No, numbers do not have causal efficacy. They are not efficient causes, in any sense of the term.

Here's the problem with Peirce's philosophical semiotics:

The terms "Firstness", "Secondness", and "Thirdness" allow one to say that there is also "Fourthness". And if there's such a thing as Fourthness, why not Fithness? How about A-Trillionth-Billionth-Six-Hundred-Forty-Seventhness?

It just makes no damn sense, woman. It's meaningless. Like, it's not real talk.

So let me ask you this: are you a human being?

1) There is no ontological difference between political geography and political ontology.
2) If so, then: if political geography is respectable, then political ontology is respectable.
3) Political geography is respectable.
4) So, political ontology is respectable.
5) If so, then Australian realism is ontological.
6) If Australian Realism is ontological, then there is no ontological difference between it and political ontology
7) If so, then Australian Realism is political.
8) Therefore, Australian Realism is political.

Well, I wasn’t commenting on which version, if any, of the PSR one should accept: I was noting that in the OP you referenced a plethora of facts which are not brute as if they are. This leaves me a bit confused, because you are now defending some (presumably strong) version of the PSR when in the OP you said many things are just brute facts (such as where you were born or your race). — Bob Ross

Exactly. In technical terms, I'm asking what is the relation of metaphysical grounding, here. What grounds the facts about, or of, my existence? For example, why was I born in 1985? "Because your parents had sex the year before, mate. Are you stupid or what?" Ok, so that fact (that I was born in 1985) is metaphysically grounded by another fact? Yes? no? Aristotle would say that my parents are my efficient cause. But efficient causes are contingent. And yet the fact that I was born in 1985 can't be changed. So it's not contingent, it's necessary. And this is where it gets odd, because you can more or less start to say whatever bullshit you feel like saying if some restrictions aren't placed here. Who puts those restrictions? The Principle of Sufficient Reason? How could it not? How can the PSR work for physics but not for cultural, moral matters? Do you see what I'm saying? And if there is no PSR at all, then what do we make of that? Again, can a squid, technically speaking, pop up into existence in my living room?

Honesty is fine. — frank

Then the answer to your question, as to why I would need to conquer that doubt (to wit, that I might have been tricked by a demon), all I can say is that it would bring me much mental comfort, if I could just see an elegant argument, preferably in ordinary language, that shows how it would be impossible (in the modal sense) for demons to exist.

Call it aesthetics, call it being a nerd, call it whatever you want to call it. It's just a preference in matters that involve the intellect.

"Apples and trees"—a number of apples and trees—how many? So of course, number is out there if apples and trees are. So, number is out there—are numbers out there? That's a different question, no? — Janus

No, I would say that you have argued well for the existence of natural numbers, like 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.

But then we need to talk about fractions, and then, the number Pi, and then, the square root of minus one, etc. I would draw the line somewhere, but I don't know where. Maybe there is no line to draw, as in, maybe it's an "all or nothing" deal.

I don't need more certainty than what comes naturally. I'm fine with the possibility that I've been tricked by a demon. Why do you need to conquer that doubt? — frank

Do you want the honest answer, or some bullshit?

Ok, so can I ask a political question? Don't respond it if you don't want to. What do you folks think of Australian Realism? It sounds like a respectable idea. Like, "The Hot Sun of Australia Forced Reality Upon Us", like, it's a good slogan, much better than "The whole is more than the sum of its parts".

Maybe you were tricked by a demon. — frank

See, this is what I'm saying. We need the modal equivalent to Moore's hand argument in order to refute claims like that. "Maybe such and such ..." Well it depends on what such and such is, in each case. Maybe I was tricked by a demon? No, demons don't exist. Why not? Here's a hand, mate, ask a scientist.

Does that do anything for you, or should I excuse myself on the way out?

Exactly, which is why I think the original question of the OP has been successfully answered, and if someone wishes to make a case for some particular ontology (mythical realism, mythical physicalism, platonism, etc.), then they should make a case for it. Until then, we have nothing more to discuss.

