Athena survived, too. — Banno

I find that counter-intuitive. The flat piece of clay that I'm looking at is clearly not a human-shaped statue, so how could it still be Athena?

See how you have to drop extensionality? That is, you can't maintain that Athena = Piece and still say only one of them survived. — Banno

You can (I believe), if you symbolize "Athena" and "Piece" using the predicate letters (or predicate constants, in the case of second-order logic), "A" and "P", instead of the individual constants "a" and "p". That way, you can say that some "x" is both Athena and Piece in a predicative sense, and you're able to say that "x" is both Athena and Piece on Monday, while it is only Piece but not Athena on Tuesday, after flattening. That's more or less the "gist" of my proposed solution to the problem of Material Constitution.

Ok. It might be a path to madness, but on your head be it. — Banno

I never made the promise that my proposed solution actually works. It might be nonsense. I'm aware of that possibility. But the problem of Material Constitution is so impossibly hard to tackle, that I'm willing to think outside the box here.

For my money, the answer to "what was flattened?" is "Athena" as much as "Piece", since Athena = Piece. — Banno

Yes, both of them were flattened, at the same time, but only one of them survived: Piece. On the other hand, Athena was destroyed when the process of flattening occurred: it has ceased to exist, and now only Piece remains.

EDIT: So, if Athena was destroyed but Piece wasn't, it follows that they were different objects to begin with.

@Banno let me try another "sales pitch" for my proposal. Allow me to compare and contrast it to Quine's. I agree with Quine, not Bunge, in treating the case of Pegasus like so:

∃x(Px)

For Quine, that means "something Pegasizes". What people asked him in the 50's is if, by the same lights, President Truman exists because "something Trumanizes". Here's what I would say. Let's agree to use the following formula, if only for the sake of argument:

∃x(Tx)

Should that be read as if it were saying "something Trumanizes"? No. It should be read instead: "someone is Truman", or better yet, "it is the case that someone is President Truman", just as it is also the case that something is Pegasus. In saying "something is Pegasus", I make no commitments, because I deny that Pegasus exists (on the other hand, I obviously believe that someone in the past was President Truman).

That the domain is not empty is a presumption for first order logic anyway — Banno

Is it a necessary presumption?

And I'm confident that Bunge's domain was not empty. — Banno

Doesn't matter, for this is a point in which I'm willing to part ways with Bunge.

The very same thing can have different properties. — Banno

Not if the properties in question contradict each other. Athena can't survive flattening. Piece can. Therefore, by Leibniz Law, you're dealing with two different objects. And this is a problem for anyone like me, who wishes to find a working monist solution.

BTW this is the language that I personally call "Basic Alien". This is not Philosophy, this is Basic Alien.

Unless you are saying that ∃(x)fx says there is at least one thing and one thing is f - ie, that the domain is not empty. That might make sense. — Banno

More or less, except that I have no use for the notion of a domain either in this proposal that I'm working on. But that would be more or less the correct parse: 1) there is at least one thing, and 2) that thing is F, in the manner of a variable (not an individual constant) having something predicated of it (instead of predicating that the variable in question is identical to an individual constant).

Except that f(x) says nothing, while ∃(x)fx says that something has the property f. — Banno

Sure, but in saying ∃(x)fx, you're saying two things, you're making two declararions (or declarative speech acts):

1) you're saying that some particular x (fill in the blanks)
2) you're saying that (fill in the blanks) x is F.

There's a sort of synthetic operation here, in a formula like ∃(x)fx. You're not saying "just one thing", you're saying two different things that only make sense when said together, but they're still two different declarations, even though neither can be declared independently of the other.

Wouldn't that just mean that any non-constant was free, and so free variables would just be variables? That'd just be dropping the distinction between bound and free variables. — Banno

It would seem that way. So far, I see no reason for not doing exactly what you just said: to drop the distinction between free and bound variables in favor of the (arguably simpler) distinction between variables and constants. In other words, it seems to me that we can do just fine with constants and variables, there is no work do be done with the tripartite distinction between free variables, bound variables, and individual constants.

EDIT: But I could be wrong.

You can change that definition for your own purposes, if you like, but why? — Banno

Because it seems to be a necessary requirement of the hopefully novel solution that I'm working on in response to the problem of Material Constitution that I was telling you about. If it just so happens that there's no need for a re-definition, even better.

Think of it like this, , if it makes any sense. I believe that in the formula ∃xPx, "x" is a free variable, not a bound variable. Why not, if it's quantified and it has a predicate? Well, because I believe that it's better to define a free variable as any variable that is not identical to an individual constant. Otherwise (and only otherwise) it's a bound variable. So, in this other formula, ∃x(x=p), I believe that "x" is a bound variable, not a free variable. But not because it's quantified, rather because it has been declared to be identical to an individual constant, "p".

