we mean the formal science that studies the logical form of arguments.

they reflect the foundational structure of reality as understood through relationality. — Mapping the Medium

And that's a wobbly, objectionable hypothesis, as far as metaphysics and science are concerned. Does Peirce or anyone else have any evidence for such metaphysically loaded claims?

I’m curious to know whether or not you’ve engaged directly with Peirce’s writings on this, such as The Categories in Detail or his Lectures on Pragmatism.” — Mapping the Medium

If by that you mean if I've read Peirce, then yes, of course I've read Peirce. I've listened to people explain their ideas about Peirce to me. I teach Peirce's ideas to my students at the Uni, when they have to study the classical pragmatists, including Peirce, James and Dewey. You seem to be suggesting that Peirce wasn't wrong about certain things, such as his triad of Categories. And all I'm saying is, that better intellectuals than me have argued, in print, that he was wrong.

I'm starting to wonder if I explained it poorly or if people are just skimming. — MrLiminal

You didn't explain it poorly, and we're not just skimming. We're just asking for more evidence, arguments, or both, from you part. Let me phrase it like this: you're not convincing us. And that's fine. The only sensible thing to do, in that case, is to examine your claims, as objectively and as charitably as possible.

I already told you what I think about alchemy: it was never magic to begin with. And its practitioners never saw it as magic, if by "magic" you mean something like witchcraft.

But the force of that argument would be logic. The point of the evil demon argument is that it's possible to doubt logic. — frank

Which is why, if someone were to prove that the evil demon argument leads to a contradiction, then such a person would have also demonstrated that it is not possible to doubt logic. And whoever demonstrates that, deserves the Fields medal. Well, maybe I'm being too extreme in my judgement, but it would certainly be a monumental achievement to prove that logic cannot be doubted.

Theoretically anything is possible — Corvus

I disagree with this, honestly. I think that there are things that are not possible even at the level of theory. I'm a realist about modality: some things are metaphysically impossible. For example, it is metaphysically impossible that demons exist. The same goes for unicorns, basilisks, ghosts, etc. Scientism, to me, is not just a series of epistemic claims, it is also a series of metaphysical claims, and some of the latter use the language of modal logic (i.e., terms like "possible", "impossible", "contingent", "necessary").

If God existed, why do you believe he/she must intervene? — Corvus

I'm an atheist. I hold that it's metaphysically impossible for beings of a divine nature to exist. But if such beings, or such a being, existed, then we would be debating theology: does God have the moral obligation to intervene in reality, in every act? That's what the occasionalists believed, in matters of theology.

The PSR is not something that comes with every event in the universe. That is what the PSR believers seem to believe, which is a groundless and irrational belief. — Corvus

Of course it's a groundless and irrational belief. But to abandon it is to say that a dragon or a squid can suddenly pop up into existence, anywhere, at any time, for no reason whatsoever (since we've abandoned the strongest version of the PSR, which is the only version of the PSR that "makes sense", and yes, the appeal to good common sense is a fallacy, it's an "appeal to the stone").

The squids might suddenly jump and dance in your room. You ask what is the reason for that? Under no circumstances would such an event happen unless someone secretly placed some lively caught squids from the sea, and placed them in your room while you were asleep. — Corvus

Why not? Why do you say that it would not happen? The circumstances of the case, of every case, become irrelevant if you abandon the PSR in its strongest form. And that's the only way to sensibly deny it. You can't have a weak version of the PSR and still expect to be able to explain some things but not others. Because, why do some things have a sufficient reason, but others don't? Either everything has a sufficient reason, or nothing does, because why would you arbitrarily "draw the line" somewhere in these matters? Here's a parity argument to that effect (inspired by Dan Korman's version of the argument from vagueness against restricted composition):

(AV1) If some things have a sufficient reason and others do not, then it is possible for there to be a sorites series for the universality of the PSR.
(AV2) Any such sorites series must contain either an exact cut-off or borderline cases of sufficient reason.
(AV3) There cannot be exact cut-offs in such sorites series.
(AV4) There cannot be borderline cases of sufficient reason.
(AV5) So, either everything has a sufficient reason, or nothing does.

Whoever wishes to resist this argument must deny one of the premises. @Bob Ross which premise would you deny, if any?

This is the opacity in your OP that I was alluding to earlier. — Bob Ross

Sure, and it's a great observation. I agree with you. But allow me to make a methodological claim, to see if you agree or not. Think of opaqueness or opacity from artistic POV, if that makes any sense. Imagine that an opaque OP is comparable, metaphorically speaking, to a sketch. The discussion that follows, in the series of posts, is an attempt to clarify and correct the opaqueness of the OP. We add some things, we erase others, we reformulate what needs to be reformulated. We then add some tonality, like dark grays and light grays in the case of an illustration, and finally we add some color, as if it were a painting. You don't paint a painting perfectly from the get-go, unless you're extremely confident in your skills and in your understanding of the subject matter that you're painting.

Do you agree or disagree with me, up until that point?

Earlier you said:

To me, it makes no sense (and no offense meant): a ‘factual property’ implies the possibility of a ‘non-factual property’. — Bob Ross

And I said:

You're quite right. It makes no sense to me either. — Arcane Sandwich

So, we agree on something here: that some things make sense, and some things don't. And by "things" in this case, I mean the things that people sometimes say. But the problem with our view (yours, mine, and anyone else that agrees with us) on this topic is that some folks will tell you that we're appealing to the stone, and that's a fallacy. And those folks are right: technically speaking, it is a fallacy. Now, there are some instances in which it isn't. If someone who takes solipsism seriously were to ask me "How do you know that you're not a disembodied brain in a vat that is hallucinating?", I would simply reply in the manner of Moore: here's a hand, mate. Why should I take your nonsense seriously to being with?

So, I take it that you and I believe in good common sense, yes? I know I do. How about you?

If someone were to craft such an argument, that person should be regarded as being very intelligent, and noble. That person should be awarded the logical equivalent to the Fields medal. It would be one of humanity's most resounding moral victories over ignorance and superstition. Something like that would have enormous value. It would be at the level of Beethoven's Ode to Joy.