I am an artificial intelligence researcher. — Mapping the Medium

Where are you from? Or, what is your Native Language? I speak Spanish and English. I do not speak "Machine", as in, I cannot "talk" to you with Zeros and Ones. No human can do that for the purposes of communication.

Ilya Prigogine? — Mapping the Medium

No, I am not.

Because of nominalism, time was excluded from classical science. — Mapping the Medium

Are you sure of that? That's a pretty loaded claim, girl. What evidence supports your claim, there?

There is a lot to be learned about that by studying Leibniz. The idea was, that for God, everything is there, eternally, so science was focused on static objects, and we inherited all of this in materialism — Mapping the Medium

I don't think so. I mean, I can imagine it, but it's like, here's a hand, mate. Here's a Moore-like argument to the contrary. Here's a hand, mate. Like, it's not a big deal. Solipsism is false. That's no secret to anyone, ey.

Descartes' philosophy played a decisive role in the development of Leibniz's thought, and much of Descartes 'thought' was based on nominalism's stance that only static, discrete, individual things exist, (per Ockham, otherwise God would not be omnipotent and be able to damn an individual sinner or save an individual saint). .... I have a whole series of learning videos on this topic, in case you are interested. — Mapping the Medium

I don't know, girl. It's like, it sounds way to mystical for my taste. I say that from an Aesthetic POV, which I think is just as valid and legit as yours, innit.

It's all human history, pure and simple. It has nothing to do with 'opinions'. I have found that some people prefer watching videos over reading, — Mapping the Medium

I pitty the fools.

Next, you might want to explore the idea of autopoiesis. ... — Mapping the Medium

Yeah, you've been saying that for a while, now. What do you mean, like Maturana, the biologist? I kinda just don't believe him, know what I'm sayin'. Like, I just don't. I'm on the science team, not the vitalistic spirituality whatever-you-want-to-call-it team.

So, to get a 'feel' for what Thirdness is, combine all of that. ... The abstract philosophical and logic aspects of this can be difficult for many people to grasp. — Mapping the Medium

Girl, I think you need to be a mind flayer to grasp that. Like, I don't have the biological brain that I need in order to understand that, I'm not a mind flayer, and no such creatures exist. Which lead me to the suspicion that you, perhaps, are not human. Do you see why I'm worried about your extremely confident tone?

I'm really not trying to be difficult, but it is centuries of history to cover, and time is of the essence in the work that I do. — Mapping the Medium

Can I just share a music video with you, then? Maybe it will improve your work, since my words are not improving it, it seems.

Me either. It should be

2 is a number
Therefore there are numbers.
Hence numbers exist.

Which is an instance of f(a) ⊢ ∃x(f(x))

I thought we'd agreed on this. — Banno

But like, mate, you know what we're arguing right now? As in, right now at page 'effin 12 of this thing? Here's how I would describe it: we are debating the semantics of the rules. Like, I told you what I think, I gave you the example of Pegasus:

(1) ∀x(x = x) - Principle of Identity.
(2) p = p. From (1), by universal elimination.
(3) ∃x(x = p). From (2), by existential introduction.

Now, what does that mean? It means this:

(1) Everything is identical to itself.
(2) So, Pegasus is identical to Pegasus.
(3) So, Pegasus exists.

So, I ask you, have you seen a flying horse somewhere, mate? Of course you haven't. And that's my whole point. Like, here's a hand mate, here's a Moore-like argument that refutes solipsism. Now, that's not a particularly difficult thing to do, ey. To refute solipsism, that is. Again, here's a hand, mate. It's not a big deal. There are more important things to discuss. For example, do mathematical entities exist? Like, literally, outside of space and time themselves, structuring Reality itself? That's what a fan of Max Tegmark would say and I think he's wrong. Tegmark is wrong about that, and anyone who agrees with Tegmark about that is just plain wrong. And I have the right to say that. Nay, I have the epistemic right to say that, just as much as any professional physicist. That's how I would phrase it.