I'm aware that none of this makes sense to you.

But you said that these were not the same "becasue x is a free variable". I just wasn't able to follow that. Not a big point in the context. Leave it if you like. — Banno

Maybe I meant to say "bound" variable instead of "free" variable, but the notions of free and bound variables is also something that I'm currently working on.

Fair enough. It's hard to elucidate exactly what I meant by "intense" and "hard", etc., but it sounds more penetratingly intense to my sensibility, particularly things like this: — Jamal

Coltrane is far too abstract for my uneducated ear, that's why I gravitate more towards metal. Because there's abstraction in metal, but not to the degree of anything that's been done in the jazz world.

In sounding so abstract, I personally fail to understand how your ear can find jazz more intense and hard, because you're probably immersed in the world of jazz to a degree that I am not. I am merely a visitor in the jazz world, it would be very difficult for me to play along and keep up during a jazz improvisation. I mean, I can hang in there, but I would be hanging in there for dear life. I find it much easier to jam in the context of blues, rock n' roll, and heavy metal. I can probably join a session and more or less play along and improvise. Don't expect great quality, though. But, at least it's something that I can more or less tackle. Jazz just seems so impossible to my admittedly unskilled abilities as a musician.

Well, in "Pesasus=x", isn't x some particular x? — Banno

But I don't say "Pegasus=x", because the phrase "is Pegasus", in the case of Px, is not the "is" of identity, it is the "is" of predication. Like when you say: Some lemons are yellow. You're not saying "Lemon = yellow", you're not saying that a fruit is identical to one of its colors. You're saying that some fruit has that color. When I say that some "x" is Pegasus, I mean it like that: some x is Pegasus, in the sense of predication, not in the sense of identity. It's something that I'm working on, so I understand your confusion.

If for the first two millennia the precondition was putting your trust to the Catholic Church, for the next two millennia of dark age the condition will be putting your trust on AI.

The US and Chinese governments are doing whatever they can, investing trillions now, so we put our trust to the new god (i.e. supercomputers that tell you everything you need and know).

Be ready, my friends. I like Stanley Kubrick, but he got a few details wrong. Elon Musk, Altman and Hinton are using Stanley Kubrick to fool all those people who watch too many movies. We have some of them here. — Eros1982

All Watched Over By Machines Of Loving Grace

I like to think (and
the sooner the better!)
of a cybernetic meadow
where mammals and computers
live together in mutually
programming harmony
like pure water
touching clear sky.

I like to think
(right now, please!)
of a cybernetic forest
filled with pines and electronics
where deer stroll peacefully
past computers
as if they were flowers
with spinning blossoms.

I like to think
(it has to be!)
of a cybernetic ecology
where we are free of our labors
and joined back to nature,
returned to our mammal
brothers and sisters,
and all watched over
by machines of loving grace — Richard Brautigan

Ah, I see what you mean. You're asking how can I say that "x" is a free variable instead of a bound variable. Is that it?

I don't see where the problem is. What is it that you don't understand here?

Px is to be read: is Pegasus. — Arcane Sandwich

So "P" is much the same as "Pegasus=" in "Pesasus=x"? — Banno

No, because x is a free variable. Like Quine, I believe that in some cases, we should avoid using individual constants, and we should treat proper nouns (i.e., names) as predicates of some free variable instead. Why? Because it has to do with a hopefully novel solution to the problem of Material Constitution that I mentioned in my previous comment.

Bunge's approach also manages to accommodate the idea that proper nouns can be treated as individual constants. — Arcane Sandwich

And seems to me to be an improvement over Quine's idea of simply dropping proper nouns and individual constants. — Banno

But that is precisely where my disagreement with Bunge is to be found, because I think that Quine is actually right in treating the word "Pegasus" in a predicative way. I don't have the space here to explain why I prefer Quine's approach on this exact point, but it has to do with a (hopefully) novel solution to the problem of Material Constitution. Essentially, I agree with Quine's syntax (which is identical to Russellian syntax), but I disagree with Quine's parsing: "something Pegasizes". I also disagree with Russell's parsing, which is based on his theory of definite descriptions (but not because referents are inscrutable). I would just parse the following syntax:

∃x(Px)

like so: "Some particular x is Pegasus".

Notice that I do not say that some "x" exists. I parse it strictly as "Some particular x". And then, Px is to be read: is Pegasus. In this way, I (hopefully) manage to preserve what is intuitive in the idea that proper nouns successfully refer; that is, they function more or less like Kripkean rigid designators, but I avoid Kripke's (and Bunge's) idea that proper nouns should be treated as individual constants. Instead, I preserve (hopefully) what is intuitive in the Russellian and Quinean approaches, that is, of treating the expression "is Pegasus" as a predicate, because the "is" here is not the "is" of identity, it is the "is" of predication.