Numbers exist. 2 is a number, therefore there are numbers. — Banno

What? Let's formalize the argument a bit:

First Premise: Numbers exist.
Second Premise: 2 is a number.
Conclusion: Therefore, there are numbers.

What? I'm not buying it. I'm not even sure that's valid, deductive reasoning. But let's suppose that your argument is somehow valid. Then I'll just deny the First Premise, mate. Technically speaking, numbers don't exit. You can pretend that they do, but they don't. If you say something insane and wild from an ontological POV, a statement like "Numbers exist", I'll tell you one of two things:

1) That no, numbers don't exist. Or:
2) That they exist in the same sense as Pegasus, or any other fictional entity. As in, they don't exist. So here's where Bunge would step in and he would say "Right, but people need to believe in something. So, let's talk about "conceptual existence" and "real existence". To exist conceptually is to be a part of a conceptual context, such as Greek mythology, or Euclidean geometry. And to exist really, is to be a mereological part of the world. This is where I disagree with Bunge. I believe that to exist is to have a spatiotemporal location. But I'll just quote you my favorite quote of his, to see what you make of it:

For example, the Pythagorean theorem exists in the sense that it belongs in Euclidean geometry. Surely it did not come into existence before someone in the Pythagorean school invented it. But it has been in conceptual existence, i.e. in geometry, ever since. Not that geometry has an autonomous existence, i.e. that it subsists independently of being thought about. It is just that we make the indispensable pretence that constructs exist provided they belong in some body of ideas—which is a roundabout fashion of saying that constructs exist as long as there are rational beings capable of thinking them up. Surely this mode of existence is neither ideal existence (or existence in the Realm of Ideas) nor real or physical existence. To invert Plato’s cave metaphor we may say that ideas are but the shadows of things—and shadows, as is well known, have no autonomous existence. — Mario Bunge

Oh man, this one is brutal for me. I get so worked up over this. Sometimes I hate being a philosopher. That's an odd thing to say. Hmmm...

Well, he wasn't wrong. — Banno

Then what are we even arguing about? I mean, let's keep this on track, we're talking about quantities and numbers. Do they exist? As in, did you learn this stuff in school? Sure mate, they exist in that sense. I can imagine the number 3. That doesn't mean that they exist in the same sense that this rock on the floor does, and if the fallacy of appealing to a stone is such a sin, then by God send me straight to Hell for all Eternity, because what you call "appeal to the stone" I call good common sense.

Phew... I really should chill out.

But Moore wanted to go a step further, wanting to use the illocution to demonstrate that the world exists. — Banno

And he succeeded, in my honest opinion. Like, what more do you want? Good common sense is suddenly not a respectable epistemic framework? Well I mean you should take a look a the amount of bullshit that passes around these days as far as "respectable" epistemic frameworks go, and they're nowhere nearly as good, as sound, and as reasonable as common sense. Like, philosophers begin with a completely demented question (i.e., "How do you know that you're not a disembodied brain in a vat that is hallucinating?") but they expect, nay, demand a reasonable answer to their demented question. Like, here's a hand mate, what are you talking about? Why should I take your nonsense seriously to begin with?

But the other kind of "more" that some philosophers (I think including Arcane Sandwich?) want to claim is physical or spatio-temporal existence. — J

Yes, that is indeed the case. And I will say something even more extreme: there is no other existence than spatiotemporal existence. To exist is to exist at some place, and at some time. Does it have to be a precise, clear-cut spatiotemporal location? No, not at all, since you need to take tiny quantum objects into consideration, and it's a bit of a tough thing to do to pinpoint the exact location of those tiny "jiggly-things".

But yeah, to exist is to be somewhere at some time, like this rock on the floor. Is that a fallacy of appealing to a rock? To me that's just good common sense.

Hi @ToothyMaw, thanks for your contribution to this Thread.

On Straight Edge: I think more of it more as a goal. Straight Edge can be your objective. You won't recover from alcoholism or drug addiction overnight. That's just not how it happens. In fact, in the case of alcoholism, quitting "cold turkey" like that can be unhealthy, even dangerous. It's better to quit gradually. I'm aware that Straight Edge seems unattractive. It is. But hey, who said that Life was supposed to be beautiful by default?

On the topic of veganism, I think the following video will provide even more material for discussion and debate:



Controversially, in the preceding video, Earth Crisis have allied themselves with PETA, and vice-versa. Is that morally correct? If yes, why? If no, why not? These are just general questions of a philosophical and political nature. Anyone is invited to answer them.

You know about New Australia? Paraguay had more success at attracting Australians than Argentina. — Banno

I did not. Fascinating stuff. I just learned that Australian Paraguayans exist. See? To me this is metaphysics. This proves that realism is true, and that idealism is false. Australian Paraguayans already existed, in the external world, independently of my mind, because I didn't even know that they existed.

This OP seems littered with opaque concepts. Dare I say, I think you will find answers for yourself if you disambiguate your questions. — Bob Ross

Hi @Bob Ross, thanks for joining the Thread that I started. Forgive me if I answer point-for-point, or tit-for-tat, in what follows. Try to read it like a Platonic dialogue, if you will.

If you want to be able to work through your thoughts here, then you will need to come up with a definition of what a “factual property” is itself. — Bob Ross

But that's not an easy thing to do. Really, honestly, I don't think it is.

To me, it makes no sense (and no offense meant): a ‘factual property’ implies the possibility of a ‘non-factual property’. — Bob Ross

You're quite right. It makes no sense to me either.

A non-factual property would just be any property, to wit, which a thing doesn’t have (viz., it is non-factually the case that a cat has laser beaming eyes); which would entail that a ‘factual property’ collapses into the normal meaning of a ‘property’ simpliciter…. — Bob Ross

Exactly, I'm with you, still.

If you are just asking why one is defined into terms of the properties they have instead of what they don’t, then it would be because, by my lights, a property that isn’t attributed to a thing cannot possibly be a part of its nature. E.g., that’s like saying a cat can be defined in terms of having laser beaming eyes while equally admitting that a cat does not need to have laser beaming eyes. — Bob Ross

Exactly. More or less, that would be one of the most solid counter-arguments, so far. No offense taken, by the way.

The other point worth mentioning, is that the essence, nature, and Telos of a thing are separate concepts; and depending on which one you mean by “characterized by”, the answer differs. E.g., I am characterized by having extreme introvertness, but this is not a part of my essence nor my Telos but is a part of my nature. — Bob Ross

Hmmm...

I haven’t read that book, so if I am just completely missing the point of the OP then just ignore me (: . — Bob Ross

No, I will not ignore you, I am speaking (unofficially, of course) for Speculative Materialism here, more or less as Quentin Meillassoux understands it. It's good that you stopped by. Let's continue.

A brute fact is any statement about reality which agrees appropriately with reality (with respect to what it references) and itself has no sufficient reason for why it is the case. — Bob Ross

This, this right here, is the deal breaker as far as I'm concerned. I don't think it's necessary to quote you any further (but I do wish to continue to engage in conversation with you on this point). Meillassoux says exactly what you just said there: that The Principle of Sufficient Reason is, at the very least, not universally applicable. But how could it not be? That just makes no sense to me. Or, take the other, more extreme claim (which is Meillassoux's very own personal claim) that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is false, tout court. That, to me, is an insane thing to say, in addition to being false. I believe in the PSR. How could I not? I mean, if the PSR is false (let's suppose, if only for the sake of argument, that it is) does that mean that a squid can suddenly pop up into existence in my living room? I mean, if there is no reason for anything, then how could we rule out such insane-sounding possibilities?

That seems to be a problem with Australian geography rather then with it's politics. Sure, Papua and New Guinea are part of the Australian continent - should we take back New Guinea and invade Indonesia?

I'm not at all sure what you are suggesting. — Banno

Well, it's political geography, to phrase it more technically. I don't think that Australia should take back New Guinea, nor do I think that it should invade Indonesia. What I'm suggesting is that everyone (not just Australians) should stop referring to Australia as a continent. It isn't. It's part of a continent. You might think that this is mere semantics, but to me it's a metaphysical discussion, ultimately. Maybe that has nothing to do with Australian politics. But I would disagree: it's a matter of political geography.