At least this is one of the projects that I'm currently working on, in my day job (professional philosophy is far less glamorous than it sounds to outsiders).

Yeah, but your name is like, RogueAI. — Arcane Sandwich


Good point. — Eros1982

It's a terrible point, and I'm allowed to say that, because it was my point. It's a terrible point because I made it in jest.

But you've piqued my curiosity with your ending lines, friend:

we are entering a new dark age for the next two thousand years or so. — Eros1982

I'm not sure that I believe you. It sounds too dramatic, especially since your name, Eros, is the Ancient Greek version of what the Romans called Cupid. Do you really think that Eros (or Cupid!) would have said something so dark? I don't think so.

And yes, that comment was also made in jest.

@Banno @Leontiskos

It's true that ∀x(Sx ∧ Bx) is not the same as ∀x(Sx → Bx). And as Leontiskos keenly observed, I wanted to avoid the "→" symbol. Certainly, the statement "Everything is a beautiful siren" is false, so from (1) to (2) can be safely rejected. That being said, consider this other case:

1) ∃x(Sx ∧ Bx) - Some sirens are beautiful
2) ¬∀x¬(Sx ∧ Bx) - Therefore, some sirens are beautiful (or some other more sophisticated parse)

To my mind, as far as ontological commitments go, this case is even worse than the preceding one, because those two formulas are interchangeable:

https://www.umsu.de/trees/#(~7x(Sx~1Bx))~4(~3~6x~3(Sx~1Bx))

So you could switch their places:

2) ¬∀x¬(Sx ∧ Bx) - Some sirens are beautiful (or some other more sophisticated parse)
1) ∃x(Sx ∧ Bx) - Therefore, some sirens are beautiful

But notice that ¬∀x¬(Sx ∧ Bx) has no existential quantifier, it only has a negated universal quantifier. So, my question is the following: does ¬∀ have ontological import? How could it not, if it's equivalent to ∃? And if that's so, then does ∀ have ontological import, since it's equivalent to ¬∃? Of course, "all" is not identical to "none", but there are cases in which it's possible to switch one of these symbols for the other. Consider:

3) ¬∃x(Sx ∧ Bx) - No siren is beautiful (alternatively, there are no beautiful sirens)
4) ∀x¬(Sx ∧ Bx) - Therefore, no siren is beautiful (or some other more sophisticated parse)

In this case, the two formulas are also interchangeable:

https://www.umsu.de/trees/#~3~7x(Sx~1Bx)~4~6x~3(Sx~1Bx)

Maybe it's just me, but I fail to understand how and why someone would treat ∃ and ∀ differently, as far as the discussion about ontological commitment goes. To my mind, either both of them have import, or neither of them does. I say that neither of them does. The existential quantifier should be called the "particularizing" quantifier instead (I didn't come up with that proposal, Bunge and some other folks have suggested that. I think that G. Priest says something along those lines as well, IIRC).

I can definitely see the merits of free logic. But it just seems like overkill to me. What's nice about Bunge's ideas regarding the existence predicate is that we don't need to step outside the realm of classical, first order logic, so there is no need to adopt free logic in the first place, which means that there is no need to say that E!t can be defined as ∃x(x=t), for example. Besides, Bunge's approach also manages to accommodate the idea that proper nouns can be treated as individual constants. For example, instead of saying ¬∃x(Px) (Nothing pegasizes), it's possible to say instead ∃x(x=p ∧ ¬E_Rx) (there is an x, such that x is identical to Pegasus, and Pegasus does not really exist).

Thoughts?

EDIT: And, speaking for myself, if I don't accept Bunge's dichotomy between conceptual existence and real existence, then there is no need for me to use subscripts, as in ∃x(x=p ∧ ¬E_Rx). I can say instead: ∃x(x=p ∧ ¬Ex).

Just out of curiosity, how would you handle the claim that the universal quantifier must have ontological import, if the existential quantifier has it? It would seem that whatever import ∃ has, ∀ must have it as well. Consider:

1) ∀x(Sx ∧ Bx) - All sirens are beautiful.
2) ∃x(Sx ∧ Bx) - Therefore, some sirens are beautiful.

Does the statement "All sirens are beautiful" have ontological import, in your view?

Sounds great, no objections from me on those points.

I think we need to take a step back here, in this discussion. We're on page 15, this can go on and on, ad infinitum, if we don't look at this from another angle, IMHO.