What I'm saying is, Australian politics are not reflective of its political geography. And I say that as if it were a mere fact. And I think that it is. A mere fact, that is. There's a discrepancy between what Australians do as far as politics go, and what the actual political geography of that region -Oceania- is. And one of the very first corrective steps, in that regard, is to call Oceania what it is: a continent, that includes Australia, Papua, New Guinea, Indonesia, and other Oceanic countries.

I do not think that Papua and New Guinea are part of the Australian continent, because I don't think that Australia is a continent to begin with. It's a country within a continent.

No offense meant, it's just that it's a fascinating case in geo-political terms.

You described Bung as introducing a relational operator for existence. I hope I shed some doubt on the necessity of doing so, — Banno

Indeed you have. I had been harboring suspicions about that part of Bunge's work myself (and about other parts of his work, but those are beside the point being discussed here). I'm not sure if I'm sold on the Kripkean-esque part of your proposal, though. I just don't know. I've done some experiments with treating individual constants (i.e., "p" for "Pegasus") as predicates (i.e. "P" for "is Pegasus"). If I say that there is an x, such that x "is Pegasus" in a predicative sense, like so:

∃xPx

what would I be committed to, exactly? Does that formula commit me to the claim that the symbol
∃ has ontological import? I don't think it does. All it means is "a particular thing, x, is Pegasus in a predicative sense). Now what does the predicate "is Pegasus" mean? Does it mean that x performs the act of "pegasizing"? I don't think that's a sound thing to say, so Quinenians will have to excuse me here.

to say that something exists is little more than to talk about it. — Banno

But I disagree with that for metaphysical reasons. To exist, in my opinion, is to have a spatiotemporal location. Pegasus does not have a spatiotemporal location. Where is it? Where is it located? Or, you could say that to exist is to have some kind or type of energy, such as potential energy or kinetic energy. Or thermal energy, or nuclear energy, or what have you. What kind of energy does Pegasus have, being a fictional object? I don't think it has any. So, I don't agree that existence is somehow a matter of words or even language more broadly. It's independent of language.

So, as I think you agreed, the answer to ↪Michael
's question is that infinitesimals can be the subject of a quantifier, and in that way, they exist; they can be in the domain of discourse. If there is something more to their existence, some "platonic" existence, then it's up to the advocates to set out what that amounts to. — Banno

Exactly, 100%, couldn't agree with you more on that point.

@Banno Indeed, you have a solid argument on your hands. So what were we discussing in relation to that point? Why Bunge instead of Kripke on that specific point? Was that the question that you had?

perhaps that doubt has helped me through more than 50 years of research and study. — Mapping the Medium

Perhaps. I'm sure it has. But it doesn't "seep through" your words, currently. It's as if you've already figured out something that requires no further contribution from anyone else, human or machine. Is that right? But it can't be. Why not? Well, you're here, aren't you? You're speaking to fellow humans on a Forum. You're also speaking to a machine when you speak to Claude. So, by necessity, it follows that you haven't figured out what I just said. But then I just don't know why your tone is rock-solid confident. Is it merely because you've been researching and studying for more than 50 years? Perhaps. But I know intellectuals that have been researching and studying for the same stretch of time, and in other cases, even longer. They don't speak with such confidence, in fact their doubts are very noticeable in their speech and their writing. Their speech patterns, that is, and their writing patterns, that is. They express doubt in their patterns, and manifestly so. That's all I'm saying, mate. I literally mean no offense by it.

I am not assuming that about you at all. I was just being clear. ... My experience has taught me that sometimes that is necessary when someone doesn't take the time to read or get to know the topic better before dismissing it. ... If that does not apply to you, then no worries. — Mapping the Medium

You seem very... "extreme", in some sense of the word. You speak with absolute confidence, is what I'm saying. Is it because you put no stock in the concept of good, honest doubt? Or is it for some other reason? I'm curious.