The OP asks what Quine means by inscrutability of reference. If someone (@Banno, for example) steps in and says "What Quine means is (fill in the blank)", then great. I have no quarrel with that. I'm not here to dispute people's knowledge of Quine's philosophy.

However, matters are different IMHO if the discussion turns into something along the lines of "Is Quine right when he says references are inscrutable?" I believe he's wrong, and I'm not alone in thinking that he's wrong. That's why I brought up the stuff about Mario Bunge. I'm not trying to appeal to authority here, all I'm trying to say is that Bunge is far more articulate than I am, so I defer to his prose, which is obviously better than mine.

But I'm not Bunge's lawyer. I'm not here to defend Bunge against every possible objection against his philosophy, because I honestly don't think that Bunge is right about everything. There are many key points that I disagree with him, for example I don't accept his dichotomy of conceptual existence and real existence (there's only real existence as far as I'm concerned). In more general terms, I don't believe in defending any philosopher against every conceivable objection. Why not? Because if you do that, then you run the risk of causing what Harman calls "The Puerto Rico Effect". I'll let him explain it:

It is said that in Puerto Rico, red and green traffic lights display a curious reversal of roles. Drivers have flouted red lights to such a degree that the practice is now contagious, so that cars approaching a green light must stop from fear of those ignoring the red. Since my travels have never taken me to Puerto Rico, I cannot verify these reports. But I will take the liberty of coining the phrase ‘The Puerto Rico Effect’ to describe a similar phenomenon in readings of past philosophies. Since every great thinker is approached through an initial aura of widespread clichés, the critical scholar is always in a mood to reverse them. Good reasons should be given whenever this is done, since we must always respect the rights of the obvious. But of course there is nothing automatically false about such reversals.
As suggested earlier, it is typical of the greatest thinkers that they support opposite interpretations, just as Aristotelian substance can be both hot and cold or happy and sad at different times or in different respects. Now, it seems to me that conventional wisdom is falsely reversed when Nietzsche is read as a democratic theorist, Spinoza as a thinker of plurality, Leibniz as a thinker of monism, Aristotle as reducing substance to the human logos, or Husserl as a realist, yet I have heard actual examples of all of these reversals. — Graham Harman,

With that in mind, I'll say that I don't want to distort Bunge's (or anyone's) views. As far as I'm concerned, Bunge is right about a lot of things, and he's wrong about a few other things (some of which are key philosophical issues, such as the topic of existence). I'm not interested in creating a Puerto Rico Effect of Bunge's philosophy.

So, I ask: is it possible that the trenchant defense of Quine's philosophy runs the risk of causing a Puerto Rico Effect here? If yes, then we should just be able to say that we disagree with Quine regarding his ideas on reference. That doesn't mean that we should throw his entire philosophy in the trash bin. Granted, sometimes my impatience gets the best of me, and I end up saying that Quine's views are nonsense. Despite that acknowledgement, I still disagree with Quine's ideas on reference. His mental experiment involving the word "gavagai" doesn't convince me. Is it an interesting philosophical experiment? Sure. But so is Descartes' hyperbolic doubt. But just because they're interesting thought experiments, that doesn't mean that I can't disagree with the ideas that are being entertained in those thought experiments, and others like them. The way I see it, Descartes is simply wrong to suppose that we can doubt everything except for the cogito ergo sum thesis. And Quine is simply wrong to suppose that what holds for gavagai holds for language in general. We can then have a discussion, and I of course recognize that I could be wrong. But if what it takes for me to be wrong here is a sort of Puerto Rico Effect reading of Quine, then it's reasonable for me to remain skeptical on such matters.

At the end of the day, it's not about Quine vs Bunge. It's about whether or not we ourselves agree or disagree with what they're saying. Who knows? Maybe they're both wrong.

I hope that clarifies my position.

I'm just having a hard time understanding how jazz can be harder and more intense than metal. I definitely agree that heavy metal is a petulant little part of the world, though.

What do you mean when you say that it's more intense? Metal is musical barbarism, few things are harsher than it from a musical standpoint. I'd say that Experimental Noise (in the manner of Merzbow or Masonna, for example) is one of the few genres that gives metal a run for its money in that sense.

Maybe so, but that's not the essential thing, and it's not why I moved away from metal and towards jazz. — Jamal

What do you get out of jazz specifically, that you don't get out of metal? For me it's the technicality, but perhaps it's different in your case. What does jazz have that metal doesn't, that makes it more interesting or more pleasing to your ear?

That did confuse me a bit. E_Rx — Leontiskos

Thanks! I fixed all of the subscripts in my post.

On Aquinas: he's right about the example of the phoenix. Ever since Kant, philosophers in general have been reluctant to grant Aquinas that point. But why wouldn't one grant him that point? My suspicion is that modern philosophers just don't want to agree with Aquinas on anything. There is this sort of unstated aversion to anything that has to do with Medieval philosophy in general, and with Aquinas in particular. It sounds as if one agrees with anything that Aquinas said, then one has magically converted to Catholicism. But this makes no sense to me. If Aquinas says "2 + 2 = 4", are we going to deny that basic mathematical statement, just because Aquinas said it? No, of course not. So why can't we say that he's right when he says that existence is a property? That doesn't necessarily commit one to every other thing that Aquinas said.

Shorter: I can distinguish Pegasus from a phoenix. They're not the same fictional creature. Neither of them exists, so how is it even possible for me to distinguish them? Most of the time, reference is far from being inscrutable. And even in those cases in which it is, it can cease to be inscrutable. Unknown references are not the same thing as unknowable references.

Ontology should precede epistemology. And yet modern philosophy started rejecting metaphysics. It did so just because the ruling metaphysics around 1600 was obsolete. The price paid for this antimetaphysical turn was subjectivism, outspoken as in Berkeley’s case, or shame-faced as in Kant’s. — Bunge (2010: 201)

"Our definition of "reality" cannot be other than this:
DEFINITION 3.30 Let Θ be the set of all things and [Θ] its aggregation. Then
Reality = _df [Θ] = ▯ = the world.
The reality of an object consists in its being a part of the world." — Bunge (1977: 161)

We have tacitly regarded all substantial properties as real, though not as autonomously real, or real in themselves, i.e. apart from the individuals possessing them. More precisely, we have implicitly employed

DEFINITION 2.17 A property P is real = _df There is at least one individual x ∈ S, other than the null individual, that possesses P (equivalently: (P) ≠ ∅). — Bunge (1977: 99)

This definition applies not only to intrinsic properties (represented by unary predicates) but also to mutual properties (represented by n-ary predicates). Thus to say that a certain relation R is real amounts to saying that there are R-related entities or substantial individuals. — Bunge (1977: 99)

Mathematical objects are then ontologically on a par with artistic and mythological creations: they are all fictions. The real number system and the triangle inequality axiom do not exist really any more than Don Quijote or Donald Duck." — Bunge (1985: 38-39)

Surely most contemporary philosophers hold that ∃ formalizes both the logical concept "some" and the ontological concept of existence. I shall argue that this is a mistake. Consider the statement "Some sirens are beautiful", which can be symbolized "(∃x)(Sx & Bx)". So far so good. The trouble starts when the formula is read "There are beautiful sirens". The existential interpretation is misleading because it suggests belief in the real existence of sirens, while all we intended to say was "Some of the sirens existing in Greek mythology are beautiful". — Bunge (1977: 155)

We need then an exact concept of existence different from ∃. Much to the dismay of most logicians we shall introduce one in the sequel. In fact we shall introduce an existence predicate, thus vindicating the age-old intuition that existence is the most important property anything can possess. — Bunge (1977: 155)

DEFINITION 3.29
(i) x exists conceptually = df For some set C of constructs, E_Cx;
(ii) x exists really = df For some set Θ of things, E_Θx.
For example the Pythagorean theorem exists in the sense that it belongs in Euclidean geometry. Surely it did not come into existence before someone in the Pythagorean school invented it. But it has been in conceptual existence, i.e. in geometry, ever since. Not that geometry has an autonomous existence, i.e. that it subsists independently of being thought about. It is just that we make the indispensable pretence that constructs exist provided they belong in some body of ideas - which is a roundabout fashion of saying that constructs exist as long as there are rational beings capable of thinking them up. Surely this mode of existence is neither ideal existence (or existence in the Realm of Ideas) nor real or physical existence. To invert Plato's cave metaphor we may say that ideas are but the shadows of things - and shadows, as is well known, have no autonomous existence. — Bunge (1977: 157)

Let us now use the existential predicate introduced above to revisit the most famous of all the arguments for God’s existence. Anselm of Canterbury argued that God exists because He is perfect, and existence is a property of perfection. Some mathematical logicians have claimed that Anselm was wrong because existence is not a predicate but the ∃ quantifier. I suggest that this objection is sophistic because in all the fields of knowledge we tacitly use an existential predicate that has nothing to do with the “existential” quantifier, as when it is asserted or denied that there are living beings in Mars or perpetual motion machines. — Bunge (2012: 174-175)

Using the existence predicate defined a while ago, we may reformulate Anselm’s argument as follows.