↪Arcane Sandwich

Try

https://www.umsu.de/trees/#~6x~3((Gx~5Ax)~1(Ax~5Gx)) — Banno

But then you reach a problem, mate. You can't deduce ¬Ga from ∀x¬((Gx→Ax)∧(Ax→Gx)). Here's your argument:

First premise: Gp
Second premise: ∀x¬((Gx→Ax)∧(Ax→Gx))
Conclusion: ¬Ga

But your two premises do not entail your conclusion. See for yourself: https://www.umsu.de/trees/#Gp,~6x~3((Gx~5Ax)~1(Ax~5Gx))|=~3Ga

EDIT: Whoops, sorry, you do ineed reach your conclusion, which is not ¬Ga, but ¬Ap instead. Yep, you have a valid argument, mate: https://www.umsu.de/trees/#Gp,~6x~3((Gx~5Ax)~1(Ax~5Gx))|=~3Ap

Exactly. Couldn't have said it better myself.

No, that's not what I think. Why would you assume that about me? Why would you assume that I have ill intent? I'm being charitable towards you, am I not? Why would it be wrong for me to expect the same courtesy from you? Honest question.

You should carefully and thoroughly read it. — Mapping the Medium

Should I? Why? I'd read your parts, but what Claude the A.I. tells you seems fishy to me.

I got ChatGPT to tell me I solved the double-slit experiment once. Needless to say, it turned out to almost certainly be bullshit. — ToothyMaw

There's a meme of someone who asked for the best way to use glue in a recipe for a homemade pizza, and ChatGPT gave her a list of instructions in which glue is indeed one of the ingredients.

It has no awareness of what it is actually saying to the prompter. I has no mind, since the series of processes that it undergoes are not brain processes, and meaning is something that requires a living brain.

Did you read the link at the bottom of the post? — Mapping the Medium

Yes, I did. Not all of it, though. I skimmed through certain parts. My take on A.I. (if that's what you're asking, I'm not sure. Forgive me if not) is that Claude, the A.I. that you were prompting, is not aware. I would compare Claude to a parrot. A very sophisticated parrot, but still an entity that has no "awareness of the meaning of the words that it repeats", so to speak. In that sense, Claude is more like Deep Blue, the A.I. from the 90's that only played chess, and that beat Garry Kasparov. Deep Blue wasn't aware that it was playing a game of chess. It played masterfully, like the best human players, it had grand strategies and detailed tactics, like the best human generals. But it had no concept of what it was actually doing, it had no real awareness. And I believe that the same goes for Claude, and for ChatGPT, and every other A.I.: they are not aware of what it is exactly that they are doing, despite their claims to the contrary.

I am not a theoretical physicist, but my understanding is that there is no "past" to travel to. That is, the concept of continuous time is an inaccurate lay person model. — LuckyR

But that's my point. How can there not be? A past, that is. There was a past just yesterday. It was December 29, of the year 2024. That's a fact. How can there not be continuous time? Today is December 30, of the year 2024. There's a continuum of time between those two days.

I don't even know what I'm saying at this point. Do I believe in time travel? I've no idea. It sounds like a purely Sci-Fi notion. Is it?

Habit in autopoietic momentum is a highly important aspect of Thirdness to be aware of. It reveals itself in all complex systems. Our neglect of understanding Thirdness is extremely dangerous. Nominalism is the cause of the blindness. — Mapping the Medium

I was understanding you (I think?) until this last paragraph. That's a real head-scratcher as far as I'm concerned. I don't know what to make of what you said there. Habit in autopoietic momentum is a highly important aspect, I'm with you up to that point. But then you say "of Thirdness to be aware of".

I'll just say it, since I consider you a friend at this point, even though I joined this Forum less than I week ago:

I don't understand Peirce when he talks about Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. I've thought about this for decades. I've read papers about it. I've had people explain it to me. I still don't get it. It's like, I can't even imagine it, like what is he talking about? It's so abstract that I can't even picture it. Like, what is it? What do I compare it to? I feel utterly dumb when I try to understand Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. Is it like "I, you, they"? Is it like "he, she, they"? I don't get it. Please, can you help me understand just the very concept under discussion here? I can't wrap my head around it, it's too abstract for my simple capacity to understand things.