God is perfect ______________________ Pg
Everything perfect exists in R [really]_____∀x(Px → E_Rx)
God exists in R.______________________ E_Rg

Both premises are controversial, particularly the first one since it presupposes the existence of God. Hence the atheist will have to propose serious arguments against it instead of the sophistry of the logical imperialist. An alternative is to admit the existence of God for the sake of argument, and add the ontological postulate that everything real is imperfect: that if something is perfect then it is ideal, like Pythagoras’ theorem or a Beethoven sonata. But the conjunction of both postulates implies the unreality of God. In short, Anselm was far less wrong than his modern critics would have it. — Bunge (2012: 175)

Note: The "R" in "ERx" is meant to be a subscript, but this forum doesn't seem to have the option for subscripts.

EDIT: I have fixed the subscripts thanks to

What is the birds-eye account of Bunge's view, and what sort of philosophical considerations and background are informing such a view? — Leontiskos

It's scientism at the end of the day, and Bunge uses that word in a positive sense, despite the fact that most people use it as a negative or pejorative term. For example, in an article of his, tiled In Defense of Realism and Scientism.

The four pillars of Bunge's philosophy are: Semantics, Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics. This reflected in his magnum opus, the eight volumes of his Treatise on Basic Philosophy. For people that don't have the time to read those eight volumes, I would recommend his book Matter and Mind, or perhaps his autobiography, Between Two Worlds: Memoirs of a Philosopher-Scientist.

His fame has nothing to do with his own philosophy, though. He became relatively famous for being critical of psychoanalysis, phenomenology, existentialism, and Analytic philosophy in general, among other schools and traditions. He criticizes all of the aformentioned for not being scientific enough, or for being pseudoscientific, which is even worse (that is precisely the case of psychoanalysis, in his view). Quine himself thought very highly of Bunge:

His international debut was at the 1956 Inter-American Philosophical Congress in Santiago, Chile. He was particularly noticed there by Willard Van Orman Quine, who called Bunge the star of the congress. He was, until his retirement at age 90, the Frothingham Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at McGill University in Montreal, where he had been since 1966.

In a review of Bunge's 2016 memoirs, Between Two Worlds: Memoirs of a Philosopher-Scientist, James Alcock saw in Bunge "a man of exceedingly high confidence who has lived his life guided by strong principles about truth, science, and justice" and one who is "[impatient] with muddy thinking".

He became a centenarian in September 2019. A Festschrift was published to mark the occasion, with essays by an international collection of scholars. He died in Montreal, Canada, on February 24, 2020, at the age of 100. — Wikipedia

I'll post some of his thoughts on existence and quantification in a moment.

Here's what I suspect the underlying problem is, in this discussion and others like it:

Most people want to avoid the thesis that existence is a property, and that it can be represented with a first-order predicate, such as "E", instead of the existential quantifier, "∃".

And why do most people want to avoid that thesis? Because they somehow believe that to treat existence as a property is naive, if not outright scholastic. After all, didn't Kant refute the ontological argument by pointing out that existence is not a predicate?

But to say that is to make a conceptual mistake, because it is not the case that properties are identical to predicates. Even if Kant succeeded in demonstrating that existence is not a predicate, it does not follow from there that existence is not a property, nor does it follow that existence has anything to do with quantification.

In simpler terms: no one wants to be accused of being a naive, scholastic, pre-critical philosopher, in the manner of Anselm, Aquinas, or even Descartes. We all want to be "the cool kids", and it seems that the only way to be "the cool kids" is to nod approvingly towards Kant's confused identification of properties and predicates, and to declare that matters of existence are matters of quantification.

Such views are nonsensical, if only because there are 20th Century thinkers like Mario Bunge, who conceptualize existence more or less like Aquinas did (as a property, not as a quantity) without being religious. Bunge was an atheist. So what's the big deal here? To imply, between the lines, that one is a Thomist if one conceptualizes existence as a property, is like saying that one is a Cartesian if one believes that a physical thing such as this table is a res extensa.

How about we start by analyzing these completely irrational themes that underlie these sorts of discussions, instead of digging our heels and just blurting out nonsensical accusations such as "You don't really understand Quine's point."

Around 1992 I migrated to jazz and classical in search of the kind of heavy I really wanted (and found Coltrane and Stravinsky) — Jamal

Jazz is definitely more technical than metal. Way more technical. Perhaps Meshuggah can hang in there with jazz musicians, but other than that, there's not much. There's some metal that has jazz influences (like Cynic, or Atheist, for example) but there is nothing in metal that comes close to the technical complexity of John Coltrane's Giant Steps. There just isn't.

I like Art Tatum, Cecil Taylor and Django Reinhardt.

I had begun with Iron Maiden, progressed to Sepultura, and eventually found myself at the more intense end of the spectrum: Death, Morbid Angel, Obituary, Carcass. Very few of those albums have stood the test of time for me personally (in my case it really was mainly just angry young man's music) — Jamal

I think that Heartwork by Carcass is the album that stood the test of time the best of those bands, which is an admittedly unpopular opinion. Morbid Angel sounds kinda corny, to be honest. Death is cool, especially because they deliberately avoided all of the stereotypical, low-hanging fruit (i.e, satanism, the devil, etc.). Sepultura is a hard case for me, but I'd say that Roots sort of stands the test of time (again, unpopular opinion, I know). Iron Maiden and Obituary get a "meh" from me. I respect them, but neither is my cup of metallic tea.

I do still like World Downfall by Terrorizer (at the punk end of thrash metal ("grindcore")) and Reign in Blood by Slayer. I went to see Sepultura, Godflesh, Carcass, Slayer and others, in fairly small venues, and I'm still living with the tinnitus. — Jamal

Terrorizer is a band that I could never really get into. In the grindcore deparment, I like Brutal Truth.



And here are the lyrics to that.

Brutal Truth - Anti-homophobe

Ignorant in thought
Distorts your twisted values
Break your ancient chains
And part with the ways of the past
You don't have the right
To force your own opinion
You don't understand
So you have to lash

Anti-homophobe

We believe in freedom
Whatever turns you on
Life is short and full of woe
So you have yourself a blast
I may not be gay
But I don't care if you are
Live your life in peace
And fuck them if they laugh — Brutal Truth

(edited because apparently I can't write without making some mistakes)

Returning to the TTC, 25. And another translation. Why this one, out of the many? Are you working your way through the terebess list? https://terebess.hu/english/tao/_index.html
Or is it one that 'works' for you, or prefer, in some way? — Amity

All of the translations deserve attention. The reason why the Bahm translation stands out to me in particular, is because it's arguably the least orthodox one. It's the most "European-ish" or "Western-ish", and think that's an interesting lens or perspective from which to read the Tao Te Ching. I prefer the Gia-Fu Feng & Jane English translation, of course. And that's the one that I'm obsessed with. But that's a character flaw that I have, admittedly. The other translations should be taken into account, of course, despite my predilection.

The voice seems authoritative, explanatory, yet not dogmatic. It goes further in describing the Tao as 'ultimate reality'. — Amity

On the topic of the ultimate (or ultimates, plural), it's useful to consider the SEP entry on God and other ultimates, because it compares the concept of Tao to the concept of Brahman and the concept of God. From the entry:

What it takes to be ultimate is to be the most fundamentally real, valuable or fulfilling among all that there is or could be. Historically, philosophy of religion in the West has taken God to be ultimate. Over the past century, the field has become increasingly aware that ultimacy is grasped under different concepts in the world’s religions, philosophies and quasi-religious philosophies—so not only as “God” but also as, e.g., “Brahman”, “the Dao”, and more. Moreover, people have thought to conceptualize each of these ultimates in numerous ways across cultures and times, so there are many models of Brahman, many models of God, many models of the Dao, and more; perhaps there is even a model of what is ultimate for each person who has thought hard about it. This entry presents a framework for understanding this vast landscape of models of God and other ultimates and then surveys some of its major sights. Familiarity with this landscape can clarify the long journey to deciding whether there is anything ultimate, among other benefits. — Jeanine Diller

There is an emphasis on the 'intelligent man'. What does he mean by this? Why the emphasis on 'intelligent'? Not all men are. Unless, it simply means having an ability to think. It's unfortunate that Bahm keeps to the word 'man' rather than 'human' or 'human beings' (as per Jane English update). Then again, a man of his time. Edit: On a re-read, I note he also used the word 'person'. — Amity

The "intelligent man" is what Gia-Fu Feng & Jane English call "the king", and what some other translations simply call "man". In that sense, we should also speak of the intelligent woman, the Queen, and simply woman. "Intelligent person" and "intelligent human being" are even better expressions, not because they're more politically correct, but rather because they get to the heart of the matter in a more efficient way. That still leaves the question regarding politics: should we understand the terms "king" and "queen" politically? Or do intelligent people aspire to become kings and queens of their own lives? Kings and queens ruling over their own emotions and impulses? Kings and queens that keep their passions in control and in check, instead of surrendering themselves to such passions? These are difficult questions to answer.