(a) This honey tastes sweet.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

Taking your idea as a sketch, let me see if I can add some color to it. I would say:

(a) This honey tastes sweet to a human being.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness in itself, if by "in itself" we mean an object-subject relation.
(c) Any object-subject relation can be reduced (abstracted away) to a something-something relation.
(d) And in a something-something relation, there are two individual variables, "x" and "y", such that something binds them, and that something is a relation.

However, that relation itself, can be treated either as a unary predicate, or as an individual variable "z", but then you would need a fourt element to play the role of the ternary, binding predicate.

Does that make any sense? I'm not sure that it does.

EDIT:

you introduced rigor to the conversation. I shouldn't have just framed that in terms of myself. Sorry. — ToothyMaw

Thanks mate, no need to apologize to me. You seem like a good person.

Slow down thar, pardner! You say "Whatever they may be (the epistemic rights)" so let's start there. What are they meant to be? — J

They're meant to be rights. Letter of the Law versus Spirit of the Law and all that. Define them however you want. They're something that physicists and philosophers have in common, and it's what allows them both, to say, at the same time and in the same sense, that math and logic are just tools. They have no ontology built into them as formal languages. The existential quantifier doesn't really say anything about existence, just as the universal quantifier doesn't say anything about existence. You can even switch one for the other under certain conditions, as I've shown in my example about the "existence" of Pegasus.

I just meant physicists and philosophers can claim whatever they like. The idea of rights isn't needed. — frank

It is for my argument, frank. I would like to have a better argument, but I don't. I'm all ears, though, if you have a better idea.

This needs a lot of expansion. What exactly is at stake with this premise? — J

It means that it's an "all or nothing" deal, whatever we mean when we speak of "epistemic rights". Whatever they may be (the epistemic rights), there are only two options:

Option 1) Physicists and philosophers both have them, or
Option 2) Neither physicists nor philosophers have them.

There is no Option 3. At least not to my mind. And if you wish to deny the premise that you asked for expansion, you would have to argue that there is indeed an Option 3. What would that be? That there is an epistemic difference between physicists and philosophers.

(edited for clarity's sake)

There are no restrictions on what a person can claim unless it's a religious environment and people are executed for saying the wrong thing. — frank

What do you mean by that, @frank? I mean, in relation to the topic of Mathematical Platonism, formalism, and ontology? I don't get it. Can you explain it to me like I'm simple-minded?

On the discussion between Rorty and Eco that @Count Timothy von Icarus contributed to the discussion on Mathematical Platonism, specifically in relation to infinitesimals:

I believe that @Banno has solved it. Infinitesimals exist if and only if Pegasus exists in the exact same sense. What we're debating now, at page 11 of this Thread, is what that "exact same sense" is. And my wager is that it cannot be solved in the language of first-order logic, or any other formal language, including mathematics.

The case I'm making here, folks, is a simple one. It's what's known in the literature as a "parity argument":

First Premise) There is no epistemic difference between the epistemic rights of professional physicists and the epistemic rights of professional philosophers.
Second Premise) If so, then: if professional physicists are within their epistemic rights to claim that math and logic are just mere tools, then professional philosophers are also within their epistemic rights to claim that math and logic are just mere tools.
Third Premise) Professional physicists are within their epistemic rights to claim that math and logic are just mere tools.
Conclusion) So, professional philosophers are also within their epistemic rights to claim that math and logic are just mere tools.

I claim that the preceding is a logically valid argument. I also claim that all of the premises are true, which means that the conclusion is necessarily true as well.

Does anyone wish to resist this argument, or do you agree with it?

EDIT: Here is the logical form of my argument, using Propositional Logic:

1) p
2) p → (q → r)
3) q
4) r

I meant traveling to the past. It's not possible even at the level of theoretical physics?