I've spoken to engineers about the Tao Te Ching before. They are far more level-headed than mathematicians and physicists on this topic, and that is the reason why I'm fascinated by how someone like @T Clark approaches this topic. Because an engineer, etymologically, is someone who specializes in engines (and structures, and machines). An engine is a human construct, it's a machine in some sense. It's a work of artifice, not nature. And that is why I think that the Tao is not identical to Nature. The Tao is a work of artifice, it is not Nature itself. The Way itself, the Path itself, is the Artifice that points to, refers to, or emerges from, Nature itself. We should note that the word "Nature" derives from the Roman Latin Natura, which is more or less equivalent to the ancient Greek word Physis. In this sense physics is "the study of nature". But the laws of physics also apply to machines, such as engines. The problem is that there is a lot of nonsense in physics today, as well as in mathematics. Even professional, prominent physicist, say nonsensical things when they say that "the observer creates quantum reality" or whatnot. Mathematicians say nonsense when they say that mathematics itself is some sort of Platonic ultimate (Max Tegmark holds this opinion, for example). Engineers are far more rational than physicists and mathematicians in that sense.

So, are machines natural? Are engines natural? Is my computer natural? They're physical things, aren't they? They are subjected to the same physical laws that trees and stones are subjected to, aren't they? But I think it makes sense to trace a distinction between Nature and Artifice, or between Nature and Culture (or Nature and Tao, if you will), even though everything is physical. Which is why I don't think that the Latin natura is identical to the Greek physis.

As for the Ultimate, in my personal philosophy, it is identical to Reality itself, not to Nature, nor to Tao.

Does that make sense?

She was also friends with Sisters of Mercy, IIRC.

Regarding metal, here's a band that I like.

Thanks! I love Siouxsie, as well as Fields. They're foundational, genre-defining bands IMHO.

All About Eve usually gets classified as goth rock. Without the stereotypes, of course.

Well now the task for me is to connect Hippie rock to METAL :D — Moliere

Black Sabbath is the connection there. They rejected the concepts of the Hippie movement/generation, while at the same time retaining some of its musical characteristics. They did try to push the envelope in that sense as well, of course, but at the end of the day Black Sabbath sounds more like Jefferson Airplane than Slayer or Mayhem, for example.

Yes, it does. It's more metal than both Coven and Sabbath, which sound more like Hippie Rock. To my mind, at least.

Metal is an odd genre. It allegedly started with Black Sabbath, but even that's debatable (given the existence of Coven's album prior to Black Sabbath).

I would say that both Coven and Sabbath sound more like Hippie Rock than what we usually think that metal sounds like. In that sense, I would say that Motörhead sounds more metal than both of those bands.

I often think of goth music as expressing similar things to punk music, but only in another mode. — Moliere

Goth rock grew out of punk rock, just as power metal grew out of heavy metal. Goth rock is a subgenre within punk rock.

How would you categorize Kraftwerk? — Moliere

It's Krautrock, IMHO, though that label doesn't really say much. Maybe "Experimental Music" is a more nuanced term. But it's just Krautrock at the end of the day, to my mind.

There are outright fantasies of murder etc. in Type O Negative that are horrific, as well as a good deal of homophobia. It's definitely a product of its times.

I'd say that this is toxicity, at least. — Moliere

Yup, that's why they're Toxic Chads instead of Healthy Chads.

Though we should probably keep in mind that "Virgin" and "Chad" aren't exactly precise scientific concepts. Like, no one in sociology uses these concepts as sociological variables. Same goes for "Toxic" and "Healthy". It's all just fun and games when we talk like this, using these words. But I don't think that any peer-reviewed journal worth its salt would or even should accept a paper that attempts to use these concepts in a serious, scientific way.

Lots of music is, tho I wonder if you'd say the same about — Moliere

Nope, though I'd say that Bauhaus is Gothic Rock, not Gothic Metal : P

Bauhaus is actually one of my favorite gothic bands, together with Sisters of Mercy.

sometimes its longing transforms into the masculine, even patriarchal, hatred of women who hurt them. — Moliere

Yeah, that's when they turn into Toxic Virgins. In other words, you're not much of Chad if women (or men!) "hurt your feelings", lol. I mean, if you're gonna get all whiny about it, then you don't have much self-esteem to begin with. And if you're gonna get all patriarchal about it, well, then you're not a real man, you know what I'm saying?

it's not hard to see that the Toxic Chad can quickly turn dark in a material way that the Toxic Virgins don't. — Moliere

Healthy Virgins don't turn dark in that material way either. I don't see Paramore fans promoting toxic masculinity or patriarchy. And they're virgins. It just so happens that they're healthy virgins instead of toxic virgins.

The real question, to my mind, is if Healthy Chads are promoting toxic masculinity. I don't think so. Consider the following song from Hatebreed, for example.



I could be wrong, though.

The interview captured a lot of what I like about Type O musically, tho. Peter Steele did legit sound and look like a sexy depressed vampire :D — Moliere

Not only that, he also posed nude for PlayGirl Magazine. How is that not Chad? Gothic Metal is really just about sex at the end of the day. The vampire thing is an excuse to get laid. Can't say that I fault him. It's quite clever, actually.

Do you know this other band?